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Abstract 
This study argues that American foreign policy (AFP) represented continuity rather than 
change from the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the fall of Baghdad in 2003. 
During this time, the US pursued a hegemonic strategy that aimed to preserve its 
unipolar moment in the new American century. However, this argument is challenged 
by two sets of AFP literature. The first sees the 1990s as a period of inconsistency in 
AFP strategy, and the second identifies post-9/11 policy as a revolutionary change in 
AFP.  
This study‘s analysis goes below the surface of AFP‘s to its deep structure (hidden 
agendas). In contrast to the majority of AFP literature, it argues the 1990s were not a 
fragmented era but that AFP showed continuity rather than change, and the strategy of 
hegemony was already in operation. Likewise, putting aside the rhetoric of the Bush II 
administration, post-9/11 policy cannot be understood except in the context of AFP‘s 
hegemonic strategy of the post-Cold War (CW) era and 9/11 was no more than a 
terrorist attack carried out by a terrorist group. However, to serve US hegemonic agenda 
that was on hold from the early 1990s, the attack was deliberately exaggerated and 
portrayed as an existential threat to the US.    
The study does not deny the political fragmentation in the 1990s or ignore the effects of 
9/11 on AFP strategy. Therefore, to critique the two sets of literature, the research 
assesses the impact of domestic politics on the ability of US officials‘ to build on 
America‘s unipolar moment. In doing so, this study highlights several aspects of US 
domestic division that curtailed the ability of bureaucrats to handle FP issues. This also 
demonstrates that AFP‘s failure in the 1990s was not on the strategic planning level but 
in its domestic context. Congress emerged as a counterweight to the leadership of the 
president. Societal groups gained unprecedented influence over policy-making as a 
result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This status changed after 9/11 when a new 
external enemy appeared. The president regained his supreme role and Congress‘s role 
retreated. Under these circumstances, the study concludes that an unchanging AFP 
strategy gave the basis for the emergence of an explicit American hegemony.
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Introduction 
 
 
1 
 
[William Shakespeare says] nothing can come of nothing. 
(Bobbitt, 2008: 429) 
 
[Victor Hugo asserts] there is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come. 
(Kegley, 1993: 131) 
 
[There is no period in US history that] has offered more opportunities for shaping international politics 
for American ends than the years immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
(Henriksen, 2001) 
 
Introduction 
 
This introductory part is in several sections. The first section introduces the research 
statement and highlights areas of convergence and/or divergence with mainstream 
literature on American foreign policy (AFP). The next section pays attention to the 
rationale of the study and is followed by a section on its aim and objectives. The fourth 
section contextualises a number of terms and concepts related to the research problem. 
Then, the chapter describes the organisation of the study, and in the subsequent section, 
the main concern is to throw some light on the modest contributions that this research 
claims. The concluding section is the summary of this chapter.  
1. Statement Of The Research Problem 
From the end of WWII, when the US first emerged as a hegemonic power, it was only 
45 years to the end of the Cold War (EoCW).
1
 Despite an intensive body of literature 
about the disarray of AFP strategy in the post-Cold War (CW) era, this research rests on 
the belief that between 9 November 1989 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall) and early 
April 2003 (the fall of Baghdad) the US grand strategy represented continuity rather 
than change and this strategy has been characterised by clear hegemonic ambitions.  
                                                          
1
 Ian Clark argues that the roots of America‘s hegemony can be traced back to the early 20 th century or 
even before when the US ―emerged as a hegemon-in-waiting‖ (2009: 24). However, its recent history 
started after WWII when the capitalist states had united under a protectorate system commanded by the 
US from the late 1940s to the EoCW. During this period, the US emerged as a hegemon by invitation 
(Clark, 2009). In this context, prior to WWII end, the famous journalist, Henry Luce, the publisher of 
Time-Life magazine not only predicted the victory over Nazism, but also proclaimed that the American 
Century had dawned in 1941 (Hoff, 1994; Trubowitz, 1998; Dunne, 2000; Ingimundarson, 2000; 
Tuathail, 2006; Ryan, 2007; Halliday, 2009). Therefore, since 1945, ―if Americans have been serious 
about anything,‖ as Michael Cox argues, ―it has been about the uses of power on the not entirely 
unreasonable grounds that if international history taught anything it was that order was impossible 
without the deployment of a great deal of power by a single conscious hegemon‖ (2006: 114). 
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This argument contradicts with at least two broad sets of AFP literature. The first set 
sees the EoCW as a turning point which changed everything in international affairs and 
AFP alike (Nye, 1990a; Gaddis, 1992; Eagleburger, 1993; Dumbrell, 1997).
1
 The 
second group of literature distinguishes 9/11 as an unprecedented ―earthquake‖ or a 
―stark turning point‖ that changed everything in international relations (IR) and 
produced a new grave phase of American militarism and unilateralism (Gaines, 2002; 
Putnam, 2002; May, 2003b; Neack, 2003; Crocker, 2005; Gordon, 2005; Griffin, 2007; 
Bolton, 2008).  
In contrast to scholars who expected ―dramatic shifts in world politics after the Cold 
War, such as the disappearance of American hegemony‖ (Ikenberry, 1998/1999: 43), 
this study argues that much has not changed. AFP‘s agenda of hegemony and 
supremacy that was in operation during the CW did not decay at the eve of the EoCW, 
but the triumph over communism reenergised US propensity to be the world‘s sole 
hegemon (Cox et al., 2001). In the same way, this research also argues that the horrible 
attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 2001 were no more 
than a ―terrorist act‖ carried out by a non-state terrorist actor (Gaddis, 2005). This is not 
to deny its apparent significance upon AFP conduct, but, according to several scholars 
(for example, Ali, 2003; May, 2003a; Kennedy-Pipe & Rengger, 2006; Buzan, 2006), 
the terrorist attacks had made no profound change in world politics. According to 
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, the only thing that has changed is ―the 
belief that there has been a great change in the architecture of world politics‖ (2006: 
540). Therefore, from this research‘s perspective, it is impossible to understand the 
US‘s War on Terror (WoT) merely as a response to 9/11 attacks, as US official have 
repeatedly argued. Instead, it argues that 9/11 has been exaggerated as a pretext to 
legitimise a US new hegemonic project which was launched immediately the CW had 
                                                          
1 According to Cox, the collapse of the USSR and the EoCW were a ―remarkable conjunction of events‖ 
that had changed the whole geopolitical landscape (2002a: 265). In a similar way, Nye (1990a) & Gaddis 
(1992) describe these shifts as a ―bouleversement‖ in the ―tectonic plates‖ of world politics. Clark (2001: 
240) identifies them ―as one of history‘s great ‗punctuation points‘‖ while Michael Mandelbaum suggests 
that they were ―the greatest geopolitical windfall in the history of American foreign policy‖ (taken from 
Dumbrell, 1997: 129). The Secretary of State at the time, Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger (1993) describes 
these historical events by saying that ―it is abundantly clear that we are in the middle of a global 
revolution—a period of change and instability equalled in modern times only by the aftermaths of the 
French and Russian revolutions‖.  
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ended (Mearcher, 2003). What has been done in the post-9/11 era, in consequence, 
cannot be separated from the political improvements of the 1990s. In this context, the 
George H. W. Bush (Bush I) and the Bill Clinton administrations had prepared America 
to bear the burden of its unipolar moment and, without their efforts, the George W. 
Bush (Bush II) administration would not have been able to respond to 9/11 the way it 
had done. On the other hand, the political transformations after the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union (USSR) to the collapse of Baghdad can only be understood in terms of the 
context of AFP strategy that has continued since WWII (Layne, 2009a). This argument, 
therefore, is in line with Robert J. Art who argues that the US strategy of hegemony has 
been clear ―four times: at the outset of the Cold War; near the end of the Cold War; 
immediately after the end of the Cold war; and at the turn of the twenty-first century‖ 
(2003: 87).  
2. Rationale Of The Study 
This topic has been chosen because of its relevance to two important arguments. The 
first argument denies any hidden agenda behind the America‘s WoT. According to the 
proponents of this perspective (for example, Dennis Ross, 2006), post-9/11‘s 
controversial policy marked an ‗exceptional course‘ in the history of AFP and it was 
merely a response to the events themselves. The second argument is that 9/11 heralded 
America‘s decline. The symbolic importance of the attacks is greater than the reality. 
The proponents of this approach may be found in the circles of fundamental Islamists 
and marginal groups in the Middle-East such as the Leftists and, to a lesser degree, the 
extreme Arab nationalists.  
This study puts forward the contention that neither of these arguments is completely 
true. The post-9/11 course cannot be seen as a crucial turning point in the AFP 
trajectory, but it is in line with AFP strategy that was formulated in the mid-20th 
century. Moreover, 9/11 itself is not an unprecedented event in world history, and it has 
not changed everything in America and abroad. As said above, 9/11 was a terrorist 
attack deliberately exaggerated to serve AFP strategy in the early 2000s. One the other 
hand, it is no more than a hyperbole to say that a terrorist attack such as 9/11 will lead 
to America‘s collapse. In fact, the EoCW, not 9/11, the event that offered the US 
unprecedented opportunity to be the sole global hegemon, but, the US hegemony 
strategy was partly during the 1990s due to a political cleavage at home. In contrast to 
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those dreamers in the Middle-East, 9/11 reunited America and offered it not only an 
unprecedented moment to rejuvenate its hegemonic project, but also the morale 
justifications needed to carry such a project on. Accordingly, it is clear AFP‘s grand 
strategy in post-WWII did not represent any crucial turning but that it still shows the 
same agenda. 
3. Aim And Objectives 
The overall aim of this study is to demonstrate the continuation of US hegemonic 
strategy between two falls: from the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the 
fall of Baghdad in early April 2003. This argument means that the US response to the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 did not mark any new crucial turn in AFP strategy. The present 
study also has a set of other objectives which are given below.  
First, this research highlights the importance of America‘s unique combination of hard 
and soft sources of power as leverage to establish its post-CW hegemony. 
Second, it demonstrates the continuation of America‘s hegemonic strategy during the 
Bush I and Clinton administrations and emphasizes the importance of the 1990s as a 
cornerstone of the American unilateral hegemonic shift post-9/11.  
Third, the study seeks to make a clear causal-connection between domestic politics and 
foreign policy in order to enhance and/or weaken the grand strategy of hegemony. It 
therefore underlines the political barriers that partly hindered the US hegemony during 
the 1990s and shows how 9/11 remedied AFP‘s fragmented domestic context and 
reunited America around the flag. 
Finally, this study also explains how 9/11 advances and legitimates the US hegemonic 
agenda in international affairs and how the WoT has enlarged the US‘s geopolitical and 
hegemonic presence worldwide.    
4. Concepts Of Central Terms To The Study 
4.1. US Recent Historical Phase: Hegemony Or Empire? 
Joseph Nye argues that ―when power is distributed unevenly, political leaders and 
theorists use terms such as empire and hegemony‖ (1990c: 185). For AFP, this has been 
the case since WWII. In the mainstream literature of IR ―the theoretical debate over US 
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global power is dominated by conflicting arguments about the degree to which the 
United States is an imperial or a hegemonic state‖ (Fakiolas & Fakiolas, 2007: 53). In 
this context, Walter Lippmann wrote in 1926: ―our imperialism is more or less 
‗unconscious‘ and that the United States was an ‗empire in denial‘‖ (taken from 
Huisken, 2006). More obviously, since the end of WWII, the US has been described as 
an imperial power, but, as Niall Ferguson argues, ―the intellectual dilemma was 
rationalized by contending that the United States might be postured like an imperial 
power but that the threat from the Soviet Union, an entity that was even more 
unmistakably imperial in structure and intent, allowed no alternative‖ (taken from 
Huisken, 2006). In the same way, after the EoCW, when the USSR had collapsed and 
the US enjoyed an unprecedented unipolar moment, the description of the US as an 
empire has also become widespread in IR literature (Ikenberry, 2004b). However, post-
9/11, the discourse and practice of ―empire that were previously kept sotto voce have … 
come into the open, with a vengeance‖ (Boggs, 2005: 35). Since that time, more than at 
any other period in US history, ―no subject has been more studied or discussed in world 
politics than the sheer extent of American power as imperialism, empire, or hegemony‖ 
(Grondin, 2006: 1).  
Therefore, scholars have intended to compare America‘s massive power and influence 
to several historical empires. For example, Michael Boyle argues that ―America had set 
its sights on the imperial mantle left behind by the British‖ (2004: 82). Bush‘s post-9/11 
far-reaching program, as Robert Jervis argues, therefore ―calls for something very much 
like an empire‖ (2005: 79) because he ―regarded imperialism as a positive force for 
global democratization and for global capitalism‖ (Gardner, 2005: 21). Some scholars 
argue that America‘s unique position in world affairs today cannot be exactly 
recognised, unless ―one has to go back to the Roman Empire for a similar instance‖ 
(Wittkopf et al., 2003: 4). Cox describes America‘s post-9/11 position by saying: ―call it 
a hegemon; even a ‗hyper power‘; call it what you want, this was an empire in all but 
name‖ (2007: 648). In this meaning, 9/11 was exploited ―to provide the justification, the 
fear, and the funding for the so-called war on terror, which would be used as a pretext 
for enlarging the [US] empire‖ in the post Soviet era (Griffin, 2007: 15). However, in 
general, it does seem sensible to say that ―the use of the term empire has been a shortcut 
for any form of critique of US foreign policy at large since September 11, 2001, prior to 
the concept being discussed in a rigorous or serious way‖ (Grondin, 2006: 1).  
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On the other hand, according to John A. Agnew, hegemony, ―is a much better term for 
describing the historic relationship between the United States and the rest of the world 
than is the word empire‖. This ―is not an aesthetic choice‖, Agnew continues, but ―it is 
an analytic one‖ (2005: 31). In line with Agnew‘s argument, Adam Watson highlights 
what distinguishes a hegemonic relationship from an imperial one. Empire, according to 
his view is ―the direct administration of different communities from an imperial centre‖. 
However, hegemony is ―the ability of some power or authority in a system to ‗lay down 
the law‘ about external relations between states in the international system, while 
leaving them domestically independent‖ (taken from Beeson & Higgott, 2005: 1174). 
Therefore, despite the very diverse academic and historical baggage with which the 
term hegemony is weighted, most studies use it to merely signify a state of domination 
and pre-eminence over all others (Nye, 1990c; Du Boff, 2003; Kegley & Wittkopf, 
2004; Lentner, 2005; Grondin, 2006; Lentner, 2006; Nilsson, 2008). In more detail, 
Thomas McCormick argues that ―in the context of the world system, hegemony means 
that one nation possesses ... unrivalled supremacy ... predominant influence in economic 
power, military might, and political-ideological leadership that, no other power, or 
combination of powers, can prevail against it‖ (1995: 5). Or, as Daniel Garst explains, 
hegemony ―is defined in the first instance by the ability of a state to combine ... material 
sources with political strategies that make other states recognise and consent to its 
leadership‖ (1988: 13).  
Hegemony in international politics studies is also used with two separate meanings: 
leadership and dominance. While both represent similar characteristics of supremacy, 
some scholars make a clear distinction between the two. Hegemony depends 
fundamentally on coercive power, whereas non-coercive influence can bring only 
leadership but not hegemony (Lentner, 2006). Hegemonic power can also be used in 
several ways. ―(1) to create a transitional order, underpinned by rules and laws (the 
benign hegemon); (2) to ignore or misuse the international rules and laws; and (3) to use 
hegemony in order to gain structural power within the international system‖ (Farrell, 
2005: 131). Recent US history demonstrates the three usage of hegemonic power in its 
FP.    
On the basis of this discussion, it would be plausible to argue that since WWII, the US 
―could not, and did not, bully the governments [of the world‘s countries], but it could 
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and did apply pressure—sometimes considerable pressure ... in order to get them to 
accept its position, while simultaneously considering the leverage possessed by its 
allies‖ (Nilsson, 2008: 130). On the other hand, it is true that the US is widely 
constructed as an ―informal empire‖ after 9/11 because of its unilateralist and militant 
behaviour, but such a construction does not fit its status during the 1990s when it 
showed ―less an intrusive mode of control‖ (Grondin, 2006: 2). Therefore, ―identifying 
the US power position and role with an empire‘s imperialism is a useless and potentially 
dangerous anachronism, insofar as the Age of Empire is definitely over and an Age of 
American Hegemony has commenced‖ (Fakiolas & Fakiolas, 2007: 58). In this context, 
Michael Hunt puts it succinctly: ―if ever the term hegemony was appropriately applied, 
it is to what the United States became in the second half of the twentieth century and 
now remains‖ (2007: 314). Accordingly, the argument of TorbjØrn Knutsen that ―there 
is an essential difference between great power based on force and great power rooted on 
consent [and his conclusion that] only the later qualifies as hegemony‖ should be 
neglected (Wight, 2001: 83).  
This study adopts the idea that the US power is better served by the term hegemony 
because it ―has the capacity to encompass both the Gramscian concept of consensus and 
persuasion as well as the classical view that highlights the role of military power and 
coercion in the evaluation of US foreign policy‖ (Grondin, 2006: 1-2). However, it is 
also important to admit at the very outset that capturing US hegemony in a single 
―model which allows description [and] explanation‖ (Matzner, 2002: 1) might be 
unavailable as will be shown in the next chapter.  
4.2. A Re-Conceptualisation Of Terms: EOCW, Post-CW And Post-9/11  
It is also necessary to explain at the outset that the conviction that the AFP grand 
strategy has been in continuation since WWII contradicts well-known concepts of 
related terms. First, EoCW has been used to highlight the most significant turning point 
in post-World War II history, as has repeatedly been claimed in the mainstream IR 
literature (for example, Bush, 1990; Wallerstein, 1993; Sulfaro & Crislip, 1997; 
Crockatt, 2001; Hill, 2003; Lieber, 2005; Kegley, 2007). However, in terms of the US 
hegemonial project, EoCW was ―meaning-less‖ and the old global system did not really 
come to an end, but it was merely ―as if two horses were racing around a track, one 
broke its leg, and the other kept on running anyway‖ (Cumings, 1992: 89). ―If the Cold 
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War ended by 1990‖, Bruce Cumings continues to argue, ―the project of American 
hegemony did not‖ (1992: 97). According to Cumings (1992), it has been obvious in the 
1990s and afterward that the US kept containing both allies and enemies and promoting 
its hegemonic project globally. At the tactical level, the only thing changed by the 
EoCW was that ―America‘s temporary Cold War hegemony in Western Europe and 
East Asia should be converted into permanent US global hegemony‖ (Clark, 2009: 26). 
In other words, it is true the EoCW changed the world system, but that shift was and 
still remains in the interest of America‘s global ambition of dominion and hegemony. 
In the same way, both the terms post-CW and post-9/11 also have to be 
reconceptualised according to their relevance in relation to the continuance of US 
hegemony. As is well-known, the term post-CW has largely been used in AFP studies to 
denote the period between the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 (11/9) 
and the fall of the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 (9/11) (Ikenberry, 2001b; 
Lieber, 2002; Buzan, 2006; Owens & Dumbrell, 2006; Rezakhah, 2007). Post-9/11 has 
also been coined to signify the period that started with 9/11 to the present.  
This chronology divides the post-Soviet era into two distinguishable historical phases 
and reveals that America‘s response to 9/11 marked a fundamental turn in AFP strategy 
in the post-Soviet era. It also represents a challenge to this study‘s main argument. In 
order to avoid ambiguity and confusion, the study holds the premise that AFP in the 
post-Soviet era does not show any break with the trajectory of AFP strategy of 
hegemony since WWII. Therefore, according to this understanding, the use of these 
terms does not reveal any crucial shift at the level of grand strategy and strategic 
thinking. The only change they might reveal is transformation at the level of practical 
policy and tactics. With this modification, the EoCW does not mean that America‘s CW 
strategy changed while the controversial post-9/11 policy is merely a continuation of 
US hegemony with increased levels of militarism and unilateralism.  
5. The Organisation Of The Research 
This research is divided into six substantive chapters. Following this introductory part, 
chapter one discusses the conceptual, theoretical and methodological framework of the 
study. It depicts the general road map and the organizing principles of the work.  
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Chapter two highlights the US turn from just a superpower in a semi-balanced world 
system to a hyperpower in a unipole world system. It also discusses several elements 
that entitled the US to be the only world hegemon in the post-Soviet world such as 
material power capabilities (military and economic) and societal forces and ideology. It 
then turns to depict the world geopolitical map of the 1990s and how the second-tier 
powers failed to counterbalance the US.  
The third chapter contradicts AFP‘s mainstream literature that describes the 1990s as a 
fragmented and directionless period. It explains that both the 1990 administration‘s FP 
and Bush II‘s agenda in the pre-9/11 era represented continuity rather than change.  
Chapter four establishes links between US domestic politics and foreign policy. On the 
one hand, this chapter presents the view that if AFP witnessed a period of directionless 
and inconsistency during the 1990s it was not because of the US administration‘s short-
sight as has often been argued. But if the leadership abroad starts at home, the cleavage 
at home during this period hinderd the state from doing well in international politics. By 
reference to the domestic political process, this chapter interprets the US‘s poor 
performance in achieving its post-CW objectives of hegemony in the 1990s. On the 
other hand, if the absence of the USSR, the external enemy that glued the AFP elite and 
society for more than four decades, fragmented the AFP domestic context, then the 
emergence of al-Qaeda and Islamic terrorism as a new enemy remedied AFP‘s lack of a 
focal point and regenerated domestic unity. This shift helped the US administration to 
carry on its agenda of hegemony without domestic resistance and the US hegemony was 
refuelled again after a decade of domestic disagreement.   
Chapter five argues that 9/11 did not result in any crucial shift in AFP strategy and US 
hegemony bridges the pre-and the post-9/11 policy. Therefore, it positions the terrorist 
attacks and their aftermath in a wider theoretical and geopolitical context and claims 
that 9/11 has been exaggerated to serve another set of agenda and used as a pretext to 
enlarge US hegemony. The WoT was not exactly to defeat terror, but it has been 
consistent with US wars since the mid-1940s.  
Chapter six provides the final remarks and conclusions. 
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6. The Contribution Of The Research 
This study bridges the gap between several divergent sets of AFP literature. The first set 
is the conflict between those who argue that the 1990s was not a break in the US post-
WWII hegemonic strategy—the idea that is adopted in this study—and those who 
believe that AFP did not show any hegemonic characteristics; rather it suffered from 
unprecedented fragmentation and lack of direction in the 1990s. The second set is the 
recent controversy between critics who describe post-9/11 policy as a break in AFP 
strategy and their challengers who believe that 9/11 did not initiate any new trend; 
rather it just motivated and legitimated an extra dose of militarism and unilateralism. 
The logic behind putting such divergent sets of literature together is that when treating 
them jointly in a wider context, several preconceptions and false ideas are easily 
revealed. In fact, this research reconciles theses divergent streams of literature using a 
combination of foreign/domestic analytical techniques.  
As is constantly repeated in AFP literature, the EoCW brings simultaneously a 
challenge as well as an opportunity to AFP grand strategy (Allan, 1992; Wallerstein, 
1993; Khalilzad, 1995a, 1995b; Clark, 2001; Lieber, 2005; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008; 
Roberts, 2008). It was a challenge but not because of the appearance of any real danger 
or competitor to its unipolar moment as many critics suggested; rather that the victory 
―seems to have left America disoriented by its own success‖ (Chace, 1996: 116). It was 
also an opportunity; but this opportunity had been threatened by the internal 
disagreement over post-1989 FP strategy. The problem therefore was laid in the US 
domestic politics in which Americans failed to build a new political consensus at home 
that allowed policymakers to put their proposals to advance US grand strategy of 
hegemony into practice during the 1990s, but this also should not reveal that US 
hegemonic strategy was inoperative at the time. By evaluating policies and agenda from 
the 1990s, such as Bush‘s strategy of the New World Order (NOW) and Clinton‘s 
engagement and enlargement strategy (En-En), this study finds that the US hegemony is 
still the supreme perspective that drove AFP at the time. However, as opposed to the 
political atmosphere of the CW, when US policymakers pursued such an agenda backed 
by a broad domestic unity, the political cleavage of the 1990s forced policymakers who 
were aware of the importance of the moment to pursue such an agenda under very 
difficult domestic conditions. In line with this understanding, not only did AFP strategy 
of hegemony continue during the 1990s, but also post-9/11 cannot be seen as a new turn 
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in AFP trajectory. The reason is that while the EoCW fragmented the domestic 
consensus of AFP, the attacks of 11 September rebuilt it. Moreover, as US hegemonic 
strategy did not garner domestic unity in the 1990s, the unity around the flag supported 
the post-9/11 hegemonic policies and put the proposals of the 1990s in practice 
(McDonough, 2009). 
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There is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. 
(Walt, 1998: 29) 
 
A (simple) theory can account for a (complex) phenomenon. 
(Allan, 1992: 235) 
 
Chapter One 
Conceptual, Theoretical And Methodological Framework 
1.1. Introduction 
According to Costas Melakopides, the study of foreign policy is ―best conducted by 
adopting organising devices known as models, frameworks, or perspectives‖ because 
―they provide the methods, concepts, assumptions, and hypotheses by which we analyse 
and evaluate the relevant material‖ (1998: 23). Accordingly, this chapter‘s main concern 
is to build a suitable framework which will enable conceptualising, theorising and 
evaluating the research problem. The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first 
section conceptualises the continuation of the US grand strategy of hegemony since the 
end of WWII to the present. The second section focuses on theorising US hegemony 
and unipolarity from the end of the Cold War (EoCW). The last part highlights the 
methodological basis of this research.   
1.2. From Berlin To Baghdad: Continuity In US Grand Strategy 
First of all, according to Christopher Layne, a grand strategy ―is the process by which a 
state matches ends and means in the pursuit of security [and interests]‖ (1998: 8). 
Therefore, it can be understood as a plan ―integrates military, political, and economic 
means to pursue states‘ ultimate objectives in the international relations‖ (Biddle, 2005: 
v).  
For the US, it could be argued that, since the Truman administration adapted George 
Kennan‘s famous article titled ‗Mr. X‘ in its National Security Council Report 68 
(NSC-68) in the early 1950s, the US grand strategy has been defined by anti-
communism and fears about the Communist threat which have set the American 
Foreign Policy (AFP) agenda (Tucker, 1990; Petersen, 1993; Brinkley, 1997; McGrew, 
1998; Lieber, 2005; Lind, 2006; McKeever & Davis, 2006; Saull, 2008). However, 
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what is not in doubt is that the Cold War (CW) containment strategy was not only used 
to minimize the USSR‘s influence internationally, but also to increase US global power. 
According to Layne (1998: 9):  
This was made clear in 1950, in the important National Security Council paper, 
NSC-68, which laid the intellectual groundwork for a policy of ―militarized‖ 
and ―globalized‖ containment. NSC-68 stated that: (1) the purpose of American 
power was to foster a world environment in which the American system can 
survive and flourish and (2) the strategy of preponderance was a policy which 
the United States would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet Union. 
This statement contains several commitments: (1) the prevention of the appearance of 
any competitor or rival within its spheres of influence, such as Germany or Japan; (2) 
the management of its closest alliances, such as the one with Great Britain; (3) the 
maximization of American power and control over the rest of the world; and (4) the 
utilization of German and Japanese industrial and economic powers as an influential 
part of the anti-Soviet strategy (Cumings, 1992; Steel, 1992; Wells, 1992; Layne, 1997; 
Curtis, 1998; Layne, 2001). Accordingly, critics such as McCormick argue that the CW 
was ―merely a subplot, part of a larger story that some historians call America‘s 
hegemonic project‖ (1995: xiii), and since the early 1950s, the US government covertly 
adopted a strategy of ―rollback‖ that entirely contradicted the publicly stated policy of 
containment (Art, 2003). In Robert Jervis‘ words, after the victory over Nazism in 
WWII ―no point on the globe was untouched by American military, political, and 
economic policy‖ and no country came ―close to rivalling America‘s worldwide 
influence‖ (1999: 220).  
However, since 1989, mainstream literature on AFP has described the 1990s as a period 
of strategic confusion and foreign policy disorientation. Not only was the EoCW an 
opportunity but it was also the first time since the late 1940s that the ―familiar strategic 
guideposts‖ (Kober, 1990; Mandelbaum, 1990/1991) or the ―magnetic north pole‖ of 
AFP (Cox, 1995; Hastedt, 2000) and its ―dominant impulse‖ (Williams, et al., 1993: 1) 
had gone. As a result, not only AFP‘s ―driving sense of purposes‖ but also its 
―overarching rationale‖ and its ―judgements and assumptions‖ were removed (Ornstein, 
1992; McCormick, 1995; Cronin, 1996; Dittgen, 1996; McCormick, 1998; McGrew, 
1998; Hurst, 1999; MacLean, 2006). In the words of Phil Williams et al., AFP‘s ―roles 
and rationales long taken for granted have been called into question‖ (1993: 1). Owing 
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to this, America remained ―a superpower adrift‖ (Allison & Blackwill, 2000: 1) and 
AFP was ―directionless‖ (Perritt, 1998/1999: 95). It also seems to be one of the ―last-
minute efforts‖, and characterised by a ―capricious flow of events‖, not by a strategic 
guideline (Schlesinger, 1993; Maynes, 1996).  
This argument portrays the 1990s as a break in the American post-WWII strategy, and 
the US‘ post-9/11 policy can also be considered a new era in AFP strategy. However, 
this thesis argues that AFP did not lose its bearings or suffer from any conceptual failure 
during the 1990s, as many critics have suggested (e.g., Allison, 1996; Allison & 
Blackwill, 2000; Clough, 2004). As Cox recognizes the post-CW political confusion 
covered a ―new sort of policy and thinking … beneath the surface of everyday political 
reality one can detect a reasonably clear set of goals which have been pursued since 
1989‖. Cox asserts that such a set of goals was ―to ensure that the United States 
remained the dominant actor in the international system‖ (1995: 1). In the same way, 
John Ikenberry also argues that, even if most critics of AFP did not completely 
recognize its nature and achievements in the post-CW era, the US‘ liberal dominance 
strategy of the CW had actually survived the EoCW. The author then states that despite 
―all the talk about drift and confusion in contemporary American foreign policy, the 
United States is seized by a robust and distinctive grand strategy‖ (2000: 104). Because 
of this, Derek Chollet asked scholars to pay greater attention to the 1990s period in 
order ―to draw lessons for the road ahead‖ because he believed that ―the roots of all of 
the problems America confronts today … stretch back to the period that began with the 
end of the Cold War in 1989‖ (2007: 5).  
In the same way, Michael Mastanduno challenged those critics who ―see US security 
policy after the Cold War as incoherent or directionless‖, arguing that ―US officials 
have in fact followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective – the 
preservation of the United States‘ pre-eminent global position‖ (1997: 51). 
Consequently, following Layne (1998) and Clark (2001), it can be argued that no 
factual shift has been observed in US grand strategy since 1945. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 merely ―removed the one impediment to the 
realization of America‘s hegemonic ambition‖ (Layne, 2001: 59), and ―left the US the 
unchallenged head of a coherent global system‖ (Hunt, 2007: 314). As Ian Clark argues, 
―the landscape in 1999 may look very different to 1989, but there are still some very 
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familiar landmarks‖ (2001: 241). Furthermore, ―in terms of ambitions, interests, and 
alliances‖, Layne argues that ―the United States today is following the same grand 
strategy that it pursued from 1945 until 1991, the strategy of preponderance‖ (1998: 8). 
Accordingly, the US strategy of primacy and hegemony has ―spanned the Bush and 
Clinton administrations, notwithstanding differences in their foreign policy rhetoric‖ 
(Mastanduno, 1997: 51-52).  
The Bush I presidency seems to be, at least to some commentators, a short transitional 
period during which it cannot be demonstrated whether or not there was continuation of 
the American hegemonic strategy. However, it is obvious that immediately after the 
EoCW, the Bush administration reaffirmed the CW reality. At that time, according to 
Layne, ―the overriding goal of US strategy was to perpetuate America‘s ‗unipolar 
moment‘ by preventing the rise of both new great powers – ‗peer competitors‘ – and 
potentially hostile regional powers‖ (2009a: 6). Preserving the unipolar moment as an 
urgent objective of AFP after the collapse of the bipolar system quickly became 
established in America‘s hidden agenda and was first laid out clearly in the Pentagon‘s 
strategy of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in 1992 (Mastanduno, 2000; Art, 
2003).
1
 The New World Order (NWO) that was designed in the lead-up to the war 
against Iraq in 1990-91 was also part of the hegemonic project and continued the same 
agenda of the CW.  
Challenging those who have argued that AFP was directionless and disoriented during 
the Clinton presidency and those who understood Clinton‘s geo-economic strategy as a 
shift from the US traditional geo-politics, Colin Dueck states that ―one of the most 
striking features of America‘s national security policy under Clinton was its essential 
continuity with Cold War assumptions‖ (2006: 114). According to Dueck, such a 
continuation was very clear during his eight years in office (2006: 114): 
Some 200.000 troops remained deployed by the United States in Western 
Europe and North East Asia, the United States spent much more on its armed 
forces than any possible combination of hostile powers … If anything the pace 
of US military intervention overseas actually increased under Clinton. And all 
                                                          
1
 The DPG was a secret report/strategy written by key officials of the Bush administration supervised by 
Paul Wolfowtiz, the third highest-ranking civilian in the Department of Defense (DOD) at the time and 
Lewis Scooter Libby. However, it was leaked to the New York Times early in 1992 (Layne, 1993-1997; 
Cameron, 2002; Gowan, 2002; Clark, 2005; Cohen, 2005; Huisken, 2006; Lind, 2006; Bacevich, 2007). 
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those strategic commitments were justified, just as they were during the Cold 
War, by two central claims: first, that the United States is and ought to be the 
preeminent world power, with significant interests and obligations in every 
corner in the globe; and second, that the United States has a special 
responsibility to promote and uphold a liberal international order characterised 
by free markets and democratic government. 
On the other hand, Manstanduno argues that (1997: 52): 
US foreign economic policy has worked at cross-purposes with US national 
security strategy. In relations with other major powers, the United States, in 
effect has been trying simultaneously to play ―economic hardball‖ and ―security 
softball‖. US officials have been forced to manage the resulting contradiction in 
order to prevent the friction generated by its foreign economic policy from 
spilling over and frustrating the attainment of its primacy national security 
objective.   
Therefore, the US hegemony was a comprehensive strategy in the last decade. 
Militarily, the 1990s was an odd decade. Unilateral military strikes, such as those 
carried out against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, or the air war against Serbia under 
NATO without a clear United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate, were 
regarded as clear symptoms of the US hegemony (Farrell, 2000; Cameron, 2002; Hall, 
2002; Walt, 2002; Art, 2003; Stengel, 2006). However, the enlargement and 
engagement (En-En) strategy is also regarded as an attempt to reconstruct world affairs 
in the post-bipolar world and establish absolute US hegemony after the CW. 
Globalisation and a free market strategy revitalised the US economy and enlarged its 
global dominance. In consequence, it readied America to play the role as global leader 
from the 1990s onwards. This perspective led Agnew to conclude that ―globalisation is 
a hegemonic project intimately connected to the geo-political calculus of the US 
government and economic interests‖ (2005: 2).  
Thus, the US hegemonic project that was launched in the immediate aftermath of WWII 
has been more obvious since the CW‘s end. Scholars summarise some of its 
characterisations in the post-1989-1992 period by saying that the US is a country 
spending far more on its military than it did at the height of the CW without a military 
challenger in sight (Murden, 2002; Beets, 2005). It is also a superpower that fights wars 
of choice rather than wars of necessity (Schlesinger, 2003; Leffler, 2004). 
In line with the discussion, it can be argued that the US‘ post-9/11 policy did not mark 
any new shift in AFP strategy, but that ―in 2001-2002, a fourth appearance of dominion-
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like behaviour became manifest under George W. Bush‖ (Art, 2003: 89). This phase of 
hegemonic strategy including the War-on-Terror (WoT) and the controversial invasion 
of Iraq ―must be understood in the context of the grand strategy consistently pursued by 
the US since at least the beginning of the 20th century‖ (Callinicos, 2005: 593). As 
David Grondin argues, this is because ―anyone interested in understanding the 
principles of neo-liberal hegemony in US national security conduct since WWII cannot 
see the Bush foreign policy as a historical anomaly‖ (2006: 13). In this context, Layne 
argues that the George W. Bush era ―is not a grand strategy outlier. Rather than 
breaking with the essentials of America‘s post-1945 grand strategy, there is a strong 
chain of continuity linking the administration‘s policies and those of its predecessors‖ 
(2009a: 6). Layne continues that ―Iraq may not have been an inevitable consequence of 
the grand strategy America has pursued since World War II‘s end, but the assumptions 
underlying that strategy predisposed the US to go to war in March 2003‖ (2009a: 6). 
Cox also argues that, without the collapse of the USSR, ―it is most unlikely that 
Washington could have acted in the way it did [after 9/11] … or have enjoyed the 
success it did‖ (2002a: 264-265). Furthermore, he also concludes that without crucial 
changes in the American global position during the 1990s, the Bush II administration‘s 
success following 9/11 would not have been possible. Accordingly, it is very difficult to 
compare 9/11 to the EoCW in terms of setting the stage for the emergence of American 
unilateral hegemonic strategy in the new era. In this milieu, Goh (2002), Saravanamuttu 
(2006), Chollet (2007, 2008) & Chollet & Goldgeier (2008) argue that 9 November 
1989, or (11/9) the date of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, not that of the attacks of 11 
September, was the most significant event to influence world politics and therefore 
AFP.  
True, the hegemonic appearance of the post-9/11 era is ―marked by tough rhetoric 
toward adversaries, a huge increase in American defence spending ... an unvarnished 
pursuit of American self-interest, a penchant for unilateralism ... [and] a reaffirmation of 
the 1992 DPG‖ (Art, 2003: 89). However, these characterisations marked a new change 
in tactics but not in US hegemony strategy. The Bush administration‘s ―breaking from 
Washington‘s reliance since the Second World War on coalition building, is seeking to 
use one of the main comparative advantages of the US—its military supremacy—to 
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perpetuate a favourable global balance of forces‖ (Callinicos, 2005: 593). In this sense, 
Alex Callinicos argues that (2005: 593): 
The seizure of Iraq seemed to favour this strategy, particularly since it would 
enhance US capacity to deny access to Middle Eastern oil to actual or potential 
rivals such as the European Union and China. But popular resistance to the 
occupation of Iraq is now testing this policy, perhaps to destruction. 
Thus, 9/11 did not change the US grand strategy, as has been claimed by US officials 
such as Dennis Ross (2006), but has been in line with the post-1945 US grand strategy. 
The former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt, in an article published in Die Zeit, 
argues that ―September 11 is actually a sign of continuity rather than a dramatic 
caesura‖ in world politics and ―American foreign policy did not change suddenly in the 
year after September 11, 2001, but instead had been moving in an increasingly 
imperialist direction for the past two decades (cited in Steinmetz, 2003: 323). Therefore, 
according to Layne, ―Iraq, after all, is only one part of a larger picture for the US [grand 
strategy in the post-Soviet world]‖ (2009a: 6).  
On the basis of what already has been said, it is difficult to agree with those who have 
seen the 1990s as ―America‘s decade-long holiday from history‖ (Hozic, 2006: 55). But 
it was a busy decade, in which both Bush I and Clinton worked energetically to expand 
American hegemony to include the entire globe. AFP during the 1990s continued the 
same agenda of hegemony and supremacy. At the time, there were no remaining 
external (systematic) obstacles that could hinder the US‘ transition towards the position 
of being an absolute global hegemon. This is not to say that their performance was 
perfectly real because the ―strong interparty and intraparty conflicts undermined further 
the hegemonic reach of United States policy makers‖ (Volgy & Imwall, 1995: 823-
824). It is true that the absolute leadership by the US in the new world cannot be 
guaranteed ―unless US policy has the consistency and domestic support to prevail‖ 
(Haig, 1991). However, it might be also true that ―the absence of [clear] evidence is not 
the evidence of absence‖ (d‘Abadie, 2005).  
Arguably, none of the 1990s administrations succeeded in offering an answer to the 
question initiated by the EoCW: ―What does a superpower do in a world no longer 
dominated by a superpower conflict?‖ (Ornstiein, 1992: 1). However, ―leaders from 
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton to George W. Bush have emphasized toughness, 
Chapter One: Conceptual, Theoretical And Methodological Framework 
 
19 
 
overwhelming American power, and aggressive defense against emerging challengers‖ 
(Suri, 2010: 4). What was not in doubt was that these administrations worked to prepare 
America to enter the new millennium as the only hegemon. The effects of such efforts 
have become clear in the post-9/11 period.  
1.3. US Hegemony And International Relations Theory: Debates And Approaches 
1.3.1. The Concept Of Power  
Since power is a very important element in pursuing the strategy of predominance and 
hegemony, it is necessary to determine the concept and highlight its relevance to the 
concept of the term ‗hegemony‘. The definition of the concept of power is contested. 
Nye captured this when he argued that ―power, like love, is easier to experience than to 
define or measure‖ (1990c: 177).  
Hans Morgenthau, the classical realist, based his concept of power on the 
characterisation of human nature in which ―people, individually and collectively are 
power-seeking, selfish, and violence-prone‖ (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72). On this basis 
classical realists argue that ―the problem in international politics is that anarchy gives 
these tendencies free rein‖ (Morgan, 1994: 248). Power, therefore, ―is an end in itself‖ 
(Mearsheimer, 2007: 72).  
Neo-realists, however, suggest that what leads states to pursue power is the nature of the 
system (the international structure), not human nature. Thus, neo-realists assume that 
power is the currency and the central concept of international politics (Duvall & 
Barnett, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2007). Neo-realists assume that the overall capabilities of 
states, military, economic and technological, define its political power in world politics 
(Walt, 1998). Thus, in contrast to the view of classical realists, power, for neo-realists, 
―is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival‖ (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72).  
The importance of material power to protect the survival of a state is not merely a neo-
realist belief; neo-liberal institutionalism also shares such a presumption. Both trends 
―assume that material power, whether military or economic or both, is the single most 
important source of influence and authority in global politics‖ (Hopf, 2000: 1760).  
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Hegemonic theory encompasses both neo-realist and neo-liberalist perspectives. 
Although its fundamental concern is with economic hegemony, it also emphasises the 
importance of military power in world politics. Hegemony stability theorists (HSTs) 
call on a government to over-invest in military affairs in order to be able to enhance the 
country‘s predominance and leadership in world affairs (Ikenberry et al., 1988; 
Grunberg, 1990; McCormick, 1995; Kohout, 2003; Layne, 2006). However, according 
to Nye ―theorists of hegemonic stability generally fail to spell out the causal 
connections between military and economic power and hegemony‖ (1990c: 188).  
Constructivists, in contrast to the neo-realist and neo-liberalist concepts of power, argue 
that ―both material and discursive power are necessary for any understanding of world 
affairs‖ (Hopf, 2000: 1760). In this way, Garst argues that ―power is actualized not by 
the presence of material resources‖, but that soft power is also included. Therefore, 
hegemony, according to constructivists, rests ―on the acquisition of leadership, in 
particular on the ability to persuade and carry out singular accomplishment ... hegemony 
presupposes some form of activity in the form of both persuasion and deeds‖ (1988: 
13). By expanding the concept of power beyond the neo-realist boundaries, in and 
through social relations, the term acquires new dimensions. Power becomes the 
production ―of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate‖. This alteration adds persuasions that falls outside neorealists‘ 
concept of power (Duvall & Barnett, 2005).  
Building on the above discussion, this research will not depend merely on the neo-
realist‘s understanding of material power (military, economic, and political) as a main 
source of US hegemony in world politics, but also will expand this conception to 
encompass dimensions of ‗soft power‘, such as culture, ideology and ideals (Hoffmann, 
1989). In this context, the neorealists‘ and hegemonists‘ argument that full hegemony 
rests on ―productive, commercial, and financial as well as political and military power‖ 
(Nye, 1990c: 186) is not sufficient, as it rests only on material aspects. Walter Russell 
Mead‘s (2004) list of American powers is more comprehensive when he divides 
American power into three categories: sharp or traditional military power; economic or 
sticky power; and sweet power (culture, ideas and ideals). These three powers 
―contribute to hegemonic power‖ (Kaufman, 2006: 146). Josef Joffe has also added 
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diplomatic prestige to Mead‘s list as an additional source of power (Schuller & Grant, 
2003: 42).  
1.3.2. Balance Of Power 
 The term ‗balance of power‘ is ―sometimes used not as a prediction of policy, but as a 
description of how power is distributed. In the latter case, it is more accurate to refer to 
the distribution of power‖ (Nye, 1990c: 185). In this section the main concern is to 
highlight some aspects of the relationship between hegemony and balance of power. For 
Kenneth Waltz, who developed the balance of power theory during the 1970s as a 
perspective for understanding world politics, the distribution of material power in the 
system is the main variable analytical tool in international relations (IR) theory. The 
distribution of gross capabilities in an anarchic system defines and motivates the 
behaviour of states (Waltz, 1979; Garst, 1988; Mastanduno, 1997).  
In his theory of balance of power, Waltz argues that the balancing of the power 
mechanic is natural in world politics, in which the ―weak have a common interest in 
balancing against the strong‖ (Pape, 2005: 19). He argues that states‘ struggle to acquire 
relative power at the expense of others may lead to ―the formulation of balance of 
power out of the coordinated actions taken by states‖ (Morgan, 1994: 252). According 
to John Mearsheimer ―the balance of power, is a function of the tangible military assets 
that states possess … [in addition to] latent power which refers to the socio-economic 
ingredients that go into building military power‖ (2007: 73).   
Balance of power is not only a concern to realists but also ―liberals view it as part of a 
larger picture of international politics‖ (Owen, 1994: 124). In contrast to realists, 
liberalists believe that amongst democratic powers, because of their common political 
and economic infrastructures, the possibility of cooperation is higher than that of 
conflict. Therefore, liberal states do not balance each other, but they ally to balance non-
liberals (Lundestad, 1993; Väyrynen, 1993; Owen, 1994; Doyle, 1997; Ikenberry, 2000; 
Reus-Smit, 2004; Judis, 2004). Accordingly, national security can also be achieved 
―through the exploitation of economic means and strength, rather than by war and 
aggression, or other coercive means‖ (Farrell, 2005: 129-130). Therefore, ―the key 
question is how power politics can be mediated through cooperation within the 
framework of international institutions‖ (Farrell, 2005: 131). To perfect international 
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cooperation and to manage anarchy in the international system, liberalists claim that 
international institutions can help. ―A high level of institutionalisation significantly reduces 
the instability of the system‖ (Farrell, 2005: 130). 
However, in contrast to the above discussion, the strategy of hegemony and ―preponderance 
rests on the assumption that states gain security not through a balance of power, but by creating 
a power imbalance in their favour (that is, by seeking hegemony)‖ (Layne, 1998: 10). 
Hegemony, as said in the last chapter, is ―understood as a unipolar configuration of politico-
military capability with a structure of influence that matches capability‖ (Wilkinson, 1999: 
143). Accordingly, hegemony and balance of power are not coexisted. This matter will be 
discussed in the next section. 
1.3.3. Balance Of Power Or Hegemony: The US In A Bipolar System 
On the basis of the above discussion, a key challenge for this research is how to 
accommodate the argument adopted in this study (the continuation of US hegemony 
since the mid-1940s) with the characterisation of the CW period as an era in which 
balance of power predominated. Is it possible to establish a hegemonic status in a world 
that was divided between two contested poles? In contrast to the neorealist assumption 
that the CW was a period of balance of power between the US and its rival, this section 
aims to explain that the CW system was imbalanced in terms of power distribution and 
the US was a hegemon power even with the existence of the USSR. If it is so, the 
EoCW did not originate US hegemony; rather, it merely fuelled this strategy to an 
unprecedented extent. 
In fact, the main problem with the argument that the US has been a hegemon since the 
mid-1940s is ―the status of the socialist world that opted out of the US sphere‖ (Clark, 
2009: 39). Therefore, with the existence of the USSR as a challenger in a bipolar system 
―was the United States hegemon of half the world only?‖ (Clark, 2009: 34). In response, 
Christopher Layne & Benjamin Schwarz argue that ―although the Soviet Union was the 
immediate focus of US security strategy, it was really quite incidental to America‘s 
liberal internationalist policy‖ (1993: 5). The USSR, according to Layne, ―was a much 
less central factor in shaping US policy than is commonly supposed‖ (1998: 9). In this 
context, there is a dispute between hegemonists and neo-realists. Robert Gilpin‘s 
labelling of the post-1945 period as a hegemonic one contradicts most neo-realists‘ 
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view of this period as a bipolar one (Bennett & Stam, 2004). From Waltz‘s viewpoint, 
the USSR and the US ―may have been adversaries but, as the two dominant powers, 
shared a mutual interest in system stability, an interest that prompted them to cooperate 
in providing public goods such as nuclear non-proliferation‖ (Wholforth, 2009: 14). But 
in terms of power, hegemonists repeatedly argue that, even with the existence of the 
USSR as a peer, the US enjoyed absolute predominance over its sphere of influence and 
over most of the world. The USSR was merely a military competitor and its power was 
not sufficient to counter the US comprehensive hegemonic status during the CW 
(Brown, 2001; Beets, 2002; Ralph, 2006).  
In this context, it is of great value to highlight the differences between the two terms, 
hegemony and bipolarity. Hegemony, according to Thomas J. Volgy and Lawrence E. 
Imwalle ―requires that one central actor holds a unique combination of military and 
economic [and soft power] capabilities … and is willing to lead in fashioning a world 
order‖ whereas a bipolar and (non-hegemonic) system is a ―substantial control of 
military capabilities between two central actors in system‖ (1995: 824). These actors, 
according to neorealist perspective were individual states, not alliances among them 
(Gowa, 1989). Building on such a distinction, and in contrast to the labelling of the CW 
as a bipolar system, Colin Wight argues that the two countries ―were never equal actors 
since the USA was always strong in terms of normative power, whereas the USSR was 
weak‖ (2001: 83). In this vein, Mastanduno also argues that ―the United States faced the 
Soviet Union as a peer competitor in international security but was peerless in the world 
economy‖ (2008: 123-124). 1  In addition, US efforts were backed by an attractive 
                                                          
1
 The US was unrivalled and a real hegemon, not only militarily but also economically on the eve of 
WWII (Stallings, 1995; Ralph, 2006). After WWII, the US economy made a significant transformation 
from ―extensive industrialisation to intensive technological revolution‖. This shift yielded a significant 
increase in the US accumulation of output, which outperformed that of France and Britain at the height of 
the colonial era (Abu-Rabi, 2003: xix). The US economy remedied the effects of the Great Depression 
when it grew by 70% after WWII.
 A few years later, in 1950, 50% of the world‘s gross production was 
supplied by the US, in addition to 60% of the world‘s industrialized production (Ikenberry, 2001b; Du 
Boff, 2003). During the CW ―the US economy dwarfed that of any other state or combination of states, 
with 40-50% of world GDP and four to five times the Soviet GDP. There was also a substantial 
technological advantage across many fields; the key role of dollar, the US capital markets as the only 
source of aid and loans for the world economy‖ (Lsrison, 1998: 70). US companies also ―dominated 
Europe as well as the Third World; US aid bought influence in many parts of the world; and US exports, 
backed by sophisticated technology could outperform those of any rivals‖ (Stallings, 1995: 6). The US, in 
consequence, was the stronger not only compared to its global rival, but also within its anti-Soviet 
alliance (Stallings, 1995; Kaufman, 2006; Lind, 2007). In this context, it should be noted that the US 
Chapter One: Conceptual, Theoretical And Methodological Framework 
 
24 
 
ideology that promotes values of liberty, democracy and human rights, whereas its 
rival‘s ideology was totalitarianism (Nye, 1990c). Furthermore, even militarily, the US 
was dominant.
1
 In this context, Gareth Porter for instance, argued that ―it was not the 
Cold War ideology or exaggerated notions of the threat from communism in Southeast 
Asia that paved the US road to war in Vietnam, but the decisive military dominance of 
the United States over the Soviet Union‖ (2005: 259). In this vein, Waltz‘s writing in 
the late 1970s, ―questioned the Soviet Union‘s ability to keep up with the United States‖ 
(Wholforth, 1999: 10). Accordingly, Knutsen concludes that ―because of its lead in 
normative power, the United States has functioned effectively as a hegemon since 
1945‖ (taken from Wight, 2001: 83). 
Building on the argument based on hegemonic order theory that the hegemon is a public 
good provider to others (Moe, 2004), it could be argued that the US, because of its 
supremacy during the CW, was actually a world hegemon, with the USSR a second-tier 
power. The CW system was not merely a bipolar, but a hegemonic system centred on 
the US (Lind, 2007). In this context, William Wohlforth et al. argue that the CW 
―international system was never ‗perfectly‘ bipolar. Analysts used to speak of loose 
versus tight bipolarity and debated whether the Soviet Union had the full complement of 
capabilities to measure up as a pole‖ (2009: 25).  
In an attempt at compromise, hegemonists brought the two codes of the CW system 
together, arguing that ―bipolarity can occur simultaneously with hegemony when a 
militarily strong contender arises to challenge the hegemon‘s leadership‖ (Volgy & 
Imwalle, 1995: 823). In the same way, the liberalist scholar Joseph Nye (1990c: 185) 
argues that ―the balancing of power does not always prevent the emergence of dominant 
states‖.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
provided security to Germany and Japan—the second and third largest economies—during the CW 
(Stallings, 1995; Ikenberry, 2004b).   
1
 America, for example, spent approximately US$4.000 billion on defence during the CW (Ambrose & 
Brinkley, 1993). However, Lafeber (1993) argues that the value was actually US$8 trillion, while 
Accornio (2000) calculates it at US$13.1 trillion. Accordingly, it possessed the most advanced military in 
the world, in addition to the strongest economy and highest level of prosperity (Ambrose & Brinkley, 
1993; Henriksen, 2001; Huntington, 2004). 
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1.3.3.1. The US Hegemony In The CW: The Cooperative Model  
In line with the argument, the existence of the USSR as a military competitor to the US 
did not decay its hegemonic status, but this is not to mean that the US hegemony was 
absolute during the CW. Hegemony has taken different shapes since WWII. 
Cooperative hegemony was to a large extent the dominant model during the CW and 
early post-CW period. According to Mary Farrell, cooperative hegemony ―fills in the 
gaps left by traditional theories of liberalism and realism‖ In contrast to the realist‘s 
aggressive assertion of the US global role, a cooperative hegemony emphasizes ―the 
role of ideas, the importance of state actors, and the necessity of institutions for 
cooperation actions‖ to achieve a hegemonic position in international affairs. It is true 
that liberalists, and particularly international liberalists, favour ―the promotion of an 
‗Americanized‘ world order, characterised by the spread of democratic government and 
open market‖ (2005: 128). Therefore, in contrast to the neorealist approach, liberalists 
―believe that a strong set of multi-lateral institutions – more than America‘s military 
predominance – is really the key to creating and sustaining a more friendly and 
democratic world order‖ (Dueck, 2006: 121). This strategy has been summarised by 
Mastanduno as follows (2008: 122):  
The United States has maintained the relative openness of its large domestic 
market to absorb the products of its export-dependent supporters. It has 
provided security benefits to those supporters. In exchange, they have absorbed 
and held US dollars, allowing US central decision makers the luxury of 
maintaining their preferred mix of foreign and domestic policies without having 
to confront—as ordinary nations must—the standard and politically difficult 
trade-offs involving guns, butter, and growth. 
This cooperative order helped the US to bear the burden of the geo-political competition 
in the CW. It also legitimated its hegemony at home, over allies and elsewhere abroad. 
The US was a hegemon, but it was a hegemon by an invitation (Litwak, 2002; Clark, 
2009).  
Accordingly, the US, not only succeeded in the projection of its own material sources of 
power into a lasting hegemonic order, but it also facilitated its supremacy and 
leadership. America used several organisations and instruments to enhance its unique 
position in the international system. These included (Huisken, 2006): 
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The United Nations, the far-sighted largess of the Marshall Plan, the early and 
not particularly popular resolve to make Germany and Japan key stakeholders in 
the new international system, and the willingness, under NATO, to assume very 
demanding security obligations to Western Europe.  
These were not only important to consolidate US hegemony, but ―gave rise to no 
anxieties about disproportionate power‖ (Huisken, 2006). 
Therefore, because of the legitimacy of this model on the one hand and the existence of 
the USSR as an enemy on the other, second-tier and major powers did not seek 
balancing against the US, but rather to join with it. As a result, its role in Europe and 
Asia was not seen as a hegemonic or imperialist one, although this was the case. This 
consensual acceptance of its role allowed it ―containing other centres of global powers 
within the overall framework of order managed by [its leadership]‖ (Chomsky, 2003: 
16). Without this consensus, the establishment of US hegemony in Europe and Asia 
would have been impossible. This is actually ―what distinguishes a hegemonic 
relationship from an imperial one, empire and hegemony being very different things. A 
hegemonic power is thus dependent on its allies at the same time as it dominates/leads 
them‖ (Nilsson, 2008: 129/130). However, the Soviets failed to establish such a model 
of cooperation within their sphere of influence and ―only the coercive presence of the 
Red Army held together the Soviet bloc‖ (Litwak, 2002: 78). In this context, it should 
be noted that the US‘ allies were economically and militarily great powers and they 
contributed to the US efforts that led to winning the CW (Layne, 1993; Wohlforth, 
1999; Chan, 2008). By contrast, none of the Soviet allies were a great power, nor were 
they able to support the USSR efforts to carry on the CW‘s expensive politico-military 
competition. In consequence, ―with its defence burden already consuming nearly one-
fifth of its national product, the USSR simply could not continue its political contest and 
arms race against the US, not to mention the entire Western coalition‖ (Chan, 2008: 59). 
This weakness, among several others, led to the collapse of the USSR in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  
However, this cooperative model of hegemony does not mean that America‘s CW 
hegemonic project disregarded the politics of power and militarism. Conversely, the US 
hegemonic project was not only based on multi-lateral institutions and market 
mechanisms (Ikenberry, 2003b; Agnew, 2005), but was also dependent on the exercise 
of tangible power (Cumings, 1992; McCormick, 1995). According to Cumings, the 
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major wars on Korea and Vietnam were also important elements in US hegemonic 
strategy that was improved by the containment strategy. For example, in the Korean 
War the US ―sought to keep South Korea and Taiwan within Japan‘s historic economic 
area ... to aid its reviving industry‖, while in Vietnam it claimed ―reasons connected to 
the needs of the French and Japanese economies‖ (1992: 88). In addition, after the 
Korean War the US used the reason of containing Soviet expansionism to expand its 
military presence across the globe (Chace, 1996). It is true that the emergence of the 
USSR hindered absolute hegemony by the US. However, even with the USSR as a 
competitor, the US enjoyed a hegemonic position in the world (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995; 
Ralph, 2006). If this is the case during the CW with the existence of the Soviet power, 
what would be the status after the collapse of the US rival?        
1.3.4. The Post-Soviet International System: Balance-Of-Power Theory on Trial 
As is well known, several circumstances have radically changed since 1989. The CW 
drew to an end, the USSR and its satellites collapsed and the distribution of power in the 
system was no more balanced. The relevance of balance of power theory to the post-
CW international environment, therefore, came into question (Mastanduno, 1997; 
Fortmann et al., 2004). Arguably, state-centred theories, and in particular neo-realism, 
neither predicted the peaceful end of the CW nor offered a clear imagination to the post-
CW world (Mastanduno, 1997; Dueck, 2006), despite the fact that balance of power 
remains the very heart of realist strategy in global politics (Nye, 1990c). In 
consequence, several key neo-realists, including Waltz (1993), Jervis (1993), Layne 
(1993; 1998; 2002); Pape (2005) and Brown (2009) argue that ‗the unipolar moment‘ 
was an ‗illusion‘ and that moment ‗will not last long‘. The US, consequently, should 
prepare itself for a world of multi-polarity instead of seeking international primacy and 
hegemony (Mastanduno, 1997; Kupchan, 1998; Mastanduno, 2000). The reasoning 
behind this axiom, as Layne argues, is straightforward ―as the geopolitical counterpart 
to the law of physics that holds that, for every action, there is an equal and opposite 
reaction. Simply put, the response to hegemony is the emergence of countervailing 
power‖ (2002: 237). 
HSTs also share the same idea. They suggest that ―the putative law of uneven growth 
ensures that unipolarity will erode. The erosion may be slow, however‖ (Owen, 
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2001/2002: 118). Accordingly, a balance of power status will soon be regained 
(Modelski & Thompson, 1999; Craig, 2009). In line with such a perspective, neo-
realists, such as Waltz, Mearsheimer and Layne, predicted in the early 1990s that, in a 
space of ten to twenty years, Germany, Japan, the EU and China would emerge to 
compete with the US for great power (Craig, 2009). Waltz also predicted, not only a 
geopolitical competition between the previous allies, but also an end to the transatlantic 
partnership. In this way, ―NATO‘s days are not numbered, but its years are‖ (1993: 76). 
In this new setting, the US ―would be transformed from an extraordinary superpower to 
a more ordinary great power sharing the centre stage of global politics with the likes of 
a rearmed Germany and Japan, a rising China and a recovered Russia‖ (Mastanduno, 
2000: 503).  
However, the post-CW political milestones have not supported the neo-realist key 
argument that world self-correction will restore a balance of power scenario and weaker 
states will counterbalance the predominant power by allying against its hegemonic 
status. The most striking aspect of the post-CW world order is the stability in US 
relations with European states, Japan, and even China and Russia (Ikenberry, 
1998/1999; Ness, 2002; Snyder, 2004). This proves that unipolarity is not a temporary 
course in modern history and the return to a multi-polar system, which is similar to that 
of the 19th century or of the 1930s, is unlikely (Nye, 1990a; Krauthammer, 1997). 
Therefore, the relevance of the theory of balance of power to the post-CW status quo 
could not be proved in the aftermath of the CW. Scholars ―were quick to recognize that 
a new ‗unipolar moment‘ of unprecedented US power had arrived‖ (Wohlforth, 1999: 
5). In this vein, Robert Pape has argued that ―historically, major powers have rarely 
balanced against the United States and not at all since the 1990s when it has been the 
sole superpower‖ (2005: 8). In the unipolar moment, the US was liberated ―from the 
confines of the bipolar structure, behaving as an unconstrained great power with 
considerable discretion in its statecraft‖ (Mastanduno, 1997: 56). Depending on the 
uniqueness of the US moment, policymakers were not concerned about the future of the 
US‘ absolute leadership and hegemony. They believed that big powers, such as Europe, 
Russia, China and Japan ―may grumble, but they will not stand in the way of US 
military policies and will quickly seek to mend fences once the United States imposes 
its will by implementing these policies‖ (Pape, 2005: 8).  
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In fact, the historical evidence drawn from the events of 1989-1991 created a large hole 
in the realists‘ central argument. However, even with the presence of such a problem, 
neo-realism, according to John M. Owen ―implies that a system is unipolar when the 
second most powerful state cannot by itself counterbalance the most powerful state‖. 
For neo-realists, the author argues ―only states, not alliances, may be poles. But in 
theory a pole may be counterbalanced by an alliance of non-polar states‖ (2001/2002: 
117). However, in support of hegemonic order theorists, weaker states in Europe and 
Asia did not unite to balance the US power in the post-CW era, because of the latter‘s 
importance to the stability of the system (Moe, 2004; Brown, 2009). Hegemonists 
assume that ―through coercion or by providing service, [the hegemon] is understood as 
an international public good‖ (Moe, 2004: 1). However, liberalists, such as Ikenberry, 
suggest that (1998/1999: 44): 
Neorealism misses the institutional foundations of Western political order - a 
logic of order in which the connecting and constraining effects of institutions 
and democratic polities reduce the incentives of Western states to engage in 
strategic rivalry or balance against American hegemony. 
However, this idea can also be criticised, because the institutional foundations of 
Western cooperation, such as NATO, have also been used to establish and sustain US 
hegemony, as will be illustrated in the following chapters. 
1.3.4.1. Realism‟s Re-awakening: A „Power Preponderance‟ Approach  
In contrast to the early 1990s‘ suggestions of the neo-realists, it was apparent by the late 
1990s, ―that unipolarity had not immediately given way to a new round of multipolar 
politics‖ (Pape, 2005: 8) and consequently ―the scholarly conventional wisdom began to 
change‖ (Pape, 2005: 9). Unlike the CW era, the US hegemony has become ―the 
defining feature of the post-Cold War international order‖ (Clark, 2009: 23). A number 
of AFP scholars, such as Ikenberry et al, describe the new changes in American global 
position thus (2009: 1):  
While in most historical eras the distribution of capabilities among major states 
has tended to be multipolar or bipolar—with several major states of roughly 
equal size and capability—the United States emerged from the 1990s as an 
unrivalled global power. It became a ―unipolar‖ state‖.  
Such a transition led Waltz to acknowledge that some of realism‘s concepts, such as 
self-help, anarchy, and balance of power ―may have been appropriate to a bygone era, 
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[and] they have been displaced by changed contradictions and eclipsed by better ideas‖ 
(2000: 5). Waltz concludes that ―changing conditions require revised theories or entirely 
different ones‖ (2000: 5). In this context, Campbell Craig (2009) argues that a younger 
generation of realists intends to remedy the large hole in the realists‘ main argument 
regarding balancing against the US. A new theory of ‗power preponderance‘ has been 
developed by scholars, such as Wohlforth and Brooks, which provides an insightful 
realist account of unipolarity. Power preponderance theorists, such as Craig, argue that 
balancing against the US in the post-Soviet era has been delayed because (2009: 29): 
First, the gap in military power between the US and any potential rival has 
passed, or is approaching the threshold where, balancing becomes a practical 
impossibility. Rival States look at the distance between themselves and the US 
and conclude that it will be impossible to catch up. Second, geography reduces 
the threat potential rivals feel from American power, magnifies the rivalries 
among themselves, and causes them to worry that an attempt to contend with 
American power will only antagonise their neighbours. Third, the US emerged 
suddenly after the end of the Cold War as a unipolar hegemon fait accompli, 
rather than a revisionist state aiming to overturn and take over the system. 
However, even with the addition of the power preponderance approach, the founder of 
the neo-realist paradigm still believes that the balance of power mechanic will—sooner 
or later—be restored. According to Waltz, the arrival of unipolarity did not bring an 
―end to interstate security competition. US primacy falls well short of global hegemony, 
which means that major powers must continue to worry about security issues and take 
steps to guarantee it, either alone or in concert with others‖ (2009b: 87). In an attempt to 
answer the question, ―why has a new balance of power been slow to form?‖ Waltz 
argues that (2009a: 32): 
Formation of a new balance is slowed or hastened by two main forces. Mild and 
moderate behaviour by the state at the top will slow it; arbitrary and arrogant 
behaviour will hasten it. Under the present circumstances balancing should 
proceed apace, but there are difficulties. First, the materials for balancing are 
not ready to hand. In the old days, victory in major war always left enough great 
powers standing to make a new balance of power through realignment among 
them. In bipolar and unipolar worlds, realignments are impossible. In a unipolar 
world the making of a new balance depends on one or more major powers 
lifting themselves to great power status. The wider the gap in capabilities 
between the one great power and the others, the longer it will take to close it. 
The gap is now immense. 
At the very end, the proponents of preponderance theory are also loyal to the balance of 
power theory. Balancing against the US is a matter of time. Other major powers are 
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―edging from the United States and balancing or preparing to balance against it‖ 
(Mastanduno, 1997: 56). 
1.3.4.2. Unipolarity, Imbalance Of Power And Hegemony    
Putting aside the theoretical quarrel between neorealists and the proponents of 
preponderance power, the collapse of the USSR and the gap in power between the US, 
the leading nation in the system, and the rest of the world have ―yielded an international 
structure unique to modern history: unipolarity‖ (Krauthammer, 2002/03: 550). 
Accordingly, the CW‘s balance of power ―has ceased to have any meaning‖ 
(Dannreuther, 2007: 29). However, according to Jervis ―we have neither a powerful 
theory nor much evidence about how unipolar systems operate‖ (2009a: 188). The 
reason, according to Waltz, is that ―the implications of unipolarity have yet to receive 
sustained theoretical attention; there are after all only fifteen or so years of history on 
which to base any evaluation of our conjectures‖ (2009b: 87). However, Waltz is still 
convinced that ―realism remains relevant both as an element of the explanation for the 
emergence of unipolarity and as a tool for understanding its dynamics‖ (2009b: 87). 
Similarly, Farrell argues that ―the realist view of the self-interested and power seeking 
state remains true‖ (2005: 128). But this is not to say that realism can answer every 
single question regarding unipolarity (Waltz, 2009b). In this context, Stanley Hoffmann 
argues that ‗the defence of the national interest‘ approach of realism, for instance, ―was 
developed for a multipolar world. In an empire [ie unipolar], as well as in a bipolar 
system, almost anything can be described as a vital interest, since even peripheral 
disorder can unravel the superpower‘s eminence‖ (2008: 47).  
In order to overcome the lack of an overriding theory, one could begin with Waltz‘s 
conviction that great powers‘ rank in the system ―depends on how states score on a 
combination of attributes – size population, resources endowment, economic 
capabilities, military strength, and political stability and competence‖ (1993: 50). In 
other words, unipolarity is ―a statement about [a superpowers‘] cumulative economic, 
military, and other capabilities‖ (Mastanduno, 2008: 123), in which ―one state‘s 
capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced‖ (Wohlforth, 1999: 9). Thus, unipolarity 
is valid to describe the status quo in the post-1991 world ―in which US military and 
economic power has dwarfed that of all other states‖ (Layne, 2009b: 148). And, ―no 
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combination of states or other powers can challenge ... [it] militarily, and no balancing 
coalition [against it] is imminent‖ (Snyder, 2004: 56). Using such criteria, the former 
French President Jacques Chirac saw American unilateralism in the late 1990s, as ―a 
product of the post-Cold War imbalance of power and the emergence of the United 
States as the world‘s lone ‗hyperpower‘‖ (cited in Oudenaren, 2004). 
Arguably, then, if material power is distributed asymmetrically, the system lacks the 
balance that occurred under the bipolar system; one nation in the system uniquely 
possesses material resources as well as significant organizational skills and shows a 
willingness to lead as the US has done in the aftermath of the CW. The system might 
turn into a hegemonic one (McMahon, 1991; Liese, 1997; Brown, 2009; Wohlforth et 
al., 2009). This is the case because ―being the only superpower is not the same as 
having power over most other in the system‖ (Brown, 2009: 125). As a number of 
critics argue, hegemonic status is the opposite of a balance of power (Ikenberry et al., 
1988; McCormick, 1995; Dittgen, 1996; Layne, 2006). Accordingly, if the balance of 
power created a bipolar system during the CW, its absence concentrated massive power 
in one country in the system and, if the CW‘s bipolarity had constrained the US from an 
absolute hegemonic project, the collapse of that system resulted in the US enjoying a 
unipolar moment and led to an unprecedented historical phase of hegemony 
(Krauthammer, 1990/1991-2002). 
Accordingly, it is obvious that unipolarity has completely changed the characteristics of 
the bipolar world system and established its new logic. Borrowing from the US 
constitution‘s idea of checks and balances, Waltz argues (2009: 31): 
In a bipolar world, two states check and balance each other. In a unipolar world, 
checks on the behaviour of the one great power drop drastically. Unipolarity 
weakens structural constraints, enlarges the field of action of the remaining 
great power ... An international system in balance is like a political system of 
checks and balances. An international system in which another state or 
combination of states is unable to balance the might of the most powerful is like 
a political system without checks and balances. 
Therefore, when a state enjoys a ‗unipolar moment‘ in world affairs, the possibility of 
its becoming a global hegemon is very high. In this context, hegemonic order theorists 
and to a degree realists claim that the rise of a hegemonic leader will be conducive to 
global political and economic stability (Grunberg, 1990; Liese, 1997; Layne, 2006; 
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Antoniades, 2008; Brown, 2009). However, this assumption ―was challenged by the 
neo-liberal literature on regimes and international institutions developed since the late 
1980s‖. In fact, neo-liberalists ―attempted to shift the focus of analysis from the subject 
of hegemony (i.e. the hegemon) to the conditions and mechanisms of its operation‖ 
(Antoniades, 2008: 3). Neo-realists are also concerned with the structure of international 
systems rather than focusing on some units (Waltz, 1979). However, in the early 1990s, 
Kenneth Waltz challenged the HSTs‘ idea of the hegemon as a public good provider by 
arguing that (1991: 669):  
The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for 
the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world. But these terms will be 
defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences 
and the interests of others ....With benign intent, the United States has behaved, 
and, until its power is brought into a semblance of balance, will continue to 
behave in ways that annoy and frighten others.  
While this is true, the proponents of the HST assume that the existence of a hegemon 
power is helpful to the global order because it can regulate and stabilise the system in 
which units operate. However, these proponents pay no attention to the behaviour of 
second-tier powers and fail to elucidate how these powers respond to the hegemonic 
power. Furthermore, they do not draw any clear distinction between cooperative and 
coercive models of hegemony (Spar, 1994). Scholars of IR and international political 
economy (IPE) have raised several critical points concerning the idea that a hegemon is 
a public good provider. These points, according to Debora L. Spar, are important in 
understanding the behaviour of the unipolar hegemonic power. First, they argue that 
there is no clear evidence to prove HST‘s presumption that cooperation between the 
system‘s units and stability is merely ―attributed to the existence of a hegemon‖ 
because, in many instances throughout history, cooperation and stability have survived 
at a time when ―no hegemon existed‖. Second, there is also ―no evidence that the 
stability created by the hegemon benefits all states in the system‖ (1994: 7). 
Furthermore, HST does not explain when and how the hegemon pursues its own 
interests instead of providing public good to others. This point might be much more 
obvious within the realist paradigm. Waltz (2000, 2009a), for instance, argues that, in a 
unipolar system, the unipole power operates without fear of being challenged or 
constrained. For realists ―the only formal justice is to be victor‘s justice: the hegemon 
would do what is needed to maintain its position‖ (Jervis, 2009: 196). This echoes what 
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the Greek realist Thucydides argues: ―large nations do what they wish, while small 
nations accept what they must‖ (cited in Chomsky, 2003: 16). In this context, some 
HSTs acknowledged that the ―weaker states might be unhappy about their position, but 
do not have the power capabilities to change it‖. In consequence, hegemony is ―based 
on coercion‖ and the hegemon is ―acting as a quasi-government‖ (Moe, 2004: 3). On the 
basis of this discussion, how can we understand the US‘ behaviour in the post-CW 
system? Would it be possible to say that America was a public good provider or was it a 
hegemon pursuing its own agenda? Some argue that nothing much has changed by the 
EoCW. America was a hegemon pursing its interests and using new rhetoric of 
spreading democracy, free market and human rights, instead of containing the 
communism in the CW (Farrell, 2000). Or, as Peter H. Smith put it, the EoCW ―relaxed 
the terms of ideological confrontation, strengthened centralist elements, reinforced 
processes of liberalisation … and enhanced the prospect of democratic consolidation‖ 
(2001: 35).  
What is apparent in the mainstream IR literature is that the two terms, hegemony and 
unipolarity, have regularly been used inter-changeably; however, despite this overlap, 
there is some theoretical distinction between the two terms (Moe, 2004; Hurrell, 2005; 
Wohlforth et al., 2009). Wohlforth et al. argue that (2009: 3):  
Unipolarity refers narrowly to the underlying material distribution of 
capabilities and not to the political patterns or relationships depicted by terms 
such as empire, imperium, and hegemony. What makes the global system 
unipolar is the distinctive distribution of material resources. 
Likewise, Wohlforth (1999: 9) is aware that concentrating on the material resources in 
the hands of a unipole power might cause confusion between the terms, unipolarity and 
empire. From his point of view, in the unipolar system, ―capabilities are not so 
concentrated as to produce a global empire‖ (1999: 9). However, ―unipolarity should 
not be confused with multi-or bipolar systems containing one especially strong polar 
state or with an imperial system containing only one major power‖ (Wholforth, 1999: 
9). Nevertheless, ―the specific characteristics and dynamics of any unipolar system will 
obviously depend on how the unipolar state behaves‖ (Wholforth, 2009: 10). Depending 
on the hegemonic order theories, Espen Moe also argues that ―unipolar powers may be 
hegemons, but this follows from their foreign policy behaviour and not from their 
power position‖ (2004: 2). This meaning is also found in Waltz‘s argument regarding 
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how the behaviour of the hegemon could slow and/or accelerate the balance against it 
(Waltz, 2009a). 
In sum, if theoretically there is some clear distinction between unipolarity and 
hegemony, practically all the distinction between the two is still blurred. For instance, 
the EoCW‘s redistribution of power turned the system to unipolar and gave the US 
military predominance. This, in turn, ―caused US strategy to shift from policies of 
deterrence or containment of threats to policies of preventive warfare‖ (Lieberfeld, 
2005: 3). The unipolar predominance after the EoCW also ―created incentives for the 
US to deemphasize collective security and to rely more heavily on its own military‖. 
With US power unrivalled, ―realist theory predicts that any US leader would view 
multi-lateral institutions as more of a hindrance than a help‖ (Lieberfeld, 2005: 3). 
1.3.4.3. US Hegemony Model In The Post-CW Era 
The post-CW hegemonic project is a mixture of cooperative and unilateral models. The 
―economic instruments of foreign policy have become at least as important as 
diplomacy and force,‖ (Light & Groom, 1994: 100) and high politics has also combined 
with low politics. Clinton‘s bid to establish US hegemony therefore turned from the 
customary balance of power perspective to a liberal internationalism and economic 
predominance (Dueck, 2006; Kurth, 2007).  
US hegemony was also institutionalized through multi-lateral entities, such as NATO 
and other multi-lateral organisations. As argued above, according to neo-liberalists, 
institutions are supposed to be very important in order to maintain cooperation and 
peace. Thus, ―institutions both limit and project state power; they are mechanisms of 
hegemonic self-restraint and tools of hegemonic power‖. However, institutions are 
neither autonomous from the influence of a hegemon power nor ―capable of checking 
its exercise of power‖ (Schweller, 2001: 163). In this context, Waltz (2000) points out, 
the ability of the US to survive and expand NATO‘s authority and presence in the post-
CW era serves its geo-strategic interests. Echoes Waltz, Randall L. Schweller argues 
that (2001: 181): 
In this respect, NATO is no different from any other US-led institution. They 
have all been designed to preserve and promote American primacy by (1) 
enabling the United States to project its preponderance of power more 
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effectively than it otherwise could, and (2) discouraging secondary powers from 
pursuing independent policies or attempting to realize their potential power and 
become viable contenders for America's crown. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that both the Bush and Clinton administrations strongly supported the continued 
existence of NATO as a way to prevent the formation of an independent 
European force that could potentially challenge U.S. global supremacy.  
The institutionalisation of the US hegemonic project in the post-CW period also rested 
on free markets, globalisation and the spread of democracy (Colás & Saull, 2006: 1). 
This mixture of pragmatic and ideological agendas served US hegemony at a time that 
the US lost its external enemy which had glued its allies and enhanced its hegemonic 
project for nearly a half century. These ideas will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapters. 
1.3.4.4. The Unilateral Hegemonic Turn 
In the unipolar moment, the US intervened in several spots around the globe, such as in 
Kuwait, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. These interventions were to a large degree 
perceived as legitimate action (by the majority of states). However, the post-9/11 
controversial policies were widely condemned. Therefore, Moe concludes that the post-
9/11 policy ―is a US foreign policy directed towards hegemony rather than non-
hegemonic unipolarity‖ (2004: 2).  
As stated previously, ―the specific characteristics and dynamics of any unipolar system 
will obviously depend on how the unipolar state behaves‖ (Wohlforth et al., 2009: 10). 
The move from the previous model of cooperative hegemony to the post-CW model of 
unilateral hegemony began in the immediate aftermath of the CW with the emergence 
of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of the early 1990s, and reached its zenith after 
the 2000 election, prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the early 1990s the US re-
charted its grand strategy by prohibiting any potential regional unification and 
preventing the rise of any new rival. In consequence, the US showed a strong 
willingness to manage world affairs in line with its geo-strategic interests.  
The most obvious course of unilateral hegemony appeared as a reaction to the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. According to Jack Snyder, realism‘s clearest success ―is its ability to 
explain the United States‘ forceful military response to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks‖ (2004: 55). Realists argue that (Snyder, 2004: 55):  
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When a state grows vastly more powerful than any opponent it will eventually 
use that power to expand its sphere of domination, whether for security, wealth, 
or other motives. The United States employed its military power in what some 
deemed an imperial fashion in large part because it could.  
A strategy of unilateral hegemony would ―imply that Washington would try to weaken 
traditional multi-lateral institutions and replace them by a new institutional structure‖ 
(Mace & Loiseau, 2005: 112). Such a strategy has been implemented during the 1990s, 
particularly during the Clinton administration (e.g., the attacks against Sudan and 
Afghanistan in 1998, and against Iraq along the 1990s). However, the approach was 
very clear after 9/11 in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq, when the US ignored the 
UNSC and acted alone with its key ally, the UK (Kapteyn, 2004). After Bush II took 
office in early 2001, the US appeared as a hegemon, not as a public good provider. The 
Bush II‘s early explicit unilateral moves on issues such as the Kyoto Protocol and 
missile defence ―may perturb and even anger US allies, but should not drive them 
toward military counter-balancing‖ (Owen, 2001/2001: 121).  
The attacks of 9/11 legitimated an open form of unilateral hegemony, which appeared 
when the US decided: to strike pre-emptively; to go it alone or with limited allies; to 
exploit the WoT for achieving its hegemonic and geo-strategic aims; to impose its 
weight over other countries; and to fight terrorism by spreading democracy (Snyder, 
2004). However, this is not to argue that the US‘ response to the attacks of 9/11 has 
undermined the NWO that was established on globalisation and a geo-economic thesis. 
Although it is true to argue that the main concern of US‘ FP agenda returned to security 
as a fundamental issue, nevertheless, according to Tom Conley ―globalisation has not 
been seen to be less important because of terrorism‖ (2007: 140). In fact, the rise of the 
new wave of global terrorism ―has often been seen as a response to globalisation‖ 
(Conley, 2007: 140). On the oher hand, the WOT has also been seen as an attempt to 
make control over the natural resources in the Middle-East and Central Asia. Therefore, 
Conley (2007) concludes that the most obvious phenomenon of the 21
st
 century is the 
simultaneous existence of terrorism, globalisation and hegemony.  
On the basis of the above discussion, it could be argued that since the EoCW, when the 
US has become the only hyper-power or hegemon, and more obviously after 9/11, the 
US showed its desire to go it alone, whatever the interests of other powers. If the US 
pursued a cooperative model of hegemony to serve its interests and contain its allies and 
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foes during the CW, the EoCW and the US emergence as a victorious nation with huge 
material capabilities weakened this model and produced a new unilateral model which is 
fit to its unipolar moment. True, the characteristics of this new model appeared since the 
early 1990s; however, it became clearer after 9/11.       
1.3.5. Hegemony Beyond State-Centred Theories 
Two important questions remain to be answered: if the end of the bipolar system and the 
emergence of unipolarity were the main incentive to establish US hegemony, why did 
AFP not present a clear and a coherent hegemonic strategy during the 1990s? And: what 
reasons hindered such a strategy from emerging explicitly until 9/11 took place? These 
questions can be reformulated: does hegemonic status occur merely because of the 
imbalance of power in the system and is it conditioned by shifts on the international 
level? Or is it also relevant to the intrastate relations? These questions direct attention 
towards domestic politics as a source to AFP making because the external context is not 
sufficient to establish a hegemonic strategy. Important conditions to move towards 
hegemony are laid down in the internal and societal sources of the FP-making process. 
The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity gave America an unprecedented opportunity to 
move towards an explicit phase of hegemony. However, the US hegemonic project 
during the 1990s was unclear, not because it was absent, but because of the failure to 
build a domestic consensus over the AFP strategy.  
State-centred approaches (realism and liberalism) are insufficient to answer these 
questions, as they fail to clarify the picture of the motivations behind a state‘s FP 
strategies. FP, according to this approach, is merely a response to external events 
(Dunne & Schmidt, 2001; Brown, 2001). Domestic sources of power, cultural 
differences among countries and dissimilarities in regimes types are not relevant to most 
structuralist explanations of IR (Chafetz, et al, 1996; Walt, 1998; Ryan, 2000; Hill, 
2003; Mearsheimer, 2007). The structuralist paradigms miss a set of crucial variables 
that enlighten the motivations behind the US hegemonic project. On the other hand, the 
system today is a hegemonic one in which the basic concepts of realism (anarchy, self-
help and power balancing) provide little guidance or explanation of a state foreign 
behaviour (Ness, 2002). Furthermore, ―it is harder for the normally state-centric realists 
to explain why the world's only superpower announced a war against al Qaeda, a non-
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state terrorist organization‖ (Snyder, 2004: 55). In the same way, liberalism‘s main 
concern with institutions and cooperation as a mechanism to discipline the anarchical 
system and understand international affairs downgrades ―politics of power‖ and other 
realistic concepts of IR. The institutions also failed to constrain the hegemon‘s appetite 
to use coercive and tangible power to serve its interest (Brown, 2001; Chittick, 2006). In 
the same way, ―the theory of hegemonic stability and transition will not tell us as much 
about the future of the United States‖ (Nye, 1990c: 188). 
In sum, from this study‘s viewpoint, it is true that systematic conditions (at the inter-
state level) are crucial to the emergence of a global hegemon, but also, with the 
availability of these conditions, domestic requirements (or intrastate prerequisites) are 
also needed. This matter will be discussing in the following section.  
1.3.5.1. An Intermestic Approach: Opening the Black Box of Domestic Politics 
Domestic politics, according to Gideon Rose (1986: 260), are ―part of the internal 
setting of the process of foreign policy‖. In other words, ―the foreign has protractedly 
transformed the domestic and, conversely, domestic factors have had significant 
implications for the outside‖ (Haubrich, 2006: 85). In this regard, Laura Neack (2003: 
8) argues that ―the stuff of foreign policy derives from issues of domestic politics as 
well as foreign relations‖.1 Equally, if not more importantly, Charles F. Hermann (1990) 
ranks external crises after a sequence of domestic sources that lead a state to change its 
FP course. From his viewpoint, four of the change agents contribute to changing FP 
orientation: leadership; bureaucratic advocacy; domestic restructuring; and external 
shock. John A. Vasquez also lists a series of domestic activities that triggered internal 
                                                          
1
 In this context, John Lewis Gaddis argues that the containment strategy of the CW, to a remarkable 
degree, was not only a product of what happened in the external scene with the USSR and its allies, but it 
was also a product of domestic forces that were working within the American political system. From his 
viewpoint, the second half of the 20
th
 century witnessed two forms of containment strategy. The 
differences between them resided in the differences between the US administration‘s economic 
philosophical approaches. ―Republicans prior to Ronald Reagan favoured tight fiscal policies capable of 
reining in inflations, while Democrats prior to Jimmy Carter preferred expensive policies capable of 
generating employment‖ (Khong, 2008: 253). However, in contrast, external challenges also play a 
crucial role in one policy prevailing over other.  For example, the invasion of South Korea in 1950, ―made 
it easy to choose the NSC-68 version of containment over George Kennan‘s more political/diplomatic 
approach, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also helped Team B win the debate about the 
Soviet intentions, facilitating the Reagan administration‘s massive military build in the 1980s‖ (Khong, 
2008: 255).   
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disputes over FP-making: ―level of interest on foreign policy questions; frequency of 
participations on foreign policy issues; the kind of participation (debate, bipartisanship, 
technical criticism, rejection, reassessment); shifts in belief systems; and changes in 
personnel‖ (1985: 651). From James N. Rosenau‘s viewpoint, any FP decision not only 
reflects ―the response to an opportunity or challenge elsewhere in the world‖ but it also 
mirrors ―the decision of an individual, the deliberation of a committee, the outcome of 
the policymaking process, the sum of clashing interest groups, the values of dominant 
elites, the product of a society‘s aspirations and the reinforcement of a historical 
tradition‖ (1987a: 2). Patrick James & Athanasios Hristoulas summarise the 
aforementioned domestic activities under two broad categories: ―(1) the public, 
including electoral phases and presidential standing; and (2) Washington, referring to 
the Congress and bureaucratic politics‖ (1994: 328). Such views have ranked domestic 
context in a salient position, whether it is in the making of or in the influencing of the 
whole process of FP agenda-setting and implementation. Robert O. Keohane & Helen 
V. Milner determine three pathways in which international affairs could influence 
domestic politics. The influence might be ―by affecting an actor‘s policy preferences 
and the resulting political coalitions; by creating a crisis; and by undermining 
governmental autonomy and policy efficacy‖ (1987: 244). Such a foreign-domestic 
interaction would happen through several tools, such as public opinion, the media and 
interest groups. These elements not only place restrictions on the FP making process, 
but they also constitute a significant component of the US foreign policy arena (Putnam, 
1988; Scott & Crothers, 1998; Hoffmann, 2004; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004; 
Haubrich, 2006). Consequently, these elements define not only the degree of US foreign 
policy consistency, but also the level of movement and commitments (Risse-Kappen, 
1991).  
The EoCW removed any precise distinction between domestic and foreign affairs in 
practice and in theory (Lake, 1993; Miller, 1994; Dunne, 2000). In this context, 
Miroslav Nincic observes that, when international affairs changes and foreign 
challenges become less imminent, the aphorism that says America‘s ―politics stop at the 
water‘s edge‖ has reflected neither actuality nor the core principles of American 
democratic characteristics. Except at a time of great crisis, as he suggests, when 
American values and interests are at stake, foreign policy is a product of domestic 
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politics (2008: 126). Therefore, during the 1990s, it was fair to argue that the old style 
of AFP-making process was no longer workable and had lost its ―bearing and sway‖ 
under the new circumstances (Clough, 2004). In fact, ―when the constraining effects of 
the CW were removed,‖ domestic actors‘ concerns over FP making process increased 
(Nye, 2000: 55). Unipolarity brings the ―international system closer to the domestic 
one‖ (Jervis, 2009: 196), and a clear distinction between the two has become impossible 
(Kamath, 1990; Paarlberg, 1995; Wayne, 2000). In this context, Thomas Paterson et al. 
argue that globalisation ―made foreign relations less foreign‖ (2010: 469). Owing to 
these changes, politics and partisanship did not stop when America dealt with foreign 
and security matters (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006).   
In consequence, US hegemony from the 1990s onwards cannot be understood solely 
from a state-centred approach, but, as Mark Beeson suggests, ―interests, values, 
ideology, and strategic beliefs are, in many cases, just as important as imbalances of 
power or threat in determining how states choose sides and why they wage war‖ (2007: 
621). That is why Jean A. Garrison suggests that the opening of ―the black box of 
domestic politics and policymaking‖ (2003: 155) is becoming a supportive 
methodological approach to understanding the state‘s FP choices in international 
politics. In this vein, McCormick argues (1995: 7):  
Hegemony does not simply happen; individuals and groups of people make it 
happen. A sufficient base of power is the prerequisite for global supremacy, but 
it is insufficient unless the will to use that power is present in those determining 
public policy for the potential superpower.  
Accordingly, in contrast to the realist assumption that a state is a unitary rational actor, 
this study treats a state as a diverse and complex entity, which comprises various sub-
actors all competing for influence (Hoffmann, 1986; Light & Groom, 1994; Hill, 2003; 
Chittick, 2006). Therefore, individual belief systems, psychology, interests, collective 
social forces, ideological groups, economic and ethnic lobbyists and governmental and 
non-governmental organisations are very important elements in the framing of a state‘s 
agenda, both internationally and domestically (James & Hristoulas, 1994; Lindsay & 
Ripley, 1997a; Taber, 1998; Garrison, 2003; Huntington, 2004). That is why FP 
explanations, in terms of society-centred approaches, are ―found in the ongoing struggle 
for influence among domestic social forces or political groups.‖ For some proponents of 
this approach, ―state officials or institutions play neither an autonomous nor significant 
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intervening role in shaping or constraining policy‖ (Ikenberry et al, 1988: 7). In turn, 
external events are not to be understood as an influential force affecting a state as a 
unitary rational entity, but they can be understood in terms of their effects on ―the way 
that individuals interact with reality‖ (Mowle, 2003: 562). However, understanding AFP 
behaviour cannot depend only on domestic politics (Brown, 2001; Chittick, 2006). In 
the next sections, this chapter will show how the AFP decision-making process can be 
understood in terms of external and internal factors. 
1.3.6. The Study‟s Meta-theory: State and Society Centred Approaches in Unity  
As Ikenberry argues ―it is not enough simply to pick some theoretical approach and run 
with it‖ (2005: 7); rather, a student of IR needs guidance ―on how to proceed when 
different approaches seem to provide equally plausible explanations—to better 
understand when a particular level of analysis or type of variable is most suitable in 
rendering an account of foreign policy‖ (2005: 7). This is because, according to Stephen 
M. Walt, ―no single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world 
politics‖ (1998: 30). Each of these competing perspectives captures important aspects of 
world politics. Critics are becoming persuaded that no one theory or method is the most 
important when addressing all the challenges that face a state (Sprinz & Wolinsky-
Nahmias, 2004b; Ikenberry, 2005). In terms of AFP, Walt recommended that one 
should remain ―cognizant of realism‘s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep 
liberalism‘s awareness of domestic forces in mind and occasionally reflect on 
constructivism‘s vision of change‖ (1998: 44). This technique is followed in this 
research.  
This research aims to understand hegemony (as a FP strategy) from a wider perspective. 
Following Ikenberry, this theoretical framework develops a ‗meta-theory‘ that 
incorporates several types of variables into a larger-scale framework (2005: 9). In other 
words, it aims to put together a collection of several elements from state-centred 
theories, such as realism, liberalism, and globalism, and society-centred theories such as 
constructivism, pluralism, and elitism. Using Stephen Walt‘s words, this research‘s 
theoretical model is a ―diverse array with competing ideas rather than a single 
theoretical orthodoxy‖ (1998: 30). However, these factors are not always treated as 
being equally important. Sometimes, greater priority is given to one approach over 
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another or to one level of analysis over the rest. The choice is entirely determined by the 
context of analysis, but, in general, these theories are applied, not as rivals, but as 
complementary analytical tools. 
The main reason behind the study‘s intention to build a meta-theory is to be able to 
work at each level of analysis. According to Ikenberry et al. (1988: 1): 
[International, or system-centred approaches] explain American policy as a 
function of the attributes or capabilities of the United States relative to other 
nation-states. In this view, government officials are perceived as responding to 
the particular set of opportunities and constraints that America‘s position in the 
international system creates at any moment in time. 
Neo-realism as a security and power focus approach, for example, is the tool needed to 
evaluate the external sources of AFP‘s hegemonism in the post-Soviet era. It can 
highlight both the opportunities and challenges that the EoCW created and explain their 
influence over AFP strategy. It is also very important to evaluate power capabilities, 
security dilemmas and national interests of the US and its closest powers. The neo-
realist approach is also able to assess the international determinants and constraints of 
AFP strategy in the pre- and post-1989 eras. Furthermore, it offers the analytical tools to 
explain AFP‘s apparent hegemonic shift at the eve of the CW (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987; 
Holsti, 1992b; Walt, 1998; Lieberfeld, 2005; Kaufman, 2006).    
Moreover, liberalism is also required in order to throw light on the US hegemonic 
project. The survival of a state is not only maintained by military power but also by 
economic resources and economic power. Maximizing a state‘s military power cannot 
be achieved without economic strength. This assumption is also pursued by most 
realists (Walt, 1998; Waltz, 2009a). Furthermore, a state‘s conduct in international 
affairs is not always determined by security issues. For example, during the CW, 
authors such as Robert J. McMahon argue that the struggle against communism was not, 
as was usually claimed, a struggle against a hostile and tyrannical competitor but to a 
larger degree was precipitated by US economic expansionism. US policy-makers, 
according to McMahon, ―were convinced that domestic peace and prosperity required 
the aggressive pursuit of foreign markets‖ (1991: 136). Thus, these policy-makers also 
saw the USSR and revolutionary nationalism in the third world ―as the principal 
impediments to the Open Door world they sought to construct; consequently, they 
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moved quickly to contain those twin threats, forging in the process a global American 
empire‖ (1991: 136). This perspective is also seen in post-CW, when the Clinton 
doctrine premised that ―economic instruments of foreign policy have become at least as 
important as diplomacy and force‖ (Light & Groom, 1994: 100). It is therefore very 
difficult to ignore the effects of such a combination on the AFP-making process and 
behaviour since Clinton‘s bid to establish US hegemony in the post-CW era turned from 
the traditional balance of power to liberal internationalism and primacy (Dueck, 2006; 
Kurth, 2007). In this context, some observers suggest that a crucial issue amongst the 
post-9/11 WoT‘s objective was guaranteeing the control of the US over natural 
resources in Central Asia and the Middle-East (Dunn, 2003). In general, liberalism also 
highlights the importance of issues such as international institutions, multi-lateral 
cooperation, trade and the ideals of democracy, liberty and prosperity. This perspective 
also makes links between international and domestic levels of analysis, because the 
opening up of the AFP-making process, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, to economic lobbyists, who enjoyed significant influence at the time, 
demonstrated that firms and industries became key figures in determining national 
interests and FP (Fordham, 1998).  
Several elements of hegemonic theory can also be used to complement the above 
theories. Since hegemonic power tends to stabilise world affairs and provide public 
good to others, it can be argued that HST can offer the legitimacy that the hegemon 
needs to promote its leadership (Moe, 2004). This assumption was in place during the 
1990s, when Washington legitimised its dominance using the claim that US was the 
engine of globalisation and the free market. A similar idea is also found in Waltz‘s 
argument, ―when rulers establish their dominance, the result is arbitrary and destructive 
governance that works for the benefit of the governors rather than the governed‖ (Waltz, 
2009: 31).  
In addition to the above state-centred theories, the study‘s meta-theory also uses several 
elements from society-centred approaches. Society centred approaches, according to 
Ikenberry et al. (1988: 1, 2), view AFP: 
... as either reflecting the preferences of the dominant group or class in society, 
or as resulting from the struggle for influence that takes place among various 
interest groups or political parties. In either case this approach explains foreign 
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... policy essentially as a function of domestic politics ... State-centred 
approaches view foreign ... policy as highly constrained by domestic 
institutional relationships that have persisted over time, and also by the ability 
of state officials to realize their objectives in light of both international and 
domestic constraints.     
Constructivism, in contrast to realist and liberalist approaches, premises that a state‘s 
behaviour is not subject merely to the international environment but has also been 
shaped by domestic factors such as elite beliefs, collective norms and social identities. 
Therefore, it is vital, not only to clarify domestic influences on AFP, but also to make 
the necessary causal-connection between external and internal levels of analysis 
(Chittick, 2006; Phillips et al., 2007). Constructivism came to the forefront of analysis 
after the CW because of realism‘s and liberalism‘s lack of ability to predict the peaceful 
end of the CW. For constructivists, Gorbachev‘s thinking and the USSR‘s domestic and 
international reformist process were the main reasons behind the EoCW. The 
constructivist approach has acquired greater attention since the events of 9/11. Since 
then international politics and AFP alike have been influenced by the role of identity 
and culture (Walt, 1998; Brown, 2001; Chittick, 2006; Phillips et al., 2007). In this way, 
some critics suggest that the ―emphasis on the link between political attitudes, national 
institutions, and national culture … can contribute to the study of international 
relations‖ (Benn, 2007: 970). A decision-making approach which premises that ―human 
decision making was central to the interpretation of foreign policy action‖ (Hermann & 
Peacock, 1987: 22) is also very important to clarify dimensions in AFP. But these 
decision makers would also be influenced or constrained by the surrounding 
environment (the organisations) which they are operating in (Hermann & Peacock, 
1987). Likewise, rational choice theorists put more emphasis on individual actors as the 
basic units of analysis (Hay, 2002; Watson, 2003). However, these actors are ―not 
subjected to structural constraints but have the ability to fashion and alter the 
environment – that is, the systemic structure – in which they find themselves‖ 
(Haubrich, 2006: 85). In line with this perspective, and in contrast to the realist view 
that the WoT is essentially rooted in the national security perspective, constructive 
liberalists argue that the rise of the neo-conservative (neo-con) group to the top level of 
the policy-making pyramid in the US with their ideological perspective was a key 
driving force that led America into the war. The neo-cons put forward their policies—
combining the liberal agenda of spreading democracy internationally with unilateralism 
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and militarism—to create and preserve US hegemony in the post-CW world. 
Constructive liberalists also argue that the WoT was ignited by a strong domestic 
coalition, composed of conservatives, neo-cons and US nationalists in the Republican 
Party, supported by the military-industrial complex and business lobbyists (Risse & 
Panke, 2007).  
In the same way, the pluralist perspective can also contribute to the research. Pluralists 
suggest that all policy areas are inter-connected and therefore influence each other. 
States are considered as important players, but FP decisions are not just the result of 
governments but other economic and social forces, such as political parties, ethnic and 
business groups, the media, the public and non-state actors play a crucial role in the FP-
making process (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987; Holsti, 1992b; Walt, 1998; Robinson, 2008).
1
 
Using this approach would help to determine, for instance, the domestic barriers that 
prevented the US hegemonic project from emerging fully during the 1990s, and the 
internal motivations that encouraged the materialisation of such a plan post-9/11.  
However, the pluralist, with its societal focus, might not be able to offer a 
comprehensive understanding of the variety of influences on US domestic politics. 
Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate elitist perspective and bureaucratic theory. A 
theory of bureaucratic politics helps to answer the question of ―why different 
bureaucracies adopt different policies, making assumptions about the preferences of 
decision-makers‖ (Zakaria, 1998: 14). Coupling individual behaviour with bureaucracy 
theory also throws light on the effects of members of government, of parliament, and 
groups on their institutions and on the FP-making process as a whole. The influence of 
the US neo-cons in shaping the post-CW foreign policy agenda is a good example. 
These tools can help in clarifying the domestic struggle over power within the US 
political system and how such competition affects the domestic context for AFP.  
                                                          
1
 According to Melakopides ―this perspective occupies a middle ground between idealism and realism. It 
is broad enough to embrace a variety of approaches known as liberal institutionalism, neo-realism, and 
even the model of interdependence‖ (1998: 24). Roberts argues that pluralism ―accepts the relevance of 
many different approaches to international relations: not just the proper emphasis on power and interest 
that is found in realist theories, but also approaches that stress the significance of ideas and norms, the 
impact of domestic political and economic structures on international politics, the roles of transnational 
movements and international organizations, and the existence of new challenges‖ (2008: 335).   
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1.4. Methodology 
The aforementioned discussion showed that AFP is recognised to be a very 
complicated, multi-layered and multi-faceted process (Cakmak, 2003; Mead, 2003). 
This section therefore attempts to build an analytical technique which is capable of 
capturing these divergent issues related to US hegemony after the CW. Just as AFP is a 
diverse process, this analytical model must also be equipped with a multi-level analysis, 
in addition to the integrative theory mentioned in previous sections (Viotti & Kauppi, 
1987; Hox, 2002; Hudson, 2007). The following sections highlight the various 
analytical techniques used in the research. 
1.4.1. A Multi-Level Analytical Technique 
Scholars choose this analytical approach because it meets several criteria. First, a multi-
level approach is more able than a single-level approach to analyse the diverse and 
multiple layers of actors engaged in the AFP-making process (Zhao, 1996; Krahmann, 
2005). Therefore, the explanatory powers are not concentrated in only one location, but 
flow through several levels: individual, sub-national, national, transnational and 
international. Second, the variety of analytical levels in this approach is not dependent 
on only one explanatory theory. As no one theory is available from the toolbox of IR, 
the model used must be designed to be suitable not only for each level of analysis, but 
also for each single variable in the research. According to Ole R. Holsti (1989: 32), it is 
not sufficient only ―to acknowledge the existence of various levels of analysis‖ but most 
important to determine ―which level(s) of analysis are relevant and necessary‖ to clarify 
political phenomena. 
The utilization of multi-levels analysis has occurred in several academic works. For 
instance, it has been found in Waltz‘s (1959) model of three levels of analysis, the 
individual, the state, and the state system, as well as in Putnam‘s (1988) theory of a two-
level game. Putnam‘s theory looks at the national or the first level of the game, in which 
―the domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt 
favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those 
groups‖ (Putnam, 1988: 434). However, at the international level or the second level of 
the game, ―national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic 
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pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments‖ 
(Putnam, 1988: 434).
1
 
Waltz (1959) argues that domestic forces, such as different pressure groups, socio-
economic classes and parties are unable to influence world politics unless they influence 
the state itself. Therefore, the first level of analysis is the individual, whose behaviour, 
beliefs and characteristics influences IR because of their roles in their own government. 
Although this level of analysis seeks to answer the question of why a nation goes to 
war, it focuses essentially on individual personalities and motivations (Neack, 2003; 
Kegely & Wittkopf, 2004; Ikenberry, 2005). The second level of analysis concentrates 
on society as a source of FP-making. The causes of war might lie within cultural or 
political institutions. In fact, Waltz suggests that each level of his analysis captures a 
different level of causation; however, his levels are not equal in terms of their influence. 
The system structure level would be the strongest, because it not only ―identifies the 
forces within which individuals and states operate‖, but also it ―generates constraints 
and imperatives by which all individuals and states, regardless of their uniqueness, must 
abide‖ (Ikenberry, 2005: 3). 
Kalevi J. Holsti echoes Waltz‘s model of analysis suggesting four possible levels of 
analysis: individual; state; systemic; and global. Focusing on the actions and behaviours 
of individual statesmen helps to understand the motivations, ideologies, culture, 
perceptions and other elements that lead policy-makers to make FP decisions. However, 
looking at IR and FP from the perspective of the ‗individual state‘ enables the 
researcher to clarify the behaviour of a state, not only in terms of ‗power politics‘ or the 
‗external environment‘ but also through the lenses of domestic and internal politics. The 
                                                          
1
 Echoing Putnam, Chittick (2006) coined the term ‗political bargaining game‘ to describe the situation 
occurring between the government and society on the one hand, and the government and other states on 
the other. Society here can influence government by means of elections, public opinion, media and 
pressure groups (economic and non-economic). In the words of Valerie M. Hudson, politicians and 
decision-makers simultaneously play ―the game of domestic politics and the game of international 
politics‖ (2005: 3). These ideas are not too far from Rosenau‘s argument of the ‗penetrated system‘. The 
national political system, he argues, is strongly influenced by international events and tendencies; 
therefore, ―national societies have become so penetrated by their external environment‖ (Hanrieder, 1967: 
978). In their attempt to study AFP, Nathan & Oliver (1994) use a similar technique of several levels of 
analysis. One level of analysis concentrated on the executive-legislative relationship in the domain of the 
AFP-making process. However, evaluating the interconnection between the demands of democratic 
accountability and foreign policy was the second level of analysis. In consequence, they examined the 
effects of public opinion and the influence of interest groups such as the business community, or ethnic 
minorities on the FP-making process.   
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concept of the state system also offers scholars different analytical capabilities. This 
level is used to focus on the distribution of power between states in the international 
scene. Furthermore, it allows the study of the rise or fall of a state. Furthermore, the 
globalist lens can be used, whereby the world is a small village and units such as states 
are disregarded. These perspectives enhance each other and each offers a partial 
explanation of a state‘s foreign policy behaviour (1992b: 6). However, Holsti does not 
completely fit his model of analysis with Waltz‘s idea that the external level of analysis 
is more important in terms of its influence over FP-making. He argues that ―the main 
characteristics of the external environment are not less important than those of the 
state‘s internal environment. Therefore, all four levels of analysis will be employed at 
different times, depending upon the type of problem to be analysed‖ (1992b: 7). 
In this way, Eugene R. Wittkopf et al. apply a framework of analysis that was 
developed by the political scientist Rosenau in 1980 and improved later in 1986 (see 
Figure 1.1). Rosenau argues that the influential factors that explain AFP can be divided 
into several sources: the external, or the global; the governmental; the societal; and 
individuals and FP elites (2003: 15). Eugene R. Wittkopf & James M. McCormick 
similarly studied AFP‘s domestic context using a methodological perspective that 
grouped its sources ―into three broad categories: the nation‘s societal environment; its 
institutional setting; and the individual characteristics of its decision-makers and the 
policymaking positions they occupy‖ (2004, 6; 2008: 9). These authors argue that each 
of these levels of analysis or categories includes different variables and wider important 
elements, but, taken together, they help a researcher to ―think systematically about 
forces that shape American foreign policy‖ (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 15). 
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Figure1.1 AFP's Different Sources 
Source: (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 15). 
Therefore, this technique‘s main characteristic is the attempt to combine behavioural 
and traditional methodologies. It includes elements of classical IR theories, such as 
realism, but also uses mechanisms derived from constructivism and other theories, as 
well as emphasizing individual influence and group behaviour. Brian Hocking & 
Michael Smith also list a series of analytical frameworks for studying world politics: (1) 
common-sense empiricism; (2) single-factor explanations; (3) single-level explanations; 
(4) middle-range theory; and (5) grand theory. However, they conclude that ―the bias is 
towards middle-range theory, in the light of different levels of analysis‖ (1995: 17, 18). 
In a similar way, Charles W. Kegley & James M. Wittkopf adopt a ―multi-level, multi-
issue perspective‖ in their study of world politics. They argue that such a perspective is 
of crucial importance because it tends to investigate several issues (2004: 18): 
(1) the characteristics, capabilities, and interests of the principal actors in world 
politics (states and various nonstate); (2) the principal welfare and security 
issues … and; (3) the patterns of cooperation and contention that influence the 
interaction between and among actors and issues‖. 
After all, the aforementioned discussion concludes that, owing to a variety of factors 
which contribute to the FP making process, multi-level analysis is probably the best 
technique that can be implemented in order to understand AFP‘s multi-dimensions. This 
kind of analysis needs also to be supported by integrative theory to be able to evaluate 
political phenomena in each level of analysis. According to Detlef F. Sprinz & Yael 
Wolinsky-Nahmias, ―methodological pluralism serves to improve our understanding of 
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policy-making and world events by creating opportunities for scholars to re-evaluate 
their claims and to compensate for the methodological weaknesses in any particular 
approach‖ (2004b, p. 378). AFP‘s multi-dimensionality inevitably necessitates the use 
of multiple levels of analysis or multi-method research (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987). The 
remaining question, however, is this: ―which level of analysis gives us the most useful 
perspective from which to explain or understand politics among nations?‖ (Holsti, 
1992b: 7).     
1.4.2. From Theory To Practice 
In attempting to answer this question, Rosenau argued that ―all time frames, and all 
units of analysis, whatever their sizes, are important ... no facet can be safely ignored, or 
easily held constant,‖ and students of FP analysis must ―concern themselves with 
politics at every level‖ (1987a: 1). This is because each level of analysis, according to 
Holsti, ―makes a contribution, but each fails to account for certain aspects of reality that 
must be considered‖ (1992b: 7).  
On the basis of what has been said above, and since this work assumes that the US 
unilateralism and hegemony in global affairs has been energized by the EoCW, it is 
necessary to begin with the realist approach and the systemic level of analysis. This is 
because ―if one begins at the level of discrete individuals and events, one is likely to be 
trapped and preoccupied in a maze of particularistic detail and idiosyncratic factors‖ 
(McCormick, 1995: xvi). Therefore, it is ―very difficult to work from the specific to the 
general, to write from the inside out. It is far less problematic, however, to write from 
the outside in‖ (McCormick, 1995: xvi). Accordingly, critics, such as Ikenberry et al. 
(1988) and McCormick (1995), suggest that a systemic-centred approach might be 
regarded as a good starting tool to analyse the international level, because ―unless one 
begins with a global unit of analysis, one runs the proverbial risk of missing the forest 
for the trees‖ (McCormick, 1995: xvi).  
International, or system-centred approaches ―explain American policy as a function of 
the attributes or capabilities of the United States relative to other nation-states. In this 
view, government officials are perceived as responding to the particular set of 
opportunities and constraints that America‘s position in the international system creates 
at any moment in time‖ (Ikenberry et al., 1988: 1). 
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Thereafter, the analysis will move towards an analysis of domestic politics in order to 
reach a comprehensive understanding. This integrates both state-and society-centred 
approaches. However, according to Ikenberry et al., state-and society-centred 
approaches ―begin their analyses within the nation state; systematic theories abstract 
from domestic politics and focus on the relative attributes of countries. In this 
perspective, theoretical propositions are only derived from the interrelationships and 
interactions among nation states‖ (1988: 4). For this reason, the international system is 
―a necessary first-cut in any analysis in international or comparative politics‖ (Ikenberry 
et al., 1988: 5). 
Accordingly, addressing US hegemony in the post-CW era starts in the international 
level of analysis in which the US‘s competitor collapsed finally in 1991. But it does not 
stop there. The collapse of the external enemy produced an opportunity to the US to 
establish its hegemony, but it also brought several changes to the state and domestic 
level of analysis. The AFP‘s domestic actors who were glued by the external challenge 
of the CW were freed when that challenge had gone and a new diversity within had 
been aroused. The analysis, therefore, will assess how the EoCW affected the role of 
individuals and groups and their shift in belief system within government and society. 
When the analysis turns from international to domestic levels, theories such as realism 
and liberalism are no more applicable. Just as the level of analysis changes, the 
theoretical perspective needs to be changed also. The appropriate theories to work in 
this level of analysis are the society-centred approaches, such as pluralist, and 
constructivist, in addition to bureaucrat and elitist theories. However, marriage between 
the two approaches is also possible whenever the analysis turns to make the necessary 
connection between two levels.            
Such a technique of using a combination of several theories in a multi-level analysis, to 
be able to offer reasonable explanations for AFP in the post-CW era, requires that this 
research draws on relevant literatures from widely diverse disciplines, such as history, 
sociology, psychology, organisational behaviour, bureaucratic theory, economics, 
politics, law, anthropology and even literary theory. This helps to consolidate the 
various analytical tools and consequently to clarify the whole picture and help us to 
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understand political phenomenon (Viotti & Kauppi, 1987; Clifford, 1990; Walt, 1998; 
Hudson, 2005).
1
  
Building on psychological theory, this study utilises ‗the external enemy‘ as a tool to 
investigate several related areas: the cohesion of AFP in the pre-1991 and in the post-
2001 periods and its confusion during the 1990s; the presence of domestic political 
bipartisanship and its disappearance; institutional unity and conflict; and the rise and 
fall of particular ideological dogmas. The external threat, according to Allison Astorino-
Courtois (2000), was the essential reference point that facilitated the American foreign 
and security policy-making process; however, since the EoCW, AFP bureaucrats have 
suffered from problems in decision-making because of the absence of that threat. In 
fact, with the demise of the external threat, both external and internal interests may 
undergo a reshaping (Nathan & Oliver, 1994). On the other hand, a crucial part of the 
acrimonious post-CW debate between internationalists and isolationists, the rapid rise of 
the neo-conservatives‘ political influence and the growth and demise of US nationalists‘ 
power, can also be understood in terms of psychological approach. The demise of the 
external rival and the victory over communism motivated internationalist individuals 
and groups to implement their ideologies and perspectives.    
Psychology and organisational behaviour are also of crucial significance in explaining 
the causes of the failure of the AFP institutions to reform in the post-CW era. Individual 
and organisational delay or resistance to reform was a crucial reason behind America‘s 
lack of readiness for the post-CW era. The key point is that, while the US administration 
behaviour showed FP hegemonic tendencies in the 1990s, it failed to create a concrete 
and explicit hegemonic grand strategy prior to 9/11. The reason can also be linked to the 
‗threat-deficit‘, as Buzan (2006) argues. However, after 9/11 the existence of the 
external enemy gathered the nation around the flag. This transition facilitated the 
establishment of the WoT as a FP strategy without any significant resistance at home, at 
                                                          
1
 One could reasonably ask: what has literary theory to do with foreign policy analysis? Terry Eagleton 
(2008: 169) might offer the answer. First of all, literary theory and politics have been much more 
interconnected than many generations of scholars of the two disciplines would recognize. It is sufficient to 
say, as does Eagleton, that ―modern literary theory is part of the political and ideological history of our 
epoch‖. 
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least until the collapse of Baghdad in 2003. America‘s post-9/11 wars have also been 
justified by the existence of the external enemy. In fact, leaders usually use the external 
enemy image to pursue and legitimise their own agenda, domestically and abroad. 
Leaders tend to exaggerate the hostility of the external enemy to galvanise public 
opinion or to satisfy their own domestic and international objectives (Luostarinen, 1989; 
Larson, 1997; Murray & Meyers, 1999).   
Since foreign policy, at least according to the realist perspective, is usually characterised 
by high levels of secrecy and sensitivity, states do not publicise their real strategies. 
Policy-makers often cover up those strategies and offer alternative, more palatable 
interpretations of their agendas. This study, therefore, borrows from critical theory the 
idea that any text has two levels of structure: surface structure and deep structure. The 
real meaning of a text is not clearly stated in its surface structure; texts conceal rather 
than reveal. To clarify the deep meaning of texts, a reader needs to break through the 
surface structure to reach its deep structure (Harries & Hodges, 1995). On the basis of 
this technique, this study treats the relevant primary data which have been obtained 
from governmental publications and policy-makers‘ speeches as ‗dissembled sources‘ 
that tend to hide rather than elucidate. Therefore, it is proposed that such texts (written 
and oral) may also contain the two types of structure.  
However, the question is how to break down these texts and which methods should be 
applied. Literary theory depends on grammatical analytical tools that are used to 
dismantle the surface structure and reconstruct it to approach the deep meaning of the 
text (Ellis, 1999). However, this kind of analysis is not appropriate to the study of 
unwritten texts.
1
 In contrast to those of literary critics, who believe that the text 
encompasses the complete reality and that there is no need to draw from outside the text 
to understand its several structures, this study draws from outside the text to clarify the 
hidden agenda (Chomsky, 2006). The method by which this is accomplished is by 
evaluating texts in the light of policies implemented, the ideological beliefs of persons 
and groups involved, historical facts and so on. Accordingly, this technique deals not 
only with texts, but also with political slogans and policies adopted by different US 
                                                          
1
 The word ‗unwritten‘ here is not synonymous with the word ‗oral‘, but refers to non-creative or non-
fiction works, such as political, social and economic texts. Creative works include literary texts, such as 
poetry, novels, and stories (Stow, 2007). 
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administrations. This sceptical perspective is a necessity for deepening the analysis and 
enriching our understanding beyond a government‘s announced rhetoric. This technique 
is of crucial importance in clarifying aspects of the 1990s hegemonic agenda that is not 
otherwise clearly represented. For example, President George H. W. Bush‘s rhetoric on 
the NWO may be better evaluated using such an approach. Clinton‘s multi-lateralism 
and free market ideas can also be understood differently using this technique. Therefore, 
it is applied in several parts of the study.  
1.4.3. The Analytical Design Of The Study  
The design of this study is not intended to be quantitative in nature and, consequently, 
―there is no systematic use of various control variables in an effort to identify a single 
causal factor to explain policy decisions‖ (Gleek, 2003: 27) or political trends. Instead, 
this research is designed to derive data from a multi-disciplinary inquiry and to employ 
a combination of meta-theory and multi-level analytic techniques.  
This study can be classified as a mixture of case study and a piece of evaluative and 
descriptive research; the nature of this research necessitates such a methodological 
marriage. First, the case study, as John Gerring argues, ―is best defined as an intensive 
study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units‖ (2004: 352). 
However, this study follows another technique. It aims to use several cases across the 
timeframe of the study to discover the implicit and/or explicit similarities between 
different policies. This research deals with AFP in its entirety and the key components 
of the US post-CW grand strategy cannot be merely found in a single case study. That is 
why this study‘s technique is to write from the diverse to the specific. On the other 
hand, the usage of case study and/or non-case study techniques is determined by ―the 
state of the research within a given field‖ (Gerring, 2004: 352). Therefore, it is of great 
importance ―to acknowledge that practical and contextual considerations are often 
paramount in the choice between a case study and a non-case study research format‖ 
(Gerring, 2004: 352). On the basis of these views, instead of one key case study, this 
research evaluates several small units or mini-case studies, such as the project for the 
NWO, the Clinton strategy of En-En and the WoT, among others. The aim is to 
highlight elements of US hegemonic grand strategy. It uses information derived from 
several case studies coupled with a descriptive and evaluative technique.  
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This study also depends on scientific information, particularly opinion polls and 
economic estimates, and military budgets. Because of this, the structure of the thesis is a 
combination of thematic and chronological styles. The justification for this mixture is 
that, while several issues need to be traced and evaluated in their historical contexts, 
others have to be studied in thematic contexts.  
1.4.4. Limitations 
However, it is worth noting that such a mixture of theoretical approaches and multiple 
levels of analysis does have its weaknesses and limitations. The result of adding several 
levels of analysis, as Hostli suggests, might be ―an undisciplined proliferation of 
categories of variables‖, which could lead to limitations. ―It may become increasingly 
difficult to determine which are more or less important; and ad hoc explanations for 
individual cases erode the possibilities for broader generalisations across cases‖ (1989: 
31). Such a collection of theories might also be accused of being a ‗no-theory‘ model. 
Some critics argue that FP research ―would yield large quantities of reliable [and] 
readily comprehensible information about foreign policy phenomenon,‖ if it adopted 
and applied a more rigorous methodological technique (Hermann & Peacock, 1987: 16).  
Taking these points into consideration, this study argues that political concepts and 
phenomena can be ―treated in different ways by different political analysts‖ (Heywood, 
1999: 8). Because there has been no epistemological consensus between scholars 
regarding which theory or method is best for studying FP grand strategy and security 
issues (Watson, 2003; Ikenberry, 2005). For example, after several decades of an 
intensive academic effort to understand the causation of war—systematic efforts which 
started in the early 1950s— Jack Levy wrote in the early 1980s that ―our understanding 
of war remains at an elementary level‖. He justifies the judgment by saying that ―no 
widely accepted theory of the cause of war exists and little agreement has emerged on 
the methodology through which these causes might be discovered‖ (1983: 1). This 
problem is inherent in the social sciences because, ―social science theory – invention -- 
cannot, of course, be tested and evaluated in laboratory replications. Its only test is a 
relative and subjective one‖ (McCormick, 1995: xvi). Furthermore, according to Brian 
Ripley (1993: 403): 
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The rational reconstruction of reality in social science research programs is a 
risky business. It is tempting to overstate expectations, oversimplify 
assumptions, and overestimate the rationality and coherence of the scientific 
enterprise. In the practice of science, complex intellectual debates are never 
really settled; the residual ambiguity leaves plenty of loose ends and unfinished 
business for a new generation of debaters.  
Mainstream literature in IR theory suggests that, just as no one worldview perspective is 
right and others are wrong, and none of them is also prevalent over others, no one 
analytical model is far superior to the others (Griffiths, 2007). In the same way, just as 
each worldwide perspective may spawn several attractive insights, each methodological 
perspective may also generate different analytical force. On the basis of such 
understanding, Robert P. Watson et al. argue that a student of IR and AFP ―should 
understand that there is not necessarily a singular account of history‖ (2003: 5). It is 
important to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical framework. 
This is because such diversity is beyond any particular theory‘s explanatory capabilities 
and, to be more reliable, a piece of research should apply a combination of IR theories 
and a multi-level analytical technique to enable understanding FP issues at different 
levels and from several angles and viewpoints (Bennett, 1987; Garrison, 2003; Hill, 
2003; Kaufman, 2006).  
1.4.5. The Time Frame Of The Study  
The specific time frame of this research is defined between two major events: from the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the end of 2003, the year that witnessed the fall of 
Baghdad. This period is of crucial importance in following and highlighting the 
characteristics of AFP‘s hegemonic tendency after the CW. It allows an evaluation of 
the impact of the EoCW on the whole FP-making process for more than a decade. This 
period witnessed three US administrations – comprising the Bush I, Clinton and Bush II 
administrations. The period is sufficiently lengthy to throw light on the divergent 
agenda that was advancing US hegemonic strategy from the early 1990s. Furthermore, 
it also makes it possible for this research to go beyond the enunciated policies to analyse 
why the hegemonic project was not explicitly acknowledged prior to 9/11. This period 
also allows this research to evaluate how 9/11 contributed to enhancing America‘s 
hegemonic shift by offering the pretext needed for the existing post-CW agenda.  
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The end of 2003 is defined as the end of the study‘s time frame, instead of April 2003, 
the date of the fall of Baghdad. The justification for this is twofold. First, the expansion 
of the research time frame to the end of 2003 is very important because it enables the 
research to investigate the pretexts that were given for the invasion of Iraq, such as 
weapons of mass destructions (WMD), and the link between the Iraqi regime and the 
organisers of 9/11 among others. Second, it disengages the study from dealing with the 
later mismanagement of the occupation, which negatively impacted on the prospects for 
America‘s hegemonic project. In addition, political developments inside and outside the 
US occurred after 2003. The US, according to mainstream literature, was in danger of 
losing the war in Iraq (particularly during 2004 and 2005). The liberalization and 
democratization of Iraq turned out to be a uniquely bloody humanitarian disaster, 
estimated in the ORB‘s 2007 poll (Opinion Research Business) at 1,220.000 causalities 
(Susman, 2007). Therefore, the domestic consensus in the US that initially supported 
the invasion began to erode and public opinion turned to disapproval, particularly after 
the elections of 2004 that overturned the Republican majority in the Senate and House 
(Thurber, 2006).     
1.4.6. Data Sources  
The research uses material from divergent and wide-ranging studies in AFP and IR. 
Primary data in the form of governmental documents and official speeches are also of 
great significance to this work. However, it was impossible to obtain access to classified 
documents, which would undoubtedly be of great importance to the main focus of this 
research. Therefore, the study cannot clarify exhaustively the research problem and, 
thus, inevitably, leaves room for further research.  
The research was, to a large degree, dependent on literature published between 1989 
and 2001. Its fundamental ideas, and particularly that concerning the American 
hegemonic shift after the CW, were derived from the 1990s literature to address two 
methodological impediments. First, it demonstrates that the US hegemonic agenda was 
asserted repeatedly in AFP literature and official US discourse prior to the attacks of 11 
September. Second, it avoids the influence of US post-9/11 literature, which turned to 
evaluating themes, such as US hegemonism, unilateralism and empire. In other words, it 
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becomes clear from the outset that the 1990s political scene can be regarded as the solid 
basis of America‘s post-9/11 hegemonic project.  
This study does not make a strict distinction between the inner-circle of US decision-
making and the outer-circle of influence, such as think tanks, interest groups and the 
business community, in attempting to clarify the US post-CW dominance agenda. This 
is because, in a pluralist style of democracy such as the US, most of the proposals from 
lobbyists, pressure groups or the epistemological community find their way into policy-
making circles, as will be discussed throughout this study. A clear image of the US 
post-CW dominance project appears not only in the light of governmental procedures, 
but also through proposals and arguments held by intellectuals, ideological groups and 
various organisations. Consequently, the study treats material from all of these sources 
on an equal footing in understanding the roots of the US‘s hegemonic policies and 
strategy.  
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter highlights several aspects of the continuation of US hegemonic strategy in 
the post-WWII era. America, as discussed above, was a hegemonic power even with the 
existence of the USSR, its military competitor during the CW. The bipolar system was 
not a perfect one. America and its allies were the strongest, militarily, economically, 
ideologically and scientifically, compared to their rival. Because of this, it could be 
argued that America and its allies were the hegemonic power, whereas the USSR and 
the Warsaw Pact were merely a second-tier competitor. On the other hand, the US was 
also the strongest amongst its allies and consequently it was the hegemon power within 
its sphere of influence. Owing to this hierarchal order, once the USSR collapsed, the US 
enjoyed an unprecedentedly powerful position in world politics, as will be shown in 
detail in the next chapter.  The manifestation of American hegemony has been reflected 
in AFP strategy in the 1990s and since 9/11 it has become more obvious.   
On the basis of the above discussion, this chapter aimed to develop a theoretical and 
methodological approach in order to find out the characteristics of AFP‘s hegemonic 
strategy between the two falls; from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the fall of Baghdad. 
However, this aspiration would probably be out of reach without understanding the 
strengths and weaknesses of the traditional FP perspectives and exploring the existing 
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set of methodological approaches. In fact, while realism, idealism and liberalism have 
offered logical insights to understand FP conduct during the 20th century, it can be 
argued that none of these schools of thought alone is able to offer a comprehensive 
understanding of AFP in the post-CW world. Each offers merely a partial interpretation 
of the story. However, none can be applied alone to clarify the whole picture.  
For example, on the one extreme, while realism offers insights to help understand the 
‗security dilemma‘, it is less concerned with domestic politics or the economic 
dimension as a source of influence on AFP-making. On the other edge, liberalism 
addresses wealth maximisation and mutual cooperation and peace as a main focus to FP 
strategy but it disregards power politics and security matters. Owing to increasing 
interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy after the EoCW, society-centred 
theories have become more important tools in order to understand the behaviour of a 
state in the international scene. Constructivism, for instance, offers further explanatory 
tools to understand the AFP-making process. Issues such as how identity and interests 
influence AFP and IR are of crucial importance to the main objectives of this research, 
because the traditional perspectives of IR, such as realism and liberalism, have had little 
to say about these themes. Indeed, because of their dependence ―on abstract reasoning 
and hard facts ... they have often missed the uniqueness of particular individuals, 
situations and moments‖ (Roberts, 2008: 339). This research, therefore, makes a clear 
connection between AFP and its broadest domestic context. This ‗intermestic‘ 
perspective is an appropriate analytical tool not only to evaluate the factors that 
hindered the U.S. from transforming into an absolute hegemony during the 1990s, but 
also to understand the interplay between external and internal politics. Accordingly, this 
chapter builds a complex theoretical approach, incorporating several analytical tools 
from each of these theories. 
This chapter also evaluates several analytical techniques and levels of analysis, 
concluding that multi-level and inter-disciplinary analysis is necessary. The analysis 
flows from the individual level to the global level. No level of analysis has been 
ignored. At each level, this research aims to use the most appropriate theory. At the 
global and international level, realism and other systemic theories are dominant. At the 
domestic level, however, another set of theories has been applied, but in accordance 
with realist theory. This inter-disciplinary approach also derives analytical tools from 
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bureaucratic politics, organisational behaviour and psychology. The image of the enemy 
is a central element in this analytical framework. Therefore, this chapter draws from 
sociology and psychology to highlight the centrality of the image of the enemy as an 
analytical tool to clarify several elements in this research. This theoretical framework 
also draws on literary theory to evaluate texts and policies. This technique argues that 
each text has two structures and each policy or political slogan can be seen as having a 
double structure. This technique allows the research to deal with each text or policy 
encountered with sceptical systematic tools. 
Such a complex model is necessary to study the US grand strategy of hegemony in the 
post-CW era because the hegemonic project is not only related to international politics, 
but is also inter-connected with domestic issues.  
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The French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine in a speech in Paris in early 1999 observed that: the United 
States of America today predominates on the economic level, the monetary level, on the technological 
level, and in the cultural area in the broadest sense of the word. 
(Ikenberry, 2001a: 191) 
 
The United States emerged from the Cold War as a "hyperpower," and the economic and military gap 
between it and the other leading powers ... increased still further in the 1990s. 
(Litwak, 2002:79) 
 
Chapter Two 
America As A Hyperpower: Trends And Transformations During The 
1990s 
2.1. Introduction 
Peregrine Worsthorne in 1991 and the French politician, Hubert Védrine in 1998 are 
correct when they used the new neologism ‗hyperpower‘ to describe the US‘ unique 
combination of powers in the 1990s (Marcus, 2000; Boniface, 2001; Quirk, 2008), 
because according to Jonathan Marcus ―the term ‗superpower‘ may no longer be a 
terribly useful one with which to categorize America‘s position in the world‖ (2000: 
92). Since then, ―transcending the Cold War rubric ‗superpower‘, ‗hyperpower‘ has 
entered our political lexicon to convey the magnitude of the United States‘ paramount 
international status‖ (Litwak, 2002: 76).1 While the US was a hegemonic power during 
the bipolar Cold War (CW) era, when the CW imperfect distribution of power ended the 
US gained a unique position in world politics. The purpose of this chapter is to 
                                                          
1
 The term ‗superpower‘ entered the English language in the 1920s; however, it has been idiomatically 
used since the mid-1940s ―to describe the superordinate position‖ that the US and the USSR enjoyed after 
WWII. It also signified the rivalry between them during the CW. Most importantly, the term has also 
been applied ―to signify the essential ‗distance‘ in power capability terms between those two countries on 
the one hand, and all other major powers on the other‖. However, when the USSR collapsed and the gap 
in relative powers increased to unprecedented levels between the US and the remaining second-tier 
powers in the system, the term superpower was no longer able to capture the new characteristics. For this 
reason, politicians and scholars popularized the term hyperpower to describe the post-superpower 
American status. A hyperpower, therefore, ―is one where there is a considerable and indeed … an 
unbridgeable distance in capacity between it and all others in the international system‖. It has the 
intention and the susceptibility to use ―its superordinate power capacities in a manner well beyond what 
others do, seeking almost obsessively to define the behaviour of others as conflicts of interest, and to 
ensure that in those conflicts of interest with others in the international system, its interests prevail‖. What 
is key, however, is that with this meaning, the term hyperpower not differ from the term hegemonic 
power, the only is the latter term is more commonly used than the former (Nossal, 1999). Accordingly, 
the two terms are used interchangeably in the thesis. 
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underline the set of elements (material capabilities, thoughts, groups, and international 
transformations) that were essential in facilitating the absolute hegemonic transition of 
the US.  
To do so, it is divided into several sections; the first aims to illustrate how the end of the 
Cold War (EoCW) brought an end to the pre-1989 discussion over the decline of 
America and introduced a new phase of internal revivalism and self confidence. The 
US‘ relative material power that was of crucial importance in establishing US 
dominance after the CW is the subject of the second section. The third part throws light 
on the neo-conservative‘s (neo-con) role as an influential societal force pushing 
America towards hegemony and unilateralism. This is followed by a discussion on the 
theoretical attempts that offered American foreign policy (AFP) a new roadmap with 
which to sustain its unipolar moment and to rationalize its hegemony. Thereafter, the 
chapter examines the possibilities of balancing against the US in the 1990s, before 
debating the US‘ search for a global leadership to counterweight its hegemony.  
2.2. After The EOCW: The US Regains Its Confidence 
2.2.1. Decline Or Hegemony? 
A few years prior to the EoCW, Henry Luce‘s forecast that the 20th century will be an 
American century ―lost much of its glow and force‖ (Ingimundarson, 2000: 165) 
because as several critics argued, America would (sooner or later) retreat from its 
hegemonic position on the global scene. This idea emerged initially in the context of the 
dramatic events of the 1970s, ―including the collapse of Bretton Woods, the OPEC oil 
shocks, and the humiliating end of the Vietnam War‖ (Mastanduno, 2000: 502), as well 
as ―other humiliations in the developing world (notably the 1979-80 Iranian hostage 
crisis)‖ (Dumbrell, 2008: 91). According to some critics such as (Ingimundarson, 2000; 
Dumbrell, 2008), the Vietnam War, eroded US political credibility, and weakened its 
economic competitiveness.  
Central amongst those who argued that as with other great powers American power 
would fail was Andrew Hacker, who published The End of the American Era in 1971. 
This predicted that the US was in terminal decline. However, this debate increased 
significantly during the Reagan presidency when the budget deficit grew to 
unprecedented levels (Stallings, 1995; Dumbrell, 2008). Hacker‘s argument was revived 
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by Paul Kennedy‘s (1987) book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Kennedy 
argued that the US was in danger of imperial overstretch, the disease that had brought 
down previous empires: Spain in the 17th century; France in the 18th century; and 
Britain more recently. Kennedy recommended that the US reduce its overseas presence, 
avoid commitments that consumed its scarce resources, and revitalise its domestic 
economy and industrial base. After the EoCW, Kennedy argued that the post-CW world 
would not be unipolar, but multi-polar, with Japan as the main CW winner (Ikenberry, 
2001c; Mueller, 2005; Black, 2008).  
Building on such views, scholars such as McCormick (1995) argued that if America 
was in decline prior to 1989, the EoCW might speed the collapse of American 
hegemony. This view was logical if the context of the early 1990s prophecy that the 
unipolar moment would be brief is taken into consideration. This view was rationalised 
by the economic recession in the early 1990s in which the US economy showed patterns 
of ―weak investment and weak consumption‖ (Cline, 1994: 9). The economic indicators 
showed that ―from 1989 to 1991, real investment fell by 15%, and consumption 
stagnated with a meagre 1% total increase over the period‖ (Cline, 1994: 9).  
Finally, similar to the argument concerning bipolarity and American hegemony, the 
theory of US decline could also be considered as an example of the lack of US 
hegemony; on this occasion during the 1970s and 1980s (Clark, 2009). However, as Jan 
Fichtner argues the US declinists ―focused their attention on the decline—relatively 
speaking not in absolute terms—of the American power base‖ (2007: 34). The main 
argument was that the US‘ share of global General Domestic Production (GDP) had 
fallen from 50% at the end of WWII to merely 25% in the mid-1980s. However, this 
fall in economic power did not see any collapse in political influence or global 
leadership. In fact, ―no point on the globe was untouched by American military, 
political, and economic policy‖ (Jervis, 1999: 220). One of the reasons behind the fall in 
the US‘ share of world GDP was because most European economies, Japan, and the rest 
of world increased their levels of production. Nevertheless, one-quarter of the world‘s 
output was a sufficiently large to maintain the US‘ hegemonic position (Fichtner, 2007).  
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2.2.2. Victory over Communism: Revival  
However, the early 1990s demonstrated that the declinists‘ predictions, including those 
of Paul Kennedy, were mistaken. The American political system did not witness a 
severe crisis and its economy recovered from the 1980s recession. Furthermore, it was 
the USSR, not the US, that was in absolute decline between 1989 and 1991 (Knutsen, 
1999; Ingimundarson, 2000; Mastanduno, 2000; O‘Hara, 2006). Therefore, in contrast 
to the declinists‘ prophecy that America would follow the fate of previous great powers, 
the US emerged as a unipole power in the post-CW era. The EoCW not only removed 
the USSR as an opponent, but also enhanced US self-confidence (Krauthammer; 1997; 
Cox, 2002a, 2002b; Halliday, 2009). Accordingly, John L. Gaddis argues that the 
EoCW left America in ―the fortunate position‖ (1991: 102) and this ―worked to 
America‘s long-term advantage‖ (Cox, 2002a: 265). The change in the international 
political architecture led several policy-makers and intellectuals to believe that ―the long 
sought after goal of American predominance seems tantalizingly within reach‖ (Layne, 
1994: 25). This was clear just six days after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, in the 
military strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Colin Powell‘s which aimed to 
shift from the CW‘s containment strategy to the post-CW global hegemony (Armstrong, 
2002). This strategy aimed that, ―no country will come close to rivalling America‘s 
worldwide influence‖ (Jervis, 1999: 220) in the indefinite future. 
Thus, the EoCW ―changed the context of world politics‖, but the change ―gave the 
United States a degree of strategic choice it had never had before‖ (Cox, 2002a: 265). 
Therefore, the EoCW did not mark any crucial shift in AFP, it merely removed the US‘ 
hegemonic challenger. This strategic advantage led Richard Haass, the National 
Security Council‘s member in the Bush I administration, to argue in 1994, that when the 
US was liberated from its geo-political rival, it became freer to intervene militarily 
everywhere (cited in Foster, 2003). Accordingly, during 1990-91, the US liberated 
Kuwait, because Iraq now lacked its CW sponsor. Likewise, the war in the late 1990s in 
the Balkans was also fought because Serbia ―also suffered from the inability of Russia 
to provide support‖ (Black, 2008: 169). The disappearance of the Soviet challenger gave 
the US unprecedented access to areas, such as Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, 
previously blocked under the bipolar world system (Cox, 2002a; Callinicos, 2003). 
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Thus, the expansion of the US-influenced North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
eastwards was a result of the USSR‘s collapse (Black, 2008: 169).  
The US‘ successes in carrying out several global missions led Robertson Hall to claim 
that the 1990s was an odd decade, which ―started with the Gulf War, with very few US 
casualties, and ended with the bombing of Serbia, with no US combat casualties‖ (2002: 
1).
1
 
In fact, the victory over the communist threat motivated the US to take this opportunity 
to establish a new American world dominance or leadership in the 1990s, without 
facing any significant disadvantages (Powell, 1992; Christopher, 1995; Barry, 2000; 
Dannreuther, 2007). President Bush I wrote in his dairy just one day after the 
dismantling of the Berlin Wall that ―I don‘t want to miss an opportunity‖ (cited in 
Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008: 1). The US, therefore, was ready to seize ―the predominant 
role, yet without adequately formulating the new rules for the global system—and 
without offering new goals for an emerging new global society‖ (Gardner, 2005: 9).  
2.3. Capabilities Needed To Guarantee Hegemony  
As shown in the second chapter, hegemonists and neo-realists argue that if a single 
country enjoys ―overwhelming strength in relationship to all other states … it will 
achieve predominance or hegemony‖ (McMahon, 1991: 137). In keeping with this 
argument, it can be argued that the US‘ post-CW hegemonic project was fuelled and 
expanded not only by the collapse of the USSR, but also through the unprecedented 
combination of powers it enjoyed at the time (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995; Maynes, 1996; 
Walt, 2000; Smith, 2001). In this context, and in line with hegemonic theory‘s 
presumptions, Colin Powell (1992) argues that there were four necessary pillars to the 
US‘ post-CW leadership: a forceful military; a strong economy; a skilled political 
performance; and the strength of the US values and beliefs of freedom and human 
rights. These elements are highlighted in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1995 
that stated: ―American assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, 
                                                          
1
 American self-confidence was restored following the easy victory in the Gulf War, in which it had few 
casualties. While between 100,000 and 200,000 Iraqis were killed, the US lost just 148 soldiers (Hoff, 
1994; Everest, 2001; Betts, 2002). Therefore, it could be argued that the Gulf War of 1991 was the 
cheapest war in terms of American blood and treasury since the American-Spanish War (Beets, 2002; 
Atkinson, 1998).   
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our powerful ideals and, above all, our people‖ (White House, 1995: I). Because of such 
a combination of powers, the US was ―in a league of its own. It is the only nation on 
earth able to project a power in every part of the world‖ (Rezakhah, 2007). In this 
context, Ikenberry argues that ―American power—military, political, economic—is the 
not-so-hidden hand that built and sustains American unipolar order‖ (2002: 288). The 
next sections look at the four pillars—the military, economic, ideal, and political 
power—at the EoCW.  
2.3.1. Military Power: The First Pillar of US Hegemony 
As discussed in the first chapter, a hegemonic power must maintain military superiority 
in the system in order to be able to pursue its agenda and facilitate its leadership. Such a 
perspective was clear in the American political discourse and performance in the 1990s. 
Powell emphasizes the centrality of military force as a political leverage to US global 
leadership: ―the presence of our arms to buttress these other elements of our power is as 
critical to us as the freedom we so adore. Our arms must be second to none‖ (1992: 23). 
Dick Cheney (1993) also argues that America cannot rely on collective approaches to 
deal with international problems, but it must have its own forces that are being able to 
protect its interests overseas. In the same way, the former Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen said that without military modernization, the US ―would be unable to provide the 
sort of leadership essential for global order‖ (cited in Cox, 2002a: 269). For these 
reasons, the propensity to modernize US military forces and the need to build up a 
capable national missile defence arsenal were crucial reference points during the 
presidential campaigns of 1992, 1996, and 2000 (Singh, 2006).  
Accordingly, even with no remaining serious challenge to its security and interests, the 
US maintained very huge military expenditures during the 1990s as figure 2.1 shows.  
 
Figure2. 1 Federal Budget Outlay for Defense Function: 1990 to 2000 (In billions of US dollars) 
Data from: (Infoplease) http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883084.html#axzz0zyasrCc3 
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In early 1990s, the US‘ military outlay equalled nearly 27% of total worldwide military 
expenditure (Hook & Spanier, 2000; Huntington, 2004). In 1992 the US‘ share of great 
powers‘ defence spending increased sharply to exceed 53% (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995: 
832). This percentage exceeded the defence budgets of the next seven largest military 
spenders combined (Kwasniewski, no date). In the mid-1990s, the US defence budget 
was still bigger than that of 1985, when the CW was at a peak (Maynes, 1996 & Waltz, 
1999), and by 1996, the American defence budget ―equalled that of all other developed 
nations of the world combined‖ (Ryan, 2000: 189). In 1998, the US military 
expenditure equalled that of the next ten major military forces added together (Jones, 
1998; Dobson & Marsh, 2001; Wedgwood, 2002) and by the end of the decade, US 
defence outlays ―began to approach 50 percent of world military expenditure‖ (Huisken, 
2006). In this context, Cox offers an accurate measure of the US‘ predominance 
position (2002a: 268): 
In every year after 1992 the United States alone accounted for nearly 40 per 
cent of all the world‘s military expenditures; and while this represented only 2.9 
percent of US GDP and 16 per cent of the US budget, it still meant that by the 
year 2000 America was spending just over $280 billion on its defense, in real 
terms only 14 percent less than in an average year during the Cold War.
1
  
Accordingly, the US spent more than ―three times what any other country on the face of 
the earth spends, and more than all its prospective enemies and neutral nations 
combined (see figure 2.2)‖ (Jones, 1998: 75). On the other hand, at the turn of the 20th 
century, most of its potential rival‘s military budgets combined were just one-fifth of 
the US‘. In fact, ―the combined military budgets of China, Russia, Iraq, Yugoslavia 
(Serbia), North Korea, Iran, Libya, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Sudan added up to no more 
than US$60 billion‖ (Betts, 2002: 22).  
                                                          
1
 The level (less than 3% of GDP) was ―the lowest percentage since 1940, the year before the attack on 
Pearl Harbor‖ (Chace, 1996: 116). Richard N. Haass, nevertheless, suggests that the total spending on 
defence, intelligence, foreign assistance and diplomacy ―comes to just under $300 billion‖ and this huge 
amount ―represented about one-fifth of the federal budget, or just under 4 percent of … America‘s GNP‖ 
(1997: 104). In fact, 14% of the federal budget as a de facto defence spending in a threat-free time was 
not a marginal amount (Haass, 1997; Ryan, 2000; Betts, 2002). It was more than enough not only to 
preserve the CW‘s military quality, but also to advance America‘s hegemonic project. In fact, militarism, 
according to David Ryan, ―was the one area where the United States was exceptional‖ (2000: 189) on the 
eve of the CW, because, according to Ignatieff, ―the US has achieved its [military] dominance at 
incredibly low cost to its economy‖ (2004: 43). 
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Figure2. 2 Military Budgets in the Late 1990s, Selected States (in billions of US dollar) 
Data from (Wedgwood, 2002: Murden, 2002: 6). 
However, even with such huge military expenditure in the 1990s, it was still a tiny 
percentage of America‘s GDP as figure 2.3 illustrates (Huisken, 2006). 
 
Figure2. 3 US Military Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1990-2001 
Data from: Truth and Politics. org: http://www.truthandpolitics.org/military-relative-size.php 
The US‘ military strength was reflected not only in its massive budget and advanced 
equipment, but also in terms of personnel and worldwide presence (Ikenberry, 2004b). 
The Pentagon sustained ―over 1.4 million men and women in active duty plus another 
870,000 in reserves‖ (Borosage, 2000: 2) deploying in more than 400 key bases in 120 
countries, compared to only 269.000 who had served in 1940 (Boggs, 2006; Brown, 
2009; Wittkopf et al., 2003).
1
 The US military, therefore, was the biggest in the 1990s 
compared to other major power‘s (see figure2.4).  
                                                          
1
 According to Chalmers Johnson, by September 11, 2001, the Department of Defence (DOD) 
―acknowledged at least 725 American military bases existed outside the United States‖. He adds that this 
number is not accurate because ―there are many more, since some bases exist under leaseholds, informal 
agreements, or disguises of various kinds‖ (2004: 4). Patrick J. Buchanan believes that the true number is 
about 1000 bases around the world. Since the EoCW, the US military has added new bases in ―North 
Africa, Central Asia, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, Balkan peninsula, and Eastern Europe‖ (2007: 127). 
However, in terms of US troops positioned outside, Clyde V. Prestowitz suggests that there were 
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Figure2. 4 Size of Arm, Selected Countries (2000) (in hundred thousands) 
Source: Mearsheimer (2001: 383-384). 
Since the collapse of the USSR, and prior to 9/11, the ―US has negotiated ‗access‘ 
arrangements for troops and equipments deployment in thirty eight countries (thirty in 
the Third World), in addition to the hundred bases in sixteen foreign lands that [it] 
already possessed‖ (Hoogvelt, 2001: 161). By the 1990s, the US Air Force, for 
example, ―had a presence of some sort on six of the world‘s continents‖ (Kaplan, 
2003a).
1
 In consequence, ―US military bases and carrier battle groups‖ circled the world 
(Ikenberry, 2004b: 609).
2
 Furthermore, there was public support for this level of 
defence spending and overseas deployment. The reasons for this support were ―fears of 
homeland vulnerability, concerns for preserving defense jobs, and support for 
maintaining the dominant US role in the world‖ (Kull & Destler, 1997: 134).3  
The American military was not only the largest in terms of quantity, but it also enjoyed 
unprecedented superiority in quality. The US spent huge money on military research 
                                                                                                                                                                          
―120.000 American troops in Europe; 92.000 in East Asia and the Pacific; 30.000 in North Africa, the 
Middle East, and South Asia; and 15.000 in the Western Hemisphere outside the United States‖ (2003: 
26).    
1
 There are several military strategists who consider ―air power the linchpin of a new Pax Americana, as 
land power had characterized Pax Romana and sea power Pax Britannica‖ (Atkinson, 1998). 
2
 ―One American aircraft carrier battle group can project more force than most of the world‘s armies put 
together … A carrier battle group is virtually indestructible. Its full complement comprises some 15,000 
personnel. Its aircraft alone can strike up to 700 targets in a single day within an accuracy of 1 meter. 
There is no equivalent in the world to its concentration of offensive military power. The United States 
does not just have one of these battle groups, it has 12 of them‖ (Sheetz, 2006: 3). 
3
According to John J. Accordino, in 1991, for instance, the total number of workforce in US defense 
industries and the Department of Defence (military and civilians) was about 6 millions, or 5% of the 
nation‘s 119 million workers. However, ―the total number of jobs that depended on defense spending was 
even larger [because] military or defense contractor job supports an additional service job in the 
community‖ (2000: 1). Therefore, Accordino suggests that no less than ―12 million person, or roughly 10 
percent of the US workforce, were directly or indirectly dependent upon defense employment in 1991‖ 
(2000: 1).    
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and development during the 1990 to prepare its military force for the requirements of 
the new American century (see figure 2.5).  
 
Figure2. 5 US Military Research and Development Outlay: 1990 to 2000 (in billions of US dollar) 
Data from: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883084.html#axzz0zyasrCc3 
These huge numbers equalled nearly 80% of the world‘s total military-related research 
and development at the time (Ikenberry, 2001c). Therefore, during the 1990s, American 
military force was seven times more advanced than that of its nearest rival, France (Cox, 
2002a).
1
 Kapstien (1994), Hirst (2002), Schuller & Grant (2003) and Black (2008) all 
stress that American military superiority relies on the ‗Revolution in Military Affairs‘ 
(RMA), which produces high-tech systems and capabilities. The new technology has 
enabled the US ―to make a post-heroic policy of intervention, in which the US need not 
risk its soldiers‘ lives to achieve policy objectives remote from the everyday concerns of 
its citizens‖ (Hirst, 2002: 329). Since the Gulf War (1990-91), the US has been testing 
the value of new military weapons and tactics such as the ―air-land battle, high level of 
readiness and strategic mobility, and advanced technology‖ (Cordesman, 1991: 40), to 
meet its new self-appointed tasks in its role as the only hegemon. Moreover, the US also 
maintained ―a strategic nuclear arsenal of over 6,000 nuclear warheads‖ (Brown, 2009: 
122) in addition to its conventional weaponry. 
Indeed, ―the nation-state system had never witnessed such a concentration of the 
resources of power in a single state‖ (Hook & Spanier, 2000: 263) and ―there has never 
in the past thousand years been a greater gap between the No. 1 world power and the 
No. 2‖ (Krauthammer, 1997). In this milieu, Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff at the time, asserts that ―no other nation on earth has the power we 
possess. More important, no other nation on earth has the trusted power that we 
                                                          
1
 In this context, it is true that the EU member states‘ militaries were bigger than the US‘ in terms of 
soldier numbers and that their combined defence budgets equalled three-quarters of the US‘, but in terms 
of technology and hardware there was no comparison (Judt, 2002).     
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possess‖ (1992: 33). The Secretary of State during the Clinton presidency, Warren 
Christopher, also states that ―today, our military is the best-equipped, best-trained, and 
best-prepared fighting force in the world‖ (1995: 8-9).  
This unique military status led James Chace to write in the mid-1990s, that America 
today ―enjoys a global military dominance that combines the transoceanic reach of Pax 
Britannica with military power of imperial Rome at the height of its power‖ (1996: 
116). Charles Krauthammer argues that America at the end of the 1990s after the CW 
was very different from historical hegemonic powers such as Great Britain. The British 
army, for example, was smaller than that of the next greatest competitors‘ armies and 
although the British navy was double the size of its rivals, its domination over the seas 
was shared by other major powers (1997-2002).  
This military might that once used to contain the USSR and its expansionist ideology, 
entitled the US to enlarge its goal to be nothing less than the ruler of the entire world 
(Chace, 1997a). As Dueck argues, ―the goal was not a balance in terms of military 
capabilities, [but] clear military superiority over potential adversaries‖ (2006: 13) and 
previous allies.  
2.3.2. Economic Strength: US Hegemony‟s Second Pillar  
Hegemony is not only about military power, but as Black argues, economic strength is a 
sine qua non to establish and sustain hegemony (2008). Robert J. McMahon also argues 
that ―any hegemonic power must, simultaneously, contain the dominant financial centre, 
possess a clear comparative advantage in a wide range of high-tech, high-profit 
industries, and function commercially as both the world's major exporter and its major 
importer‖ (1991: 137-138). In this context, the US was a unique state in the 1990s, not 
only in terms of military power, but also economically (Art, 2003; Harries, 2005; Black, 
2008). As shown above, the dismantling of the USSR renewed the ―relative strength of 
the American economy, [and] marked the real arrival of US global dominance‖ (Betts, 
2002: 21).  
In 1991, the date of the CW end, American companies‘ production of goods and 
services equalled US$5.6 trillion, or more than one quarter of worldwide production 
(Hook & Spanier, 2000; Walt, 2000). In 1992, the US‘ ―share of great power economic 
capabilities stood at no less than 35% and was probably closer to 39%‖. And its portion 
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of great power total capabilities was ―in a range of 44.3% to 46.1%‖ (Volgy & Imwalle, 
1995: 832). The US share of world‘s total GDP of 27.6% in 1997 was greater than any 
other single country‘s in the late 1990s as figure 2.6 shows.  
 
Figure2. 6 Shares of Gross World Product in 1998, selected countries 
Data from: (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 160) 
Furthermore, as figure 2.7 shows the US economic growth between 1990 and 1998 was 
almost four times that of the Japanese‘s and outperformed growth in the EU.  
 
Figure2. 7 Growth Between 1990 and 1998, selected economies 
Data from: (Ikenberry, 2001a, 2001c, 2003). 
In this context, in 1989, the year that witnessed the collapse of the Berlin Wall, 
America‘s economy was 1.8 times larger than its nearest rival, Japan, with a GDP of 
US$5.2 trillion. Although Japan ranked second to the US in terms of economic size, its 
production of US$3.4 trillion in the early 1990s was only ―three-fifths of the US total‖ 
(Hook & Spanier, 2000: 262), and its economy was ―about one-third the size of the 
United States‖ (Huisken, 2006). In 1995 alone, US GDP was US$7 trillion, achieving a 
growth of 30% from the 1989 indicators, while the Japanese and German economies 
had grown 4% and 5% respectively (Walker, 1996b; Dobson & Marsh, 2001) and 
between ―1995 and 2000, US GDP growth accelerated, rising from 3.1 percent to 4.1 
percent‖ (Soederberg, 2006: 162). America‘s GDP therefore equalled the collective 
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outputs of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (Hook & Spanier, 2000). In 
this context, it is very important to mention that ―65% of the top 80 companies in the 
world just happened to be American‖ (Cox, 2002b: 61).  
In the turn of the new millennium, when the US General National Production (GNP), 
was ―running well over $10 trillion a year‖, and constituted ―almost 30 percent of the 
world‘s combined GNPs‖ (Brown, 2009: 122), there was no other major power‘s 
economy can catch up or compete (see figure 2.8) 
 
 
Figure2. 8 GNP, selected countries (2000) (in trillions of US dollar 
Data from: (Mearsheimer, 2001: 383-384). 
Due to this unique economic status, the US, during the 1990s, more than any other 
country, ―served as an engine of growth overseas by importing far more‖ (Hook & 
Spanier, 2000: 262). Not only was US output increasing, but also the country ―was 
tapping the resources of the information revolution that has been transforming the world 
economy‖ (Nye, 2000: 54). The US was also the leader in higher education and the 
service industry (Walt, 2002). According to Martin Walker, ―only three non-American 
universities—Oxford, Cambridge, and London—seriously qualify for any list of the 
world‘s top 20 academic institutions‖ (2002: 38). In consequence, the US enjoyed the 
highest economic productivity and an unprecedented amount of scientific and 
technological resources (Modelski & Thompson, 1999; Ryan, 2000; Cameron, 2002; 
Judt, 2002; Wittkopf, et al., 2003; Pastusiak, 2004; Halliday, 2009). Such a unique 
economic power led the NSS of 1996 to argue clearly that ―our economic strength gives 
us a position of advantage on almost every global issue‖ (White House, 1996). 
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Furthermore, the US, throughout its history has ―repeatedly demonstrated the capacity 
to translate this economic weight into decisive military power‖ (Huisken, 2006).1  
2.3.3. Power From Values And Beliefs: The Third Pillar Of US Hegemony 
The US political culture that includes ―values, beliefs, and self-imagines … stand out as 
a primary source for American foreign policy‖ and these basics ―remain potent forces 
explaining what the United States does in its foreign policy‖ (Wittkopf & McCormick, 
2008: 10). The roots of this phenomenon can be traced back to America‘s very 
foundation. The US, since then, has regarded itself as an ‗exceptional‘ nation in world 
system as a ―city upon a hill in international system‖ (Williams et al., 1993: 17). Due to 
this, it believes that ―the export of its model of government—liberal democratic market 
capitalism—is a universal good‖ (Dunn, 2003: 285). This has been a very important 
source of hegemony. Just as material power is an important source for hegemony, 
ideology and values are also of great significance to a hegemon ―to compel deference to 
its principles and policies‖ (McMahon, 1991: 138). In this context, it is not true that the 
history of AFP is about the conflict between power and principles, as has usually been 
portrayed (Coll, 1995; Leffler, 2003; Christie, 2008). But, as Melvy P. Leffler argues, 
―America‘s ideals have always encapsulated its interests. America‘s ideology has 
always been tailored to correspond with its quest for territory and markets. In short, 
power, ideology and internal interests have always had a dynamic and unsettled 
relationship with one another‖ (2003: 1050). For this reason, Robert J. McKeever & 
Philip Davis argue that AFP‘s ―rhetoric has been peppered with widely understood 
codewords‖ such as liberty, freedom, human rights and democracy.2 Such notions are 
becoming ―essential to the formulation and practical conduct of international policy‖ 
                                                          
1
 This is demonstrated, for example, ―by developing its navy from unranked in the 1880s to second-
ranked by 1907, awesomely so following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and more or less 
continuously following the onset of the Cold War‖ (Huisken, 2006). In this way, America‘s economic 
boom of the 1990s supported its large military forces during the decade and afterwards (Art, 2003). 
2
 In this context, President Woodrow Wilson, for example, entered the war in 1917, not only to defeat 
Germany, or to enlarge the US geostrategic presence, but also to create a world safe for democracy and to 
guarantee the independence and dignity of small nations as well as bigger nations. Franklin Roosevelt, in 
a similar way, fought in the Second World War (WWII), not only to defeat the Axis, but also to secure 
four freedoms for the entire world. Freedom of religious thought, free speech and expression, and liberty 
from fear and want. To preserve world peace and security after the war, he supported the creation of the 
United Nations (UN). His successor, Harry Truman adopted the same agenda and continued the same way 
(Coll, 1995; Ambrosius, 2002; Callinicos, 2003; Wittkopf et al., 2003; Leffler, 2004; Holsti, 2006a; 
Christie, 2008). Ronald Reagan had also started what is so-called the second CW not only against a 
geopolitical rival or competitor, but also to defeat an ―empire of evil‖ and to enlarge liberty (Ambrosius, 
2002 & Kaplan & Kristol, 2003). 
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(2006: 172). In fact, ―US principles need US power every bit as much as US power 
needs principles‖ (Coll, 1995: 387). 
In this way, the victory over communism praised liberal ideology, democratic values, 
and capitalism. American culture, products and lifestyle, therefore, spread rapidly into 
every corner of the globe (Harries, 2005; Halliday, 2009). In addition to its material 
capabilities, the US values and culture constitute a source of its massive soft power in 
international politics (Hoffmann, 1989; Nye, 2002/2003). According to Walker (2002: 
38): 
The United States has established a unique cultural predominance, not just 
through the quality of its free principles and constitution but through the 
seductive power of its entertainments and fashions, from movies to blue jeans to 
gangsta rap. Never before has there been anything quite like this American 
domination of the world.  
In the same way, Krauthammer argues (1997):  
There has been mass culture. But there has never before been mass world 
culture. Now one is emerging, and it is distinctly American. Why, even the 
intellectual and commercial boulevard of the future, the Internet, has been set up 
in our own language and idiom. Everyone speaks American.  
In this way, the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine argued that ―American 
globalism … dominates everything. Not in a harsh, repressive, military form, but in 
people‘s heads‖ (cited in Harries, 2005: 227). This soft power was an additional source 
of the US‘ self-confidence and hegemony in this period (Maynes, 1999; Henriksen, 
2001; Cox, 2002a; Mazlish, 2007).  
Therefore, the defeat of the USSR‘s communist ideology enhanced the credibility and 
power of the US and offered the US an opportunity to be the world leader not only in 
military and economic power, but also ideologically and culturally. Values such as 
liberal ideology, democracy, and capitalism were used as a mechanism to expand US 
geo-strategy after the CW. In this milieu, President George H. W. Bush invaded Panama 
in the name of ―democracy‖ and prepared to liberate Kuwait in the name of defending 
the sovereignty of small states (Chomsky, 1992). Clinton in the same way intervened in 
the former Yugoslavia in the name of humanitarianism.  
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2.3.4. Political Power: The Fourth Pillar of US Hegemony 
Hegemony is not only about economic and military powers, but it also ―about will‖ 
(Layne, 2006: 11) and the political will is simply a cumulative result of all sorts of 
power. The US triumph over communism and the collapse of its CW rival not only 
transformed the world structure from being a bipolar to unipolar system, but also 
enhanced US centrality in the post-CW world. The US became the only global power 
with massive military and economic capabilities and a unique predominant position, 
both ideologically and culturally. Such a new scene offered the US an opportunity to be 
the only world leader and the most influential figure in driving world politics. World 
institutions such as the UN, the WTO, World Bank, and IMF, among others, became 
subjected to American influence and used to push the American agenda. On the other 
hand, America appeared as an indispensible nation according to Madeleine Albright 
(Chollet, 2007). In this context, Krauthammer argues that (1997): 
Diplomatically, nothing of significance gets done without us … Until the 
Americans arrive in Bosnia, the war drags on. When America takes to the 
sidelines in the Middle East, nothing moves. We decide if NATO expands and 
who gets in. And where we decide not to decide, as in Cambodia--often held up 
as an example of how the UN and regional powers can settle local conflicts 
without the U.S.--all hell breaks loose. 
2.3.5. Summary Of The Four Pillars Of US Hegemony 
This combination of powers consolidated the American hegemonic tendency during the 
1990s and reinforced the belief that the US could rule the world without risking much of 
its own blood or resources (Walt, 2002). In fact, when a state possesses such a 
concentration of power and can ―undertake an action alone,‖ unilateralism will be ―very 
feasible‖ (Alger, 2006: 51). This unique status of a concentration of powers led French 
Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine in early 1999 to suggest that American global 
dominance ―is not comparable, in terms of power and influence, to anything known in 
modern history‖ (cited in Ikenberry, 2001a: 191), and in the words of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Carter‘s National Security Advisor (NSA), the US was ―the first, last, and 
only global superpower‖ (cited in Nossal, 1999).  
Building on what has been said so far, the normal and traditional constraints on the 
actions of states could no longer limit American international behaviour (Maynes, 
1999). In consequence, AFP was ready to move into a new phase of unprecedented 
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hegemony (Leffler, 2003), and the collapse of its external rival gave the ―flexibility to 
US foreign policy that the Cold War had not allowed‖ (Kaufman, 2006: 124). Because 
of this huge size of power resources, any tiny shift in US policy can have significant 
effects for other countries (Ikenberry, 2001c). For this reason, Hoffmann questions that 
with no remaining rival, and no imminent challenge to its security and interests, and 
with such a combination of power resources ―what ought American foreign policy to 
be?‖ (1989). This question is difficult to answer because such a combination of power 
has ―perplexed politicians, pundits, and academicians as to [what to do]‖ (Henriksen, 
2001).  
2.4. The Hegemony‟s Communal Sources: The Burgeoning Influence Of The Neo-
Conservatives In The 1990s 
As argued in the first chapter, material capabilities and the lack of a principal geo-
strategic rival are very important for establishing hegemony, but they are not the only 
conditions needed. ―The present US hegemony did not fall from heaven; it is the result 
of human action‖ (Matzner, 2002: 1). In the case of the US, the rise of the neo-cons in 
the 1990s was a crucial element in pushing the country towards an unprecedented phase 
of militant and hegemonic foreign policy (FP). Importantly, the neo-cons‘ ideological 
and political influence was apparent long before the EoCW. For example, they firmly 
stood against the strategy of containment, believing in roll-back and regime change for 
failed states and unfavoured governments. They also criticised the Nixon-Ford 
administration‘s détente policy with the USSR during the 1970s, which they regarded as 
similar to an ideological defeat (Allin, 1994). However, they were able to extend their 
influence when Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency. Reagan ended the post-
Vietnam soft containment policy and started the ‗second-CW‘ (Garthoff, 1994; Allin, 
1994; Maynes, 1996; Flanigan & Zingale, 1998; Hastedt, 2000 Halper & Clarke, 2004; 
Vanaik, 2007).   
The neo-cons believed that the EoCW was an American ideological victory, primarily 
driven by Reagan‘s ‗victory school‘ (Hastedt, 2000; Lundestad, 1993). This conviction 
led them to believe that ―the method used to attain it [the Cold War triumph] licensed 
the United States to throw its weight around the world‖ (Guyatt, 2003: 234). The 
triumph over communism gave the neo-cons a new energy to enhance their position 
within the US political scene and pursue their radical and hegemonic agenda to replace 
Chapter Two: America As A Hyperpower: Trends And Transformations During The 1990s 
79 
 
the CW containment strategy. In this way, ―ideological polarization between the major 
parties, increasing support for the Republican Party among former Democrats, and a 
shift to the right of the Republican party under the growing influence of the religious 
right‖ became obvious after the elections of 1992 and 1994 (Minkenberg & Dittgen, 
1996: xiv). Furthermore, the long cleavage between the Republican traditional 
conservatives and neocons increased during this period (Cohen, 2005; Isaacson, 2006a). 
On the other hand, the CW ideological divisions did not stop at the end of the CW. 
Rather, they stretched to the new era. AFP leaders, therefore ―perceived the events 
surrounding the end of the Cold War, and the lessons to be drawn from these events, 
through their old ideological lenses‖ (Murray & Cowden, 1999: 456).    
Within such shifts, neo-cons‘ intellectual manoeuvres ranged from Reagan‘s utopianism 
to Bush I‘s pragmatic realism. Therefore, they supported the 1990-91 Gulf War, not 
only to establish the new world order (NWO), but also, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, to remedy the defeatist ‗Vietnam Syndrome‘ effects, and ready America for the 
unipolar moment (Hoff, 1994; Huisken, 2006). Despite President Bush I‘s alleged lack 
of vision and President Clinton‘s preference for leading from within the international 
community, and focusing on geo-economics instead of the traditional geo-politics, there 
was a team of pervasive neo-cons within and outside both administrations which 
worked continuously to influence and redirect AFP to a more ideological, radical, and 
aggressive path (Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Gardner, 2005; Huisken, 2006). By the end of 
the 1990s, not only was the Republican Party dominated by the neo-cons‘ school of 
thought, but also the wider debate on AFP. A set of influential journals, such as the New 
Republican, the National Interest, the Weekly Standard—and a collection of pervasive 
and powerful think tanks, such as the Project of a New American Century, the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institute, the Hudson Institute and the 
Heritage Foundation—took a leading role in energizing the neo-cons‘ intellectual 
dominance over AFP thinking (Szabo, 2004). According to Philips et al (2007) it is not 
true that there was no neo-cons presence within the Clinton administration and that they 
had to promote their project from outside the policy-making circle. However, it is true 
that an ‗obscure bunch‘ of officials who worked under the Reagan and Senior Bush 
Chapter Two: America As A Hyperpower: Trends And Transformations During The 1990s 
80 
 
administrations came back to power to promote their previous agenda of global military 
dominance and leadership (Lobe & Barry 2002; Lobe, 2003; Escobar, 2003).
1
 
The EoCW affected neo-cons‘ proposals for the militarization of AFP. This was 
because the EoCW, as Yuen F. Khong argues, deprived the neo-cons of ―a clear 
external other or outside enemy upon which to focus‖. On the other hand, they were 
also dissatisfied with Bush Senior‘s and Clinton‘s failure to maintain the military 
spending levels of the CW era (2008: 254). Despite these obstacles, the neo-cons kept 
trying to militarise US post-CW foreign policy by resisting any proposals for reducing 
military expenditure and by promoting US military superiority (Barry, 2004b; Huisken, 
2006). Kagan and Kristol (1996) criticised Clinton‘s soft FP and called for the 
establishment of American post-CW hegemony, by arguing that the US should increase 
its defence budget in order to meet the requirements of worldwide leadership. 
Documents, such as the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of 1992, the Project of the 
New American Century‘s document of 2000, written and signed by key neo-cons, 
crystallised their vision about America‘s post-CW strategy; US global dominance 
(Escobar, 2003; Dueck, 2004; Parmar, 2005; Clark, 2005; Philip, et. al, 2007; Tunander, 
                                                          
1
 During the debate over globalisation in the mid-1990s, the neo-cons focused on US economic 
supremacy and how to preserve national interests and secure energy supplies (Lobe & Barry 2002). 
Moreover, the reconciliation of the neo-cons with the Democratic Party was enhanced during the Clinton 
administration because the administration did not shy away from the hegemonic agenda. In addition, the 
neo-cons themselves were also ―more liberal critics of liberalism than converts to conservatism‖ 
(Rovinsky, 1997: 4). Therefore, not only key neo-con members found their way into the Clinton 
administration, but also the neo-cons‘ FP prints were obvious during his administration (Barry, 2004a). In 
reality, the neo-cons ―found little that was objectionable in Clinton‘s commitment to spreading 
democracy and promoting free trade‖ (Reus-Smit, 2004: 29), because they ―are optimists, hyper-
Wilsonian in their belief that the world can be democratized and thus pacified‖ (Szabo, 2004: 55). 
However, ―they hated his weak and inconsistent internationalism and his failure to give full expression to 
America‘s indispensible role‖ (Reus-Smit, 2004: 29). Although the influence of the neo-cons within the 
Clinton administration was limited compared to that of his predecessor‘s administration, they were still 
important actors. For example, many neo-con intellectuals penned pieces of work arguing that the US 
should lead on the basis of opportunity and American hegemony would be the ideal for the world; for 
example,. William Kristol and Robert Kagan‘s 1996 Foreign Affairs article. Because of the absence of a 
clear external enemy, Kristol and Kagan focused instead on the NSC-68 and the Team A and B debate 
about the Soviets as basis for strategic thinking to lay the foundation for AFP in the post-CW 
environment. From their viewpoint, neither Buchanan‘s neo-isolationism nor Clinton‘s Wilsonian multi-
lateralism ideal perspectives for the post-Soviet America. They argued that conservative realism would be 
preferable. The neo-cons did not support Henry Kissinger‘s detent policy during the CW, but they 
espoused his promotion of realpolitik in the post-CW era because it de-linked ideals of foreign policy and 
called for preserving US military supremacy (Szabo, 2004; Khong, 2008). Paul Wolfowitz was a neo-con 
who criticized Clinton‘s FP from his academic position as a dean of Johns Hopkins School for Advanced 
International Studies between 1994 and 2001 while remaining influential inside the administration 
(Bolton, 2008).  Those ideas will be very important after 11 September when George W. Bush put them 
into practice.     
Chapter Two: America As A Hyperpower: Trends And Transformations During The 1990s 
81 
 
2007; Vanaik, 2007).
1
 They adopted a ―proposed agenda involving concepts like regime 
change, benevolent hegemony, unipolarity, and pre-emption‖ (Fukuyama, 2006a: 3) 
based on militarism because they believed that the US was ―ill-equipped for the post-
Cold war era‖ (Robin, 2004). Therefore, the realist approach to AFP during the CW was 
being replaced by a new ideological FP thinking style.  
Alongside the neo-cons‘ ideology, the motto of ‗global democratisation‘ occupied the 
US official discourse during the 1990s. The tendency for spreading democracy 
worldwide and the intention to rollback unfavoured regimes were part of the main focus 
of the neo-cons‘ political discourse. For example, in May 1998 a group of key neo-cons 
(critics and politicians) wrote a letter to the President and Leaders of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives calling for replacing Saddam Hussein‘s regime in Iraq with a 
democratic one.
2
 The rhetoric of democratisation became a new tool, which the US 
selectively applied to achieve its ends (Garthoff, 1994; Allin, 1994; Ehrman, 1995; 
Cronin, 1996; Maynse, 1996; Hastedt, 2000). The post-CW neo-con principles focused 
around four key issues: democratisation of world politics; concerns about human rights 
and domestic politics; that US power can be used not only pragmatically but also 
idealistically; and unilateralism as the preferred FP perspective because of their 
sceptical views about multi-lateralism, international organisations and international law 
(Fukuyama, 2006a). 
Thus, the neo-cons and their aggressive ideology played a significant role in leading 
America toward a new phase of hegemony in the post-Soviet world.  
2.5. Alternatives To The CW‟s FP Perspective: Hegemony Versus Balance Of 
Power 
The victory over communism encouraged scholars to offer new proposals for AFP 
strategy in the new era. The justification for such efforts was the claim that ―the very 
                                                          
1
 The report/strategy DPG was one of the earliest pieces of evidence that uncovered America‘s new 
perspective for dealing with the new world order. It might also be understood as an early attempt to 
militarize AFP in the new era (Tyler, 1992; Lobe, 2003; Everest, 2004; Cohen, 2005; Right Web, 2008). 
2
 The calls for toppling Saddam Hussein regime first appeared in Paul Wolfowitz‘s proposal for DPG of 
1992 as a vital strategy to secure the flow of oil and raw materials to the US. The toppling of Saddam 
Hussein re-appeared in 1996, when neo-cons such as Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser 
reported to the new Israeli Likud government regarding the peace process. They called for removing the 
Iraq regime and re-establishing the principle of pre-emption doctrine. From their viewpoint, Iraq‘s future 
could profoundly affect the Middle East‘s strategic balance (Katzman, 2003).   
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thing that gave structure and purpose to post-WWII American foreign policy‖ had 
disappeared: ―fear of communism, fear of the Soviet Union, and a determination to 
contain both‖ (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 6). Some scholars argue that the US had not only 
been deprived of its CW mission, but also, the rationality of the containment strategy 
that guaranteed US dominion in the CW had ended (Nye, 1990a; Eagleburger, 1993). 
This deficit led the US knowledge community (individuals and think tanks) to offer 
alternatives to the containment strategy even before the EoCW. The delay in producing 
a new perspective to deal with the new status quo, according to Zalmay Khalilzad, was 
―squandering a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to shape the future of the world‖ (1995a: 
57).  
The important factor is that although neo-realists argued that the US‘ unipolarity could 
not be sustained and a multi-polar would emerge, other critics contradicted this 
perspective to pave the way towards American absolute hegemony in the new era. 
Individual examples include Francis Fukuyama‘s (1989-1992) thesis of the End of 
History, Samuel Huntington‘s (1993) controversial hypothesis of the Clash of 
Civilisations, and Charles Krauthammer‘s (1990-1991) unipolar moment, which were 
examples of efforts to guide America towards hegemony. Institutional attempts include 
the proposal of the Project of the New American Century (PNAC) (Tsygankov, 2003; 
Aysha, 2003). In this context, it would be fair to remember what John Maynard Keynes, 
more than a half century ago, wrote: ―the ideas of economists and political philosophers, 
both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood‖ (cited in Tsygankov, 2003: 55).  
Accordingly, these ideas have been perceived internationally as ―constraints to social 
and cross-cultural creativity at best, and as a war-prone justification for a global West-
centred dictatorship at worst‖ (Tsygankov, 2003: 54). However, in general, H. W. 
Brands argues that the arguments of Fukuyama and Huntington ―had policy 
implications for the United States, but on the whole they described rather than 
prescribed‖ (2006: 11).  
2.5.1. The End of History (1989): AFP‟s “Geo-economic Approach” 
In summer 1989 when he was the Deputy Director of the Department of State‘s (DOS) 
policy planning staff, the neo-con Francis Fukuyama celebrated the Western victory in 
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the CW and offered his vision of the post-CW international order (Roberts, 1991; 
Bacevich, 2007). His article The End of History contained ―the usual disclaimer that his 
opinions did not reflect those of the US government‖ (Roberts, 1991: 518). Roberts 
(1991) and Crockatt (2007) argue that Fukuyama‘s thesis was one of several answers to 
the urgent question regarding the world system after the prolonged bipolarity of the 
CW. In this context, David Ryan claims that Fukuyama turned back to the Western 
heritage to provide ―an intellectual framework at a time when the president lacked a 
‗vision thing‘ and the nation emerged into a bewildering future‖ (2000: 184). 
Fukuyama‘s argument is rooted in the idealistic and liberalist heritage of AFP 
(Prestowitz, 2003). However, as Andrei P. Tsygankov argues, it is ―a hegemonic and 
expansionist‖ perspective (2003: 54).  
Fukuyama‘s response to the EoCW cannot be separated from the discussion above, the 
triumphalist school of thought that identified the EoCW ―as a victory of the good over 
the evil‖ (Carlos, 2004). The thesis promoted the view that democratic capitalism won 
the CW and that the Western ideas had become universal (Gray, 1998; Cohen, 2005; 
Crockatt, 2007; Bolton, 2008). Therefore, it can be viewed as an early attempt to push 
the US towards unilateralism. Fukuyama did not just celebrate the Western victory but 
―theoretically articulated and politically justified these policy beliefs for what would 
become the post-Cold War world‖ (Tsygankov, 2003: 58). This belief of the victory of 
Western Liberalism cannot be isolated from the Western conservative struggle of the 
late 1980s against the communist ideology (Gray, 1998; Tsygankov, 2003). In early 
1987, Fukuyama before the disintegration of the USSR, argued that ideology was no 
longer the dominant factor in the creation of the Soviet foreign policy objectives 
(Muller, 1992). The EoCW gave his previous views credibility, leading him to proclaim 
the end of history. Accordingly, the End of History thesis not only put forward the idea 
of the end of ideology, but also initiated a new ideology for the new era in which 
American liberalism triumphs over its rivals (Dumbrell & Barrett, 1990). From this 
perspective, the majority of previous conflicts, particularly the CW, were ―cases of 
ideology versus liberalism‖ (Roberts, 1991: 518). In turn, the defeat of Fascism and 
Marxism-Leninism, and the triumph of liberalism, led to the end of history, and the only 
remaining legitimate regimes were liberal democracies (Roberts, 1991; Fukuyama, 
1992). In this argument, Fukuyama delegitimized non-Western liberal regimes such as 
China and most of the Third World regimes. On the other hand, that victory over the 
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communist ideology with its economic style, guides to ―a growing common 
marketization of international relations, and a diminution of the likelihood of large-scale 
conflict between states‖ (Artaud, 1992: 185). This is the materialistic dimension of the 
victory in which the victorious should gain the rewards of victory.  
The influence of the Fukuyama‘s thesis over AFP strategy in the 1990 was profound. 
For instance, Clinton‘s perspective of globalisation and a free global economy as 
Richard Crockatt argues, was ―broadly consonant with the Fukuyama thesis … 
Fukuyama‘s analysis helped to set the American agenda for the 1990s‖ (2007: 137). 
Therefore, according to Andrew J. Bacevich, Fukuyama ―held that economic security 
was the first pillar of US foreign policy; the second and third pillars were streamlining 
the military and promotion of democratic values‖ (2007: 34).  
2.5.2. The Clash Of Civilisations (1993): AFP‟s “Geo-Cultural Approach” 
During the political confusion of the transitional period (1989-1993) critics such as 
Michael Clough argue that ―without clear and present danger, the public is no longer 
willing to trust experts to make the right decisions‖ (2004: 80, 81). This is because ―at a 
fundamental level, our enemy is our pretext‖ (Sulfaro & Crislip, 1997: 104). As Shoon 
K. Murray and Jason Meyers (1999) argue, the creation of an enemy is important for 
mobilising the nation around common objectives.  
Huntington‘s Clash of Civilisation thesis is based on this perception. The creation of a 
new enemy would be beneficial to US hegemony. Thus, Huntington argues that 
Fukuyama‘s End of History argument suffers from ―the single alternative fallacy‖. It is 
rooted in the CW assumption that ―the only alternative to communism is liberal 
democracy and that the demise of the first produces the universality of the second‖. 
However, Huntington argues that ―there are many forms of authoritarianism, 
nationalism, corporatism and market communism (as in China) that are alive and well in 
today‘s world‖ (1993a: 191). Therefore, he suggests that after the CW ―there is clearly a 
need for a new model that will help us to order and understand central developments in 
world politics‖ (1993a: 187), and alternatively, offer a new strategy of 
‗cultural/civilisational clash‘ instead of the old geo-political containment strategy. 
According to Emad E. Aysha, the clash of civilisations thesis was ―stylized as, and 
probably intended to be, the X article of the post-Cold War era‖ (2003: 113). In contrast 
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to those critics who predicted that China, Germany, or Japan might fill the position of 
the USSR and emerge as potential enemies to the US, the clash of civilisations thesis 
offered a set of ambiguous threats to America. However, such ambiguity could prove 
useful for the American hegemony project because it gives the US the excuse to be 
involved globally under the pretext of preserving its interests and defending its security. 
Therefore, in contrast to Tsygankov who suggests that the clash of civilisations thesis 
was ―defensive and isolationist‖ (2003: 54), critics, such as Layne (1994), Smith 
(2002b) and Aysha (2003) argue it is hegemonic and aggressive. Steve Smith argues 
that Huntington assumes that ―a world without US primacy will be a world with more 
violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the 
United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global 
affairs‖ (2002: 173). Layne posits that the perspective ―held the assumption that 
American security hinges on its ability to maintain its international primacy‖ (1994: 21), 
while Aysha considers that Huntington‘s thesis ―promotes US geo-political interests, 
maintaining US primacy, strengthening the Atlantic alliance, and identifying potential 
enemies and allies‖ (2003: 114).  
In contrast to those critics who deny the influence of Huntington‘s thesis over the US 
external agenda, Fawas A. Gerges suggests that while American leaders did not believe 
in Huntington‘s thesis, ―American post-Cold war policy appears to be affected by the 
fear of an ‗Islamic threat‘‖ (1999: 4). In the same vein, Steve Smith suggests that the 
dangerous effect of Huntington‘s thesis is that it ―seems to have guided US policy since 
September 11‖ (2002: 175).  
2.5.3. The Project For The New American Century
1
 (2000) 
The task of theorising of US hegemony was not only undertaken by individuals, but also 
by think tanks (or groups). Central amongst these bodies was the Project of the New 
American Century (PNAC). Its document of 2000 calls for establishing a new American 
global leadership in the new century. The document reproduces the essential concepts of 
                                                          
1
 The PNAC is a think tank founded in 1997 by dozens neo-cons, social conservatives and military-
industrial complex representatives. This body was established to remedy the conservative‘s failure to 
advance a clear strategy for AFP in the post-CW era; therefore its founders promoted the concept of US 
global leadership in the post-Soviet world based on American military power and strength. Among the 25 
signatories were Paul Wolfowitz, Luis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Elliott Abrams, Zalmay 
Khalilzad and William J. Bennett (Lobe & Barry 2002; Lobe, 2003). 
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the DPG of the early 1990s. It calls for preserving America‘s unipolar position and 
taking the opportunity to establish the new American century through rebuilding its 
military capabilities and stopping other major powers from becoming new rivals. It 
offers a set of new missions and tactics deemed more fitting to America‘s unique 
position and role in the post-CW world. Crucially, the document calls for readjusting 
US nuclear deterrence in order to be enable the US to outweigh the current and potential 
nuclear powers from the previous doctrine that was rooted in counter-deterrence with 
the Soviets. The document calls for increasing the US defence budget, and raising the 
numbers of American forces to at least 1.6 million. To ready America for the 21
st
 
century the document also offers new tactical steps such as the repositioning of 
American bases to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia and shifting the deployment of 
the US navy to respond to rising strategic concerns in East Asia. However, the most 
striking idea is the assertion that such a project of global dominion could not be 
accepted by Americans unless the state faced a new Pearl Harbour (The Project of the 
New American Century, 2000).  
The document‘s recommendation concerning nuclear operations appeared later in the 
Nuclear Posture Review Report prepared by the Department of Defence and submitted 
to Congress on 31 December 2001. The report, which became public two months later, 
offers new tactics and directions for the US nuclear power in the post-Soviet era. Since 
then the US has prevented not only Russia and China, but also other potential 
challengers like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria from developing their nuclear 
potential. The report also calls for using nuclear power against biological or chemical 
powers that could attack the US (Global Security, 2002; Arkin, 2002; Clark, 2005; 
Global Security, 2005).    
PNAC members had previously criticized Clinton‘s neo-liberal FP perspective, 
claiming that his policy did not suit America‘s unipolar moment. In 1998, several 
grandee members sent a message to Clinton over regime change in Iraq.
1
 In addition, 
dozens of the PNAC founders wrote to members of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate leaders, Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott, asking them to take the lead in 
foreign policy issues. They argued that President Clinton did not represent the sort of 
                                                          
1
 Among the signatories were Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay 
Khalilzad, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. (Khong, 2008: 258). 
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decisive presidential leadership that America needed as the only superpower (George, 
2007). This group and their organisation became more influential during the 
administration of President George W. Bush (Lobe & Barry 2002; Smith, 2005a). 
In sum, just as Fukuyama‘s thesis is based on the Western liberal democrat dogma, and 
provides theoretical cover for Western capitalism and liberal democrat political system 
as the only legitimate model in the post-Soviet era, a former National Security Council 
(NSC) official in the Carter administration, Huntington‘s thesis is deeply rooted in the 
concept of the ‗centrality of the Western civilisation‘, which assumes ―the West stands 
against the rest‖. Moreover, it provides academic cover for the supremacy of Western 
culture (Aysha, 2003: 114). Importantly, both Fukuyama and Huntington are aware that 
in the post-CW era the US is seen as the ‗doorkeeper‘ of Western values as the unipole 
power. In doing so, the two scholars reintroduced old terminology in a new context, not 
only to capture the changing characteristics of the post-CW era, but also to preserve 
American hegemony over its sphere of influence and to legitimate its expansion over 
the rest (Crokett, 2007). Accordingly, both theses offer a hegemonic and unilateralist 
roadmap for AFP. In this way, Aysha argues that although the two theses were different 
in style, the aim was the same (Aysha, 2003: 114). The PNAC‘s strategy is also in the 
same way offering the proposal needed to maintain and sustain the unipolar moment. 
American hegemony in the 21
st
 century cannot be guaranteed unless military power is 
modernised, expanded and implemented.   
2.6. Balancing Against The Hegemon: Geo-Political Challenges  
This section discusses potential scenarios for the other major powers to balance against 
the US in the post-Soviet era. As discussed in the first chapter, critics, and particularly 
neo-realists, were unsure about the evolution of the post-CW‘s geo-political scene. They 
predicted that the post-CW era ―may simply see the emergence of a five-way-balance-
of-power system rotating around the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and what 
remains of the Soviet Union‖ (Bird & Alperovitz, 1992: 207). Accordingly, the US 
hegemonic status might not only be challenged by its CW allies (Germany, the EU, and 
Japan), but also from old foes such as China and Russia (Bird & Alperovitz, 1992; 
Cumings, 1992; Haass, 1997). Meanwhile, Americans were uncertain about who was 
the new potential enemy and challenger (Lieber, 2005; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006). AFP 
studies offered several different answers to the question during the 1990s, which are 
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―not as clear-cut as they were when the Soviet Union was … [the US‘s] main 
adversary‖ (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 15). The following sections trace some proposals 
and fears about the then geo-political status quo. 
2.6.1. Japan And Germany: Allies Or Potential Rivals? 
At the EoCW, Richard Rosecrance (1992) argues that by the EoCW the traditional state 
would be in transition and military power in IR would also be discounted. The post-CW 
state might be a trading state. On the basis of such a view, the author predicts that 
economic power would put Japan and Germany in a predominant position in the 21
st
 
century, unless the US shifted from its dominant concern with military power 
maximization to revitalise its economic competitive capabilities.  
Rosecrance wrote: ―the most potent future antagonism the world could witness is a 
radical division between the United State and Japan‖ (1992: 78). Japan therefore was 
seen as a potential challenger to the US due to its economic penetration of the US 
market. Accordingly, critics such as Deibel (1992), Garthoff (1992) and Wallerstein 
(1993) argued that Japan would be transformed into a world hegemon, particularly if it 
integrated more with South East Asia. Economic indicators highlight that Japanese 
direct investment had increased six-times from 1985 to 1988, while its trade and exports 
with South East Asia had also doubled during the same period. In addition, Cumings 
predicted that the Asian countries, and Australia, would ―have a GNP of $7.2 trillion by 
the year 2000, which will be bigger than that of the EC [European Community and] … 
the number of effective consumers in the region will be at least as large as Europe‖ 
(1992: 97). For these reasons, Friedman and Le Band, predicted in the very early 1990s 
that Japan and the US ―would descend into a downward spiral from trade friction to 
protectionism to armed showdown over markets and raw materials‖ (cited in Benn, 
2007: 972). Huntington (1993a) argues that Japan attempted to use its economic power 
to replace US global influence and to weaken American primacy, which meant ―the 
continuation of [the cold] war by other means‖ (Mueller, 2005: 19). Such fears 
motivated the Clinton administration to attempt to rectify trade imbalance with Japan, as 
will be illustrated in the next chapter.  
Not only economically, but psychologically, Japan was entitled to be a new competitor. 
In this way, Richard Rosecrance argues that (1992: 78):  
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beneath the external policy of a Japanese trading state boil nationalist 
resentments directed at a half century of American tutelage and Western neglect 
... if current trends continue, it may not too long before ideological 
rationalisations of Confucian strength and vitality are propounded by Japan as 
antidotes to supposed Western decadence and growth.   
However, in contrast to this perspective, Nye argues that ―Japan remains one-
dimensional in its economic power‖ (1990a: 513). Japan was a ―first class economy but 
third rate in politics‖ (Arrighi & Silver, 1999: 6). As Volgy and Imwalle highlight, 
―Japan‘s economy is not matched by similar military or political capabilities‖ (1995: 
823), while Ikenberry perceived Japan to be ―stagnant‖ (2004: 609). Irrespective of its 
economic strength, Japan ―will remain a vulnerable state‖ (Chace, 1997b: 79). 
However, the Japanese threat did not last long, because, by the mid-1990s ―the once 
miracle economy of Japan was in crisis‖ (Cox, 2002a: 270). The end of the Japanese 
economic miracle led Huntington to turn his argument from the struggle over economic 
resources as a source of war to the clash of civilisations (Mueller, 2005).  
Meanwhile, several scholars (e.g., Steel, 1992; Garthoff, 1992; Wallerstein, 1993; 
Peterson, 1996; Ikenberry, 2001b) paid particular attention to Germany rather than other 
European states as a potential competitor to the US in the new era. They argue that 
while the CW offered a solution to the German question, its termination, on the 
contrary, brought the German matter into the spotlight once again. Its reunification, in 
addition to its geo-political influence in the recently independent states of Eastern 
Europe, could revive its traditional tendency to adopt an independent geo-political role. 
If Germany succeeded in doing so, it could pose constraints on American hegemony in 
Europe and elsewhere. Therefore, Peterson suggests that ―the New Transatlanticism 
may be viewed largely as a by-product of German unification‖ (1996: 58).  
However, in contrast to this perspective, the resurgence of Germany as a rival to the US 
was undermined by the problems associated with its reunification ―especially the large 
costs involved and high unemployment in the former East-Germany [that] diverted 
German‘s attention inward and delayed its ambitious European agenda‖ 
(Ingimundarson, 2000: 181). On the other hand, the main concern of Germany was not a 
geopolitical struggle, but its economic power, which might threaten US hegemony in 
the post-Soviet world. 
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In reality, Chollet (2008) argues that the EoCW was a sort of paradoxical moment 
because of the contradiction between victory, defeat and decline. On the one hand, it 
was regarded as a victorious moment for the US and its allies. However, on the other 
hand, some thought that Germany and Japan were the real victors; America, from their 
viewpoint, had sacrificed its economic potential struggling against communism, while 
the Germans and Japanese were able to expand their economies. This led some to repeat 
the early 1980s assertions about the US as a declining power. Nye, however, points out 
that ―even a reunited Germany is only one fifth the size of the United States economy‖ 
(1990a: 513). Waltz, ignoring the economic aspect, argues that ―the ghastly experiences 
of Germany and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century make them reluctant to 
step forth [towards becoming rivals to the US]‖ (2009a: 32). 
2.6.2. The European Union: The New Regional Power As A Potential Rival 
The EU (as a political and economic regional unity) was also considered to be a 
potential rival to the US at the EoCW. According to Dannreuther (2007), the US 
supported European integration when it served American hegemony on the continent 
and to contain the USSR. Nevertheless, after the EoCW, the status of the EU changed. 
The independence of the Eastern European countries, EU enlargement towards the east 
and the reunification of Germany added further power to the European unification 
project and arguably led to closer cooperation and deeper integration amongst 
Europeans (Garthoff, 1992). In addition, several European states such as France and 
Germany were enthusiastic about building a common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP), despite the numerous obstacles. Moreover, Europeans appeared to be willing to 
play a crucial role in international affairs. Therefore their seeking to be more 
independent of the US was an appropriate response (Schirm, 1998; Smith, 2003). The 
French approach to the negotiations of the European Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) appeared as a desire to charge the EU with ―the defense of Europe, for 
Europe, by Europeans‖ (De La Serre, 1996: 32). This shift was seen as a threat to US 
political influence over the CW allies (Ikenberry, 2001b). Regardless of the mutual 
cooperation of the CW, the absence of the USSR ―made cooperation more difficult 
because there no longer seemed to be an imperative for collective action in the face of a 
common enemy‖ (Lieber, 2005: 25). Transatlantic unity, therefore, could potentially be 
torn apart in the post-Soviet era because the allies were no longer dependent on the 
American military role for protecting their security. In accordance with the neo-realist 
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approach, Ikenberry argues that ―without the cohesion provided by a common external 
threat … the major powers would revert to competitive strategies driven by the 
underlying structure of anarchy‖ (2001b: 21).  
However, the EU was suffering from several weaknesses. First, although the EU was 
equal to the US in terms of economic weight and population, it lacked the geo-strategic 
presence (Ikenberry, 2001b; Clark, 2005). Second, Europe was drawn inward with its 
post-CW transitions: German reunification; the impact of the East European countries‘ 
independence; creating the single currency, the Euro; the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia; and EU enlargement towards the east. Europe, therefore, was not in a 
position to be either a military or a political rival to the US (Mastanduno, 1997; Chace, 
1997b).  
Although pre-2002 military indicators showed that the EU member states‘ total soldiers 
were more than the US‘s, and their combined defence budgets were about 70% of the 
US‘s, the EU lacked the qualitative power and the geopolitical prestige that America 
had (Judt, 2002). This is not the complete story. Volgy and Imwalle (1995) suggest that 
the emergence of the EU as a potential challenger to the US is unlikely in the near 
future unless the internal mechanisms of the decision-making process are changed. This 
idea is also expressed by Nye when he argues that ―unless progress on political 
unification in Europe accelerates well beyond current plans, the United States is likely 
to remain by far the largest power in the next decade‖ (1990a: 513). Furthermore, Waltz 
argues that ―despite its plentiful resources, Europe does not constitute a political unit 
able to act in the arena of foreign and military policy‖ (2009a: 32). Despite the lack of 
threat, tensions arose between the two sides over issues such as commerce, and the EC‘s 
international role in the immediate post-CW era. More serious differences arose over 
sanctions against Iraq and trade with Iran (Keohane & Nye, 1993; Dittgen, 1996; Nye, 
2000; Ikenberry, 2004b). However, building on the above discussion, and in line with 
what has been said in the previous chapter, Europe will not stand in the way of US 
hegemony due to several impediments (domestic and international). 
2.6.3. China 
In the minds of many Americans, US hegemony could be exclusively challenged by 
China. In a forecast on the global situation in 2015, released in December 2000, the US 
National Intelligence Commission argues (Benjian, 2001): 
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If China becomes stronger, it will then seek favourable rearrangement of power 
in the Asia-Pacific and may engage in conflicts with its neighbours and some 
outside forces. As a rising power, China will keep on expanding its own 
influence without considering the US interests. 
China was seen a long-term challenger to the US dominance, not only because of its 
military capabilities, but also due to its economic progress since the 1980s, when it 
opened its domestic market to foreign investment. By the 1990s, the Chinese economy 
was performing strongly and had started to be an economic giant (Wallerstein, 1993; 
Maynes, 1996; Hyland, 1999; Callinicos, 2003). China‘s total trade increased more than 
eightfold in a space of only 14 years, jumping from only US$20.66 billion to US$165.6 
billion between 1978 and 1992. This sharp increase saw China ranked as the eleventh 
largest economy by trade. Furthermore, Mearsheimer illustrates that ―If China‘s per 
capita GNP equals South Korea‘s, China's overall GNP would be almost $10.66 trillion, 
which is about 1.35 times the size of American GNP. If China‘s per capita GNP is a half 
of Japan‘s, China‘s overall GNP would be roughly 2.5 times bigger than America‘s‖ 
(2001: 398). Therefore, there was a general conviction that China would no longer be 
content to play a marginal role, but would become an influential player (Gong, 1994).  
Because of such predictions, critics such as Charles W. Maynes (1996) imagine that 
China might play the former role of the USSR and replace Moscow as an enemy for the 
US. Militarily, ―following US successes in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the 
Kosovo campaign of 1999‖ (Owen, 2001/2002: 120), China increased ―its gross 
military spending and attempt[ed] to modernize its navy, air force, and missile arsenal‖ 
(Owen, 2001/2002: 119). Furthermore, following in the steps of Huntington‘s clash of 
civilisations thesis, Volgy and Imwalle (1995) emphasize the sharp ideological 
differences with the US as a potential motive to challenge US hegemony. However, 
they acknowledge ―but it may take decades of sustained economic growth before the 
Chinese can upgrade their domestic infrastructure or their military to superpower status‖ 
(1995: 823).  
In a similar vein, James Chace argues that ―China was on the rise‖ and maybe someday 
would vie with the US, ―but not in the near term‖ (1997b: 79). Waltz emphasises this 
view when he argues that ―China, though growing rapidly, still has a long way to go‖ 
(2009a: 32), while Cox also agrees that ―China was bothersome but marginal‖ (2002a: 
270). Furthermore, Christopher (1995) and Ikenberry (2001b) argue that China would 
threaten US interests only if the Chinese challenged the international community and 
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attempted to destabilize Asia and the rest of the world. Therefore, the early post-CW 
predictions that China might be able to fill the USSR‘s position and challenge 
America‘s hegemony have not been fulfilled. The 1990s illustrated that China 
accommodated to US wishes and was no more than a developing country (Ikenberry, 
2001c; Callinicos, 2003; Ikenberry, 2004b).  
2.6.4. Russia 
Close relations between the US and Russia started after Gorbachev‘s political revolution 
and peaked in 1990-91 when the Soviets and the Americans jointly worked to liberate 
Kuwait (Paterson et al., 2010). Despite this co-operation, several US strategists 
remained convinced that Russia was still a threat to American hegemony. Regardless of 
its internal problems, in 1991 it was still a powerful state because of its 30.000 nuclear 
warheads, the size of its territory and its membership of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). These strengths encouraged Russian nationalists to play a geo-
political role, especially in Eurasia, through the control of oil and gas reserves and 
pipelines, thereby creating a new status quo (Cox, 1995; Maynes, 1996; Callinicos, 
2003; Natural Resources Defense Council, 2006). However, John M. Owen argues that 
―Russia has mostly acquiesced to US predominance‖, but that since 1991 Russians have 
haltingly changed ―from a cooperative to a testy relationship with the United States‖. 
This was clear during Russia‘s attempt ―to block NATO, and hence US, control of 
Kosovo in June 1999 by attempting to carve out its own zone of occupation; and in July 
2001 Russia entered a ‗friendship pact‘ with China‖ (2001/2002: 119). 
However, during the 1990s Russia was in decline and retreated to being just a regional 
power. In general, ―Russia‘s military, its economy, and its political system were in 
confusion‖ (Volgy & Imwalle, 1995: 823). Russia lacked the capability to balance 
against US hegemony. Its economy in the 1990s was about that of Denmark (Cumings, 
1992; Ikenberry, 2001c; Nye, 2008) and according to Carl Kaysen et al. it showed ―no 
will to use its military power externally and almost certainly lacks the political 
coherence to do so‖ (1991: 95). Furthermore, ―its military capability is unlikely to be 
matched by successful economic innovation‖ (Modelski & Thompson, 1999: 112). In 
consequence, as Halliday (2009) argues, Russia‘s military power was exaggerated 
because as Nye argues, Russia‘s economy is essentially ―based on a single commodity, 
energy‖ (2008: 57). Its military capabilities alone do not give it sufficient strength to act 
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as a counterbalance or a rival to the US (Waltz, 1993) because, to ―be a great power, a 
state needs to excel not in one area, but across a range of capability attributes‖ 
(Manstanduno, 1997: 53).  
The 1990s showed two contested US attitudes regarding Russia. First, American 
willingness to integrate Russia into the international community in the immediate 
collapse of the Soviet Union; and second, the US tended to ignore Russian influence in 
international affairs. For example, Russian opposition to war was ignored twice: during 
the 1991 in the Gulf and in 1999 during the Kosovo air campaign (Kapteyn, 2004).  
In brief, none of the above potential rivals was able to counterbalance against US 
hegemony during the 1990s. And, as mentioned in the first chapter, the remaining of the 
US as a sole hegemon does not support the realists‘ viewpoint regarding the 
counterbalance of power and the self-correction machine in world politics. The US 
policy-makers‘ ambition of establishing a new phase of American hegemony and 
predominance was consolidated by the geo-political circumstances of the 1990s: Europe 
was ―drawn inward‖, Japan was ―stagnant‖. China was accommodating the US and 
Russia was ―in a quasi-formal security partnership with the US‖ (Ikenberry, 2004b: 
609).  
2.7. Pretences To Hegemony 
2.7.1. Rogue States: Justifying Hegemony In A Threat-Free Environment 
As said above, if there was no real challenge or enemy to the US in the post-Soviet era, 
and the existence of an enemy was very important to advance America‘s hegemonic 
project, the creation of a new enemy became necessity. According to Valerie A. Sulfaro 
& Mark N. Crislip, literature derived from psychology, sociology, and politics ―has 
suggested that individuals need an example of an ―enemy‖ in order to function in their 
everyday lives‖ (1997: 104). And, if those enemies or scapegoats ―have not been readily 
available ... [individuals] have created them‖ (Murray & Meyers, 1999: 555). By 
extension, this argument can be prolonged to include nations in addition to individuals. 
―International behaviour requires direction, and this direction is often determined by 
perceptions of potential conflict and opportunity,‖ consequently, ―the role of enemy is 
more fixed than those filling the role‖ (Murray & Meyers, 1999: 555).  
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In this context, the threat of ‗rogue states‘ that developed by leading academic security 
theorists, decision-makers, commentators and analysts since the early 1980s, reappeared 
in Colin Powell‘s military strategy in 1989 and were refined over the next decade to 
include a set of the third world‘s states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea in 
addition to some political enemies like Noriega, Aideed, Saddam Hussein, and Gaddafi 
(Klare, 1998; Ryan, 2000; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2005).  
This sort of challenge was developed to an unprecedented extent during the Clinton 
administration. President Clinton and his assistants overused this threat (see for 
example, Christopher, 1995; Lake, 1993; Albright, 1999). The NNS of engagement and 
enlargement also asserted that rouge states ―pose a serious danger to regional stability in 
many corners of the globe‖ (The White House, 1996). True, the challenge of rouge 
states is not necessarily affecting the US in a direct manner, but those states are still 
harming their neighbours, the US closest friends. Consequently, American interests 
would be at stake (Christopher, 1995; Layne, 1997). 
If there was no remaining geopolitical rival, the US officials created the rogue states as 
a new enemy to serve the US hegemony project in the 1990s and afterward. The new 
existing challenge enabled the US government not only to enlarge its geopolitical 
presence in the world, such as in Iraq and the Middle East, the Former Yugoslavia and 
the Balkans, and around the world, but also eased the mobilisation of congress and the 
US public to accept the government‘s agenda of modernising military might and 
maintaining high defense spending to support American involvement around the world.  
2.7.2. Unprecedented Challenges 
Not only rogue states, but in the absence of great geostrategic rival, the US‘s explicit 
discourse of the 1990s emphasized unprecedented kinds of threats to its security and 
interests. The NSS of 1991 declared that ―we face new challenges not only to our 
security, but to our ways of thinking about security‖ (White House, 1991). The NSS of 
1992 did not identify those threats, but it stated that ―though yesterday‘s challenges are 
behind us, tomorrow‘s are being born‖ (White House, 1992). President Clinton‘s State 
of the Union addresses of 1994, 1995, and 1999 and NSSs during the 1990s (White 
House, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000) identified those new sorts of threats. They 
included burgeoning terrorism, trans-border challenges such as drug travelling, 
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immigration, illnesses, organised crimes, ethnic conflicts, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and the increasing production of WMD‘s delivery systems. 
Likely challenges could also come from technological innovation and information flow. 
In addition to the above list of challenges, the liquidity of instability from the marginal 
to the core areas of American interests as a result of the ethincisation of international 
politics was also a dominating fear in the American political discourse of the 1990s. 
Therefore, the NSS of 2000 put the homeland security against unconventional attacks 
between its urgent priorities (White House, 2000). The same fear was also echoed in the 
official discourse since the early 1990s. President Bush I (1992), for example, asked 
congress when supporting his administration to find ―a program to protect … [America] 
from limited nuclear missile attack‖ (White House, 1992). 
In brief, the US was actually searching for a new enemy to serve its hegemonic agenda. 
In the absence of any geopolitical challenger, it developed the rogue state challenge, and 
it tended to support this with set of lesser challenges. These enemies were needed to 
preserve the uncertain conditions that keep America ready to expand its hegemonic 
project.  
2.8. Some Hegemonic Strategy‟s Instruments 
2.8.1. NATO And US Hegemony 
Balancing against US hegemony should also be analysed in the context of NATO, the 
organisation that helped prolong US influence in Europe and elsewhere during the CW. 
According to Lord Ismay, the First Secretary General of NATO, ―the purposes of the 
alliance were to keep the Russians out, Americans in, and Germans down‖ (cited in 
Nye, 2000: 53). In this way, some critics argue that (e.g., Stallings, 1995; Bloch-Lain, 
1999) the organisation played a crucial role in sustaining American comprehensive 
influence (military, political and economic) in Europe and Japan. NATO was founded 
on the basis of the Soviet threat, which diminished considerably after the EoCW. 
Therefore, NATO‘s existence could be brought into question (McCalla, 1996; Schirm, 
1998; Bloch-Lainé, 1999).
1
 However, without the organization, the US would not have 
                                                          
1
 This coincides with the former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld‘s argument during the early stage 
of the WoT that ―the mission determines the coalition‖ (Krauthammer, 2002). In this spirit, Peter J. 
Anderson asks ―what the Alliance‘s role should be after the fall of its principal opponent, Soviet 
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been able to legitimize stationing of its troops in Europe (Bertram, 1990). Furthermore, 
it ―will no longer have the capacity to extract political leverage from its provision of 
security to others‖ (Art, 1991: 7). In other words, the US would lose its influence in the 
region and worldwide because NATO was not only a military arm, it was also a very 
significant institutional tool and, without it, the US could lose its ability to play any vital 
role in Europe (Nye, 2000). 
Possible changes resulting from the end of the bipolar world system include ―alliances 
would come unstuck, collective institutions … would erode, and national military and 
economic cooperation would intensify‖ (Reus-Smit, 2004: 25). In this context, 
supporters of the European common identity repeatedly argued that NATO is no more 
than an instrument for the US to exercise influence and pursue its interests in Europe 
(Schirm, 1998). However, the EoCW changed the status quo. Anthony Foster and 
William Wallace  interpreted Javier Solana‘s move from NATO‘s Secretary General to 
the position of Secretary General of the Council of Ministers of the EU as symbolic, 
signalling ―a change in the relationship between the EU and NATO which may mark a 
turning-point in the development of a CFSP‖ (2000: 462). However, it could be 
impossible to combine a European common foreign and security policy (CFSP) with 
NATO.  
In contrast to the argument that has been advanced by neo-realists and neo-liberalists 
that alliances were essentially created to balance a hegemonic power, the 1990s 
demonstrated that alliances such as NATO could be used by the hegemonic power to: 
preserve the status quo; minimize, or even check, the influence of allies; and prevent a 
likely competitor or a counter-alliance from emerging (Du Boff, 2003). As a result, 
during the 1990s the Americans worked hard to keep NATO alive, as it serves the US‘ 
own post-CW agenda. It has been used to prevent Europeans from challenging US 
hegemony.  
If NATO had been dissolved it would have been harmful to US post-CW hegemony. It 
would have curtailed America‘s dominance over Europe, and set the stage for the 
emergence of the EU as a new rival. Therefore, maintaining the organization was a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Communism.‖ (2000: 195), while Bloch-Lainé (1999: 148) questions ―was NATO still needed in its CW 
form?‖ 
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priority. Fears about Europe‘s potential transformation into a rival were explicitly stated 
in the DPG of 1992 (Du Boff, 2003). Thus, the US‘ concern that NATO survival was 
not only to maintain the transatlantic relationship (as is usually argued) but also to 
prevent the EU or some of its members from becoming rivals to the US in its unipolar 
moment.  
The European failure to resolve the problems of the former Yugoslavia gave the US the 
pretext to re-engage NATO in the region (Ham, 1994; Jakobson, 1995). Thus, President 
Clinton actively ―advocated a stronger European engagement in the continent‘s security, 
but inside the transatlantic partnership NATO‖ (Schirm, 1998: 70). It was for the 
reasons of maintaining its hegemonic position that the US bore the greatest burden of 
NATO‘s engagements in Yugoslavia.  For example, the US ―provided two-thirds of the 
aircraft in the campaign over Kosovo and Serbia‖ (Nye, 2000: 58). 
2.8.2. Global Leadership As A Counterweight To US Hegemony 
According to Doug Stokes (1998) the military issue was relevant to international 
politics in the post-CW era. The concentration of such a massive material power, the 
collapse of the external enemy, and the desire to lead, inevitably guided Americans to 
exercise hegemony worldwide. This search for hegemony was often conducted under 
the guise of global leadership, which, according to Robert J. Pauly & Tom Lansford, 
was ready available because ―leadership in the international arena is really about power‖ 
(2005: 3). Furthermore, ―to exercise leadership is to get others to do things that they 
would not otherwise do‖ (Pauly & Lansford, 2005: 3). However, it is not surprising that 
a world hegemon, as a public good provider, seeks leadership to regulate the system. 
The problem, as discussed previously, is the difficulty in distinguishing the hegemon‘s 
actions to provide public good from its actions to enhance its own hegemony.  
In line with this argument, American discourse in the 1990s presented the US as a 
unipole power that sought leadership to enhance the NWO. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Americans identified several new challenges not only to its security, 
but also to its allies and the rest of the world (White House, 1995, 1996; 1997, 1998). 
Thus, claiming to preserve the world peace and stability, the US sought leadership. 
President Bush (1990), for example, argued that in the post-CW period ―there is a need 
for leadership that only America can provide‖. One year later, he also said that ―today, 
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in a rapid changing world, American leadership is indispensable‖ (Bush, 1991). The 
NSS of 1991 also accentuates that ―there is no substitute for American leadership‖. 
American leadership in the post-Soviet epoch was ―pivotal and inescapable‖ (White 
House, 1991, 1992). President Bush (1992) also declared that the US, the leader of the 
West during the CW, ―has become the leader of the world‖. Dick Cheney argues that 
without American leadership, the world would not be able to take a collective approach 
to solve international crises (1993). The centrality of American indispensable leadership 
became even clearer in the following years. Clinton (1994), for example, made a causal 
connection between the flourishing of democracy worldwide and American leadership, 
saying that: ―the young democracies we support still face difficult times and look to us 
for leadership‖. In this way, Hoffmann (1989), for example, argues that the US cannot 
lead by using the previous style alone, but it needs new mechanisms. He adds that the 
US must set rational FP goals for the post-CW era to maintain its unique position and 
lessen any potential resistance. In the end, Hoffmann states that the US can rule if 
―games of skill‖ replace ―tests of will‖. Similar ideas may be found in Nye‘s soft power 
thesis (Nye, 1990b-1990c).  
However, in contrast to Hoffmann‘s perspective, Colin Powell, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, for example, emphasized that ―America should lead‖ 
because it was ‗obligated‘ to do so (Powell, 1992). Former Secretary of State, Madeline 
Albright‘s slogan of America as an indispensable nation also captured such an approach 
(Kagan, 2002; Chollet, 2007). This tone was also repeated in the 1996 NSS that declares 
that ―we must exercise global leadership‖ (White House, 1996). Importantly, in the mid-
1990s American official discourse began to highlight US interests instead of 
international concerns as the priority for its leadership. Clinton placed greater emphasis 
on the relationship between American worldwide leadership and the spreading of peace, 
freedom, and democracy; stating that ―we still can‘t be strong at home unless we‘re 
strong abroad‖ (1995). The 1995 NSS declares that ―if we exert our leadership abroad, 
we can make America safer and more prosperous. Without our active leadership and 
engagement abroad, threats will fester and our opportunities will narrow‖ (White 
House, 1995: 2).  
In 1997, the basis for American leadership developed to include a clear hegemonic 
dimension, the strategic view of the 21
st
 century. Clinton argued that ―to prepare 
Chapter Two: America As A Hyperpower: Trends And Transformations During The 1990s 
100 
 
America for the 21
st
 century we must master the forces of change in the world and keep 
American leadership strong and sure for an uncharted time‖ (Clinton, 1997). Clinton‘s 
argument can best be understood as a direct influence of the home-grown dialogue over 
the New American Century that had been initiated by the neo-cons. However, arguably 
there were no differences between these ideas, and those principles adopted in the 
Pentagon‘s DPG of the early 1990s during the Bush I administration. Clinton‘s call for 
managing the forces of change in the world can be understood as a counterpart to the 
idea pursued in the 1992 document/strategy of preventing the emergence of any new 
rival in the post-CW era. Clinton continued to stress America‘s unique responsibility as 
a tool to establish American leadership in the new century. In his State of the Union 
address of 1998 he said: ―we must exercise responsibility … around the world. We have 
the power and the duty to build a new era of peace and security‖ (Clinton, 1998). This 
statement echoes Bush‘s NWO, but the most important aspect is Clinton‘s emphasis on 
the availability of power as a guarantor for America‘s global leadership. Clinton called 
for reforming and developing America‘s infrastructure (people, communities, and 
technology) in order to be able to lead the world economy. He suggested if this reform 
took hold they would inevitably have commenced their obligation to ―build a 21st 
century of propensity for America‖ (Clinton, 1999, 2000).  
Scholars, such as Hoffmann (1989) and Nixon (1992), suggest that America‘s demand 
for unilateral world leadership from the 1990s was a realistic, rather than a rhetorical, 
feature in AFP practice. Thus, the claim that America was seeking world leadership to 
establish a NWO and preserve peace and security was merely an instrument to enhance 
and sustain its hegemony over the system. This was its unipolar moment. 
2.9. Conclusion 
In line with neorealist, hegemonist and neoliberalist approaches, a state‘s share of 
material capabilities is a sine qua non to establish its hegemonic position in the system. 
Without it, hegemony is impossible. America, as discussed above, was in a category of 
its own as a hyperpower in terms of military, economic and scientific capabilities after 
the CW. In early 1991, for instance, its military expenditures of $280 billion equalled 
27% of the world‘s total, and in the late 1990s, this percentage increased to more than 
40% of the world‘s total. While the US military budget approached $300 billion in the 
late 1990s, no other second-tier‘s military budget broke the record of $40 billion at the 
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time. The US military outlay therefore was bigger than that of the rest of the 
industrialised world combined. Not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, the US 
military forces were seven times more advanced than those of France, its closest rival in 
militant technologies. What matters here, however, is that while these huge numbers 
were much bigger than that of its allies and potential foes combined, they were only 
16% of its federal budget and less than 4% of its GDP. America military might, 
therefore, was inoffensive economically, and the US economy kept performing 
magnificently during the 1990s and afterward. Accordingly, the US emerged from the 
CW struggle not only the strongest militarily, but also economically. Even with the 
severe economic problems of the late 1980s and the early 1990s‘, the size of the 
American economy was about two times the size of its closest rival - the Japanese 
economy, while Japanese production was about three-fifths of the US total. The EU‘s 
economic size was nearly parallel to that of the US, but geostrategically, Europe did not 
enjoy the position that America held. In the mid-1990s, the US economic growth was 
bigger than any other economy in the world, and by the late 1990s, the US economy 
was the engine of the world's growth. Scientifically, the telecommunication revolution, 
and the advancement in computer hardware, enhanced America's post-CW leading role 
in global, political and economical affairs.  
Therefore, this is in contrast to the neorealists prophecy that the unipolar moment would 
not last long and that the system would regain its balance. Predictions that China, Japan, 
Russia, or the EU would be transformed into a new rival to the US proved wrong. There 
was no single power or coalition that was able to challenge the US‘ unipolarity and 
hegemony. The US was hegemonic in the 1990s to a degree that it was able to project 
its power everywhere and use NATO to sustain its dominance over allies. Germany was 
looking inward to manage its reunification‘s effects, and even economically, Germany 
would not be capable to be a new rival to the US; its economic size was about one-fifth 
of the US. The Japanese miracle of the 1980s turned out to be stagnant, and instead of 
becoming a new competitor to the US over raw material, the Japanese economy 
witnessed a period of recession. Russia retreated from being a superpower to merely a 
corrupted regional power and its economic size was less than Denmark‘s. China was no 
more than a developing country. This status consolidated America's propensity to be the 
world‘s lone leader. Therefore, while the last chapter proved that the US was a 
hegemonic power during the CW, this chapter shows that classification is also apposite 
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in the 1990s. In fact, as the 1990s progressed, the US became a unique political 
behemoth that had not been experienced previously. The US as unipole power with such 
huge power resources cannot even be compared to ancient Rome or the British 
hegemony in the early 20th century.   
That is why the term superpower was no longer capable of describing the US‘s new 
powerful position in world politics. If it is true, the US enjoyed a hegemonic position 
within the CW‘s bipolar system. How did the EoCW and retreat of the USSR to become 
a regional power impact on America‘s status in the new global environment? This 
transformation not only yielded a unique global structure in which the US was a 
hyperpower at the apex of a unipole system, but also resulted in a considerable gap in 
relative power between America and the remaining powers, as shown above. 
Accordingly, the term hyperpower or hegemon would be more able to capture the 
characteristics of US power and to describe its new position in world politics.  
True, material power is a very important source to establish hegemony and 
predominance over all; but more importantly, the crucial factor to give the US self-
confidence was the victory over communism which was widely seen as an American 
triumph. Furthermore, the victory over the communist ideology boosted the US 
ideology of freedom and human rights, which, as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
was a further source for enhancing and legitimating US hegemony in the period.  Since 
1989 onward, the declinist theory has been defeated and the revivalist and expansionist 
approach has flourished. However, it is also important to note that America‘s 
hyperpower or hegemonic status did not come about just because of the collapse of the 
USSR. It was also driven by individuals, groups, and particularly hyper-internationalists 
such as the neo-cons. 
Neo-cons amongst other groups offered several proposals to push America into a new 
form of an aggressive internationalism and hegemony. The neo-cons' pervasiveness in 
the policy-making circles of the 1990s encouraged them to put their agenda into 
practice. The DPG of 1992 written by Wolfowitz and Libby, for instance, was supposed 
to be a new NSC-68 to guide AFP at the unipolar moment. As shown later, the DGP has 
been the organising principle of AFP strategy throughout the 1990s and after 9/11. 
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The neo-cons‘ influence also exceeded the governmental institutions to reach AFP‘s 
knowledge community. This mood was reflected in AFP thinking and strategy 
throughout the 1990s, as seen in Fukuyama‘s and Huntington‘s theses and in the 
PANC‘s proposals. Instead of looking inward, America needed to be more 
internationalist, and AFP strategy was also in need of a new roadmap. In this context, 
Huntington, for example, created the clash between cultures as the successor to the 
clash between superpowers. This was sufficient to redirect American attention beyond 
their borders. Fukuyama rejoiced in the US ideology of triumph over its competitors 
and cried for Americans not to retreat, but to enjoy the fruits of the victory over 
communism. According to Fukuyama, the history‘s running stopped at 1989. Western 
capitalism and democracy was the only legitimated regime, and America, the door 
keeper of this regime, will be an eternal power. The expansion of the global market and 
the liberal democratic system is the instrument needed to expand American hegemony.    
In line with these efforts, the PNAC institution proposed to strengthen the American 
military in order to guarantee American hegemony. It posited the argument that the 
country needed to aggrandize its military capabilities and expand its political influence 
in the post-bipolar world. This proposal was not only in line with the DGP of 1992, but 
also in harmonisation with Clinton's efforts to keep the US military, the best equipped 
and trained in the world.    
 At the very least, the above discussion highlights several aspects of the US transition 
from the CW era to the post-CW reality and summarizes how a superpower differs from 
a hyperpower and hegemon. The aforementioned debate reveals that the US post-CW 
hegemonic appearance was due to several factors: psychological effect of the US 
triumph over the USSR; societal groups and individuals who were enthusiastic to invest 
in the collapse of America's rival to sustain its unipolar moment; and material 
capabilities that were of great significance to impose the hegemonic weight over all.  
A key question arising from this chapter is: what implications does this new American 
status have for the US‘ role and place in the post-CW world? The reflection of this shift 
will be reflected in AFP during the 1990s and beyond. The next chapter discusses 
AFP‘s continued hegemonic agenda between 11/9 and 9/11.
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American hegemony is the only reliable defence against a breakdown of peace and international order. 
(Kagan & Kristol, 1996: 22) 
 
At present the United States faces no global rival. America‘s grand strategy should aim to preserve and 
extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible. 
(Project of American New Century, 2000: ii) 
 
The new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-
defined global ends. 
(Krauthammer, 2001) 
 
Chapter Three 
Between 11/9 And 9/11: AFP‟s Hegemonic Strategy In Progress  
3.1. Introduction 
As argued previously, the US emergence from the Cold War (CW) as a hyperpower 
with no real challenger to its interests or security motivated the 1990s American 
administrations to follow the same strategy of hegemony that had been pursued by 
previous governments for half a century. However, in contrast to this perspective, an 
extensive body of literature puts forward that AFP was confused about its strategic 
direction during the 1990s. Jeremi Suri, for instance, argues that after the end of the 
Cold War (EoCW) ―American policymakers sought to create a new grand strategy for 
the United States, but they failed in this endeavour‖ (2009: 611). However, this chapter 
demonstrates that AFP was strategically consistent in its aims in this period, rather than 
discussing whether or not the US administrations succeeded in formulating a new 
strategy similar to the containment strategy. For this reason, this chapter looks beyond 
the fragmented daily policy by breaking through American foreign policy‘s (AFP) 
surface structure to reach its core. It achieves this by comparing and contrasting the two 
contested sets of AFP literature. This process enables this chapter to establish a 
relationship between the explicit policies of the 1990s and the implicit background 
agenda.  
The chapter is divided into several sections. In the first section, the main concern is to 
discuss the first set of literature that sees the 1990s as a period of disorientation for AFP 
following the EoCW. The second part reviews the Bush I policy to highlight the 
hegemonic characteristics of AFP during the early 1990s. The third part explains 
Clinton‘s contribution to preparing the US for the 21st century; however, the last section 
focuses on Bush II policy prior to 9/11. 
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3.2. America Alone: A Unipole Power Without An Enemy 
As stated in the first chapter, the post-Soviet era produced a large body of literature 
which argues that the fall of America‘s external enemy in the early 1990s disoriented 
AFP performance in international affairs. According to Michael Howard, this shift left 
America ―with a peculiar paradox‖ (1993: 49), which, as Cox argues, ―the nation 
seemed to be all at sea in the new world; more secure than it had ever been in the 
twentieth century, but without a mission to fulfil‖ (1995: 1). Thus, in the words of Barry 
Buzan, Washington ―seemed to experience a threat deficit‖ (2006: 1101), and ―without 
barbarians at the gate it was difficult to formulate an attractive policy‖ (Ryan, 2000: 
185). Because of this, the US‘s ―interaction with the world lacked the defining peril and 
mission that had given structure to US policy‖ (Brands, 2008: 1). Therefore, the decade 
of the 1990s has been described by Mead, amongst others, as ―lost years in American 
foreign policy‖ (2003: 3) because the disappearance of the enemy ended the rationality 
of AFP‘s containment strategy (Hentz, 2004; Stokes, 2005) and left the US ―without a 
map, or a set of maps … [to] navigate the ... challenges of the new world order‖ (Hentz, 
2004: 1), but also ―to play beyond its own borders‖ (Paarlberg, 1995: 1).  
3.2.1. The Lack Of AFP‟s Vision Or A Grand Strategy In The 1990s   
As Stephen D. Sklenka argues (2007: v): 
the US inability—or unwillingness—to connect strategic ends and appropriate 
means to accomplish clearly defined goals … has occurred so often over the past 
15 years … [that problem] has become a disturbing and pervasive characteristic of 
the modern American way of war. 
In a similar way, Graham T. Allison & Robert Blackwill put it clearly: after five 
decades of consistency, AFP experienced a decade of discomfiture, and the ―defining 
feature of American engagement in recent years has been confusion‖ (2000: 1). 
Consequently, under such conditions of strategic blindness AFP became ―reactive and 
impulsive in a fast-changing and uncertain world‖ (Allison & Blackwill, 2000: 4).  
Critics such as Zalmay Khalilzad (1995a, 1995b) and Karen J. O‘Connor & Larry J. 
Sabato (2004) argue that this confusion resulted from the threat deficit, which meant 
that the US has been relatively unsure about its post-CW objectives and entered into the 
new era without certainty or a clear foreign strategy. Thus, the US‘s role in the new 
global system was no longer self-evident (McGrew, 1994; Joffe, 1995; Allison & 
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Blackwill, 2000) and it was unclear which set of forces America ought to embrace in its 
FP strategy (Hastedt, 2000). With the US as the only superpower left, John L. Gaddis 
suggested in 1993 that ―no one can guarantee that the long peace will survive‖ (1993: 
22). Furthermore, he argued, because of the early 1990s ambiguousness ―no one can 
foretell with any assurance what is going to happen‖ (1993: 8). Cox agrees with Gaddis 
that ―nobody—not even the Council on Foreign Relations—seemed to have any easy 
answer‖ (1995: 2). There was no guarantee, Cox confidently argues, that AFP ―would 
ever rediscover the international road back to true happiness‖ (1995: 1).  
At a macro level, Stephen Walt argues that ―the post-CW world still awaits its ‗X‘ 
article. Although many have tried, no one has managed to pen the sort of compelling 
analysis that George Kennan provided for an earlier era, when he articulated the theory 
of containment‖ (1998: 36). In line with Walt‘s viewpoint, Hal Brands suggests that an 
absence of a grand strategy in the 1990s was not because of a shortage of ideas, but that 
an overall design or vision was lacking, a grand strategy ―that incorporated US interests 
into a coherent and politically sustainable framework‖ (2008: 2) and that ―gave 
coherence and purposes of American involvement abroad‖ (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 9).  
Because of this, the Bush I administration has been accused of having no unified FP or 
coherent strategy. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, for instance, suggests that there was ―no centre of 
gravity to Bush‘s policy‖ (cited in Hyland, 1999: 9). Wiarda (1996), Dumbrell (1997), 
Hurst (1999), Reus-Smit (2004) and Brands (2008) also argue that, although President 
Bush offered AFP great energy, operational efficiency, management and tactical 
mastery, there was a lack of leadership and a clear vision; as Suri put it, ―Bush had 
process without purpose‖ (2009: 611). The administration had also been accused of 
being unable to translate its success in dealing with the early-1990s individual problems 
into a long-standing strategy for the post-CW era (Hurst, 1999; Chollet, 2007). Thus, 
Ron Huisken argues that Bush ―had no discernable appetite to think grandly about what 
the United States could do with its unipolar moment in the post-Cold War world; 
instead, he focused closely on unravelling the central front of the Cold War and 
reversing Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait‖ (2006). 
Bush‘s foreign policy (FP), therefore, was criticized for being tentative and cautious, 
relying on a new perspective of wait-and-see, particularly in relation to the changes in 
Eastern Europe and the disintegration in the former Yugoslavia (Rosati & Twing, 1998; 
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Dobson & Marsh, 2001; Krauthammer, 2005; Chollet & Goldgeier, 2008). Steven 
Hurst, for instance, observes that the Bush administration ―spent much of this period 
preoccupied by the question of how best to respond to and encourage these 
developments [in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe]‖ (1999: 38).  
Bush‘s plan of the New World Order (NWO) that was adopted as a response to the Gulf 
War of (1990-91) is also criticised. Instead of highlighting its importance as a 
cornerstone in American post-CW hegemonic grand strategy, most scholarly attention 
has discussed and criticized its marriage between idealistic and pragmatist components.
1
 
Critics, such as Noam Chomsky (1992), also suggest that the NWO was not a fully-
fledged strategy to replace the CW strategy; rather, it was an attempt to remedy the 
problem of his administration‘s lack of vision by claiming that the coalition of the Gulf 
War was the foundation of a new world order. Because of this, the NWO ―was never 
more than a slogan‖ (Chollet, 2007: 5), and, once the Gulf War ended, it ―lost its luster 
and became a source of discontent and disillusionment among scholars‖ (Davis, 2003: 
55).  
In the same way, Clinton‘s FP has also been accused of being vacillating, hesitant, 
visionless and inconsistent (Ambrose & Brinkley, 1997; Rosati & Twing, 1998, Barry, 
2000; Szabo, 2004; Marsden, 2005). Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
described Clinton‘s FP as ―a series of seemingly unrelated decisions in response to 
                                                          
1
 Nye (1992) argues that the NWO is rooted in two various contexts of American political perspectives, 
the tradition of the realist approach that was represented by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and the 
tradition of the liberal approach of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter. The first approach supposes that 
international politics is a continued struggle between sovereign states to balance each other‘s power, 
whereas the latter believes that the world order is to be built upon broad values of human rights, freedom, 
democracy and respect for the international law and institutions. ―The problem for the Bush 
Administration,‖ as Nye (1992: 84) argues, is that it ―thought and acted like Nixon, but borrowed the 
rhetoric of Wilson and Carter.‖ Hendrickson (1992: 54) agrees with Nye‘s analysis, adding that the new 
American task in the NWO embodies a blending of two conflicting traditions in AFP. The first team 
includes the legacy of Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson that seeks international ambitions, 
achieving it through ―measures sort of power.‖ The second, however, includes the legacy of Alexander 
Hamilton and Henry Cabot Lodge who think that FP must be linked to the national interests and believe 
in the need of the military alertness as a command in the conflicts among nations. Therefore, AFP that 
was built to set the NWO has embraced ―both universal aspirations and military force‖ (Hendrickson, 
1992: 55). Hurst (1999) & Davis (2003) suggest that the NWO was a combination of two heritages of 
AFP: the legacy of both Franklin Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. President Bush, following the steps of 
his predecessors, designed a strategy based on the combination of collective security, free trade and 
democracy. In general, Ryan (2000: 187) suggests that ―the tension between freedom and order, and the 
universal and inclination of US foreign policy,‖ was echoed in the Bush‘s FP agenda since his state of the 
Union of 1990. That was because of ―the pursuit of ... [the US] national interest, vied with the promotion 
of national narrative‖ .   
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specific crises‖ (cited in Dumbrell, 2002: 43) and criticized the [enlargement and 
engagement strategy] (En-En) strategy ―as being less a strategy and more a statement of 
principles, as overly ambitious and lacking operational terms‖ (cited in McCormick, 
2000: 64). In the same way, Redd (2005: 138) describes AFP as ―an ever changing 
policy‖ under his presidency.  
However, Josef Joffe argues that Clinton‘s problem was not ―a lack of conviction, but a 
surfeit thereof. He believe[d] in too many things, either all at once or in short sequence 
and that … [did] not make for steadiness of purpose. Worse, there … [was] no unifying 
concept‖ (1995: 95). As Suri argues, ―Clinton had purpose without process‖ (2009: 
611). In the same way, Chollet (2007: 6) agrees that the President was ―full of ideas and 
had a vision for the future—globalisation‖, but, in contrast to Joffe (1995), he argues 
that the president ―lacked the confidence, attention, acumen and political capital to 
implement it‖. Earlier examples are also apparent in the literature: one high-ranking 
military officer from Clinton‘s National Security Council (NSC) asserted that Clinton 
―vacillates a lot because of the political capital he does not have and has never had‖ 
(cited in Redd, 2005: 138). Because of this, according to Jerel Rosati and Stephen 
Twing, he had ―not taken a strong leadership role or exercised considerable power over 
foreign policy‖ (1998: 36).  
Likewise, an intensive body of literature views a strong causal connection between the 
administration‘s departure from the traditional geo-political perspective to the new geo-
economic perspective and the confusion over the direction of AFP. According to Tom 
Barry, opponents to this shift joked that ―the sum of Clinton‘s foreign policy experience 
had been gleaned at the International House of Pancakes‖ (2000: xvii). Critics also 
argue that Clinton‘s thinking about Russia and China was ambiguous; it had no policy 
to deal with ‗rogue states‘ and, most important of all, failed to build a solid domestic 
constituency for consistent foreign action (The Economist, 19 February 2000). 
Furthermore, during the 2000 presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, George W. 
Bush‘s senior FP adviser, also criticized Clinton‘s perspective of using force abroad, 
saying that he ―has never really had a picture of how America's power should operate in 
the coming world‖ (The Economist, 19 February 2000: 51). 
Overall, it would appear that the above spectrum of views reveals that the 1990s was 
considered to be a decade in which the two administrations failed to find a new mission 
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or a grand strategy for the US in the new era. However, this conclusion clearly 
contradicts with the argument put forward in the first chapter, that the overall thrust of 
AFP strategy has been continuous since the end of WWII. Thus, in what follows, the 
main concern is to assess these views more closely, taking into account the influence of 
the EoCW upon AFP uniformity in order to show that the continuity of AFP and the 
existence of American hegemonic strategy cannot be denied.  
3.3. The Bush I Strategy: Preparing The Stage For US Post-CW Hegemony 
This section questions the idea that the Bush administration lost its strategic guidance 
and pursued a collection of fragmented policies. In contrast to the previous discussion, 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State (1989-1992), may be right 
when he argues that Bush‘s political perspective has been largely misunderstood, or 
even intentionally deformed. The administration, as he suggests, ―may be faulted, 
perhaps with having chosen to articulate … [its] vision more in deeds than in words‖ 
(1993: 16). True, the Bush era was a transitional period in AFP and international affairs 
(Kaufman, 2006) and the President and his assistants suffered from time shortage 
(Cohen, 2005). Furthermore, the political transformations were unprecedented and the 
administration lacked the experience to deal with such status. But, even with these 
problems, the administration‘s performance was magnificent in terms of preparing 
America to deal with its emerging opportunity. In the subsequent subsections, the 
discussion highlights the organizing principle that lay behind the Bush administration‘s 
policy.   
3.3.1. Managing The Transformative Moment: The Integration Strategy 
In contrast to the previous views, Eagleburger suggests that the administration dealt 
successfully with the various dangerous events between 1989 and 1992, such as the 
dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, German reunification, 
the invasion of Kuwait, and the Gulf War of 1991. These achievements, as numerous 
crtitics argue (e.g., Maynes, 2000a; Cameron, 2002; Barry, 2003; Chollet, 2007), were 
undertaken in a changeable and unpredictable period following the EoCW and the US 
containment strategy was no longer able to offer policymakers the choices needed to 
meet the emerging status quo.  
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The discussion about the Bush I administration‘s lack of vision should not reveal that it 
failed to manage this crucial turning moment, nor that it had lost its strategic guidance 
when dealing with these events. It is true that US policymakers were taken by surprise 
at the sudden and unexpected change in Mikhail Gorbachev‘s policy that led to the fall 
of the USSR between 1989 and 1992 (LaFeber, 1994). Furthermore, it is also true that, 
once the Berlin Wall had crumbled, the administration ―initially divided between 
hardline ‗squeezers‘ and ‗dealers‘ over the correct response to Gorbachev‖ (Paterson et 
al., 2010: 443). However, the administration immediately moved from the previous 
containment strategy to a new policy of integration, not only to help the Soviets‘ 
movement towards democracy and a liberal market but also to re-engage the Soviets as 
a partner in international affairs (Dobson & Marsh, 2001; Paterson et al., 2010). The 
administration was aware of the sensitivity of the moment and, according Eagleburger 
(1993) and Burgess (2002), the President, who proved to be one of the most magnificent 
experienced policymakers in US history, aimed to facilitate the transition from the 
bipolar system to the new unipolar one calmly. Accordingly, instead of pursing an 
aggressive or interventionist policy, the administration adopted a policy of ‗strategic 
silence‘ which ―signalled that the United States would not exploit the upheaval in 
Eastern Europe‖ (Paterson et al., 2010: 443). According to Jack Matlock, the US 
ambassador to Moscow (1987-1991), ―our marching orders [were] don‘t do something, 
stand there‖ (cited in Paterson et al., 2010: 443). Krauthammer (2005), among other 
critics, suggests that this policy showed hesitancy in relation to the liberation of the 
USSR satellite states. He uses the example of the speech by Bush in Kiev in 1991, in 
which he warned Ukrainians against suicidal nationalism, which Krauthammer argues 
highlights that Bush preferred the unity and stability of the USSR, rather than the 
emergence of 15 new independent countries. In this way, some scholars claim that the 
shift from containment strategy, and the change of the US from an influential global 
actor into a passive observer, created very important contradictions for AFP during the 
early 1990s. This retreat occurred at the critical juncture of the EoCW (Dobson & 
Marsh, 2001).  
However, Charles Krauthammer‘s view ignores the nature of this crucial moment in 
which nobody could predict what was going to happen. The administration, rather than 
being hesitant, did not wish to rush into any uncalculated adventures, bearing in mind 
that at this stage the changes did not threaten US interests. In general, this policy not 
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only avoided any unwanted competition with the remaining big powers over the 
potential allocation of spheres of influence in the post-CW world, but also allayed fears 
over the US role in the post-CW system. Thus, the Bush administration acted benignly 
rather than aggressively. This perspective is clear from the President‘s discourse. In 
relation to the Baltic countries, Bush stated (1991):  
The principle that has guided us is simple: our objective is to help the Baltic 
peoples achieve their aspirations, not to punish the Soviet Union … We will watch 
carefully as the situation develops. And we will maintain our contact with the 
Soviet leadership to encourage continued commitment to democratization and 
reform. 
In the same way, the 1990 NSS asserted that ―our response [to Gorbachev‘s 
demilitarisation] represents prudent caution, but the Soviet leadership and people should 
realize that it is a caution based on uncertainty, not on hostility‖ (White House, 1990: 
10).  
The policy resulted in the US being able to guarantee the smooth fragmentation of the 
USSR and the independence of ex-Communist states in Europe and Central Asia at no 
cost to the US in blood or resources. The main problem for the US was the USSR‘s 
nuclear arsenal. Bush was reluctant to push the independence of the Soviet Republics 
before the elimination of the nuclear weapons positioned in Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan (Burgess, 2002). In this context, the administration planned to reduce and 
control the USSR/Russia nuclear weaponry by signing the START accords. According 
to Thomas G. Paterson et al., the START-I accord ―limited each nuclear superpower to 
1.600 delivery vehicles and 6.000 strategic nuclear devices‖. Bush also signed the 
START-II agreement before leaving office in 1993 in Moscow with the Russian 
President, Boris Yeltsin. The accord ―provided for the cutting of nuclear warheads and 
bombs to 3,500 (US) and 2,997 (Russia)‖ (2010: 448).  
The overall objective was setting the stage for the US‘s emergence as a unipolar 
hegemon. At this stage there was no need for the explicit use of hard power or an 
aggressive policy. According to Nye, the successful foreign policy of George H. W. 
Bush ―was more a matter of brilliant intuition and management of rapid change on the 
ground than an attempt to change the world‖ (Nye, 2006: 142). However, when the use 
of a tangible power was needed to preserve the US interests, the administration acted 
decisively, such as in its response to the invasion of Kuwait. In sum, Bush I successfully 
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managed the uncertain conditions of the early 1990s and achieved the important 
transition from bipolarity to unipolarity at no domestic cost to the US.  
3.3.2. The NWO: Setting The Stage For The US Post-CW Hegemony 
First of all, it is important to note that this section does not claim that the NWO was a 
coherent strategy similar to the containment strategy. However, it concentrates on 
establishing whether or not the NWO served the US ambition to be the global hegemon 
at this critical transitional period. If the NWO met this objective, the debate around 
whether or not Bush had a grand strategy is irrelevant, as this thesis is concerned with 
the continuity of US hegemonic agenda rather than the abstract controversy about grand 
strategy.  
In contrast to those who sees the NWO as a temporary plan, the establishment of a 
NWO ―would be to the Bush presidency what the New Deal had been to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt presidency‖ (Hyland, 1999: 3). Such calls to manage problems of peace and 
war multilaterally have obviously been echoing in AFP literature since the National 
Security Council‘s 1950 document, the (NSC-68) (Layne & Schewarz, 1993). In this 
context, President Nixon, for example, called in 1971 for the establishment of ―a new 
and stable framework for international relations‖ (cited in Hastedt, 2000: 8). Therefore, 
it could be argued that President Bush and his administration did nothing new; rather 
they reused these ideas from the AFP legacy. The return to these ideas arose because of 
the pressure of the EoCW, which had ended the validity of the containment strategy. 
The US‘s demand to replace the containment strategy was a vital need to accommodate 
its conceptual balance with such changes in world politics (Hendrickson, 1992; Nye, 
1992; Kaufman, 2006). Therefore, the NWO was supposed to be a new foreign policy 
framework to remedy the US‘s lack of post-CW strategic foresight and to give AFP the 
necessary consistency. 
The world entered a new unpredictable period in the early 1990s resulting in the US‘s 
explicit discourse revealing that it was not concerned with major powers but, as 
President Bush claimed, the enemy was the new ―unpredictability and instability‖ (cited 
in LaFeber, 1994). To remedy such anxieties, the US required to stabilize the post-
bipolar world system, or, more precisely, reshape the world order in harmonisation with 
its international agenda of hegemony and predominance (Huntington, 1993c; 
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McCormick, 1995; Hurst, 1999; Dunne, 2000; Davis, 2003; Bolton, 2008). Thus, 
Bush‘s FP was not visionless but was a grand strategy designed to establish a post-CW 
Pax Americana (Tunander, 2007). As Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi suggests, the ―Pax 
Americana seems to be a de facto system of hegemony that no one … can dare 
challenge‖ (2003, xx). The opportunity to personalise the NWO came with the Iraq 
occupation of Kuwait in 1990. 
3.3.3. The Gulf War 1990/91: The NWO‟s Hegemonic Agenda  
The Middle-East, among other regions, has been pivotal to the US pre-eminence 
strategy since its emergence as a global power after WWII. Brzezinski (1997), President 
Bush‘s main advisor during the Gulf War, described the area from Portugal to Malaysia, 
including the Middle-East, as a grand chessboard on which America operates to 
guarantee its hegemony in the post-CW world. It is in such a geo-political context that 
the Gulf War must be understood. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the US portrayed 
the Kuwaiti invasion, not only as a challenge to regional stability, but also to the entire 
post-CW order. Thus, the international community under the lead of Washington ought 
to deal with the problem. On the basis of this view, the US created a ‗coalition of the 
willing‘ to defeat Iraq. However, it can be mooted that war was the achievement of 
another set of geo-political ends.    
The Gulf War started at the EoCW and the collapse of the bipolar system. Therefore, 
while the war was ostensibly fought to defend Kuwaiti sovereignty, it also symbolically 
declared that the new American Century had started (Cumings, 1992; Hunter, 1992; 
Maynes, 2000a). The discussion inside the US cabinet, which followed the invasion of 
Kuwait, did not reveal the ideals of the NWO that President Bush later spoke about in 
his address on 29 January 1991. However, according to Brent Scowcroft, the mood was 
―well, this is a little conflict, we don‘t much like Kuwait anyway, they‘re not that 
friendly with us, they‘re halfway around the world‖ (cited in Chollet & Goldgeier, 
2008: 9). Equally, if not more important, General Colin Powell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
chairman at the time, admitted that the war was not essentially prepared to this end, but 
―the Iraqis sat there and we kicked the shit out of them‖ (cited in Chollet & Goldgeier, 
2008: 12). This was clear since President Bush I said, ―what is at stake is more than one 
small country; it is a big idea—a new world order‖ (1991). On the other hand, the US 
would be in need of such a war for expanding its geostrategic presence in the region. 
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Those who support such a perspective argue that the US had ―begun luring Iraq into 
attacking Kuwait, to give it a pretext to launch the Gulf War‖ (Ralph, 2006: 264). The 
US indirectly encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait when the US ambassador 
to Baghdad, April Glaspie, said to Saddam Hussein, in an interview held prior to the 
war that ―we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement 
with Kuwait‖ (The New York Times, 1990) and this revelation might be understood as a 
―green light to Saddam Hussein about his hostile plan to invade Kuwait‖ (Frum & Perle, 
2004: 186). This perspective of conspiracy became more acceptable after 2003, when 
the US created several artificial scenarios to legalise its old proposal to invade Iraq. 
In the context of the establishment of US hegemony, the Gulf problem was an occasion 
to convey a message to friends and foes alike that the US would not hesitate to use force 
to maintain its own interests in the whole region and sustain its influence in the new era. 
Therefore, the war, irrespective of the rhetoric of the NWO, highlighted to the 
remaining powers America‘s unprecedented military capabilities and its political will 
(Hunter, 1992; Cox, 1995; McCormick, 1995; Maynes, 2000a). Therefore, to defeat the 
Iraqi army, that was ranked ―a fourth-rate army‖, the US sent ―8 out of 18 Army 
divisions, 6 out of 9 Marine brigades, 6 out of 15 aircraft carrier battle groups, and 10 
out of 22 Air Force tactical fighter wings‖ (Bello, 2005: 26). In the words of General 
Colin Powell, ―the Gulf War was the war against the Russians we did not have. There 
were no trees and no hills, but that‘s what we were trained to fight‖ (cited in Chollet & 
Goldgeier, 2008: 12).  
Relevantly, the administration did not fight the war alone. The rhetoric of the NWO and 
the multi-lateral action against Iraq were not only steps to serve a temporary agenda but 
were also very important techniques to stabilize the international system after the 
profound shock of the EoCW and to allay the fears of other major powers at the time 
(Davis, 2003; Colás & Saull, 2006). Although America would have been able to fight 
the war alone, the administration‘s response to the Kuwaiti invasion revealed its 
intention to share the responsibility for sustaining world peace and security with others. 
Thus, according to Gibbs (2001), America represented itself as a benign rather than 
predatory hegemon. This crisis-management style served America‘s long-standing aim 
of containing other major powers (previous allies and potential foes alike). Furthermore, 
by initiating the NWO rhetoric, the US did not offer the excuse for any potential rival to 
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work individually or collectively against its hegemonic desire (Martel, 2007; Chollet & 
Goldgeier, 2008). According to Peter J. Anderson, the other major powers, if they 
wanted, were ―capable of causing US hegemony substantial trouble‖ (2003: 38). But 
Bush‘s policy towards these powers not only relaxed them, but also encouraged them to 
cooperate, rather than challenge, the US leadership.  
The NWO‘s first war can be seen as part of the long-term strategy of hegemony, with 
the US seeking to secure the flow of crude oil and to control such a significant geo-
strategic area (Cumings, 1992; Martel, 2007).
1
 In this context, from the early stages of 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US was concerned about Saddam‘s potential 
control over the region‘s oil. Iraq after the invasion controlled nearly 20% of the 
world‘s oil reserves, and if Saddam had also invaded Saudi Arabia his reserves would 
have doubled to 40%. In such a scenario, Saddam would have threatened not only US 
interests, but also European and Japanese interests. At the time, the US imported 20% of 
its oil from the region, while Europe‘s dependence on the Gulf‘s oil was 40% of its need 
and Japan‘s was 70% (Martel, 2007). This was amongst the main reasons that 
encouraged the Europeans to contribute to the war and was also a crucial motivation for 
the US. Gaining control of the region‘s oil resources not only served its economic 
interests, but also gave it the ability to control access to oil of its other potential 
adversaries. For this reason, the US did not want any regional power to be transformed 
into a regional hegemon. This is supported by the Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney‘s 
statement in 1990 when he said, (cited in Scott, 2007: 180). 
We‘re there because the fact of the matter is that part of the world controls the 
world supply of oil, and whoever controls the supply of oil … would have a 
stranglehold on the American economy and on indeed on the world economy. 
The Americans were not only concerned about the Saddam regime, but also about the 
pervasive Chinese presence in the region. China established a significant presence in the 
region from the mid-1980s, when its relations with Saudi Arabia—the US‘s traditional 
partner in the region—improved to a degree which saw Beijing supply the Kingdom 
with strategic weapons such as medium-term missiles (Mann, 2003; Gendzier, 2006). 
China also developed relations with Iraq, helping to develop its infrastructure, 
                                                          
1
 After all, the war was not ignited for a temporary objective, as many have argued, but it was a continuity 
of the Eisenhower (1958) and Carter (1980s) doctrines that had pledged to defend the US interests in the 
Gulf region forcefully (Bromley, 2005; Clark, 2005). 
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especially the communication sector. Such developments led the US to recognize that 
China might emerge as a challenger to its interests in the region (Gendzier, 2006).  
Accordingly, the US strategy behind the war was to establish a presence in the region, 
not only to control the huge reserves of oil, but also to prevent other big powers such as 
China (the main potential rival at the time) from gaining control of the region and 
undermining the American unipolar moment. Despite these efforts, Bush has been 
criticised more for ―his mishandling of China than over any other foreign policy‖ 
(Hyland, 1999: 8). In this context, Bush‘s wars (in Panama and Iraq) cannot be 
separated from the CW‘s long-standing strategy of hegemony (Cumings, 1992; Kiani, 
undated; Martel, 2007). Cynthia Weber also suggests that Panama‘s war was to rescue 
US post-CW hegemony because ―the Panama Canal functions in Bush‘s discourse as 
the reflective pool/screen that can mirror/project US hegemonic subjectivity‖ (1999: 
98). In this milieu, Layne and Schwarz conclude that the efforts of the early 1990s to 
create a new strategy show that the ―CW grand strategy is being reaffirmed … rather 
than re-examined‖ (1993: 6). American policymakers, as some scholars argue, ―could 
hardly imagine any alternative future‖ (Schulzinger, 2006: 457).  
Finally, while the US rush into the region was not unsurprising, what actually surprised 
some observers was the way in which the Bush administration responded. Neo-cons, for 
instance, were unsatisfied that America defended its own interests by depending on an 
international coalition of more than 30 countries when it could have easily defeated Iraq 
by itself (Hunter, 1992; Hyland, 1999; Barry, 2004a; Reus-Smit, 2004). Disproving 
such views, the next section casts more light on the causes that led Bush to react as he 
did. 
3.3.4. Bush‟s Multi-Lateralism: Between Choice And Necessity 
In the light of the said argument in the first chapter regarding the activation of the US 
hegemonic project after the CW, it is reasonable to ask: if the US was really interested 
in sustaining its hegemonic project after the CW, why did the Bush administration deal 
with the Gulf problem multi-laterally? If the US was really keen to be a hegemon, the 
logical action would have been to go it alone. A unilateral response to the Iraqi 
aggression was the preferable response for the interventionist wing inside and outside 
the administration. However, there were four major barriers to unilateral action. 
Chapter Three: Between 11/9 And 9/11: AFP‘s Hegemonic Strategy In Progress 
117 
 
The first deficit was the financial deficit. The administration was constrained by the 
massive budget deficit inherited from the Reagan administration and the economic 
recession of the early 1990s. President George Bush I would not or could not ask 
Americans to make more sacrifices to fund unilateral military action (Maynes, 2000a; 
Nau, 2002; Cohen, 2005). This can be understood from Bush‘s speech to Congress in 
September 1990, when he had said ―the US had a vital interest in the conflict, but was 
unable to pursue it without support from an international coalition of states‖ (cited in 
Peterson, 1996: 67). As Fraser Cameron suggests, the lack of financial resources was 
―an important factor in the US response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the summer 
1990‖ (2002: 15). Central amongst American objectives to build the NWO‘s coalition 
was the financing of the war. As a result of Bush‘s successful policy, Japan, Germany, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid nearly 90% of the war‘s bill. Japan, alone, paid about 
US$13 billion, while Germany‘s contribution was around US$10 billion. The largest 
contribution of US$37 billion was from the Gulf countries (Cumings, 1992; Hoff, 1994; 
Peterson, 1996; Atkinson, 1998; Hurst, 1999; Maynes, 2000b; Beets, 2002; Cameron, 
2002; Wedgwood, 2002; Mann, 2003; Cohn, 2005; Daggett, 2008). This matter led 
some scholars to put it in the context of US weakness. Joan Hoff, for instance, argues 
that it was first time that the US ―could not afford to finance its own participation in a 
war effort‖ (1994: 211). However, Bush succeeded in overcoming this weakness and 
achieved US interests at little domestic costs.  
Second, the US built an international coalition because of the ‗domestic consensus 
deficit‘, as it was difficult at the time to build a domestic consensus to support any 
unilateral action towards Iraq. Building an international coalition of the willing 
mobilized support from both Congress and the US public to accept military action. In 
addition, the administration was aware that it needed the support of the electorate in 
future elections (Khalilzad, 1995a-b; Maynes, 2000a). 
The third deficit was the psychological barrier. The impact of the defeatist Vietnam 
Syndrome was still constraining a generation of the AFP elite, Congressmen and the 
public (Lafeber, 1992; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a; Hurst, 1999). There was a lack of 
confidence, or a ‗confidence deficit‘, in the immediate aftermath of the CW, but this 
problem is not related to the administration itself, or to the historical moment. It was 
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inherited from the Vietnam failure that advocated no more Vietnams (Crabb, 1988; 
Lafeber, 1992; Maynes, 2000a; Mueller, 2008).  
The fourth deficit was US uncertainty about the reaction of the other powers, 
particularly China. The Bush administration aimed to allay the concerns of other major 
powers by engaging them in the Gulf War effort. However, it could also be argued that 
the US used the resources of other powers to achieve its own hegemonic agenda.  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the US multi-lateral perspective to deal 
with the crisis was not the result of a lack of commitment to the unipolar moment, but 
was a matter of necessity rather than a matter of choice. In what follows, the US‘s 
multi-lateral perspective will be given greater consideration.  
3.3.5. Bush‟s Multi-Lateralism And The US Post-CW Hegemony 
As Walden Bello argues, if multi-lateralism leads to achievement of the objective of 
hegemony, then the US would not hesitate to apply it, which was actually the case in the 
Gulf War (2005). It enhanced America‘s CW experience that a unilateralist tendency 
needed occasionally to be ―tempered by realization that alliances and multilateral 
strategies could be adopted if they advanced American interests‖ (Leffler, 2003: 1050). 
Therefore, the administration used multi-lateral discourse in order to gain UN approval 
to become involved militarily in Panama and Iraq (Brands, 2008) and built international 
coalitions to serve its own agenda. Because of this, the US guaranteed its interests and 
global leadership, without igniting resistance and, once Iraq was defeated, the allies left 
the region while America‘s troops remained and its direct political influence become 
stronger. It was a burden-sharing strategy (Hurst, 1999) to consolidate US post-CW 
hegemony. The Gulf War of 1991 allowed the US to deploy approximately 500,000 
soldiers in the Persian Gulf, with their military facilities, and to operate permanent 
military bases in all the Arabic Gulf countries (Cox, 2002a, 2002b). In this context, in 
the post-1991 war, the US ―was invited by the Saudi monarchy to maintain US military 
forces near Riyadh. At the same time, the Department of Defense stored vast quantities 
of monitions and military materials in Kuwait and Qatar‖ (Clark, 2005: 46). 
Thus, the NWO was a useful slogan to serve the US hegemonic agenda. In this vein, the 
US used its political weight to influence the members of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) to pass Resolution 678, and to ensure support from its NATO allies. However, 
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it also paid US$1billion to Russia to gain its support and approval (Kiani, undated; 
Bennis, 2000). On the other hand, the centrality of the US in the international coalition 
led to the marginalization of the UN‘s role (Hendrickson, 1992; Barry, 2002).  
Although, according to Joffe, the rhetoric of the NWO was used in the Gulf, it was not 
the case in Serbia (1995: 94). The reason the US did not invoke the NWO in the former 
Yugoslavia was because of fears of being seen as a policeman (Cameron, 2002; Kaplan 
& Kristol, 2003); James Baker had justified the lack of US unconcern to the crisis by 
saying that ―Serbs did not have Iraq‘s capabilities [and] we do not have a dog in that 
fight‖ (cited in Cameron, 2002: 17). This ambivalence led a number of critics to argue 
that the US ―was guilty of double standards. It was ready to act quickly and decisively 
when its oil interests were threatened, but not otherwise‖ (Cameron, 2002: 17). 
However, Bush‘s unwillingness to intervene in the Yugoslavian war that started in 
March 1992 was not because of its insignificance to US strategy, but because of the re-
election question. This was true because, once he took office, President Clinton started 
dealing with the Yugoslavian crisis. In fact, Bush‘s neglect of the Yugoslavian conflict 
that wrongly or rightly was understood as a green light ―to Serbian ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia and Croatia‖ (Gelb, 2009: 64) gave President Clinton the pretext needed to 
intervene in the region on the ground of moral humanitarianism. 
However, most importantly, the Gulf War was actually a warm-up to ready America to 
meet its commitments in the new century, rather than to establish a NWO. President 
Bush, once the dust of the war had settled down, announced that ―by God, we have 
kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all‖ (cited in Lafeber, 1992: 17).1 This 
statement highlights the hidden agenda behind the AFP at the time. John Dumbrell and 
                                                          
1 In fact, the efforts to remedy the ―Vietnam Syndrome‖ - the main psychological barrier in the face of 
exercising armed FP in the post-CW era – had started before the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Western (2005) 
suggested that the US had been battling the Vietnam Syndrome since 1983 in Grenada. However, 
according to Dumbrell, the invasion of Panama in 1989 ―was, in the President‘s own phrase, ‗a warm up‘ 
to eradicate the Vietnam Syndrome and its inhibitions on US military action‖ (1997: 132). President 
George H. W. Bush, according to Melanson (2005) and Dumbrell (2008), proclaimed that the Vietnam 
syndrome lay buried in the desert sands of the Persian Gulf. In this context, Eagleburger elaborates on 
some points regarding the Vietnam Syndrome. He suggests that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait because 
he thought that the world had changed after the CW and the US would not be able, or would even be 
unwilling, to do anything to defend Kuwait. However, ―What Saddam did not know was that the 
American people, if not the entire political class, were no longer in the thrall of the Vietnam Syndrome‖ 
(1993: 17). According to such a view, the Gulf War just consolidated such a recovery. 
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David M. Barrett suggest that the NWO was an attempt to ―institutionalize the 
termination of Vietnam Syndrome inhibition on the use of American military force‖ 
(1997: 43). In this context, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf acknowledged that, with 
the victory in the Gulf War, ―the nation rediscovered the pleasure of adoring a military 
hero‖ (cited in Atkinson, 1998).  
In sum, it is clear that that the US did not enter the war against Iraq to create a new 
multi-lateral world order. Rather, it was undertaken to enhance its position, preserve its 
interests and establish its absolute leadership in the post-CW world. Thus, there was no 
profound discontinuity with the US grand strategy since WWII. It was a plan to secure 
US hegemony in a changeable and uncertain era.  
3.3.6. After The Gulf War: Preparing America For The Future 
True, Colin Powell, a few days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, proposed to change 
American strategy to a new hegemonic one, but this proposal/strategy was put on hold 
for a while. However, President Bush publicly accepted this strategy with few changes 
on August 2, 1990, the day that Iraq invaded its neighbouring country, Kuwait 
(Armstrong, 2002). However, after the victory over Iraq in 1991, the US desire to be the 
global hegemon became obvious. The psychological effects of the Vietnam Syndrome 
were removed and America acquired self-confidence. The US administration now 
needed to sustain its predominance and enhance its global hegemony. In contrast to 
those who have argued that the Bush administration pursued divergent policies, Layne 
suggests that the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) of the early 1990s was a ―new 
NSC-68 intended to establish an intellectual framework for America‘s post-Cold War 
grand strategy‖ (1993: 6). In contrast to America‘s explicit discourse about the NWO 
and multi-lateralism, Mearsheimer argues that the DPG copied the elements of the CW 
strategy. The main difference, however, was that, instead of prohibiting the rise of a 
competitor within its Western sphere of influence, the US no longer tolerated the 
emergence of any competitor anywhere (Kaufman, 2006; Bacevich, 2007). According 
to May (2003b), the impact of the victory in the Gulf War appeared immediately in US 
military strategic thinking. Therefore, it can be argued that military force would still 
play a political role as significant as during the CW, if not more so (Betts, 2005). The 
interconnection between the Pentagon and foreign policy led scholars, such as Cameron 
(2002), Lobe & Barry (2002), to argue that the US intended to militarise its post-CW 
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foreign policy. Therefore, such efforts to use US military forces cannot be understood 
except in the context of US preparations to hold to the New American Century‘s 
obligations, because such a profound shift in AFP thinking took place when the 
strategic challenger to the US had eventually been removed.  
After its multilateral perspective that helped to regain it self-confidence, the US turned 
to its permanent style of policy. The DPG proposal (strategy) was unilateralist, 
hegemonic, and aggressive, and some of its components have been demonstrated in 
today‘s AFP (Lobe & Barry, 2002). Importantly, the strategy marked the end of the 
cooperative hegemonic model, the international collective strategy of the CW (Tyler, 
1992; Clark, 2005; Cohen, 2005), and initiated a new model of malignant hegemony 
(Henriksen, 2001; Guyatt, 2003). The document/strategy outlines the main objectives of 
American defence strategy for the forthcoming years. It calls for an unparalleled 
increase in the defence budget
1
; the safeguarding of the unipolar order; the blocking of 
the emergence of any global or regional contestant powers (e.g., Germany, Japan, 
China, or the EU); the pre-emptive, or even preventative, use of force; and the 
avoidance of a multi-lateral perspective in international affairs if this was not expedient 
to the US‘ dominant position. It also calls for an interventionist policy to solve 
international disputes, even if these do not directly affect American interests. This 
document demonstrated the neo-cons‘ early efforts to push the state toward an 
unprecedented phase of hegemony and unilateralism (Tyler, 1992, 1993; Hook & 
Spanier, 2000; Ryan, 2000; Gowan, 2002; Buchanan, 2003; Halper & Clark, 2004; 
Cohen, 2005; Right Web, 2008).  
                                                          
1
 In contrast to the document‘s call, the US administrations during the early 1990s announced their 
intention to downsize the military budget and redirect these huge sums of money to other pressing needs 
(Rockman, 1997; Accordino, 2000; Dueck, 2006). In 1991, for example, the government had proposed 
cutting 22% of defence spending, and reducing the number of people in uniform by 26% in the space of 
five years (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b & Stockton, 1997). Senator Edward Kennedy, in 1992, called for 
cutting US$210 billion from defence spending over a few years and redirecting the funds for domestic 
services (Phillips et al., 2007). Notwithstanding, even with such announcements, the US had done some 
symbolic reduction ―at a slower rate than other countries‖ (Ikenberry, 2001a: 191). However, by 1992, a 
strong resistance to this tendency appeared in Washington, particularly in the Senate (Phillips et al., 
2007). This resistance is also apparent in government documents of the time. The reduction of the US 
military‘s personnel and spending must not affect the overall quality of US power, according to Cheney‘s 
(1993) Regional Defense Strategy (RDS) for the 1990s. He adds ―high-quality personnel and 
technological superiority represent capabilities that would take decades to restore if foolishly lost in this 
time of reductions‖ (1993: 2). The Department of Defense (1993) had also shared the same idea and 
called for ―avoiding the risks of precipitous reductions in defense capabilities and the overseas 
commitments‖, because of dangerous effects on America‘s attempts to improve both its overall security 
and interests. 
Chapter Three: Between 11/9 And 9/11: AFP‘s Hegemonic Strategy In Progress 
122 
 
This object of the document was to maintain the US‘ hegemonic position, because it 
was written when there was no remaining significant global challenge to American 
security and interests (Gaddis, 1991; Cheney, 1993; Ray, 2000). In the new era, the US 
needed to meet new commitments, and, to do so, it had to redefine carefully its defence 
strategy and aggrandize its military and political influence over the rest of the world 
(Gowan, 2002; Buchanan, 2003; Tunander, 2007). Therefore, it is rational to argue that 
the US‘s post-CW problem was a problem of expansion, not a problem of exhaustion. 
The early-1990s calls for military modernization and an increased defence budget can 
be seen to mirror the US‘s expansionist ambition (Stockton, 1997; Lindsay & Ripley, 
1997b; Clark, 2005).  
The DPG debunked the rhetoric of the NWO and highlighted America‘s constant 
hegemonic tendency. On the other hand, the explicit rhetoric regarding the new kind of 
risks that the US prepared itself to face at the time, such as terrorism, the ethnicisation 
of world politics and WMD was no more than a diversionary tactic to avoid 
unfavourable reactions by other major powers. America‘s real fear was the re-emerging 
of any new geopolitical competitor that could threaten its unprecedented unipolar 
moment.  
In contrast to what has been said so far, some observers could argue that the President 
himself refused this document and it also faced a storm of criticism from Congress 
(Right Web, 2008). However, such contestation is worthless. On the one hand, it is 
ironic that the strategy was discussed in the National Security Council (NAC) and the 
President did not know about it. On the other hand, the presidential condemnation of the 
document was after it became public knowledge. Such a reaction is logical to avoid 
further criticism. True, the document was revised by Lewis Scooter Libby; however, its 
final edition ―merely softened some of the hard edges of the earlier draft‖ (Right Web, 
2008). Nevertheless, according to Clark, the idealistic objective of ―a US global power, 
enforcing its role of dominance remained alive throughout the 1990s‖ (2005: 25).  
In the context of the establishment of US hegemony, Peter Gowan (2002) argues that 
the DPG draft was leaked to the New York Times deliberately in 1992 for the same 
purpose as the Gulf War was fought, to send a message of US power to the other major 
powers. In the words of one leading scholar, (Cox, 2002a: 268): 
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[The war was not only to] deter likely enemies, but also to send an 
unambiguously clear message to more friendly regional players that the United 
States would not countenance any challenge to its hegemony. Much might have 
changed since the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR, but one thing 
had not: the American urge to remain number one.  
3.4. The Clinton Strategy: A Change Within Continuity  
3.4.1. Clinton‟s Lack Of FP Experience And The Turn In The US Hegemonic 
Strategy 
The concept of ‗national security‘, at least since the early 1940s, ―had served as a 
profoundly unifying concept, yoking foreign policy, military decisions, and domestic 
affairs; it was America‘s commanding idea‖ (Olson, 2004: 307). Because of this 
tradition, generations of scholars and policymakers alike were ―limited by the only 
history they knew—that of the Cold War‖ (LaFeber, 1994: 753). In this way, I. M. 
Destler (1998), for example, saw Clinton‘s new geo-economic approach to AFP as a 
clear reaction to the Bush‘s realism and the rhetoric of the NWO. However, what is not 
in doubt is that Bush and Clinton strategies shared a common agenda and the same 
objectives.   
While Bush‘s experience in foreign affairs ―was to be held against him‖ (Donnelly, 
2004: 80) in the 1992 election, Clinton‘s campaign advisor suggested, the EoCW, 
―made Clinton‘s inexperience in foreign policy much less important‖ (Hyland, 1999: 
15). Brands captured such a paradox when arguing that ―Clinton had one important 
advantage over Bush … his lack of prior experience made the transition from Cold War 
to post-CW less traumatic‖ (2008: 101). Thus, Clinton was freed from the traditional 
concept of national security that had - to a large degree - constrained the capabilities of 
his predecessors and responded to calls that America should think and act differently 
because the international environment had changed (Kaysen, et al., 1991; Deibel, 1992; 
Nixon, 1992; Lake, 1993; Walt, 1998; Waltz, 2000). Although Clinton entered the 
White House on a domestic platform by claiming ―It‘s the economy, stupid‖ (cited in 
Miller, 1994), in the space of a few years he recognized that there was no clear 
distinction between foreign and domestic politics (Lake, 1993; Carter, 1998; Dobson & 
March, 2001; Kaufman, 2006). 
In contrast to those who posit that Clinton‘s geo-economics is a departure from his 
predecessor‘s policy, it can be argued that his approach was in line with his 
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predecessor‘s rather more than many recognise. His aim was to ready America to meet 
the challenges and opportunities of the early 21
st
 century (Ikenberry, 1996; Brinkley, 
1997; Clinton, 1997; Cavanagh, 2000; Clinton, 1997). However, it should be noted that 
Clinton‘s policies can be traced back to the Bush I era, when the US signed the Canada-
US Free Trade agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989 as a regional cooperative entity prior to 
EoCW (Du Boff, 2003; Clarkson, 2006). In addition, James Baker III, the Secretary of 
State during the Gulf War, admitted that the war in the Gulf was about jobs (Hyland, 
1999). Thus, Ryan (2000) suggests that George H. W. Bush‘s security perspective was 
not just that of a realist, but also of a liberal democratic internationalist. His FP agenda 
did not show any discontinuity with the CW strategy (Hurst, 1999). However, what is 
not in doubt is that the Bush‘s stay in office and the nature of the historical moment 
itself did not allow him to complete the job of remaking the world order and building 
US hegemony, which was therefore handed over to his successor, President Clinton.  
This next section bridges the gap between the two eras. The paradoxical issue that 
appears to reveal a policy break between the two administrations resides over the 
scholars‘ separation of Bush‘s NWO and Clinton‘s geo-economics. 
3.4.2. Clinton‟s Geo-Economics: An Absolute Change Or A Change In Continuity? 
The lesson drawn from the Gulf War for Washington was that to be capable of 
guaranteeing absolute global leadership and to provide public good and a security 
umbrella around the world as a hegemon, the US had to rebuild its economic strength 
(McGrew, 1998; Stokes, 1998; Sheetz, 2006). The early 1990s were unlike the post-
War era, when the US emerged as ―a victorious creditor nation with little foreign 
economic competition‖. While at the EoCW, America suffered a serious economic 
recession, along with a significant budget deficit; its CW allies were revitalizing their 
regional economies and competing internationally with the US (Nye, 2000; Hoff, 2008). 
Although the US enjoyed unilateral military dominance, in economic terms it could not 
be considered to be hegemonic, with economic power being distributed between the US, 
Japan, and Europe (Stallings & Streeck, 1995; Smith, 2001). This status worried AFP 
decision-makers because military strength alone no longer ―appears to translate directly 
into global political influence‖ (McGrew, 1998: 168).  
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After the Gulf war, the other powers accepted that competition with the US in the 
military domain was no longer possible. As a result, according to Anthony McGrew, 
―economic power rather than military power is emerging as a key currency of 
international politics‖ (1998: 168). Furthermore, the changing nature of the new era had 
also changed the traditional concept of geo-politics. John Peterson argues that ―global 
telecommunications, economic interdependence, and long-range weapons delivery 
systems make ‗geopolitics‘ seem irrelevant‖ (1996: 57). In consequence, the US 
realized that its key foreign adversaries in the post-Soviet era would not be political or 
military but economic (Cox, 1995; Sulfaro & Crislip, 1997). Accordingly, in contrast to 
those who criticize the administration‘s reduction of military budget in the early 1990s, 
it would be plausible to say that it was a plan to strengthen America‘s long-term 
strategy. It is true that ―US spending on national defense fell from a decade high of 6.2 
percent of GDP in fiscal 1986 to 3.2 percent of GDP in fiscal 1998‖ (Calleo, 2001: 
186), however, it is also true that ―the federal budget deficit fell from 5.1 percent of 
GDP to a surplus of 0.8 percent in the same period‖ (Calleo, 2001: 186).1 
This tied into neo-liberal thinking which argues that America‘s predominance is not 
about military strength alone, ―but it also lies in its predominance within the advanced 
sectors of the postmodern economies, its matchless financial dexterity, and in particular, 
its technological prowess‖ (Calleo, 2001: 377). According to Lee Marsden, ―a dynamic 
economy would enable America to retain its preeminent role militarily, diplomatically, 
and economically‖ (2005: 41). In turn, it intended to open new markets for exports and 
use its wealth, rather than its military might, to control and manage international affairs 
(Hanson, 1996; Stokes, 1998; Ryan, 2000). However, without a doubt, ―the rationales of 
free trade and capitalist economic were used to disguise America‘s hegemonic power 
and make it seems benign, or, at least, natural and unavoidable‖ (Johnson, 2004: 256).  
Clinton‘s perspective of the use of economic power to guarantee hegemony is not new, 
but it follows a pattern in AFP. America‘s post-WWII hegemony was based on two 
                                                          
1
 This phenomenon contradicts with what is known as a ―military Keynesianism‖: the view that by 
promoting effective demand and supporting monopoly profits military spending could help place a floor 
under US capitalism‖ (Foster et al, 2008). This strategy recovered the US economy from the great 
depression‘s effects in WWII.  The NSC-68 emphasized that ―the economic effects of the [military 
spending] program might be to increase the gross national product by more than the amount being 
absorbed for additional military and foreign assistance purposes‖ (cited in Gibbs, 2006: 34). It is probably 
true because between 1950 and 1953, US military production was expanded seven times (Saull, 2008). 
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cornerstones, ―massive military spending and massive overseas investment‖ 
(McCormick, 1995: 239). In this direction, the promotion of globalization, free market, 
trade and global capital flows was not a shift in AFP strategy, but it is the second aspect 
of the NWO of the 1990s. Moreover, economic power can also be used to limit 
adversaries. For example, since 1993, the US ―has imposed new economic sanctions, or 
threatened legislation to do so, 60 times on 35 countries that represent 40 per cent of the 
world population‖ (Maynes, 1999: 517). Accordingly, in opposition to those such as 
Khalilzad (1995a), who argue that Clinton came to the White House without a clear FP 
strategy and challenging those who have seen the Clinton administration‘s call for 
continuing strong US leadership in the post-CW world as rhetoric (Volgy & Imwalle, 
1995: 823), this section puts forward the argument in line with Cameron that Clinton 
and his advisors restored ―the American economy to good health [as] an essential 
prerequisite for foreign policy‖ (2002: 19). The administration‘s contribution to the 
establishment of the American hegemony in reality resided on the reprioritization of the 
AFP agenda and setting economic concerns at the heart of US geo-politics (Brinkley, 
1997; Destler, 1998; Calleo, 2001; Judis, 2004). This shift was needed as the traditional 
distinction between economic and political issues was no longer beneficial. US security 
and its way of life depended on a prosperous economy (Christopher, 1995; Ryan, 2000; 
Dueck, 2006). On the other hand, ―seizing a dominant position in the globalizing 
economy [would be] translated directly into political pre-eminence and offered the best 
guarantee for US national security‖ (Bacevich, 2002: 98).  
3.4.2.1. A Global Economic Regime To Drive US Hegemony 
In contrast to Paul M. Kennedy‘s recommendation that the US must retreat to avoid the 
fate of other hegemonic powers, the engagement strategy ―called upon the country to 
compete, not retreat‖ (Nau, 2001: 285), and ―to make trade a priority element of 
American security‖ (Bello, 2005: 27). It was in this context that Mexico was included in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which in 1993 expanded the 
previous agreement with Canada (Cavanagh, 2000; Du Boff, 2003; Clarkson, 2006; 
Bacevich, 2007). Geo-economically, the NAFTA agreement created a ―regional trade 
block discriminating against Europe‘s interests persuaded the EU to engage more 
seriously with Washington‘s trade demands‖ (Clarkson, 2006: 211). As a consequence, 
NAFTA‘s negotiation was also used to jumpstart other global negotiations, such as the 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and in 1994 the US signed the 
Uruguay Round. This was quickly followed in 1995 by the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which Clinton hailed as promoting economic renewal for the US 
(Cox, 2008; Paterson et al., 2010). The Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
was another economic space that advanced US interests regionally and globally. In this 
context, Mark Sheetz argues that ―If globalization refers to the impact of foreign 
influences across national borders, be they economic, political, societal, cultural, or 
information-related, then globalization, in one sense, amounts to little more than an 
expression of US hegemony‖ (2006: 4).  
In addition to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the new 
regional agreements were used to expand the liberalization and privatization of world 
economies by imposing structural reform in most countries, in order to open up their 
economies to globalization and foreign investment flows (Gardner, 2004; Smith, 
2005b). They not only shifted ―emphasis in security from geo-politics to geo-
economics‖ (Ralph, 2000: 33), but also ―represented the post-Cold war apogee of US 
hegemony‖ (Clarkson, 2006: 211). According to Dumbrell, ―geoeconomics increasingly 
drives geopolitics‖ in contrast to the CW‘s model in which ―geopolitics drove 
geoeconomics‖ (2008: 89). These structural changes helped to overcome the fiscal 
deficits that hindered the Bush administration from acting unilaterally in 1990-91 and 
readied the stage for the following administration to act more unilaterally. By the end of 
the 1990s, the US economy had enjoyed a decade of ―uninterrupted growth, the third 
longest expansion in the nation‘s history‖ (O‘Connor & Sabato, 2004: 721). During the 
CW the leader of the free world found an unprecedented opportunity to expand its 
leadership to include the entire world (Barry, 2000; Nau, 2001) and the US economy 
transcended the German and Japanese miracles of earlier decades (Cavanagh, 2000: 57). 
 
3.4.2.2. The US Economy: Restored Healthiness 
Although budget deficit had been a chronic problem since 1969 (Chace, 1996, 1997a), 
the main increase in the US budget deficit started during the Reagan administration 
(1981-89), because of the severe recession of the early 1980s and the increase in 
military expenditure (Cline, 1994; Chace, 1996; Du Boff, 2003). The US deficit ―rose at 
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a rapid rate of 6% annually‖ (Cline, 1994: 12), and jumped dramatically ―from $9 
billion in 1981 to $207 billion just two years later‖ (Smith, 2005b: 123). By 1992 it was 
nearly US$300 billion, the largest in the country‘s history (Chace, 1996; Ambrose & 
Brinkley, 1997). As a result, the US ―moved from being a creditor nation to being the 
largest debtor nation in the world‖ (Cameron, 2002: 15). Reagan‘s policy left the state 
―dependent on foreign investors to keep its economy afloat‖ (Cohen, 2005: 13). 
Therefore, by 1989, ―America‘s foreign debt stood at $500 billion‖ (Schonberg, 2003: 
176). However, according to Douglas Kellner, during the Reagan presidency, ―the 
national deficit was doubled to $2 trillion‖ while during the George H. W. Bush 
administrations, the deficit doubled again to ―an almost unconceivable record $4 trillion 
dollar debt‖ (2003: 15). Not only budget deficit, but also trade deficit was a big problem 
faced US economy in the early 1990s. Andreas Falke argues that ―the trade deficit with 
Japan was over $60 billion‖ in the late 1990s, and the deficit with China jumped from 
US$3.5 billion to almost US$57 billion in the space of a decade from 1988 to 1998 
(2001: 21). 
Owing to these weaknesses, it was feared that the US might be on its way to losing its 
global hegemony in the post-CW era. In this context, several critics warned from the 
very early 1990s that the US would always be a ―crippled giant abroad‖ until it could 
manage the federal budget deficit and trade imbalance (Rostow, 1991; Hamilton, 1991; 
Cox, 2002b). However, Clinton‘s geo-economics approach allayed such worries and 
overcame American economic weaknesses.  
In line with the early calls to remedy the budget deficit, the administration‘s efforts led 
to breaking ―the national habit of ever-increasing budgetary deficit‖ (Calleo, 2001: 
377). It announced in 1998 that the state had ended a red period of deficit and entered a 
black period of surpluses (O‘Connor & Sabato, 2004). As figure 3.1 shows, it was 
almost US$300 billion in 1992 but had fallen to US$255 billion in 1993. It dropped 
again from US$117 billion in 1996 to reach just US$70 billion in 1997 (Chace, 1996-
1997). The US budget was balanced in 1998, four years earlier than had been projected, 
and in financial year (FY) 2000, there was ―more than $200 billion surplus‖ (Pfiffner, 
2006: 47).   
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Figure3. 1 US Budgetary Deficit and Surplus (in billions of US 1996 dollars). 
Data from: (O‘Connor & Sabato, 2004: 729). 
On the other hand, in order to remedy the trade deficit, Clinton‘s tough trade stance 
eventually strengthened and revitalized the US economy and kept the trade deficit with 
its main economic competitors within acceptable levels (see figure 3.2). The US 
endorsed an assertive or even aggressive trade policy with its allies and economic 
partners to balance the trade deficit (Stokes, 1998; Nau, 2001) and this hardline policy 
nearly led to an unparalleled trade war when the US ―threatened 100 percent tariffs if 
Japan did not open up the auto and auto-parts sector which contributed to 58 percent of 
the trade.  
 
Figure3. 2 US Trade Partners in 1999 
Data from (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 219). 
In consequence, the US, as said in the previous chapter, enjoyed an exceptional period 
of economic growth. The openness of the US economy also motivated capital flow from 
outside. Figures show that, from just US$12 billion invested by foreigners in US 
business in 1980, private investment by foreigners had risen to approximately US$200 
billion annually by 1998, and by the early 21
st
 century, the US ―received more than 
twice as much foreign investment as any other country in the world‖ (Sowell, 2007: 
462). On the other hand, America‘s private foreign direct investment abroad was about 
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US$1.207 trillion in 1998 (in 2001 terms) (Rogowsky et al., 2001). Since 1994 the US 
―exported more than any other nation‖ (Stokes, 1998: 164), and its ―stock market soared 
by more than 300 percent between 1990 and 1999‖ (O‘Connor & Sabato, 2004: 721). 
Between 1993 and 1996, ―more than 200 new market opening agreements helped to 
create 1.6 million American jobs‖ (Brinkley, 1997: 3). The structure of the US economy 
also changed. By 1995, business in commodities, services and financial tools 
represented approximately 30 per cent of America‘s GDP, compared with only 6-8 
percent during the mid-1950s (Walker, 1996). Exporting of services equalled more than 
$80 billion once President Clinton took office in his second term, compared with only 
$58 billion in 1992 (Brinkley 1997). The impact of these improvements can be seen in 
the US GDP‘s increase during the 1990s (see figure 3.3). 
 
Figure3. 3 US Gross Domestic Product GDP, Fiscal Years 1990 to 2001 (in billions of US dollar) 
Data from: http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_gdp_history 
These shifts led John Cavanagh to argue that in the late 1990s ―everything that should 
be up is up—Gross Domestic Product (GDP), capital spending, incomes, the stock 
market, employment, exports, consumer and business confidence. Everything that 
should be down is down—unemployment, inflation, interest rates‖ (2000: 57). In this 
context, in early 1997, the economic growth rate was 5.6%, and the indicators of 
inflation fell to a lower rate (less than 4% in the same period). During this period, the 
unemployment rates also significantly dropped to the lowest level in 25 years - less than 
6% in the mid-1990s, falling further to just 4% in 2000 (see figure 3.4). American 
companies made huge profits and dominated the broader global market. America also 
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shared one-third of the entire world‘s production (nearly 30%) and its exports increased 
from 9.9% to 12.1% of the US GDP (Bergsten & Henning, 1996; Chace, 1996, 1997a; 
Naím, 1997/1998; Cavanagh, 2000). 
 
Figure3.4 US Unemployment Rates, 1990 to 2000 
Data from: United States Bureau of Labour Statistics, (Available at) http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-
english/telearn/global/ilo/seura/usunemp.htm; (Cavanagh, 2000). 
These improvements, in addition to the promotion of the free global market and 
globalisation, played a vital role in transferring the US into a phase of unprecedented 
absolute hegemony (economically and militarily) in the 1990s and beyond. If the US‘s 
geo-strategic objective since the early CW had been to prevent the rise of any 
hegemonic power, then the Clinton administration maintained this objective, not only 
by prohibiting the rise of any geo-political rival, but also by stretching it to include the 
blocking of the potential emergence of any economic hegemon that could challenge the 
US in its unipolar moment (Stokes, 1988). Clinton‘s revitalization of the US economy 
was also seen as a very important dimension to AFP not only at the time, but also for 
the following administration. From the Clinton administration officials‘ viewpoint, the 
US was not only a dominant power but also an indispensable nation. Although they did 
not actually use the phrase ‗hegemonic stability‘, in terms of practical policy, the US 
was a real hegemon (Deuck, 2006). The key question is: without Clinton‘s efforts to 
ready the US economically to bear the burden of its global hegemony, would it have 
been possible for the Bush II administration to respond to 9/11 as it did? If not, who can 
accept the argument that Clinton‘s geo-economic perspective diverted US strategy in 
the 1990s?     
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3.4.2.3. Clinton‟s Wilsonianism: The Legitimisation Of The US‟s Hegemonic 
Agenda 
The En-En strategy listed the main US objectives in the 1990s: the enhancement of US 
security; the expansion of democracy and the free market abroad; and the promotion of 
economic prosperity at home (White House, 1994). Such a mixture of idealistic and 
realistic objectives is not unprecedented in US history and more than two centuries of 
AFP (Crabb & Holt, 1992; Wiarda, 1997). However, scholars aroused an intense storm 
of controversy and criticism of the Clinton strategy by arguing that such a combination 
was the main reason behind AFP fragmentation at the time (for instance, see Cox, 2000; 
Farrell, 2000; Smith, 2000b). In contrast, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1996 
was clear when it stated ―all of America‘s strategic interests … are served by enlarging 
the community of democratic and free-market nations‖ (White House, 1996). For this 
reason, democracy enlargement was not only ranked among AFP‘s supreme objectives, 
but was also linked to US geo-political interests (Christopher, 1995; Gerges, 1999; 
Travis, 1998; Vanaik, 2007). It has been a polestar for AFP since the EoCW because it 
served the US geo-political agenda in Eastern Europe, the former USSR satellite states 
and the Middle East (Bakhash, 1993; Maynes, 1996; Travis, 1998; Vanaik, 2007).  
For the Clinton administration, democracy and globalization were more connected than 
many observers may have recognised: while ―democracy provided the foundation for 
the post-CW international community, trade and capital flows were seen as forces of 
political reform and integration‖ (Ikenberry, 2004b: 622). On the other hand, Wiarda 
(1997) argues that, without such an idealistic component, AFP may have lacked the 
support needed domestically and engendered resistance globally. In terms of tactics, 
listing democracy as a FP objective gave the US a moral excuse, and good cause, to 
intervene wherever it needed without having to face problems. Therefore, without a 
countervailing USSR, the US had ―a more aggressive interpretation of the need to 
promote democracy‖ (Vanaik, 2007: 17).   
In sum, the above discussion shows that Clinton‘s liberal and moral policy did not 
represent any discontinuity from or contradiction with AFP‘s mainstream since WWII. 
Clinton‘s promotion of geo-economy and democracy was complicit with traditional 
geo-political concerns, and Wilsonian discourse, such as liberty, democracy and human 
rights, had been used to legitimate and enhance the US agenda everywhere. David 
Chapter Three: Between 11/9 And 9/11: AFP‘s Hegemonic Strategy In Progress 
133 
 
Calleo was correct when he argued that under Clinton ―American imperialism wore its 
Wilsonian face‖ (2001: 377). 
3.4.3. En-En Strategy‟s Tangible Face: “Speak Softly And Carry A Big Stick” 
The discussion in the previous section reveals that the Clinton administration‘s 
approach to peace and security avoided traditional power politics and fitted exactly 
within the liberal and Wilsonian tradition (Dumbrell & Barrett, 1997; Cox, 2000; 
Litwak, 2007). However, although the Clinton administration ―saw the world as much 
less hostile than either Bush administration did, it was not able to radically transform 
the military, reorient doctrine, or decrease the American military presence around the 
globe‖ (Crawford, 2005). In fact, Clinton‘s foreign and defence policy was not an entire 
shift from his predecessor‘s doctrine; it represented continuity rather than change 
(McGrew, 1998). The liberalist commitment for promotion of free trade and the market 
and the idealist commitment for enlarging democracy and enhancing human rights were 
coupled with an unprecedented willingness to use military force unilaterally if needed 
(Gowan, 2002; Posen, 2003; Dueck, 2006; Falk, 2007; Goldgeier & Chollet, 2008).  
The core concepts of Bush‘s DPG strategy clearly reappeared when the remarks of 
Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor (NSA), made at Johns Hopkins University 
in 1993. Then, these concepts found their way into policymaking circles (Khalilzad, 
1995a; Gowan, 2002). The main components of the DPG and the Pentagon‘s two-war 
doctrine during the Bush administration were adopted by the Clinton administration‘s 
strategy. In this way, the Bottom-up Review (BUR) of 1993 had showed the 
administration‘s intention to keep the US military ready to fight and win two 
simultaneous regional wars, and offered several suggestions to prepare America for the 
future (White House, 1995; Department of Defense, 1997; Isenberg, 1998; Hartung, 
2003; Johnson et al., 2003; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2005). This tendency was clear in all 
NSSs of the 1990s: it not only called for maintaining the quality of the US‘s CW 
military power but also pledged to increase military strength as a guarantor of US 
security and leadership in the post-CW world (White House, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 
1996, 2000).  
By the time of the mid-term election in 1994, the Clinton administration had changed 
course and refused any further defence budget decreases. It pledged to keep the US 
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army unparalleled in terms of training, apparatus, and readiness to fight (Clinton, 1994, 
1997, 1999). The administration requested Congress to increase the defence budget by 
US$1.7 billion for FY 1994 and by US$2.6 billon for FY 1995. The administration also 
called for an increase in the defence budget by US$25 billion to improve the quality of 
military life over the next few years (White House, 1995). Clinton‘s domestic politics as 
a main focus lasted a short time before the emphasis shifted to FP, and his earlier calls 
to decrease defence spending also dramatically changed (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b; 
Rockman, 1997; Phillips et al., 2007). While it is true that the defence budget had 
declined from the CW‘s peak of 28% to only 15% of the total government budget in FY 
1997, as shown in the previous chapter, this did not mean that American capabilities 
differed from those of the CW. Perhaps most importantly, ―the Clinton Administration 
presided over the longest sustained boom in US history, so that even a relatively huge 
outlay on defence became, at less than 3.5 per cent of GDP, quite inoffensive in 
economic and, more particularly, political terms‖ (Huisken, 2006). 
The similarity between Clinton and his predecessors was also clear in his FP conduct. 
For instance, Layne (1993: 6) argues that there is no evidence that the Clinton 
administration‘s view of unipolarity was different from that of the Bush administration. 
Reus-Smit (2005) and Marqusee (2007) argue that the US‘s willingness to play the role 
of the world sheriff at the time was obvious and AFP showed the same conduct of 
unilateralism and global dominance. The US‘s strategy of assertive multi-lateralism that 
was promoted once the administration took office in 1993 soon turned out to be more 
pragmatic, internationalist, unilateralist or even hegemonic under domestic pressure and 
international calculations (Barry, 2000; Maynes, 2000b; Ikenberry, 2003; Kaplan & 
Kristol, 2003; Bello, 2005; Betts, 2005). In this context, Madeleine Albright, Clinton‘s 
Secretary of State, argued (1999: 14):  
If our choice is always to wait until everything is perfect and all the downsides 
have turned rightsides up, waiting is all we would ever do. We have long since 
passed the time in our history when we could count on the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans to guarantee our security; when we could protect our interests by 
maintaining a few key relationships, principally in Europe; and when we could 
safely take a reactive approach to most events in most places most of the time. 
Our era demands a dynamic approach that recognizes the global nature of our 
interests, the rapidity with which new threats may emerge and the extent to 
which progress in one area can lead to breakthrough in another. 
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This kind of thinking and implementation not only represented continuity with the elder 
Bush‘s strategy, but also laid the foundations for the post-2001 pre-emptive doctrine 
that has been largely utilized to legitimise the US war on terror. Such a growing 
tendency led Charles William Maynes in 1998 to warn against the new militarization of 
AFP. He observed that ―the surplus of power that the United States enjoys is beginning 
to metastasize into an arrogance toward others that is bound to backfire‖ (cited in 
Knight, 2000). Some official indicators at the time demonstrated that the US depended 
on military power to achieve its objectives, rather than other instruments. For example, 
in FY 1998, Congress appropriated US$247.7billion for the Department of Defense 
DOD compared with only US$1billion for the Department of State (DOS) and $3 
billion for the CIA (Jones, 1998). In this milieu, Marqusee (2007) argues, the use of 
force abroad during the Clinton presidency was greater than that of any post-Vietnam 
predecessors. According to Dumbrell, Clinton  ―ordered US forces into 25 separate 
operations‖ by the end of 1995, compared with only 17 in Reagan‘s two presidency 
terms and just 14 during the George H. W. Bush presidency (2002: 52). By March 1999, 
when the air campaign against Serbia began, Clinton had ―notified Congress 46 times 
that he was deploying US troops abroad to face imminent hostilities‖, compared to 
President Ford who notified Congress ―only 4 times, Carter once, Reagan 14 times, and 
Bush just 7 times‖ (Borosage, 2000: 12). Thus, Barry argues that President Clinton was 
also ―the most interventionist, sending troops on more foreign missions than any of his 
predecessors‖ (2000: xvii). The Department of Defense also declared that the US would 
continue ―using all dimensions of its influence to shape the international security 
environment‖ to protect its crucial interests. Key among these was the prevention of the 
―emergence of a hostile regional coalition or hegemon‖ (1997). Charles Knight asserts 
that AFP‘s hegemonic tendency was more obvious in the US defence strategies of the 
1990s than during the CW. In fact, there was a growing political tendency in 
Washington to remake a new global environment through military force. For example, 
the US had ―invaded Haiti, for nothing, but only to say that America was not a paper 
tiger‖ (2000). For this reason, Anthony Lake, Clinton‘s NSA, said prior to the invasion: 
―our action in Haiti will send a message far beyond our region, to all who seriously 
threaten our interests‖ (cited in Ryan, 2000: 188). Lake‘s assertion found its reasoning 
in the 1990s political discourse regarding defence strategy.  
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The continuity of AFP also appeared in the humanitarian intervention, or ‗military 
humanism‘, that was largely adopted during the Clinton administration. It can be 
described as the equivalent of the CW discourse of the defence of freedom and 
democracy against the evil of Communism. As Achin Vanaik describes, it can also be 
linked to the post-9/11 ‗regime change‘ doctrine (2007: 16). Journalist Paul Starobin 
describes Clinton‘s humanitarian intervention as ―liberal hawkism‖ (cited in Dumbrell, 
2002: 43). Such rhetoric of humanitarian intervention was also found in President 
George H. W. Bush‘s political discourse. As the US forces led the military operation in 
the Gulf, the President announced in Congress: ―We are Americans; we have a unique 
responsibility to do the hard work of freedom‖ (cited in Marqusee, 2007: 105). The 
Clinton administration was, in fact, ―pushing an American agenda (and occasionally 
American soldiers) onto the rest of the world‖ (Guyatt, 2003: 233) to consolidate the US 
position as a hegemonic power. Therefore, Benjamin Cohen concludes that Clinton‘s 
strategies of multi-lateralism, regionalism, and unilateralism ―may in practice be made 
to function as complementary components of an effective global policy—three cards in 
a potentially winning hand‖ (cited in Dumbrell, 2000: 45).   
In fact, humanitarianism served the overall US global strategy. In contrast to the 
criticism of candidate Bush II‘s political advisor in the 2000 presidential election, 
Condoleezza Rice that Clinton had no perspective of using force abroad (The 
Economist, 19 February 2000), it could be suggested that her view was no more than 
electoral rhetoric. She knew that the strategic foresight behind Clinton‘s intervention 
abroad was the expansion of US strategic presence and the enhancement of US 
hegemony. Therefore, following the former Yugoslavia crisis of 1999, the US enjoyed 
military presence in several states, such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, 
Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia, in addition to its continuing presence in Europe, Asia and 
Japan (Henriksen, 2001; Kagan, 2007). This wider strategic presence did not exist 
several decades previously. Such military wide-deployment was set up not only to deter 
or defeat enemies but also to contain and manage allies and to protect and impose 
influence globally in the new American Century (Cox, 2002a, b).  
In sum, after the EoCW, American global presence and influence did not retreat but 
expanded to new regions, such as Eastern Europe and the Middle East in addition to its 
continuing deployment in Europe and Japan (Kagan, 2007). The US, from the Clinton 
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administration officials‘ viewpoint, was not only a dominant power, but also an 
indispensible nation. They did not actually use the phrase ―hegemonic stability,‖ but in 
terms of practical policy, the US was a real hegemon (Deuck, 2006). In all 
circumstances, the economic agenda was enhanced by the argument of a democracy-
advancing policy. 
3.4.3.1. Clinton‟s Strategy Toward Collective Organisations: Multi-Lateralism Or 
Hegemony 
Just as the Clinton administration utilised the world economic organisation to advance 
its own interests, the UN and NATO also were used to achieve its geo-political ends. In 
contrast to its explicit rhetoric of multi-lateralism was the declaration by Madeleine 
Albright, the US ambassador to the UN, in 1995, that the UN is an instrument of AFP 
(Cited in Bennis, 2000). Following in the steps of its predecessor, the Clinton 
administration used the multi-lateral organisation to advance its hegemonic agenda, 
since it offered solutions to the problems of finance and legitimacy. For example, the 
UN was used to legitimise the US‘s intervention in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti (Maynes, 
2000b; Brands, 2008).  
However, the Clinton administration also weakened the UN as a constraint to its 
hegemonic strategy. Early in Clinton‘s second term in office, the US was ―in arrears to 
every major international body except … NATO‖ (Maynes, 2000b: 86). In March 1999, 
―Washington‘s debt to the UN totalled $1.6 billion‖ (Bennis, 2000: 111), or ―61 percent 
of all arrears‖ (Maynes, 2000b: 86). Moreover, while it asked others to pay their 
contributions to the peacekeeping costs, the US reduced its contribution to fund UN 
peacekeeping from 31% to 25% during 1995 (Christopher, 1995).  
On the other hand, while the US promoted human rights political discourse and 
championed the creation of the ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia in 
1993 and Rwanda in 1994, it opposed the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) (Ikenberry, 2003; Malone, 2003). Furthermore, while the Clinton 
administration joined the rest of the world‘s countries in ratifying the Ottawa 
Convention on the Banning of Land Mines in June 1997, the Senate opposed the 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, and showed its 
opposition to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) (Ikenberry, 2003).  
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More importantly, on many occasions the US acted internationally without clear 
authorisation from the UNSC. Its intervention in Haiti in 1994, the missile strikes in 
Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998 and several missile strikes in Iraq (for example, in 1993, 
1996 and 1998), and in Kenya were all mounted unilaterally without permission of the 
UN but were committed under the right of self-defence. The US-led air strikes against 
Serbia of 1999 were also carried out without a clear resolution from the UNSC (Kiani, 
no date; Dumbrell, 1997; Wedgwood, 2002; Ikenberry, 2003; Kohut & Stokes, 2006). 
In the same context, while the US‘s involvement in Somalia was conducted under the 
UN umbrella, its unilateral withdrawal was not. The US not only failed to stop the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994, but also impeded the involvement of the international 
community in the case. This was not only because of the US‘s bitter experience in 
carrying out Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, but also because of the insignificance 
of Africa in the US post-CW strategy at the time. Somalia did not possess the natural 
resources that Iraq had and the African Horn had lost its strategic importance in the US 
strategy after the CW (Hurst, 1999; Burgess, 2002; Malone, 2003; Judis, 2004; Kohut & 
Stokes, 2006; Murphy, 2007).  
Therefore, by using the UN as a political scapegoat and hesitating to pay its bill, the US 
―weaken[ed] both the UN‘s reputation and its capacity relative to its expanded 
peacekeeping responsibility‖ (Sewall, 2002: 192). However, this undermining of the 
UN was preferable for the US because it enhanced its unipolar moment. In fact, with no 
great threat on the horizon, there was no need for allies. Therefore, according to Charles 
W. Maynes, American policymakers were ―even less likely to accept the constraints of 
international institutions and obligations ―(2000b: 86). 
NATO was also used to marginalize the UN‘s commanding role in international politics 
and to offer legitimacy to the US‘s preferred action outside the UNSC (Reisman, 
1999/2000; Bennis, 2000; Sewall, 2002). In this context, President Clinton repeatedly 
stated that the US and NATO were ―operating on behalf of the world community‖ 
(Cited in Reisman, 1999/2000: 40). Consequently, the US, through NATO, legitimized 
the air strikes of 1999 during the Kosovo crisis (Reisman, 1999/2000; Hendrickson, 
2002; Wedgwood, 2002). Secretary of State William Cohen asserted on 11 June 1998 
that the US and NATO ―had the right to use force … without the approval of United 
Nations Security Council or Congress‖ (cited in Hendrickson, 2002: 119). However, 
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Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General at the time, ―did not see fit to pronounce on the 
legitimacy of the war, probably because NATO approved and participated in it‖ (Kohut 
& Stokes, 2006: 194). For several observers, while it was NATO‘s war, ―it was clearly 
very much America‘s war‖ (Marcus, 2000: 79).   
From the above discussion, it is clear that Clinton‘s policy did not lose its way. It was in 
continuity with the Bush administration‘s agenda and neither administrations‘ agenda 
represented any discontinuity with AFP since the end of WWII. Consequently, it seems 
logical to argue that ―Clinton‘s enlargement policy [was] already catapulting America 
into the next millennium‖ (Brinkley, 1997: 5). 
3.5. Bush II‟s Pre-9/11 Policy: Preparing America For An Unprecedented 
Hegemonic Phase  
The consequences of Clinton‘s strategy were immediately reflected in his successor‘s 
policy. The US was no longer constrained by its economic weakness and it was 
enthusiastic to abrogate the previous multi-lateral barriers to its power. This was clear 
during George W. Bush‘s presidential campaign and during his eight months in office 
prior to 9/11. In contrast to his proclamation during the presidential campaign that the 
US must be a humble nation, George W. Bush‘s policy showed no change from his 
predecessors‘ agenda: hegemony and supremacy. Prior to 9/11, the characteristics of the 
post-CW era AFP became clear. These will now be examined. 
First, the US intended to turn its back on the international community, either by 
separating itself from previous international commitments or by showing its intention to 
review or abrogate international treaties. The US declared that it might withdraw from 
any treaty that did not fit its own concepts and interests. These treaties included the 
ICC,
1
 the Protocol on Biological and Chemical Weapons, the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. Most importantly, the administration 
treated international institutions such as the UN, the WTO, the G8, and NATO with 
gentle contempt. During the early period, Bush also declared that the US would be 
withdrawing from the peace negotiations in the Middle East and Northern Ireland and 
                                                          
1
 According to Barry (2003) and Johnson (2004), the US‘s withdrawal from the ICC treaty can be 
understood as part of the US strategic transformation toward unilateralism. Therefore, this avoids any 
multilateral constraints on American power in its unipolar moment. These steps echo Reagan‘s early 
efforts to establish US unilateralism when America ―rejected the Law of the Sea Treaty and the 
International Seabed Authority‖ (Buchanan, 2007: 159). 
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would not send any more troops to the Balkans (Boniface, 2001; Teixeira, 2001; 
Bremmer, 2002; Allen, 2003; Anderson, 2003; Guyatt, 2003; Hartung, 2003; Watson, 
2003; Young, 2003; Boyle, 2004; Johnson, 2004; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a; Dumbrell, 
2005; Gaddis, 2005; Melanson, 2005; Rudalevige, 2005; Mingst, 2006; Singh, 2006; 
Tokatlian, 2006; Falk, 2007; McMurtry, 2007).  
Second, after Bush took office, the movement toward modernizing US military 
capabilities took place. However, Bush‘s blueprint for the transformation of the US 
military was clear even two years prior to 9/11. On 23 September 1999, in his important 
speech at the Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, candidate Bush vowed to 
construct a new advanced missile defence system, new advanced high-tech weaponry 
and a new strategic military dogma to make the mobilization of America‘s heavy land 
troops easier and effective. In early 2001, once he was inaugurated as President, Bush 
announced that his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, had been given broad 
authorization to put the proposal articulated in his Citadel speech into practice (Klare, 
2003). At the same time, his administration continued the efforts to build up the missile 
defensive shield and carried on the attempts to weaponize space. Furthermore, the Bush 
administration introduced modifications to its nuclear posture that had banned the US 
from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (Teixeira, 2001; Strategic 
Comments, 2002b; Guyatt, 2003; Boggs, 2006; Ruggie, 2006; Vanaik, 2007). In this 
context, Jonathan Schell concludes that, with such modifications (2002): 
the United States, safe behind its missile shield, will, at its sole discretion and 
unconstrained by treaties or even consultation with allies … protect its territory 
and impose its will in the world by using its unmatched military power to coerce 
or destroy, if possible by preemptive attack, every challenger.  
Thus, ―the threat of military power must now be exercised as never before to ensure 
American supremacy globally‖ (Vanaik, 2007: 15).  
It should be pointed out that, during the Clinton presidency, the Republicans had 
criticized the US military interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo; however, once 
they had control both of Congress and presidency, ―the US government took a tough 
line‖ on foreign policy issues, even before the attacks of 9/11 (Kohut & Stokes, 2006: 
218). Such toughness was apparent in the presidential discourse from the beginning of 
his presidency: President George W. Bush ―prided himself as a decisive figure 
compared to what came before. He described the post-CW period prior to his presidency 
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as ‗years of repose‘ and ‗years of sabbatical‘‖ (Chollet, 2007: 5). He claimed that his 
presidency would be a corrective process ―to poor decisions and mistakes of the past‖ 
(Cited in Chollet, 2007: 5). David Gergen has observed that recent history shows that 
―the First Hundred Days … are the most precious time in the life of a president to define 
who he is and what he is seeking to achieve through his leadership. In those fourteen 
weeks, more than any other time in his presidency, he sets the stage for his entire 
stewardship‖ (2000: 128). If one accepts this view, then it can be reasonably argued that 
the time of explicit US hegemony had arrived. 
From the discussion, it is clear that the 1990s administrations followed their 
predecessors, borrowed from the past and, in defining strategies for the new era, 
borrowed the ideas and the conceptions and intended to achieve the same ends. In 
consequence, themes such as liberty, freedom, democracy and peace predominated in 
the US‘s official discourse at the time (Ryan, 2000; Callinicos, 2003; Wittkopf et al., 
2003). In the post-CW era, two administrations followed the same technique to establish 
US hegemony. Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton differed in styles but pursued 
the same agenda. Bush, the realist, justified military operation in the Persian Gulf by 
Wilsonian discourse and Clinton, the liberalist, used military force abroad more than 
Reagan and Bush (Cameron, 2002; Dumbrell, 2005).  
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter contrasts with the majority of AFP‘s mainstream literature that has argued 
that the US lost its strategic direction and entered a decade of disorientation and 
fragmentation between 11/9 and 9/11, and is in line with Chollet‘s (2007) call for 
rethinking AFP in the 1990s, because, as he suggested, American unilateral hegemony 
after 9/11 would have been impossible without the 1990s political improvements. This 
chapter argues that both Presidents Bush I and Clinton represented continuity rather 
than the opposite, which many scholars maintain.  
President Bush I‘s (fragmented policy) - as it appears to some scholars - was more 
coherent than many may recognise. Owing to the nature of the period (1989-1992) as a 
transitional time that might bring unpredictable changes, the Bush I administration‘s 
urgent task was twofold. The first task was to facilitate the world‘s calm transition from 
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the bipolar system of the CW to the unipolar system of the post-CW and the second was 
to establish the firm foundations of the NWO that suited the US unipolar moment.  
Bush‘s FP perspective demonstrated that America‘s CW grand strategy of hegemony 
was being reaffirmed rather than re-examined. The NWO was in fact in the service of 
American hegemony. Bush‘s multilateralism was a matter of necessity, owing to several 
foreign and domestic problems: 1) America was economically not ready to bear the 
burden of war: 2) Americans‘ consensus over FP strategy that was apparent during the 
CW turned to be a sort of domestic cleavage over the state‘s international conduct. Also, 
the bad experience of Vietnam was still dominant in US public mood and FP elite alike. 
The multilateral coalition, therefore, offered sensible solutions to all of these barriers. It 
offered money to fund the US military machinery, as well as the political aid that 
America was in need of to mobilise Congress and the US public. The multilateral 
approach also allayed the US public fear that there was any new Vietnam. True, the US 
- commanded coalition triumphed, but the real victor was the US. America achieved all 
of its aims without risking its blood or resources. It expunged the Vietnam Syndrome; 
enhanced its position as a global hegemon; secured its presence in the Middle-East; and 
showed other big powers its real tangible power. Imagine: if Bush had not taken such 
steps, particularly the remedying of the Vietnam psychological syndrome - would it 
have been possible for his successors and particularly President Bush II to intervene 
militarily? In a similar way, without Bush I steps, would it have been possible to 
President Clinton to turn attention from the traditional geopolitical struggle to geo-
economic perspective for the remedying of US economic weaknesses that limited Bush 
I ability to choice in the early 1990s?  
Accordingly, Bush I prepared the stage for the US hegemonic manifestation and, after 
the Gulf war, the prior debate regarding counterbalancing against the US was nearly 
muted. Bush‘s policy had convinced all the big powers to follow the US leadership, 
rather than competing with it. This achievement freed Clinton from any geopolitical 
struggle with other powers. Clinton was aware that American hegemony depends not 
only on its military might, but also on its economic power. His administration‘s new 
urgent task, therefore, was to establish America‘s economic hegemony as a 
complementary dimension to its military and political hegemony that was announced in 
the 1991 war. The first step was to place trade in the forefront of AFP‘s agenda and to 
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promote American trade. The administration completed the economic unity of North 
America (NAFTA) to limit European interests in the area and to enforce them to accept 
American economic needs. The negotiation led also to the establishment of GATT in 
1994 and then to the creation of the WTO. These arrangements, in addition to the World 
Bank and IMF, served the American economic and political agenda in the 1990s. In 
consequence, hundreds of new markets opened and US exports went everywhere. The 
US economy, as a result, recovered quickly, after more than a decade of fluctuating 
performance. In this sense, globalisation, as discussed in the first chapter, was a 
hegemonic plan aimed at consolidating American position globally.  
In the space of several years, therefore, the Clinton administration succeeded in 
managing the trade deficit with its main economic competitors, particularly Japan and 
China. The budget deficit that was about $300 billion in 1992 was turned round to be a 
budget surplus in 1998 (about $200 billion surplus). Unemployment also dropped to less 
than 4% in 1997, as did inflation. Economic growth increased to 5.6% in 1997 and its 
exports increased from 9.9% to 12.1% of its GDP. The US‘s share of the world‘s 
national production was about 30%. Therefore, Clinton‘s call on the nation to compete, 
not to retreat, led to the revitalisation of the US economy. In addition to this great 
achievement, the administration also worked seriously to expand the US‘s geostrategic 
presence worldwide under several justifications, such as humanitarian interventionism 
and democracy promotion.  
This is not to say that Clinton‘s concern was only economic but it is clear that Clinton 
continued the same geopolitical policy of his predecessor. The administration pledged 
to increase military budgets and formulate new military strategies to deal with foreign 
affairs, such as BUR‘s two simultaneous regional wars. The administration‘s use of 
military power abroad was greater than any other administration‘s. For example, 
Clinton ordered US forces into 25 operations during his first term, compared to just 14 
during his predecessor‘s presidency and, by 1999, the president had notified Congress 
46 times of US troop deployment by his administration in foreign lands to fight against 
imminent challenges, compared to only 7 such deployments during the Bush 
administration. The administration also invaded Haiti without good cause and without a 
UN mandate. Clinton also used humanitarian intervention to expand US geostrategic 
presence. In the same way, building on the accomplishments of the Clinton 
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administration, the Bush II administration, even prior to 9/11, showed more desire to act 
unilaterally and to give back, not only to the international community, but also to its 
closest allies such as NATO members. Theses shifts will be discussed more in the fifth 
chapter of this research. 
On the basis of the aforementioned discussion, it can be argued that, without the efforts 
of the Bush I administration that managed the status quo and controlled the forces of 
change in the very early 1990s, Clinton might not have been able to give attention to 
remedying US economic weaknesses. And if the Clinton administration had failed to 
revitalize the US economy, the Bush II administration might not have been able to 
respond to 9/11 as it did. In fact, just as the Bush I strategy had prepared the stage for 
the Clinton administration to build on, the later administration‘s achievement also 
enabled Bush II to pursue the strategy of fighting two wars simultaneously. What 
matters here is that a grand strategy cannot materialise in a very limited time. The small 
agenda and (fragmented) policies of the 1990s, when they are located in a wider 
context, demonstrate that AFP strategy of hegemony was still in progress between 11/9 
and 9/11.  
Finally, even with such evident continuity, this chapter does not deny the difficulties 
that had faced the administrations‘ strategy in the 1990s, or claim that AFP‘s hegemonic 
agenda was the dominant feature in AFP discourse. The Bush I and Clinton 
administrations were conducted under very difficult political circumstances, 
characterised by international unpredictability and domestic political fragmentation. 
However, even with these obstacles, AFP represented continuity rather than 
discontinuity.  
What matters here is that this thesis puts forward the argument that the claim that AFP 
was fragmented in the 1990s was not entirely true, as discussed above, but what was 
actually fragmented was the domestic context of AFP after the CW. That domestic 
political cleavage was a considerable AFP obstacle, which puzzled US bureaucrats and 
the AFP elite. True, the demise of the external enemy affected AFP conduct but the 
effect was indirect. It was not the absence of a clear strategic perspective to deal with 
the world but the political cleavage at home that hindered the US policymakers from 
putting their agenda into practice in an ideal way. Since then US politics have not 
stopped any more at the water‘s edge until the morning of 9/11. Because of this, this 
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study distinguishes two issues, firstly, the existence of a grand strategy and secondly, a 
cohesive strategic guideline pursuing America‘s hegemony and the associated 
significant non-existence of US domestic consensus that puzzled US policymakers. 
The following chapter, therefore, will turn to evaluating the effects of US domestic 
politics on AFP conduct in the light of the two events: the EoCW and 9/11. 
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Indeed, in the absence of a galvanizing Soviet threat, policymakers in the 1990s faced a significant 
challenge in mobilizing domestic support for an activist United States. 
(Litwak, 2002: 80) 
 
Without consensus on a new vision, challenges to US leadership were all the more worrying. 
(Ray, 2000: 188) 
 
Indeed, a new ―North Star,‖ the war on terrorism, largely became the defining American foreign policy 
issue, much as the Soviet Union had been during the Cold War. 
(Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004: 17) 
 
Chapter Four 
Leadership Abroad Starts At Home: 
US Domestic Politics As A Constraint Upon And/Or A Motivator To 
The Formulation Of AFP Strategy Between The Eocw And 9/11 
4.1. Introduction 
As shown in the last chapter, American foreign policy (AFP) in the 1990s did not suffer 
from the absence of a clear perspective. In contrast to those who argue that the 1990s 
was a period of confusion for AFP, the last chapter shows that the US post-CW 
hegemonic project was initiated with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. However, 
the seeming inability of the US to design and pursue a fully-fledged ―new grand 
strategy for the new era has rooted in the changed and changing character of the United 
States‖ (Wittkopf et al., 2003: 12). Accordingly, the US administration‘s ability to 
pursue its strategy was not only influenced by the transitional events, as has been 
repeatedly argued; as this chapter puts forward, the problem for AFP lay in the domestic 
political fragmentation and the absence of AFP‘s bipartisanship. Owing to this cleavage 
at home, America, to a large degree, was not as capable of leading internationally as it 
could have been. The domestic disagreement over AFP not only complicated its policy-
making process and hindered policy-makers from implementing their agenda, but also 
brought uncertainty to US grand strategy. However, this situation changed completely 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, when the emergence of a new external enemy 
remedied AFP‘s domestic fragmentation and united the country again behind the 
presidential leadership. Since then, America has shown a clear hegemonic perspective 
in dealing internationally. 
To highlight this argument, this chapter brings two sets of literature on AFP together to 
demonstrate the strong interplay between domestic and foreign policy. In doing so, this 
chapter is divided into two main sections: the first part is concerned with the political 
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fragmentation in the immediate aftermath of the CW, whereas the second part highlights 
the change of course after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
4.2. US Politics No Longer Ends At The Water‟s Edge 
As mentioned earlier, the end of the Cold War (EoCW) removed America‘s 
longstanding rival that had disciplined its foreign behaviour for decades. Since then, as 
Wittkopf et al., state, US politics no longer ends at the water‘s edge (2003) and the 
AFP-making process has become ―subject to the same partisan and ideological dispute 
that characterised domestic policy making‖ (McCormick & Wittkopf, 1990: 1077). 
Furthermore, many of the presidential prerogatives were curtailed (Lindsay & Ripley, 
1992) as Congress became more involved in FP-making to a degree that confused the 
AFP bureaucracy. In addition, societal sources became more deeply involved in setting 
the AFP agenda. These shifts were probably related to the uncertainty following the 
EoCW: the CW acted as glue for divergent societal and institutional forces behind the 
presidential leadership. The collapse of the USSR ―released the centrifugal forces of 
American single-issue politics, the politics of particular interests and culture diversity, 
and has increasingly weakened the centripetal power of anticommunism‖ (Lösche, 
1996: 157). Therefore, ―no longer are political leaders or pundits able to argue that what 
happens abroad must take precedence over what happens at home‖ (Miller, 1994: 622). 
Arguably, the domestic cleavage curtailed the emergence of a new fully-fledged FP 
strategy between the early 1990s and 9/11. The collapse of the external rival and the end 
of the demands for a balance of power opened the way for the domesticization of FP-
making. Since then, the domestic groups have injected AFP with sets of fragmented FP 
goals and policies (Huntington, 2004). These domestic groups and their lobbies, 
therefore, have influenced officials and legislators on how to direct the state‘s FP in the 
post-Soviet era (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a). Deuck summarises these elements by 
arguing that (2006: 129):  
The division of power
1
 in the American political system, together with the 
byzantine structure of the national security bureaucracy, always complicates US 
                                                          
1
 The root of this problem is laid in the US constitution that ―envisions power as the rival of power, 
whatever friction and inefficiency resulted, to preclude‖ (Sorensen, 1994: 520). Or as James L. Sundquist 
put it: the constitution ―put two combatants [the president and congress] in the ring and sounded the bell 
that sent them into endless battle‖ (1981: 16). Therefore, the constitution is not only a ―bundle of 
compromises,‖ as Edward Corwin (1949: 7) argued, but it also an invitation to ―struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy‖ (cited in Foster, 2006: 429). While the president is constitutionally 
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strategic planning, and the absence of any strong sense of external threat during 
… [the 1990s] made it unusually difficult to formulate and execute a coherent 
grand strategy. 
The following sections give further detail on this aspect. 
4.2.1. The Governmental Sources Of Fragmentation 
After the Vietnam crisis, ―the long period of executive dominance in the diplomatic 
field‖ (Crabb, 1988: 153) was partly eroded, the president started to lose control over 
FP-making and an ―Imperial Congress‖ appeared against an ―Imperial president‖ 
(Trimble, 1989: 750). However, even with the existence of such obstacles, the overall 
AFP-making process remained in the hands of the president prior to 1989 (Peterson, 
1994), because of the survival of the USSR and the explicit agreement over the AFP 
strategy of containment. 
 
Figure 4. 1US Presidential Preeminance over AFP Making process during the CW 
Source: (Scott, 1997: 240) 
A real change came with the fall of the USSR, when the ―bedrock of US political 
consensus that gave the president a fairly free hand in foreign policy‖ was removed 
(Country Monitor, 2000: 1). Therefore, just as the CW had extensively aggrandized 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the commander-in-chief, his power has eventually been constrained by the authority of Congress. The 
congress, in fact, has been delegated to raise and support the military and navy, and most importantly, to 
declare wars (Mastanduno, 2005). On the one shoulder, ―while the congress was a legislative branch, the 
president had a role in legislation‖ (Sundquist, 1981: 16). On the other shoulder, the constitution has also 
allowed Congress and Senate to share several FP governing authorities with a president (Thurber, 1996; 
Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a & Smith, 2000a). The Senate – with its advice and consent - has been also 
shared the authority of treaty making and diplomat appointment (Smith, 2000; Malone, 2003; 
Mastanduno, 2005). One of the most influential powers for the Senate is ―to approve presidential 
nominations for Cabinet, senior State Department position and ambassadorship‖ (Cameron, 2002: 75). 
That is why, Thurber argues, that such a system ―was designed for a small and fragmented Republic, not a 
global superpower‖ (1996: 60), because, according to Mastanduno (2005) it poses several constraints on 
the US ability to construct a successful and cohesive foreign and security policy.  
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presidential and bureaucratic power and control over foreign and security policy (see 
figure 4.1), peace, in contrast, brought such imperialistic dominance to an end. On the 
other hand, the containment strategy that clearly defined US purposes, focused the 
national mind, and united AFP elite in the pre-1991 period was no longer workable 
(Lindsay & Ripley, 1992; Peterson, 1994; Jamison, 1997; Carter, 1998; Rosati & 
Twing, 1998; Hyland, 1999; Hamilton, 2000; Wittkopf et al., 2003; Schlesinger, 2004; 
Dunn, 2006). Because of this, legislators no longer routinely followed the presidential 
leadership and ―domestic politics … increasingly shape[d] America‘s actions abroad‖ 
(Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008: 8). Scholars, such as Norman J. Ornstein and Mark 
Schmitt, in the immediate EoCW, questioned: ―How will the US political system 
operate without anticommunism as its central organizing principle?‖ (1990: 169). 
President Bush I was aware that, without domestic unity, the US administration would 
not be able to lead the country towards its objectives. This was obvious since his first 
day in office. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1989, said:  
We need a new engagement … between the Executive and the Congress … 
There‘s grown certain divisiveness … And our great parties have too often been 
far apart and untrusting of each other. It‘s been this way since Vietnam. That 
war cleaves us still … A new breeze is blowing – and the old bipartisanship 
must be made again. 
However, in opposition to President Bush‘s desire, ―bipartisanship‖, according to 
Charles A. Kupchan & Peter L. Trubowitz, ―dropped sharply following the end of the 
Cold War, reaching a post-World War II low after the Republicans gained control of 
congress in 1994‖ (2007: 76). In what follows, the discussion will address some aspects 
of congressional involvement in AFP making process and how this shift in 
congressional-presidential relationship affected AFP consistency.  
4.2.1.1. Congress As A Counterpart To The President‟s FP Leadership  
According to Steven E. Schier, unlike in its CW position, the authority of Congress in 
foreign policy appeared to grow from the EoCW, with the president unable to lead as he 
had done previously (2000). Because of this, Wittkopf et al. argue (2003: 403): 
The president saw his attempt to establish a new strategy for dealing with ethnic 
conflicts in the global south blocked, his effort to redesign foreign aid policy 
thwarted, his request for authority to negotiate expanded trade denied, his 
design for curbing global warming ignored, and his commitment to ending 
nuclear testing rejected.  
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For example, in 1992, against Bush‘s wishes, Congress prohibited all tests of nuclear 
weapons until the end of September 1996. Furthermore, Congress passed the Cuban 
Democracy Act (CDA) in early October 1992 that was introduced by Representative 
Robert Torricelli (D-NJ). The bill imposed economic sanctions on the foreign 
subsidiaries of US companies that did business with Cuba, before it accepted the 
president‘s position. Similarly, Congress refused Clinton‘s 1993 request to renew the 
1961 Foreign Assistance Act and it cut both Bush‘s and Clinton‘s military and 
diplomatic budgets and foreign aid programmes. In 1993, the Senate refused the 
President‘s demands to approve the START II Treaty with Russia, and in 1994 it would 
not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). It was a Democrat Congress that pressurized Bush I to respond effectively to 
the collapse of the USSR, while a Republican Congress did not support Clinton‘s FP 
objectives or his policies and tactics. However, Republicans were willing to encourage 
Clinton‘s policy of free trade, while they stood firmly against external humanitarian 
missions and cooperation with UN peacekeeping operations (Thurber, 1996; Carter 
1998; Travis, 1998; McCormick, 2000; Smith, 2000a; Brenner et al., 2002).  
The rivalry between the president and Congress did not end after Clinton gained party 
control of Congress following the 1992 election (Thurber, 2006). The challenge by 
Congress occurred on a number of occasions; for example, over the NAFTA 
ratification, ―on whether and how long to keep US troops in Somalia, on whether and 
how much aid to give Russia‘s Boris Yeltsin, and over Iraq policy‖ (Wiarda & Skelley, 
2006: 21). Overall, the Democrat-controlled Congress compelled the Clinton 
administration to reorient its policy and place additional emphasis on foreign affairs 
(Lindsay & Ripley, 1992; Carter 1998; Travis, 1998; Walt, 2000; McCormick, 2000; 
Lindsay, 2004; Kaufman, 2006; Dunn, 2006). Thereafter, the 1994 election again 
reshaped the congressional-presidential rivalry, and also changed the balance of power 
between the two, as the House became Republican-controlled (Thurber, 2006). The 
situation continued through to the late 1990s when ―bitter partisan divide over President 
Clinton‘s impeachment‖ (Lieber, 2005: 12) was witnessed. Thus, during his eight years 
in office, Clinton was unable to build any solid domestic consensus to support his FP 
initiatives. This phenomenon was apparent even when Congress was under the control 
of the Democrats.  
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At the time, it was apparent that the Senate and House were becoming much more 
partisan but independent institutions in foreign affairs. Even in ―areas like defence and 
security policy, where political consensus had been relatively easier to achieve during 
the Cold War, it now seemed harder for Congress to get things done‖ (Sinder, 2005: 
242). According to Andrew Rudalevige, ―The impeachment and trial of Bill Clinton in 
1998-1999 were the first since 1868 and the first ever of an elected president‖ (2005: 
140). Such division was also quite clear when the Senate rejected the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) ―by a 51-48 vote in October 1999‖ (Malon, 2003: 
29).  
4.2.1.2. Congress And Multi-Lateralism 
Congress, as mentioned in the previous chapter, forced President Clinton to back away 
from supporting UN multi-lateral peacekeeping operations. In this context, in October 
1993, Congress, against the president‘s desire, voted to withdraw US troops from 
Somalia by 31 March 1994. Likewise, when President Clinton announced that US 
troops would be deployed to Bosnia after the Dayton accords were completed in late 
1995, the Congress (in both chambers) passed a resolution supporting US troops in 
Bosnia, but rejecting the president‘s approach to dealing with the country. In March 
1999, the Senate vote over supporting the campaign on Kosovo was 52-48, but in April, 
the House rejected the authorisation of US participation in the air war (McCormick, 
2000). In contrast to Clinton‘s announced multi-lateral approach, the Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, told the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) in January 2000, that Congress was the only custodian of the US 
taxpayers‘ money and Congressmen ―have not only a right, but a responsibility, to insist 
on specific [UN] reforms in exchange for their investment‖ (cited in Luck, 2003: 28). 
He warned that if the international organization rejected these conditions, ―it would 
mark the beginning of the end of US support for the United Nations‖. Because of this 
domestic cleavage, the president was not able to meet America‘s commitment outside. 
That is why Clinton bypassed congress by conducting ―the use of American troops for 
peace operations largely through ... NATO‖ from the mid-1990s (Sewall, 2002: 191). 
4.2.1.3. Congress And Foreign Economic Policy 
As argued in the previous chapter, Clinton was successful in revitalising the domestic 
US economy, despite the difficult political environment. Nevertheless, Congress was 
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unwilling to support Clinton‘s international policies. Clinton struggled to build a cross-
party coalition of both Republicans and conservative Democrats to be able to pass some 
of his economic agenda (see figures 4.2, 4.3). For example, in contrast to the Congress‘s 
objection to an American rescue of the Mexican government after the peso plunged in 
late 1994 and early 1995, the Clinton administration ―used its own executive legislative 
authority to fashion a $50 billion assistance package‖ (McCormick, 2000: 71). The 
administration‘s request to refinance the IMF after the 1997 financial crisis in Asia was 
delayed about a year before it was approved in October 1998, but only after a number of 
conditions were imposed on the IMF. In November 1997, the Congress also ―failed to 
renew fast-track negotiating authority for the executive branch‖ (McCormick, 2000: 71; 
Sloan, 2003: 21). On the other hand, during Clinton‘s two terms, and against his multi-
lateral perspective, Congress imposed sanctions on 61 occasions; to put this in context, 
sanctions had been applied on only 43 other occasions in the post-WWII era (Sloan, 
2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 2 Congressional Votes  on NAFTA, 1993, and GATT, 1994 
Source: Jentleson 2004: 540) ; www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/92/iie2679.pdf 
As figure 4.2 and 4.3 shows, In 1993 Congress passed the NAFTA Treaty but 
ratification proved difficult, because a majority of Democrats refused to approve it. 
There was also a cleavage over the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
the first track of 1998, and the normal trade relations with the People‘s Republic of 
China. A coalition of the Republicans and conservative Democrats also backed 
President Clinton‘s WTO agenda. In 1997, likewise, Clinton succeeded in putting 
partisanship aside regarding the blueprint to balance the budget over five years. 
President George W. Bush, Clinton‘s successor, also worked successfully with 
Congress to approve permanent normal trade relations with China in 2000 (Institute for 
 NAFTA GATT 
 House Senate House Senate 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Democrats 102 157 27 28 167 89 41 13 
Republicans 132 43 34 10 121 56 35 11 
Total 234 200 61 38 288 145 76 24 
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International Economic, no-date; McCormick, 2000; Sloan, 2003; Wiarda & Skelley, 
2006; Thurber, 2006; Pfiffner, 2006).  
Democrats Republicans 
Yes No Yes No 
29 171 151 71 
 
Figure 4.3 House Vote on First Track of 1998 
Source: www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/92/iie2679.pdf 
4.2.1.4. The Use of Power Abroad 
However, in line with the post-WWII political realities, the president‘s power to declare 
war did not undergo any profound change. President George H. W. Bush, for example, 
took a unilateral decision to invade Panama in 1989, without congressional approval 
(Briggs, 1994; Cameron, 2002). The president, at the time, ―did not acknowledge the 
applicability of the War Powers Resolution, nor did he consult with congressional 
leaders before committing troops to Panama City‖ (Briggs, 1994: 159). This case was 
also repeated during the 1990-91 Gulf War. The President ―boasted that he did not have 
to get permission from some old goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam 
Hussein out of Kuwait‖ (Lindsay, 2003: 142), arguing that the UN authority to attack 
Iraq was sufficient. Hence, on 11 September 1990, Bush announced the war against 
Iraq, its objectives (the establishment of the new world order, and how it would be 
achieved—multi-lateral cooperative alliance) without consulting Congress (Lindsay, 
2003; Krahmann, 2005). The president also doubled the number of US troops in the 
region, and changed the objective of the operation from defending Saudi Arabia to 
liberating Kuwait without consulting Congress. However, he only took these steps after 
November to avoid criticism in the congressional election (LaFeber, 1994; Lindsay, 
2003). In consequence, opponents of the Gulf War argued that even the war‘s legislative 
resolution did not reflect the real attitudes of Congress. Congressmen were unable to do 
anything but to follow, because by the deployment of half a million troops to the region, 
Bush ―had put them in an impossible position to debate a war resolution‖ (LaFeber, 
1994: 762). The Gulf War showed a profound shift in congressional-presidential 
relations over foreign policy and the declaration of war. And ―unlike the Tonkin Gulf 
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Resolution 27 years earlier when all but two members of Congress rallied behind 
President Johnson, the Iraqi resolution saw 47 Senators and 183 representatives vote 
no‖ (Lindsay, 2003: 143). On 12 January the vote in Senate was 52-47 in favour, 
whereas in the House of Representatives it was 250 to 183 in favour (LaFeber, 1994; 
Rosati & Twing, 1998; Cameron, 2002; Kaufman, 2006; Hodge & Nolan, 2007). 
However, during the Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992, Bush gained support 
from the UNSC, and domestically, he ―received strong backing from congress and high 
approval ratings from the American public‖ (Hendrickson, 2002: 24).  
President Clinton, in the same way, followed in his predecessor‘s steps, not only in his 
belief that the president was constitutionally authorised to send troops abroad without 
congressional authorization, but also in arguing that NATO authorisation was sufficient 
to engage the US militarily in Bosnia and Kosovo (Reisman, 1999/2000; Cameron, 
2002; Hendrickson, 2002; Wedgwood, 2002). In consequence, in cases such as the 
administration‘s military operation in Haiti and the deployment of American troops to 
Bosnia, Clinton never had obvious congressional support, and took these steps 
regardless of Congress‘ position (Rosati & Twings, 1998). According to Senator Biden, 
in the cases of sending American troops to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, ―one or both 
houses adopted resolutions giving rhetorical support to the US troops and their 
missions, but congress did not, in a formal legal sense, authorize the deployment‖ 
(2000: 17). 
The congressional-presidential relationship witnessed a decade of confusion. True, 
President Bush I, owing to his public prestige and political skills, faced little opposition 
in Congress during his first two years in office. However, the last two years witnessed 
intensified opposition from the Democrat-controlled Congress (Lindsay, 2003). 
Moreover, the divided Congress and the Democrat-controlled Congress affected 
President Clinton‘s ability to lead and had disoriented AFP conduct (Rosati & Twings, 
1998).  
On the other hand, President Clinton succeeded in gaining Congressional support when 
his approval was high, particularly during his first term; however, as his popularity 
dropped during his second term after the Monica Lewinsky scandal, he ―failed to obtain 
first track authority‖ (Cameron, 2002: 76).   
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4.2.1.5. George W. Bush‟s Perspective Prior to 9/11 
Because of the difficulties that President Clinton faced, during the 2000 presidential 
campaign, George W. Bush promised that his administration would ―restore honour and 
dignity to the White House‖ (cited in Rudalevige, 2005: 211). Furthermore, he would 
not be willing ―to let Congress erode the power of the executive branch‖, as his 
obligation was to protect ―the executive branch from legislative encroachment‖ (cited in 
Rudalevige, 2005: 211). When Bush II took office in January 2001, the Republicans 
were in control of the House and Senate; therefore, some of the president‘s policies 
(e.g., his tax-cuts policy) gained greater support. However, six months later, the 
president‘s party lost control over the Senate and a new partisanship replaced the short 
period of political consensus (Cameron, 2002).  
After taking office, Bush‘s ‗Americanist‘ approach to foreign policy faced public and 
congressional dissatisfaction. A divided Congress—a six-seat Republican majority in 
the House and only one seat in the Senate—was not happy with the administration‘s 
unilateralist tendency and created major problems for the president‘s policy (Teixeira, 
2001; Anderson, 2003; Malone, 2003; Covington, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005; Lindsay, 
2005b; Melanson, 2005). Therefore, David Frum, a presidential speechwriter, 
acknowledged that ―on September 10, 2001, George Bush was not on his way to a very 
successful presidency‖ (cited in Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a: 77). However, 11 
September changed this and yielded a crucial new shift within the US political system, 
as will be shown in the next part of this chapter. 
In sum, the congressional-presidential relationship witnessed a deep phase of ebb tide. 
In this context, Henehan argues that ―congressional behaviour in the 1990s indicated 
that in foreign policy the president has been weakened, but not eliminated, and that the 
resurgent congress has backed down but not gone away‖ (2000: xiii). Brenner, et al. 
also argue, ―the executive is today more fragmented, foreign policy is more complicated 
and diverse, and Congress is both more engaged and also more open to political forces 
in foreign policy than perhaps ever before‖ (2002: 193). Steven W. Hook & John W. 
Spanier (2000) might be right when they argue that the nation‘s world politics 
represented the internal conflict. Consequently, it could be argued that the EoCW ―made 
it harder to reach a consensus on most matters of foreign policy‖ (Rockman, 1997: 26). 
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Under such domestic cleavage, AFP bureaucrats were unable to articulate a fully-
fledged strategy responding to the unprecedented opportunity offered by the EoCW.  
4.2.1.6. AFP‟s Institutional Problems In The 1990s 
The source of AFP‘s domestic cleavage in the 1990s was not only the imbalance of 
power between Congress and the various presidents, but also the AFP institutions 
themselves. Prior to 1947, the number of AFP institutions was small, and the number of 
AFP bureaucrats was also limited.
1
 However, since that date, when Congress passed the 
new National Security Act (NSA), not only has AFP bureaucracy expanded 
considerably, but also AFP authority has been divided among several huge institutions, 
such as the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defence (DOD), smaller 
groups such as the intelligence community (itself divided into a myriad of 
organisations), and individual players such as the president (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997; 
Taber, 1998; Wayne, 2000; McKay, 2001). However, even with this intensive growth, 
the machinery of AFP continued performing well because of the existence of a clear 
adversary that helped to create domestic consensus over FP strategy.  
The shift came with the EoCW, in which the enemy that legislated the establishment of 
these organisations had gone. This status led Johnson to argue that the changes in the 
international scene might bring dramatic changes ―within the government of its arch 
rival, the United States‖ (1997: 156). On the other hand, the AFP bureaucracy needed to 
be restructuring its institutions and reorienting its conduct to be able to deal with the 
new political status quo (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997a; Scott & Crothers, 1998). However, 
in contrast to this perspective, the 1990s showed that AFP institutions were ―having 
considerable difficulty redefining‖ their objectives and policies (Jones, 1998:57). For 
instance, during George H. W. Bush‘s presidency (1989-1992), there was no 
―substantial change either to the military or to the intelligence service. There was no re-
organisation of the NSC, the State Department or other executive branches. Nor was 
there any real pressure from congress or the public to do so‖ (Cameron, 2002: 11). In 
this context, Les Aspin, who served as Chair of the House Armed Service Committee, 
argues that the demise of the Soviet Union broke down the ―Pentagon‘s long-standing 
                                                          
1
 The State Department and the Department of war were established in 1789, and a Department of a Navy 
was also created a decade later in 1798. Since then there was no further expansion in the institutions of 
foreign and security policy till the outset of the CW (Nathan & Oliver, 1994; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b; 
Rosati & Twing, 1998). 
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reason to exist and the rationale for its force structure and budget‖ (cited in Stockton, 
1997: 108). He, therefore, ―criticised the Bush administration for failing to recognise 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union necessitated a fundamental restructuring of the 
Pentagon‖ (cited in Stockton, 1997: 108). However, Aspin also failed ―to revolutionize 
the Defense Department‖ when he later became Secretary of Defence (Lindsay & 
Ripley, 1997a: 11-12).  
The lack of institutional change may have been because of resistance to losing 
influence. The Pentagon, for example, ―was well placed to defend its own interests 
against the advocates of a peace dividend … [because it had] a strong interest in 
preserving the [CW‘s] status quo‖ (Guyatt, 2003: 116).  
The domestic fragmentation was in part driven by an emerging conflict amongst the 
AFP institutions themselves. The most important was the growing bureaucratic conflict 
between the DOS and the DOD. While the DOS preferred ―a US military presence 
abroad ... to back up its diplomacy ... [as the DOD is] not wanting to be put in an 
indefensible position militarily, it is usually more reluctant to go‖ (Wiarda & Skelley, 
2006: 22). Therefore, since the early 1990s, the DOD enjoyed a much larger role in the 
process of FP-making through its planning group that periodically provided the Defence 
Secretary and President with a Defense Planning Guidance review (Cohen, 2005). The 
Pentagon‘s responsibility was expanded to include not only the defence and military 
policy, but also the strategy of AFP (Tyler, 1992; Everest, 2004; Cohen, 2005). This led 
one official from the State Department to say that ―it has long been easier for us to deal 
with Russians than to produce agreements with our own Defence Department‖ (cited in 
Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 67). On the other hand, locating environmental issues and 
economic concerns within the DOS‘s core agenda after 1993, in an attempt to adjust its 
tone to the new era, added another layer of complexity to the AFP-making process 
(Jones, 1998; Lyman, 2002). Furthermore, the Treasury and the Departments of 
Agriculture, Energy, Justice and Commerce were becoming more involved in foreign 
policy, as a consequence of the US‘ global economic perspective (Hamilton, 2000; 
Wayne, 2000; Lyman, 2002; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).
1
  
                                                          
1
 President Clinton encouraged the US Treasury and Department of Commerce to adopt more ambitious 
plans. Treasury Department, especially under Robert Rubin, ―enjoyed unprecedented influence and 
arguably represented the most powerful Cabinet seat‖ (Smith, 2005b: 21). The Treasury Department, as 
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The delay in reforming AFP agencies affected the consistency of the state‘s 
performance in international affairs. Thus, many scholars (e.g., Cox, 2002a; Frum & 
Perle, 2004; Johnson, 2005, 2006; Singh, 2006), blamed the delay in reforming the 
intelligence agencies—the CIA and the FBI—as a main reason behind the failure to 
detect, deter, and preserve America from the attacks of 9/11. Because of the lack of 
reform, the agencies failed to share the necessary information about the terrorist cells 
that were preparing the 9/11 attacks. In this vein, Bob Graham, the Chairman of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) in 2002, said: ―we probably did not 
shake the [intelligence] agencies hard enough after the end of the Berlin Wall‖ (cited in 
Johnson, 2005: 17), adding, ―hey, look the world is changing and you need to change 
the way in which you operate‖ (Cited in Johnson, 2006: 186). The division into two 
agencies, according to Frum & Perle (2004: 165), was appropriate for the CW era, but 
was inappropriate for the new environment.  
Critics, such as Haass (1997), Jones (1998), Borosage (2000), suggest that the poor 
performance of AFP institutions in the 1990s was also due to internal constraints 
brought with the collapse of the USSR. Crucial amongst these were the budgetary 
problems (although the foreign affairs budget during the 1990s had equalled only 1.2% 
of all government expenditures (Jones, 1998).
1
 Likewise, US foreign aid dropped to just 
1% of the federal budget in FY 1993, with the associated reduction in personnel (Jones, 
1998). This level was not more than one-tenth of 1% of the US‘s GNP in 1995 (Hook, 
1998). In 2000, foreign aid ―has slipped to 0.11% of GDP‖ (Patrick, 2000: 38). The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Hamilton (2000) & Lyman (2002) argue, played the leading role in fashioning the US response to the 
Asian financial crisis of 1998, while the Department of State ―struggled for several weeks to have a seat 
at the table in order to inject its concerns‖ (Lyman, 2002: 78). The Secretary of the Treasury, Larry 
Summers, travelled to Africa in 2000, and spoke about other political and health issues, such as HIV. 
Furthermore, several domestic-oriented agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service also expanded their presence 
outside of the US, because of the interconnection between domestic and foreign concerns. These changes 
not only superseded the authority of DOS, but also changed the structure of the AFP-making process. The 
US role in international monetary institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, was also ambivalent. 
This was because the US Treasury Department, the State Department, and the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) each tried to influence these international institutions. The 
Department of Energy also became more involved in FP-making. During 2000, for example, it persuaded 
the OPEC members to increase oil supply in order to lower rising oil prices. It also held meetings with 
African oil ministers and offered technical support to foreign states (Lyman, 2002). The Department of 
Treasury ―has emulated the Pentagon in dedicating a war room to track international competition for 
contracts around the world.‖ Therefore, in support of this framework, ―export promotion was elevated to 
the very top of the US foreign policy agenda‖ (Ralph, 2000: 33).     
1
 According to Haass (1997) spending on US diplomacy is amounted to between US$4billion and US$5 
billion a year 
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DOS had also suffered from workforce reductions. From FY 1993 through to FY 1996, 
its personnel were reduced by 2,500 (Jones, 1998). As a result, the Department not only 
lost a large number of its specialists, but also its ability to govern AFP was affected. 
The financial and employees‘ shortage led to the closure of more than 36 diplomatic and 
consular posts between 1993 and 1996 (Jones, 1998). Intelligence staffing saw also a 
22% cut during the post-CW peace dividend period (1989-2001) (Bolton, 2008).  
James Lindsay (1997) and Cameron (2002) list a number of reasons that slowed the 
pace of institutional change in the post-CW era: (1) bureaucratic resistance to change 
and vested interests to maintain the status quo; (2) congressional inflexibility, and a 
disregard for the post-CW institutional question; (3) the administration‘s lack of 
concern about its own proposals; and (4) a lack of domestic consensus over FP 
orientation. These problems all affected the ability of AFP institutions to deal with the 
new status quo after the CW. This was amongst the reasons that affected the external 
performance of the country between 11/9 and 9/11.    
4.2.1.7. AFP Bureaucrats 
The poor performance of AFP institutions is related to the divisions amongst 
bureaucrats over the FP-making process. The rivalries between individuals, the 
individuals‘ attempts to run organisations in a particular way, or to protect them from 
reform, were a significant element in influencing the performance of institutions 
(Clifford, 1990; Nathan & Oliver, 1994). For example, in contrast to President Bush I‘s 
strategy to deal with the transitional moment at the EoCW, his Secretary of Defence, 
Dick Cheney, adopted a clear hegemonic agenda during the early 1990s. However, the 
latter‘s rush to revolutionise AFP strategy was restricted by the National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft and ―the president‘s own preferences and world view‖ (Szabo, 
2004: 62). But in general, it could be argued that Bush had a ―close-knit foreign policy 
team‖ (Wiarda, 1996: 4). Together, Baker and Powell with Cheney and Scowcroft, 
―made up a competent team… [but] splits did occur, but were neither as deep-seated nor 
as damaging as those which affected their Carter and Reagan administrations 
counterparts‖ (Dumbrell, 1997: 131). In addition to his rich experience, the 
harmonisation of Bush I‘s FP team is another actor that could explain his 
administration‘s success in dealing with the urgent requirements of the moment. 
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However, President Clinton was unable to maintain a harmonized foreign policy group 
during his eight years in office. Under his presidency there worked two NSAs (Anthony 
Lake and Sandy Berger); three Secretaries of Defence (Les Aspin, William Perry, and 
William Cohen); and two State Secretaries (Warren Christopher and Madeleine 
Albright). Most of those officials had different views over how to preserve and promote 
US interests in the post-CW world. For example, Albright and Berger ―tended to have a 
greater affinity for the use of military force than either Lake or Christopher (Pauly, 
2005: 66; Pauly & Lansford, 2005: 20).  
Furthermore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher disagreed with Clinton, Lake, and 
Gore over the enlargement and engagement (En-En) strategy. Christopher was an 
adherent of the old style of AFP (the realpolitik) and rejected human rights and 
peacekeeping as fundamental objectives of AFP. Therefore, in his four years as 
Secretary of State, Christopher ―uttered the word ‗enlargement‘ only in the context of 
NATO expansion—and then only with caution‖ (Brinkley, 1997: 121). Instead of the 
En-En strategy that emphasized democracy promotion as a central pillar of AFP, 
Christopher asserted in 1995 that democracy and human rights must be merely 
supportive instruments to perspective advance American interests and ideals (Travis, 
1998). In contrast to Christopher‘s FP perspective, high ranking positions within the 
AFP bureaucracy were filled by proponents of democratization. For instance, Brian 
Atwood, who served as a head of the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs and had acquired very rich experience in democracy promotion abroad, was 
appointed by Clinton as head of the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Atwood listed promotion of democracy among the 
four main goals of his agency. Furthermore, a new high-ranking position was created 
within the Department of Defence with Morton Halperin appointed as Assistant 
Secretary for the Promotion of Democracy and Peacekeeping (Travis, 1998).
1
  
                                                          
1
 Neo-cons tried to block the nomination of Morton Halperin because of his background. He resigned 
from the membership of the NSC during the Nixon administration in protest over the American invasion 
of Cambodia and he was also unhappy over US policy in Vietnam. He also condemned the Nixon-
Kissinger ―wiretaps of NSC officials‖ (Travis, 1998: 258). Before his nomination, he argued in an article 
that ―when a people attempts to hold free elections and establish a constitutional democracy, the United 
States and the international community should not only assist but should guarantee the result‖ (Cited in 
Travis, 1998: 257).     
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Furthermore, the overlap between economic and foreign policy brought extra 
complexity for FP bureaucrats. Clinton‘s first Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, was 
―the most influential Commerce Secretary since Herbert Hoover‖ and he occupied a 
central place in the president‘s FP team (Melanson, 2005: 241). He initiated several 
plans to promote exports, while the encouragement of democracy and enhancement of 
peace were also on the agenda of the State Department International Affairs budget of 
1994 (Rosati & Twing, 1998; Ralph, 2000; Dobson & Marsh, 2001). In the same way, 
Cameron (2002: 22) argues that because of the Clinton‘s increased attention to 
economic and trade issues, the US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, ―enjoyed 
much better access to the president than Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State‖ 
(Clinton‘s view was that the US was like a mega-company struggling in the global 
market) (Cameron, 2002).    
In contrast to Bush I, President Clinton, because of his lack of FP experience, was 
subject to his advisors‘ influence (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004, 2008). This was clear, 
for instance, during the lead-up to the Kosovo War. Several critics argue that the use of 
air force against the Serbs happened because of the influence of his Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright (Brinkley, 1997; Redds, 2005). AFP fragmentation at the time 
happened primarily because Clinton‘s advisors offered him highly conflicting views. 
This is because the administration encompassed officials from a very wide political 
spectrum. For example, ―in his cabinet appointment, there were both strong left-of-
centre leanings (Dona Shalala, Henry Cisneros, Robert Reich) and strong moderate 
leanings (Lloyds Bentsen, Janet Reno, William Cohen)‖ (Wittkopf & McCormick, 
2004: 374).  
4.2.2. Societal Sources Of Fragmentation 
As previously said, the US political structure has given access to several non-state 
actors to become influential in AFP making process (Riss-Kappen, 1991; Peterson, 
1996; Bose, 2002; Woodruff, 2005).
1
 Such side-line actors can in reality ―mobilise 
support and … affect the balance of forces within the policy network‖ (Riss-Kappen, 
1991: 502). Hence, throughout US history, the president has been checked by so many 
                                                          
1
 They include ―an ill-defined set of peripheral groups and institutions - members of critics of the foreign 
policy establishments; interests groups and lobbies, both foreign and domestic; and the media‖ (Taber, 
1998:30). 
Leadership Abroad Starts At Home 
162 
 
influential interests and institutions in the domain of domestic policy. Consequently, 
―his only hope of succeeding is to swim with the political currents of the day, not 
against them‖ (Denison, 2006: 1).  
When the CW drew to an end, such societal factors played a crucial role in the division 
over FP strategy. That is why John Dumbrell argues that ―in post-Cold War conditions, 
the integrating Soviet threat absent, domestic opinions and domestic lobbies did have to 
be treated with care and attention‖ (2002: 47). The following subsections shed some 
light on the effects of several domestic societal divisions over AFP in the 1990s. 
4.2.2.1. Public Opinion 
One source of domestic fragmentation in the 1990s was the division of public opinion in 
the post-CW era. The EoCW and the triumph over communism showed both a sea 
change and a continuity of public attitudes from the CW era (Jentleson, 1992; Richman, 
1996; Melanson, 2005). This is contrast to those scholars (e.g., Powlick, 1995; Clark & 
Dautrich, 2000) who argue that the CW‘s irrational public mood became more stable 
and rational after its end. In this way, Olson Holsti argues that the EoCW ―has had a 
retrogressive impact on public opinion‖ (2006b: 237). On the eve of the EoCW, 
Miroslav Nincic also argued that ―the public is likely to be driven by naive moralism 
and uninformed emotion. Consequently, popular sentiment tends to be volatile and 
misguided, driving foreign policy off the path of cool reason, and ultimately 
undermining the national interest‖ (1992: 773). The following sections highlight aspects 
of the confusion over US public opinion.   
4.2.2.1.1. US Activism In World Politics  
In the first instance, the public showed very divergent views regarding America‘s world 
role. On the one hand, the US public was still internationalist, preferring an American 
activist role abroad. For example, in March 1991, 79% of Americans still believed that 
the US should play an active role in world politics, whereas in November 1994 this 
percentage had dropped a little to 68% (Richman, 1996; Minkenberg, 1996; Lindsay & 
Ripely, 1997a; Holsti, 1998; Kull, 2002; Melanson, 2005). In the lead-up to the 
liberation of Kuwait, Gallup found that about 84% of Americans supported action to get 
the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, 78% wanted to destroy Iraq‘s nuclear capacity, and 73% 
wanted to see Saddam Hussein removed from power (Jentleson, 1992; Hermann & 
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Peterson, 1997). Such public consensus was reflected in President George H. W. Bush‘s 
popularity, that flew to an unprecedented level (91%) on the heels of Operation Desert 
Strom (Hodge & Nolan, 2007). Therefore, it is clear that Americans who supported US 
active international role remained higher in number than those of the 1970s (Melanson, 
2005).  
However, in contrast to this trend, an early-May 1993 poll conducted by CBS News, 
reported that 52% of Americans did not agree that the US had a moral obligation to 
intervene in the international crisis, whereas 37% believed it did. In the same way, the 
CNN/USA Today poll of May 1993 showed that 55% of respondents were against that 
the US conducting airstrikes against Serbian troops, compared to 36% who were in 
favour (Kelleher, 1997). On the contrary, in early 1993, a poll conducted by the Los 
Angeles Times found that 58% of Americans agreed to the use of US force in Bosnia, if 
there was no another option to protect civilian lives (Kull & Ramsay, 2003). Likewise, 
public approval for the deployment of US troops outside, which peaked at more than 
70% during the 1991 military operation in Kuwait, started to see dramatic changes 
(Richman, 1996). It declined to 50% in November 1994, and, in December 1995, the 
CBS/New York Times survey found that only 36% of Americans believed the 
deployment of US ground troops to Bosnia was the right action. 58% disapproved of 
such action at the time (Clark & Dautrich, 2000; Murray, 2000). In the same way, in 
March 1999, a Gallup poll found that only 31% of respondents would support any 
Clinton intention to send ground troops to the Balkan, whereas 65% firmly opposed 
(Redd, 2005). Owing to this decline, Clinton‘s options to send ground troops to Kosovo 
in 1999 were very limited. As a result, he depended on airstrikes only, as a ‗zero-
casualty war‘ approach (Redd, 2005; Robinson, 2008).  
The US public‘s internationalist trend was also contradicted with a higher degree of 
sensitivity over the costs of US engagement abroad, particularly in peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions (Dumbrell, 1999; Redd, 2005). In early December 1992, for 
example, only 20% of Americans thought that the loss of American lives was not worth 
the cost of humanitarian duties; however, this percentage doubled when an American 
life was lost, to reach about 44% (Clark & Dautrich, 2000; Murray, 2000; McKay, 
2001). This trend was dominant during the Clinton administration (Redd, 2005).  
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4.2.2.1.2. Domestic Versus External Concerns 
On the other hand, in contrast to the US public‘s internationalist mood, another set of 
evidence from the 1990s shows that American public interest in world issues had 
dropped to unprecedented levels, and the US public‘s domestic concerns outweighed 
concerns about any foreign policy matter (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b; Walt, 2000; 
Lindsay, 2005d; Melanson, 2005; Holsti, 2006b). Therefore, when Americans were 
asked by a Times Mirror poll in late 1993, respondents ranked ―protecting the jobs of 
American workers‖ as the top priority (85%), compared with just 22% for promoting 
human rights abroad, and 18% for enlarging democracy worldwide (Melanson, 2005: 
25). The same was true in 1996; when a Wall Street Journal-NBC News poll ―asked 
voters to rank sixteen issues that might help them decide how to vote in the presidential 
race, foreign policy was ranked last‖ (Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b: 320). Likewise, when 
Americans were asked by the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs (CCFA) to identify 
two or three dilemmas challenging the country in 1998, ―foreign policy issues did not 
even make the list‖ (Lindsay, 2005d; Lindsay & Ripley, 1997b).  
In contrast to its internationalist trend, the data from the early 1990s reveals that the 
public continued to support domestic goals such as job protection, trade balance, and the 
securing of the energy supply. However, in sharp contrast, and despite the US public‘s 
traditional fear of free trade, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre in February 
2000, found that 64% of Americans believed that free trade was a good thing for the 
country‘s economy, and 62% of Americans believed that the US‘s membership of the 
WTO was serving US economic interests. The public was less concerned about 
American commitments to remedy the Third World‘s economic problems, as seen by 
the decreasing support for foreign aid. The public also favoured the coupling of human 
rights and trade issues, particularly in relation to China: according to a Times/CNN poll 
conducted in May 1994, 60% of Americans preferred to use trade issues to achieve 
humanitarian outcomes, compared with only 28% who did not favour such a linkage. At 
the other extreme, the public did not automatically follow their officials‘ concerns about 
defence (Holsti, 1995, 1996; Richman, 1996; Hermann & Peterson, 1997; Rosati & 
Creed, 1997; Rourke & Clark, 1998; Holsti, 1998; Flanigan & Zingale, 1998; Rosati, et 
al., 1998; Dumbrell, 1999; Lindsay, 2005d).  
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4.2.2.1.3. Multi-Lateralism Versus Unilateralism 
The 1990s reveal an increasing gap between the public and the AFP elite occurring over 
America‘s suitable approach to its global role (Richman, 1996; Minkenberg, 1996; 
Holsti, 1998; Kull, 2002). Unlike the US officials, who were enthusiastic in pushing 
America as the hegemonic leader, the US public rejected this notion. During 1991, 71% 
said no to the notion that America should serve as the world policeman. Only 16% of 
the public supported the US leading role in world politics, whereas 57% said that 
America should take a chief role but not the leading one (Kull, 2002). This trend was 
repeated a year later, when just 29% of respondents found that the deployment of US 
forces to Bosnia was appropriate if it was to consolidate American global leadership 
(Kull, 2002). 
In late 1994, for instance, 69% of Americans preferred that the US pursue its security 
concerns multi-laterally, and 51% supported its involvement abroad in a combination 
with other countries, compared with only 17% who called for unilateralist action 
(Richman, 1996: 307). In 2000, Americans were asked by the Program on International 
Policy Attitudes (PIPA) to rank three general options for the US role in the world. 72% 
of the respondents supported multi-lateralism as an approach to AFP, compared with 
just 11% who preferred hegemony and unilateralism and 15% who favoured 
isolationism (Kull, 2002: 100).  
In this context, the public also preferred to strengthen international institutions such as 
the UN and WTO (Lindsay, 2005b). In November 1997, a poll conducted by CNN-US 
Today found that 85% of Americans believed in the central role of the UN at the time. 
Likewise, in October 1999, a poll conducted by a Pew Research Centre showed that 
76% of the respondents held a positive view of the UN (Kelleher, 1997; Kull, 2002; 
Kull & Ramsay, 2003; Lindsay, 2005d). This trend contradicts some of the US officials‘ 
claims. For example, the powerful Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Jesse Helms, in a strongly-worded speech to the UNSC, claimed that the US public‘s 
view about international organisation, particularly the UN, was essentially very 
negative. Americans, as he argued, think that the UN‘s attempts to establish a new 
global governance is threatening their state‘s sovereignty and they do not think that the 
US is obligated to pay the organisation its back dues (Kull, 2002). In this context, it 
would also be proper to mention that, in contrast to the US government‘s opposition to 
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the creation of the ICC, two-thirds of the respondents in a poll conducted by the 
Program of International Policy Attitudes supported the establishment of this court, 
even after being told why the US government opposed it (Lindsay, 2005d).   
In sum, such instability in the public mood during the 1990s led Holsti to argue that the 
public ―establishes a vast region of admissible policies surrounded by a belt of 
inadmissible policies‖ (1995: 263); therefore, on some occasions, the public mood tied 
the policymakers‘ hands behind their backs, whereas in some other instances politicians 
considered public opinion an ―insignificant element in policy making‖ (1995: 263). This 
conclusion accords with the realists‘ viewpoint that the ―quality of foreign policy is 
likely to suffer if the mass public is allowed to have much direct impact‖ (Jacobs & 
Page, 2005:1). This also shows the divide between US public preferences and their 
representatives over issues such as cooperation with the UN and foreign economic 
policy. However, elites, in the absence of public activism, were able to act freely in the 
FP-making domain (Polwick & Katz, 1998). Furthermore, the disengagement of the 
public in foreign affairs ―opens the door to issue-driven special-interest groups ... [to] 
command political attention and wide influence perhaps beyond their numerical strength 
(Lyman, 2002: 73).  
4.2.2.2. Media And AFP Making Process 
Relating to the above discussion, the CW was ―characterised by a dominant paradigm or 
meta-schema that organised ―normal‖ elite thinking, media coverage, and public 
response to foreign and defence policy‖ (Entman, 2004: 95). In order to satisfy the mass 
media, the CW ―provided a filter and a set of criteria for determining priorities in the 
selection of events to report ... as well ... the task of political reporting has become 
much more complex without the simplifying assumptions of the conflict‘ (Soderlund, 
2003a: 2). However, the EoCW did not only leave ―the media without a clear fall-back 
frame for the interpretation of crises‖ (Soderlund, 2003a: 2), but also became ―highly 
partisan and biased‖ (Wiarada & Skelley, 2006: 4). In this way, Entman (2004) found 
that US media coverage was being partisan even during the US intervention (with 
NATO) in the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Some of the US national media failed in offering a 
balanced view, but it was either with or against the war. Public opinion therefore was 
divided over critical issues due to the mass media‘s conflicted coverage. That is why the 
press or the media appeared as a ―sideline player and occasional cheerleader in the 
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policy process‖ (McCormick, 1998: 171). It creates public consciousness over FP issues 
through its role as a unique agenda-setter particularly after the CW (McCormick, 1998), 
―through tone, content manipulation, and issue frames‖ (Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 
526).  
In fact, ―the media‘s agenda-setting function,‖ according to Dumbrell & Barrett (1997: 
182) ―has long been recognised‖. This recognition became clearer after the absence of 
any significant external challenge to America in the 1990s. Numerous critics (e.g., 
Allison & Blackwill, 2000; Strobel, 2000; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006; Robinson, 2008) 
argue that AFP became a prisoner to television images and the short-lived passions of 
domestic politics. The ―CNN‖ effect,‖ or the television images, therefore, has acquired a 
significant influence on AFP making process. Echoing such a view, Colin Powell said: 
―we had been drawn into this place [Somalia] by television images; now we were being 
repelled by them‖ (cited in Schraeder, 1998: 353). It was also television ―which showed 
bedraggled Haitians arrived on overcrowded boats on US shores – that prompted the 
Clinton administration to refocus its policies on Haiti‖. In the same way, ―the televised 
reports of rape, genocide, and mass starvation on Bosnia-Herzegovina ... forced the 
United States to consider intervention in that area‖ (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 20). 
Media also played a significant influential role in AFP agenda-setting on several 
occasions. In reality, both Presidents Bush and Clinton (between 1992, and 1995) were 
not convinced that the war in Bosnia directly threatened US vital interests to a degree 
that the US should intervene militarily; the same was also true during the East-Timor 
violence after the independence referendum of the late 1990s, when the US 
administration regarded such an issue as less significant. However, on the two 
occasions, the non-stop coverage and the images of the humanitarian suffering led to 
changes in the course of AFP (Strobel, 2000). At the other extreme, one of the basic and 
misused lessons from the Vietnam War, according to Ryan (2003: 107) was that ―the 
media was in part responsible for the US defeat.‖ For this reason, President George H. 
W. Bush, for instance, in run-up to the Gulf War of (1991) indicated that ―we don‘t 
need another Vietnam ... No hands are going to be tied behind backs  ... It will not be a 
long, drawn-out mess.‖ On the basis of such a suspicion, during the hot events like the 
Gulf war (1991) and the Kosovo crisis, all media narratives and reports were subjected 
to military censorship (Guyatt, 2003). However, Warren P. Strobel has argued that, if 
US strong diplomatic leadership was uncertain, as it was during the 1990s, during the 
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Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia crises, the US adversaries using the news media ―move 
quickly to fill the vacuum. Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Mohamed Farah Aided in Somalia, 
and Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia used the news media, particularly 
television, to complicate achievement of US foreign policy objectives‖ (2000: 27).  But 
in a parallel way, US political leaders have also used television news and images to 
rally the American public behind the policy of engagement abroad in Somalia, Haiti, the 
Gulf region, and the former Yugoslavia (Cameron, 2002; Soderlund, 2003b & Wiarda 
& Skelley, 2006). In sum, according to Norquist (2007: 8):   
the media has not only fuelled the public dividedness over FP issues, but also 
the partisan loyalty gets worse. America has approximately 500 TV stations, 
and a tremendous number of journals and news papers nowadays comparing 
with only three TV networks and some major journals at the past.  
4.2.2.3. Interest Groups: Ethnic And Economic 
In contrast to their limited influence during the CW, the 1990s witnessed a greater role 
for interest groups over the AFP-making process. According to Woodruff (2005) ―in 
times when there is no real threat to our national security, American politics becomes 
the politics of organised groups‖. In this way, McCormick (1998) illustrates changes 
that brought such groups into the policymaking circle after the CW. AFP committees 
and sub-committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate began playing a 
crucial role in formulating the AFP-agenda in the post-CW era. In addition, the number 
of congressional FP staff increased. These moves created increased opportunities for 
lobbyists to influence policy. Through the use of ‗soft money‘ to political parties, the 
interest groups were more intertwined with congressional campaigns in the post-CW 
period.  
4.2.2.3.1. Business Interest Groups 
As said in the first chapter, globalisation ―has erased the traditional distinction between 
what is national and what is international, what is private and what is public, and what 
is domestic and what is foreign‖ (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2001: 18). Thus, the EoCW 
brought economic issues into the centre of the AFP-making process as the interests of 
US companies shifted from domestic to global markets. Therefore, business groups 
became more interested in influencing the process of AFP-making and conduct (Kutler, 
1995; Pahre & Papayoanou, 1997; Fordham, 1998; Cavanagh, 2000; Lyman, 2002; 
Conley, 2007). As a result, business interest groups became more active in ―contributing 
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to election campaigns, lobbying congress for favourable legislations, and acting as 
advisors to government agencies‖ (Wiarda & Skelley, 2006: 52). This led Pascal 
Boniface to argue that the US ―confuse[d] its national interest with a global interest … 
when once the saying was, What is good for General Motors is good for the United 
States‖ (2001: 158). 
Thus, the business groups were able to a degree directly or indirectly to affect AFP. 
Cox, for example, indicates that ―pro-NAFTA business organisations spent between $30 
and $50 million lobbying for the agreement, which made it one of the most expensive 
foreign policy campaigns in US history‖ (2008: 1530). Clinton‘s difficulty in passing 
the NAFTA treaty in Congress was essentially because of the influence of interest 
groups. While business groups backed Clinton‘s proposal, organised labour, supported 
by human rights and environmental groups, opposed the treaty. This divide was clear in 
Congress, where the Republicans and conservative Democrats supported the business 
groups and the president‘s initiative, while the majority of Democrats supported the 
organised labour groups in condemning the treaty (Cameron, 2002; Wiarda & Skelley, 
2006). When Congress was hesitant about refinancing the IMF on the heels of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, businesses, farmers‘ lobbying groups, and officials played a 
crucial role in making Congress approve US$17.9 billion, the amount that the 
administration had suggested nearly a year earlier (McCormick, 2000). Furthermore, 
―most multi-national companies, some large foreign-owned companies ... hire 
Americans with legislative and executive experience and contacts to represent them on 
pending issues in which they have an interest‖ (Wayne, 2000: 27). In the mid-1990s, 
according to Cameron, ―a broad-based coalition of nearly 700 business and agriculture 
groups, set up USA Engage, to lobby for free trade‖ (2002: 95).  
There is a widespread belief amongst the public and critics that American oil companies 
and weapons producers, among others, run or are even hijacking the AFP-making 
process (Cameron, 2002; Guyatt, 2003). The mutual interests of the business 
community and the Pentagon, for example, worked well against the advocates of the 
peace dividend, who wanted the military budget to be cut during the early 1990s. 
Because ―many of the largest and most prestigious US corporations … were major 
suppliers to the Pentagon: defence contracts funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars 
each year to companies like Boeing, General Electric, AT&T, and General Motors‖ 
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(Guyatt, 2003: 117). In a parallel way, weapons producers, such as Lockheed Martin, 
―helped finance the campaign for NATO enlargement‖ (Cameron, 2002: 95), while the 
missile manufacturer, Raytheon ―helped support the campaign in favour of national 
missile defence‖ (Cameron, 2002: 95).   
As Clinton saw the US ―like a big corporation competing in the global market place‖ 
(Ambrose & Brinkley, 1997: 402; Dumbrell, 1997: 182), the business community 
supported him more ―than any Democrat since Johnson‖ (Cox, 1995: 27). In 
consequence, the business groups‘ fingerprints on the shaping of AFP are very clear. 
For example, according to John T. Rourke & Richard Clark (1998: 204), pro-China 
groups, which consisted of the US companies that were gaining huge profits from 
economic relations with China, and business and farm groups, played a very important 
role in the shaping of the US-China relations during the 1990s and beyond, in line with 
Clinton‘s economic executive agencies. Clinton, during his presidential campaign in 
1992, said that he ―would deny most-favoured-nation status (MFN) to China … impose 
trade sanctions, and encourage the younger Chinese generation‘s democratic 
aspirations‖ (Rourk & Clark, 1998: 204). However, once in power he renewed China‘s 
MFN status. Thereafter, in 1994, he officially made a distinction between economic and 
human rights issues in the government‘s discourse, because of the influence of business 
groups. Meanwhile, agricultural business groups‘ lobbyist activities led to an easing of 
the export restriction on Cuba in 2000 because their trade with the island was about 
US$1 billion (Neack, 2003; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006).   
4.2.2.3.2. Ethnic Interest Groups 
Hoff (1994) and Woodruff (2005) argue that it is not totally accurate to say that only the 
‗power elite‘ possess the ability to guide the nation‘s policy, but that there is also a set 
of small groups which can do the same. As with the economic groups, ethnic groups 
have also benefited from the post-CW political circumstances and enhanced their 
influence on policy makers. Thomas Ambrosio observes that ethnic groups sought ―to 
influence policy in three ways: framing
1
 information and policy analysis, and policy 
oversight‖ (2002: 2). In this context, Lindsay states that global politics in the US is 
increasingly becoming ―local politics—and local politics, often, is ethnic politics‖ 
                                                          
1
 ―Framing refers to the attempt by interest groups to place an issue on the government‘s agenda, shape 
perspective of the issue, and influence the terms of debate‖ (Ambrosio, 2002: 2).    
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(2004: 134). This became clear after the collapse of the external challenger to the US. 
The inability of Americans to create a grand strategy similar to the CW‘s containment 
created a significant policy vacuum, ―which ethnic identity groups sought to fill to the 
advantage of their ethnic kin or national homeland‖ (Ambrosio, 2002: 12). 
Thus, for example, Mexican-American groups played a crucial role in the NAFTA 
debate and in the framing of the whole US policy toward Mexico (Clough, 2004). 
Chinese-American groups, likewise, have played a similar role in shaping US foreign 
policy toward China. Cuban-American lobbies also play a fundamental role in driving 
US policy toward Cuba, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ambrosio, 2002). 
Although the CW came to an end, and the Cuban regime lost its previous geostrategic 
importance, the US maintained the embargo of the CW against the island. The pressure 
of the Cuban-American lobbies continued and, for instance, yielded the passing of the 
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996
1
 (Haney & 
Vanderbush, 1999; Ambrosio, 2002). Thus, in contrast to ―the political spectrum 
editorial writers, academic associations, business and labour leaders, farm associations, 
and even Cuban-American groups [who] have called for a change in U.S. policy‖ 
(Brenner et al., 2004: 193). It ―would seem that US policy toward Cuba has stayed 
roughly the same since Clinton signed Helms-Burton‖ (Brenner et al., 2004: 192). The 
American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),
2
 in the same way, has been 
described as the strongest figure in formulating US policy towards the Middle East, as 
well as concentrating on the fate of Jews in other countries, such as Russia (Massing, 
2006; Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006). Irish groups during the Clinton era followed and 
supported the Northern Ireland peace process (Ambrosio, 2002). The US engagement in 
the Balkans and Aegean was a major concern for the Greeks and other minorities from 
Eastern Europe. However, the Croats and Serb lobbies were both weak and their 
activities did not influence US policy towards the conflict in the Balkan during the Bush 
I administration. This factor would interpret James Baker‘s reaction that America did 
not have a dog in that conflict. The Eastern European American lobbies, particularly 
Polish-Americans, played a vital role in pushing US policy makers to adopt the 
                                                          
1
 The Act introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (R-
Indiana) and was passed on 26 March 1996. The Act ―penalizes foreign companies that do business with 
Havana‖ (Ambrosio, 2002: 206). 
2
 AIPAC is the strongest lobby in America with ―55.000 members, a staff of over 150, and an annual 
operational budget of $25 million‖ (Cameron, 2002: 88). 
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expansion of NATO (Farkas, 2003). Hispanic and Asians were more active in 
immigration legislation and trade deals (McKay, 2001; Uslaner, 2004). Indian-
Americans also ―used their growing political clout to block efforts to persuade congress 
to condemn Pakistani aggression in Kashmir‖ (Lindsay, 2005d: 52).   
Such diversity of input can affect the consistency of AFP and lead to the 
domesticization of AFP (Huntington, 2004), because of the contested and even 
conflicting aims that these groups seek to fulfil. In the 1990s, it was widely argued that 
―the sheer volume of interest group activity at all levels of government had undermined 
the capacity of governments to articulate the wishes of the public and to get things done. 
On every issue lobbies mobilize for and against in ways which make the costs of 
pursuing a particular policy option very high‖ (McKay, 2001: 222). In this context, 
Buchanan discusses a number of examples. By the autumn of 1997, Armenian-
Americans succeeded in blocking ―aid to Azerbaijan though the United State had oil 
interests there, and Turkey was being deprived of US helicopters and frigates it had 
purchased because of pressure from Greek-Armenians‖ (1999: 337). Likewise, easing 
the embargo of Cuba during the 1990s was also blocked by the Cuban-Americans 
because of their voting weight in New Jersey and Florida (Buchanan, 1999; Cameron, 
2002).  
On some occasions, however, interest groups‘ agendas have coincided with the US 
administrations‘ foreign policy agenda. Thus, Cameron argues that ―Clinton‘s call to 
expand democracy was taken up by many ethnic groups with ties to Africa, Latin 
America, and the former Soviet Union‖ (2002: 88). Also, the coincidence of Eastern 
European groups‘ agenda with US strategy was clear in promoting NATO expansion 
towards the East; thus, such groups ―voted heavily for the Democrats in 1996 and 2000‖ 
(Cameron, 2002: 88). However, the US‘s lack of concern over the mass killings in 
Rwanda in 1994 was in part because the genocide did not find sufficient ―resonance in 
African-American political circles‖ (Ambrosio, 2002: 14), which, in turn, meant there 
was little effort to influence Congress and the US government to become engaged with 
the issue.  
In a similar way, the majority of academics argue that the AIPAC extended its grip over 
important parts of the American government (Ambrosio, 2002), including the ―Vice 
President‘s office, the Pentagon and the State Department, besides controlling the 
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legislative apparatus of Congress‖ (Pravda, 2006). In this task, it was ―being assisted by 
powerful allies in the two main political parties, in major corporate media and by some 
richly financed so-called ‗think-tanks‘ such as the American Enterprise Institute, the 
Heritage Foundation, or the Washington Institute for Near East Policy‖ (Pravda, 2006). 
The American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee (AHIPAC) was previously 
ranked the second largest lobby group; however, it lost most of its influence after the 
EoCW, when American concerns turned to other hotspots in the world. African-
Americans turned to deal with FP issues after a long tradition of concern with only 
domestic politics. The abolition of the South African apartheid system was their initial 
main concern and, since 1993, the Congressional Black and TransAfrica—two African-
Americans lobby groups—have become think tanks dealing with the FP agenda 
(Uslaner, 2004). Indian-Americans have started to be an active group in FP, not only 
because of the geo-political challenges that face India, but also because they are one of 
the richest ethnic groups in the US (Lindsay, 2004; Lindsay, 2005d). However, there are 
also less significant ethnic groups, in terms of their influence over policymaking, such 
as Arabs, Latinos, and Eastern Europeans, who are less united around particular 
political issues (Lindsay, 2004; Uslaner, 2004). 
4.2.2.3.3. Single Issue Lobby Groups 
The post-CW era also witnessed an increase in influence of powerful and well-
organised single-focus or single-issue lobby groups (e.g., human rights movements, 
such as Amnesty International; environmental movements, such as Greenpeace, and the 
Sierra Club; and religious groups, such as the National Council of Churches). They have 
become more engaged in the AFP-making process, and have also joined external 
networks with the aim of influencing other governments. They exert considerable 
pressure domestically and internationally to achieve their global agenda (Cameron, 
2002; Clough, 2004; Woodruff, 2005; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006). For example, labour, 
human rights and environmental groups oppose the role of the WTO and challenged 
business groups that were advocating free trade and economic openness in the Seattle 
meeting in late 1999, and during the Washington D.C. meetings of the IMF and World 
Bank in 2000. This union of disparate groups influenced the US public against free 
trade and the WTO. Such groups also worked against the NAFTA treaty in the early 
1990s. In this way, ―human rights, activities, labour unions, and environmentalists kept 
President Clinton from wining authority to negotiate new trade deals that would receive 
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privileged consideration on Capitol Hill‖ (Lindsay, 2005d: 52). Conservative groups 
also ―turned US participation in UN peacekeeping missions into political poison‖ 
(Lindsay, 2005d: 52).   
It is not easy to demonstrate and measure NGOs‘ direct influence on AFP-making; 
however, their lobbyists target policy-makers, and they conduct their campaigns on 
Internet websites and via the mass media to influence the public‘s mood and choices 
(McCormick, 2000; Strobel, 2000; Cameron, 2002; Lindsay, 2005d; Wiarda & Skelley, 
2006). Thus, President Bush‘s decision to send US troops to Somalia in 1992 was 
essentially made because of the efforts of ―a loose coalition of relief groups such as 
CARE, members of Congress, and mid-level US officials helped direct Bush‘s attention 
to the starvation in Somalia by encouraging and facilitating media coverage there‖ 
(Strobel, 2000: 39).  
The problem with the influence of these groups is that, as Wiarda & Skelley argue, ―the 
existence of so many groups, which frequently clash with each other over policy goals 
and choices, has often led to paralysis as decision makers fear offending groups that, 
collectively, represent a sizeable segment of the voting public‖ (2006: 51). Furthermore, 
Lindsay states that ―when politicians did address foreign policy issues, they often had to 
satisfy interest groups demands,‖ adding that most interest groups (ethnic, commercial, 
and ideological) ―were willing to reward, or punish politicians when the broader public 
was not‖ (2005d: 52).  
The outcome was that the president could ―no longer consult with only the leadership in 
congress and be assured of the congressional support for presidential initiatives‖ 
(Hamilton, 2000: 24), but also he must respond to business interest groups, which 
exerted great influence on his choices. Furthermore, from the 1990s Congress was also 
―more responsive … to the hyper pluralism of well-organised groups and associations‖ 
(Thurber, 1996: 72). As a result of the overlapping political environment in 
Washington, David McKay observes that (2001: 238):  
It is difficult to distinguish between the ‗insider‘ (elected and officials) and the 
‗outsiders‘ (lobbyists, media consultants, interest group leaders). Indeed, the 
presence of policy networks with fluid memberships and constantly shifting 
agendas means that there are really only ‗insiders‘.  
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Hamilton describes the influence of such groups over Congressmen by saying that ―too 
many people place constituent interests above national interests. They don‘t see much 
difference between lobbying for highway funds and slanting foreign policy toward a 
particular interest group‖ (2000: 24). Lindsay continues this theme by remarking that 
―the-not-too-surprising result was that American foreign policy in the 1990s was often 
inconsistent and short-sighted‖ (2005d: 52). However, in the light of the previous 
chapter‘s debate, Lindsay‘s observation is not truly correct, because, even with such 
diversity, AFP pursued a comprehensive agenda. True, AFP conducted its affairs under 
very difficult domestic bipartisanship, but what is not in doubt is that AFP did not lose 
its strategic way.        
4.2.2.4. Grand Strategy And Domestic Debate 
Not only have post-CW‘s agenda items, such as trade, the US military intervention, and 
environmental issues ―fissured both political parties‖ and societal actors (McCormick, 
1998: 172), but without "monolithic Communism", both Republicans and Democrats 
tended to change their CW intellectual positions and the debate around the state's role in 
the new era was not yet sorted out (Hewson & Sinclair, 1999; Dumbrell, 1999). It seems 
apparent, therefore, that the pre-1989 rational basis of AFP was eventually transformed 
by the EoCW, and the post-CW era initiated an intense and stifling debate to redefine 
AFP‘s new priorities and strategy (Minkenberg & Dittgen, 1996; Lindsay & Ripley, 
1997a; Hurst, 1999). In this way, Grew McGrew identified three main dominant 
positions in the national debate on the post-CW‘s security strategy: ―the preponderants; 
the neo-isolationists; and the globalists‖ (1994: 243). Such a dispute represents several 
alternative strategies to the CW‘s containment: a neo-isolationist, or disengagement 
strategy; a strategy of selective engagement; a strategy of balance of power; a primacy 
strategy; a liberal internationalism strategy (Posen and Ross, 1996/1997 & Dueck, 
2004). 
 These perspectives contested each other within American domestic discourse along the 
1990s. At the eve of the EoCW, the neo-isolationists called for an inward look, arguing 
that the US should pay its attention to domestic and economic problems, and turn its 
back on the external chaotic world. The end of the prolonged internationalism, from 
their viewpoint, should lead to a phase of "nostalgia for a more normal FP" (Gergen, 
1992; Lösche, 1996; Kull & Ramsay, 2000; Buchanan, 2007). Several critics argue that 
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the manifestation of this tendency or at least the rise of this sort of debate came to the 
surface with the election of President Clinton, who prioritised domestic issues over 
foreign policy during his presidential campaign (Rockman, 1996; Destler, 1998 & Dunn 
2005). The 1992 presidential election found willingness amongst the public to support 
the state's FP reform after the CW. The isolationist appetite might ―be founded on the 
radical left, amongst presidential candidates Jerry Brown, Jesse Jackson and Douglas 
Wilder and on the right from Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan and 
Independent presidential candidate Rose Perot‖ (Dunn 2005: 238). Therefore, the neo-
isolationist propensity has appeared in the post-CW FP through their strict bias against 
any sort of internationalist perspective. For instance, during the 1992 presidential 
campaign, both Pat Buchanan and Jerry Brown stood against foreign aid, opposed the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and believed that the US should 
keep itself out of the Gulf War. Furthermore, Buchanan criticised the deployment of the 
US military forces to Bosnia and Clinton‘s 1995 plan for Mexico (Lindsay & Ripley, 
1997a; Nincic, 1997; McCormick, 1998; Dumbrell, 1999). Jeane Kirkpatrick also wrote 
that the EoCW ―frees time, attention and resources to American ends‖ (Cited in 
Buchanan, 2007: 132). 
However, even though the ―isolationist minority has not grown substantially during the 
post Cold War era‖ (Brewer & Steenbergen, 2002: 43), it was a target of a harsh 
criticism across the country, because, according to James Baker, ―isolationism and 
disengagement are simply not options. We are too integrated into the world, in 
economic and security terms, to walk away from it. If the United States does not 
exercise power, others will‖ (2007: 15). The economic nationalists criticized the neo-
isolationists‘ protectionism (Schlesinger, 1995, 1996; Kull; Ramsay, 2000). Both 
Presidents Bush I and Bill Clinton warned against the flourishing of the isolationist 
tendency after the CW. Bush, for example, advised Americans to resist "that faulted 
siren" after the 1994 midterm elections. Clinton, in May 1995, also blamed the 
congressional leadership for its most isolationist plans in the last half-century. 
Moreover, he argued that America‘s withdrawal from international affairs today would 
be very harmful for its future. His National Security Advisor – Anthony Lake – saw the 
1994 Republican victory in the congressional elections as a new rise of isolationism. 
However, President Clinton himself, who was very suspicious of the resurgence of the 
isolationist tendency during 1995, has been accused by several critics and politicians 
Leadership Abroad Starts At Home 
177 
 
alike (for example, Muravchik and Caspar Weinberger) of echoing domestic concern 
with the post-CW neo-isolationist viewpoint. The Los Angeles Times, likewise, in 
February 1995, expressed such worries of the isolationist propensity across the new 
Republican congress (Nincic, 1997; Hurst, 1999; Dumbrell, 1999; Kull & Ramsay, 
2000; McKay, 2001).  
In a similar way to what happened during previous phases of the state‘s history, 
advocates of the ―homebound‖ standpoint clashed with the interventionists, or 
internationalists, who saw the post-CW era as a unilateralist moment leading to the 
American unrivalled global leadership in the 21st century. This cleavage over AFP 
strategy is another source of fragmentation affecting the performance of the US 1990s 
administrations (Krauthammer, 1990/91, Cheney, 1993; Mastanduno, 1997; Rosati & 
Creed, 1997; Scott & Crothers, 1998; Hook & Spanier, 2000).  
4.3. Post-11 September: Rally-Round-The-Flag 
The aftermath of 9/11 offered AFP a unique opportunity to rejuvenate the domestic 
political bipartisanship, and generate a new rally-round-the-flag mentality that was lost 
with the EoCW. In addition, it removed the vacuum created by the lack of an external 
enemy, which came about after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
4.3.1. AFP‟s Missing North Pole Rediscovered 
The EoCW removed the US‘ global peer and left America as the sole hegemon, and also 
created a strategic vacuum that affected the FP-making process for more than a decade 
(Cakmak, 2003 & Sklenka, 2007). It has been argued by the likes of Chollet that the 
absence of ―a broad narrative like the War on Terror‖ was the main reason behind the 
indecisiveness of AFP during the post-CW epoch (2007: 5). Terrorism ―was no longer 
one among a number of assorted dangers to the United States … [but a] fundamental 
threat to America‖ (Lieber, 2002: 6). In effect, the ―core question raised by the fall of 
the Berlin Wall on 11/9 – what to do with American power absent global adversary – 
had been answered. The country was now at war‖ (Chollect & Goldgeier, 2008: 313). In 
consequence, 11 September 2001 created ―a sense of international purpose‖ and united 
―the nation around some fairly powerful themes‖ (Cox, 2002a: 273). According to 
Chollet (2007: 5): 
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After years in which American leaders seemed to career from crisis to crisis, 
none of which quite rose to the level of grave threats to national security, the 
United States now faced a moral enemy and a generational struggle. Foreign 
policy in the post Cold-War era finally had an overriding purpose: to defeat 
Islamic extremism. If history ended in 1989, for many it seemed to begin in 
2001.
1
 
Since then, anti-terrorism replaced the CW‘s anti-communism (Barry, 2002; Colás & 
Saull, 2006; Leffler & Legro, 2008), and has become ―a major focus of policy-making 
attention and commands enormous intellectual and material investment from the 
security establishment, the emergency services, industry and commerce, the academy 
and the media‖ (Jackson, 2007: 394). In consequence, the War on Terror (WoT) 
remedied the problem of a threat deficit from which the US suffered during the 1990s 
(Barry, 2003a; Buzan, 2006; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008) and ―marked the return of 
an adversarial world, with detestable bad guys out to kill us, and the first opportunity 
since the Cold War to restore foreign policy‖ (Crocker, 2005: 51). Therefore, the debate 
over US grand strategy that was ever-present during the 1990s came to an end on 11 
September 2001, at least for some time ahead (Lieber, 2005).  
As a result, the domestic consensus that had been fragmented in the 1990s and limited 
US policymakers‘ ability to respond to the new international environment ended. The 
country reunited under the new conditions. As Vasques (1985) highlights, crises usually 
generates domestic consensus and bipartisanship, while Dumbrell (2002) states foreign 
policy strategy explicitly emerges in the heat of events. In fact, the ‗rally-round-the-
flag-effect‘ sparked by 9/11 was unprecedented, uniting elites, the political parties in 
Congress in which Democrats rallied behind the president, the mass media, 
governmental institutions, interest groups, and even the international community 
(Kupchan, 2002; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003; Sloan, 2003; Wittkopf & McCormick, 
2004; Smith, 2005a; Covington, 2005; Thurber, 2006; Falk, 2007). Therefore, political 
―bipartisanship returned to be the central organizing principle in US foreign policy for 
the first time‖ since the EoCW (Singh, 2006: 17). This was an ideal environment to 
carry on pursuing AFP of hegemony. In the following section some aspects of the new 
bipartisanship will be discussed.  
                                                          
1
 This phenomenon was apparent even during the first few months of the George W. Bush‘s presidency 
prior to 9/11. One journalist argues that, ―one day China was a strategic competitor and a threat to all 
Asia: the next, the US had to engage with China and deepen its involvement in the world. Even more 
confusion existed towards North Korea – initially it was an unfit negotiating partner, and then moving to 
be a posture of talking without preconditions‖ (Cameron, 2002: 30).                                                                                                       
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4.3.2. 9/11 And US Political System Efficiency: Aspects Of Presidential /Congress- 
ional Relations  
The attacks of 9/11 brought new uncertainties to the US and that shift redistributed 
power within the US political system. In contrast to the 1990s which saw greater 
congressional and societal involvement in AFP agenda-setting, the new uncertainty 
reconsolidated AFP‘s CW model in which authority shifted back to the president, the 
armed forces and the law enforcement community (Hayden, et. al, 2003; Allen, 2003; 
Fisher, 2003; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a; Vanderbush, et. al, 2008). In the following 
sections more light is shed on how 9/11 revitalized the model of the Imperial presidency 
with Congress following the presidential leadership.  
 4.3.2.1. The Imperial Presidency Reappeared 
9/11 and its aftermath ―once again tilted the pendulum back toward an empowered 
presidency and executive branch‖ (Hamilton, 2006: 267) and gave ―more power than 
ever to the Imperial Presidency and place[d] the separation of powers ordained by the 
constitution under unprecedented, and at time unbearable, strain‖ (Schlesinger, 2004: 
xxiv). President George W. Bush found it easy to reclaim the supreme role in the 
domain of FP-making as the attacks ―provided a rare clarifying moment in the nation‘s 
collective consciousness,‖ not only because ―a national focus and sense of mission, 
absent since the end of the Cold War, re-emerged,‖ but also because of ―both American 
national identity and US foreign policy were reinvigorated—separately and in relation 
to each other‖ (McCartney, 2004: 400).  
Therefore, 9/11 served Bush in several ways and offered him numerous advantages, 
strengthening his political leadership. First, the events effectively closed the discussion 
over Bush‘s controversial election, which saw disputes over the votes in Florida and the 
unparalleled involvement of the US Supreme Court. Prior to the attacks, 40% of 
Americans regarded his presidency as illegitimate and a number of the House of 
Representatives expressed their dissatisfaction at his election. Following the strikes the 
nation rallied around Bush‘s presidency. Furthermore, the pre-9/11 belief that Bush was 
inexperienced in the field of FP evaporated. Since then a legislative window opened to 
put much of the decision-making in his hands (Brenner, et al, 2002; Strategic 
Comments, 2002a; Cox, 2002a; Crocker, 2005; Hamilton, 2006).  
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Even before the attacks of 9/11, Bush saw himself as ―a different kind of president‖ and 
as a ―man of big ideas‖ (Bolton, 2008: 140). 9/11 allowed this belief to come true. The 
events of 9/11 transformed President Bush into the most popular American president 
ever and focused attention on his leadership. Immediately after 11 September 2001, 
Bush‘s public approval rating leapt to 86% and in the next polls of 21 and 22 
September, it increased to over 90% (the highest level of public approval ever witnessed 
by Gallup) (Young, 2003; Yetiv & Dziubinski, 2003; Covington, 2005; Parmar, 2005; 
Smith, 2005a; Lindsay, 2005d; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a, 2005b). According to Sara 
Binder, Bush II used his high post-9/11 support to mobilise both Congress and the 
media (Brookings, 2002). However, the high popularity was exceptional and short-
lasting: within one year Bush‘s approval declined to 70%, and by July 2003 it fell 
further, to 61% (Parmar, 2005). However, the fall in support did not reduce his ability to 
lead and to formulate the FP agenda. For instance, in 2002, 71% of Americans believed 
that Bush‘s personality and ability were sufficiently strong and well-equipped to lead 
the nation. Prior to the 2004 elections, 61% of Americans also favoured Bush‘s 
performance in the WoT compared to 34% who preferred John Kerry‘s (Parmar, 2005). 
In 2004, Americans re-elected Bush, and gave support to his plan of anti-terrorism 
(Jackson, 2005).   
9/11 gave Bush II the opportunity to exercise his presidential power and to justify his 
unilateral tendencies in the eyes of Americans and abroad. With the nation rallying 
around the flag and mood of nationalism high, the president was able to gain support 
from Congress and convince the legislative entity to authorise his administration‘s 
actions. At the same time, it was difficult to criticise the president‘s policy. Such 
unprecedented domestic consensus following 9/11 created a new political hegemony 
over domestic entrants (May, 2003b; Covington, 2005).
1
 As a result, 9/11 enabled the 
                                                          
1
 In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush represented a new way to run the 
American presidency. According to one scholar, since then, there was ―no move to the centre that you 
normally see in presidencies‖ (Denison, 2006: 3). One the other hand, Republicans ―were quick to brand 
anyone who criticized the administration as giving aid and comfort to ... America‘s enemies‖ (May, 
2003b: 35). In this vein, Senator Tom Daschle had been compared, by the Family Research Council, to 
Saddam Hussein because; he just refused ―drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge‖ (cited in Rich, 
2002). Trent Lott also reprimanded him when he disapproved of the US military operation saying that 
―how dare Senator Daschle criticize President Bush while we are fighting our war against terrorism‖ 
(cited in Lindsay, 2003b: 536). In a press conference held on 9/11, Donald Rumsfeld rebuked Senator 
Carl Levin, the chair of the Senate Service Committee, who was attending, by saying that ―you and other 
Democrats in Congress have fear that you simply don‘t have enough money for the large increase in 
defence that the Pentagon is seeking, especially for missile defence … Does this sort of thing convince 
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President to initiate a hegemonic FP approach without the worries of domestic 
confrontation. In addition, the events played a crucial role in shifting the public‘s 
concern from internal issues (low politics) towards foreign and security policy (high 
politics). As a result, Bush‘s controversial domestic proposals, such as the tax-cuts 
initiative, took a backseat. Fighting against terrorism and national security concerns 
were brought back to the forefront (Darius, 2002; Hayden, et. al, 2003; & Allen, 2003; 
Covington, 2005;; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005a, 2005b; Lindsay, 2005d; Melanson, 2005; 
Wedeman & McMahon, 2006; Tuathail, 2006 & McMurtry, 2007). 
This tactic of pushing FP issues to the forefront of policy was used by the president and 
his administration a few years later, by invoking Iraq as a potential threat to US 
security, Bush not only blocked the Democrat attempts to redirect American attention to 
the economic matters, but also helped Republicans win the 2002 elections. Bush also 
renewed his popularity with the Iraq invasion; on 22 March 2003, just three days after 
the war started, his approval increased from 58% to 71% (Melanson, 2005; Smith, 
2005a).  
In sum, Bush, through 9/11, gained ―what he had not been able to generate for himself: 
public acceptance of and even trust in his leadership‖ (Covington, 2005: 86). It was an 
opportunity for him to seize control of the national agenda and shape the country‘s 
grand strategy in FP (McCartney, 2004: 408). These ideas are given greater 
consideration in the following sections. 
4.3.2.2. 9/11: Reproduces The CW‟s Model Of Congress As A Follower 
9/11 changed the short post-CW status of Congress as assertive in FP-making and 
reproduced the CW‘s form of congress merely following the presidential line. In this 
context, Sara Binder and Bill Frenzel, the congressional experts in the Brookings 
Institution, argue that the impact of 9/11 on Congress was comparable to that of the 
Pearl Harbour attacks of 7 December 1941. However, Binder suggests that the political 
                                                                                                                                                                          
you than an emergency exists in this country to increase defence spending?‖ (Griffin, 2007: 15; Reynolds, 
2007: 106). In turn, congress immediately responded and ―appropriated an additional $40 billion for the 
Pentagon and much more later‖ (Griffin, 2007: 16). In a similar way, on December 6, 2001, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft ―told the Senate Judiciary Committee that those who criticize the post-9/11 
curtailment of civil liberties aid terrorists ... erode our national unity and diminish our resolve‖ (May, 
2003b: 49).   
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environment of each was not entirely similar. In 1941, the president‘s party held a 
significant majority in both houses. However, on 9/11 the Republicans had only a small 
majority in Congress, whereas the Senate was controlled by the Democrats. Binder 
argues that the 1941 legislature handled the issue more smoothly than did the 2001 
legislature. However, Frenzel argues that in 2001 both the Republicans and Democrats 
reflected the wishes of the populace and interpreted it in a series of bipartisan policies 
(Brookings, 2002). As Richard Falk argues, there was an overall consensus in Congress 
to follow the president‘s path to war (2007). The consensus enabled the WoT to be 
fought explicitly in Afghanistan and Iraq ―with no questions arising in congress, or the 
press‖ (McMurtry, 2007: 141).  
This congressional response according to Robert J. McKeever and Philip Davis 
―confirmed a familiar pattern: for all re-assertiveness of congresses in recent decades, 
when a major crisis occurs, the president takes the lead and congress follow‖ (2006: 
185). Major national debacles, such as Vietnam and Watergate, or profound shifts in the 
environment, such as the EoCW, led Congress to assert its authorities over AFP. 9/11, 
the WoT and the Iraq war, not only reproduced the domestic consensus over AFP and 
empowered the president, but also deterred Congress from challenging presidential FP 
initiatives (May, 2003b; Melanson, 2005; & Lindsay, 2005b; Wiarda & Skelley, 2006; 
Hamilton, 2006).  
Congress responded to 9/11 by changing its 1990s way of operating. More precisely, 
Congress ―deferred to the president on national security issues to a degree not seen since 
before Vietnam and Watergate‖ (Melanson, 2005: 33). Both Republicans and 
Democrats put aside their political disputes, rallying around the president, and 
supporting his FP initiatives. Most Republican officeholders were hawkish, pursuing 
American primacy in world politics, while the return of the national security agenda to 
the forefront concerns of Americans in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 undermined the 
Democrats‘ resistance to the president‘s military proposals (Brookings, 2002; Lindsay, 
2005b; Singh, 2006). As a result, a blank cheque was given to the president, authorising 
him to use all available and necessary force against the organisers of 9/11. On 14 
September, Congress passed a resolution virtually unopposed that granted Bush 
unlimited war powers. The resolution passed in the lower house with only one vote 
against (420-1), while the Senate passed it 98-0. Republican and Democratic leaders in 
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Congress worked closely with the White House to offer the necessary funds. The two 
houses of Congress also worked harmoniously, a phenomenon rarely seen in 
Washington.  
In contrast to the conventional aphorism that Congress is unable to respond with the 
necessary speed to FP issues, Congress demonstrated decisiveness rather than 
deliberation. Congress changed its traditional legislative process and passed resolutions 
swiftly with little opposition. For example, in October 2001, the USA Patriot Act was 
passed in the Senate 98-1, while in the House the vote was 357-66. Therefore, it can be 
argued that, at certain times, Congress can respond rapidly and effectively. 9/11 also 
changed the daily concerns of Congress from domestic politics to dealing with foreign 
policy issues. Questions of defence and homeland security were permanent subjects, 
whereas the federal budget was put on hold (Teixeira, 2001, Parenti, 2002; Brookings, 
2002 & Lindsay, 2005b, 2005d; Squire, 2005; Melanson, 2005; Phillips, et. al, 2007; 
Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).  
As stated previously, Congress followed the presidential initiatives. It authorised him to 
use military force against terrorism and it also toughened the country‘s anti-terrorism 
rules. In addition, Congress agreed to raise financial support for the wider WoT and 
homeland security (Cox, 2002a; Sloan, 2003 & Melanson, 2005). In contrast to the early 
1990s‘ constraint on military expenditure, defence spending increased dramatically in 
the post-9/11 environment. It increased from US$332 billion in 2002 to approximately 
US$436 billion in 2004, while funds for ―homeland security almost doubled during the 
first three George W. Bush years‖ (Melanson, 2005: 33). In October 2002, Congress 
also provided support to the president over the question of Iraq ―by passing a joint 
resolution authorising the president to use force as he determines to be necessary and 
appropriate in order to defend the national security of the United States against the 
continuing threat posed by Iraq‖ (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008: 18).   
During the three years that followed 9/11, congressional criticism was practically muted 
and its oversight virtually collapsed, particularly between 2000 and 2006. As a result, 
Congress failed to terminate its necessary foreign policy responsibilities (May, 2003b; 
Haydon, et. al, 2003; Fisher, 2003; Covington, 2005; Lindsay, 2005a; 2005d; Daalder & 
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Lindsay, 2005b; Ornstein & Mann, 2006; Howell & Pevehouse, 2007).
1
 Therefore, 
Congress, as some scholars suggest ―had become a rubber stamp for White House 
initiatives‖ (Lindsay, 2005b: 79), which is why ―President Bush retains extraordinary 
institutional advantages over congress‖ (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007: 106).  
4.3.2.3. US Public Concern: From Post-CW Ambivalence To The Post-9/11 Unity  
In contrast to public apathy over AFP in the 1990s, the events of 9/11 brought FP issues 
back to the top of the lists of concerns for the public (Betts, 2005; Lindsay, 2005d; 
Ornstein & Mann, 2006). On 10 September 2001, for instance, the public‘s main 
concern was the US economy: 39% of Americans believed that economic issues were 
the main challenge, while 1% believed that terrorism was the most important. However, 
two days later, around 64% of Americans ranked terrorism as the top challenge to the 
nation compared with 20% who believed economic issues were the most important 
(Melanson, 2005; Lindsay, 2005d & Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008). A poll carried by 
the CCFR in 2002 also found that 36% of Americans believed that terrorism was the 
biggest problem facing the US and FP issues were considered by 41% of respondents to 
be the most important threats to the US (Deibel, 2007). Gallup also found that issues 
such as terrorism, national security, or war were named by two out of three Americans 
as the most crucial problem facing the US in the immediate post-9/11 environment 
(Lindsay, 2005d). This profound shift in the US public mood was the first since the 
CCFR poll was established in 1974. It was also the first time that foreign policy issues 
overrode domestic concerns (Deibel, 2007). The placing of the public‘s importance on 
FP had been reflected previously only in the early stages of Vietnam and Korean Wars 
(Lindsay, 2005d; Mueller, 2008).  
In contrast to the ambivalent American public mood during the 1990s, post 9/11 the 
public mood reflected a shift toward internationalism. In November 2001, for instance, 
                                                          
1
 In consequence, Congresses failed to examine the government‘s policies in the defence and domestic 
security area. Congressional oversight failed to determine if American laws were implemented; if 
government agencies exceeded their constitutional limits; and if American resources were used properly. 
For example, Congress did not scrutinize the functions and performance of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the House‘s Committee of Homeland Security had no control over the DHS‘ budget. 
Moreover, Congress appears to have forgotten its authority in limiting the government‘s action on issues 
such the NSA surveillance of telephone calls or the torture at Abu Ghraib in 2004. Therefore Ornstein and 
Mann (2006) emphasise that since Bush II came to the office congressional oversight dramatically 
declined. In sum, it is fair to suggest that the events of 9/11 returned the control of AFP-making to the 
president. President Bush ―highlighted the magnitude of the task before the nation and so justified his 
leadership role in responding to the attacks‖ (Covington, 2005: 86). 
Leadership Abroad Starts At Home 
185 
 
81% of Americans (the highest number ever) supported the US‘s active role in 
international affairs. A few months later, this percentage had dropped slightly to 71% 
(Lindsay, 2005d; Deibel, 2007; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).
1
 In consequence, ―more 
spending on defence, intelligence gathering, and homeland security‖ was more 
acceptable (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008: 17).  
Polls show that US citizens enthusiastically supported Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 
2002. For example, a Pew Research Centre‘s poll carried in October 2002 found that 
66% of US citizens believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in the attacks of 9/11 
and 79% of the American population believed that ―Iraq possessed or was close to 
possessing, nuclear weapons‖ (Kellner, 2006: 152). However, in a mid-March 2003 
Gallup poll, 88% of the respondents were convinced that Iraq had conspired with al-
Qaeda to attack the US and about 51% believed that Saddam Hussein was personally 
implicated in the attacks of 9/11 (Schlesinger, 2003; Malik, 2003; Dumbrell, 2005). 
Such convictions still existed in 2003. In a news survey conducted by the New York 
Times/CBS, 42% of Americans still believed that Saddam Hussein was directly 
responsible for the attacks of 9/11, while, according to a NBC news poll, 55% of the US 
public were still persuaded by the belief that Saddam Hussein supported al-Qaeda in 
conducting its attack against America in 9/11 (Roy, 2004). In turn, ―three-quarters of 
the American public supported the war‖ because the Bush administration ―successfully 
convinced them that a link existed between Saddam Hussein and terrorism generally, 
and between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda specifically‖ (Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 
525). However, in general, the public‘s support for the Iraq War declined when its 
moral justifications had dissipated: there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
and the claim that Iraq had links with Al-Qaeda had collapsed.  
5.3.2.4. The Role Of Media and public discourse  
Such a public mood would be expected, particularly at such an important historical 
point. However, what is not in doubt is that, through extensive political coverage, the 
                                                          
1
 By 9/11, the defeatist experience of the Vietnam War was successfully and finally pushed into the past: 
―The images of commercial airliners slamming into the World Trade Centre have replaced the memory of 
US soldiers stuck in the mire of Vietnam‖. These images had ―dramatically altered public thinking about 
national security and the need to sacrifice American lives overseas‖. This new change led to the idea that 
the US had to act pre-emptively ―to deal with threats before they manifested on American soil—a threat 
Bush referred to when justifying the invasion on Iraq‖ (McCarthy, 2006). 
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media led the public to give a green light to the Bush administration to activate its 
unilateralist and hegemonic plans. Therefore, it would be reasonable to say that the 
public‘s large support for the post-9/11 controversial FP, especially the Iraq invasion, 
was in large degree because of the lack of information, if not the manipulation or 
misleading nature of it (Schlesinger, 2003). Typically, when discussion occurred 
between elites, particularly from the opposition, about FP, media will convey this 
debate to the public. However, if such a debate ―is muted on nonexistent, a one-sided 
information flow emerges, even if citizens or foreign critics hold other viewpoints‖ 
(Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 526).  
The success of the Bush administration in rallying the nation around its WoT was in 
part due to ―the power of the pro-government think tanks and also to the difficulty that 
the opposition had in accessing the mainstream media‖ (Benn, 2007: 970). The 
mainstream media therefore followed the narrative of the administration‘s WoT, while it 
largely ignored the strong and thoughtful speeches of Democratic Senators, Edward M. 
Kennedy of Massachusetts and Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, who were strongly 
opposed to the US quick rush to war. William Powers wrote in March 2003: ―turn on 
CNN one recent Sunday, and you could catch Bianca Jagger earnestly debating actor 
Ron Silver on the merits of war‖ against Iraq (cited in Dumbrell, 2005: 35, 36). In this 
context,  needless to say, conservative media such as ―Fox TV and other US cable 
networks play stories of Iraqi arms programs and their threat to the United States and its 
allies all day to beat the war drums‖ (Kellner, 2006: 152). Islamophobia was the most 
important instrument to rally public around the new American mission: war against 
evil.
1
 Mass media supported the administration‘s agenda by an unprecedented 
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 The Islam-terrorism linkage was a very common circulating idea in-and-outside the administration at the 
time. Kenneth Adelman – from the Pentagon‘s Defence Policy board staff – and Paul Weyrich, who was 
very influential in the White House for instance, found it very hard to see Islam as a peaceful religion. In 
difference to Jesus, who was a peace promoter, Mohammed, the Islamic founder was a worrier according 
to Kenneth Adelman. Paul Weyrich went on to deny the Administration‘s separation between the Islam 
and terrorism. Jerry Falwell, frankly declared that Mohamed was a terrorist. Franklin Graham, also 
described the Islam as an evil and violence backer religion. John Ashcroft, the Attorney General at the 
time, also said that the Islam is a faith that advocates violence and death. The most obvious difference 
between Islam and Christianity as he argued is that in the Christianity God sent his Son to die for the 
humankind while in Islam God demands people to send their sons to sacrifice their own lives for him 
(Malik, 2003). This tone has also been found in the Bush‘s (2002) speech when he said ―our enemies send 
other people's children on missions of suicide and murder … We stand for a different choice … We 
choose freedom and the dignity of every life.‖ Daniel Pipes, the famous analyst was also a hyper-
supporter to the ―Islamophobia‖ and he saw the Islamic threat as a counterpart to the Fascism and 
Communism (Malik, 2003). It could also be argued that this kind of views was not separated from the 
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exploitative use of the politics of fear. By buffering such a politics and exaggerating the 
threat‘s nature, solid domestic unity and national sacrifice that are required in such 
junctures will be available (McKeever & Davis, 2006: 185). A deliberated strategy of 
fear and tension, in fact, allows the US government terminating its project of hegemony 
without being resisted or questioned (Ganser, 2007). After 9/11, one scholar observed 
that (Jackson, 2005: 1): 
The public language of American government has been used to construct a 
whole new world for its citizens. Through a carefully constructed public 
discourse officials have created a new social reality where terrorism threatens to 
destroy everything that ordinary people hold – their lives, their democracy, their 
freedom, their way of life, their civilisation.
1
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the exaggerated image framed by the media and 
governmental discourse was dominant among the US public to a degree that led Mark 
Bowden to say that ―housewives in Iowa...watching TV [were] afraid that al-Qaeda's 
going to charge in their front door‖ (Mueller, 2005: 26). 
After all, the influence of the 9/11 frame as an ‗existential threat‘ to the US, and the role 
of media as fear buffer were quite obvious in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion.   
4.3.2.4. AFP Institutions, Bureaucrats, And US Hegemonic Agenda After 9/11    
In sharp contrast to what has been said regarding the post-CW unprecedented 
fragmentation within and between AFP organizations because of the absence of any 
external threat to the US, the struggle against global terrorism since the attacks of 9/11 
renewed the consistency and increased the power of the institutions associated with 
AFP (Daadler & Destler, 2004). On the security front, 9/11 and the WoT led to the 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (Cox, 2002a). This was created 
to ―bring about central operational coordination and to put an end to overlapping duties‖ 
                                                                                                                                                                          
government‘s agenda. It could be understood from President Bush‘s (2002) declaration that ―we seek a 
just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror‖. 
1
 In this way, official statements and government policy that made by the Bush administration and the 
Homeland Security Office heightened public‘s fear by recommending ―the American people to buy duct 
tape and plastic sheeting as a barrier to terrorism. This advisory had little to do with ―chemical 
protection‖ and much to do with the politics of fear‖ (Altheide, 2003: 38). Furthermore, there was also 
―dramatic change in homeland security and transportation policy that directly affected hundreds of 
thousands of Americans.‖ The US also issued ―a serious of yellow and orange warnings of terrorist 
dangers –which have not materialised‖ (Kern et al, 2003: 283). Politics of fear essentially depended not 
only on the exaggeration of the terrorist‘s conventional power, but also exceeded to include the fear of 
(WMD). 
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(Jackson, 2005: 15). The passage of the USA Patriot Act in the immediacy of 9/11 gave 
the US government unlimited new powers that empowered US bureaucracy in the 
expense of other political bodies. New legal authority was also given to the FBI to arrest 
alleged terrorists (Jackson, 2005).  
Again, in contrast to the 1990s, in which geo-economic, environmental and other issues 
rivalled security concerns in AFP institutions, 9/11 returned security issues and geo-
politics as the main focus of AFP and security organisations (Wiarada & Skelley, 2006). 
However, the post-9/11 political environment enhanced the longstanding rivalry 
between Defence and State departments. The movement towards the WoT, including 
the Iraq war, gave the DOD extra power in framing the AFP agenda at the expense of 
the DOS. The cabinet divisions between Dick Cheney/Donald Rumsfeld and Colin 
Powell/Condoleezza Rice can be seen as part of this institutional competition (Cameron, 
2002); however, importantly, this did not affect the political consistency of the 
governmental institutions and its strategy to respond to 9/11.  
If ―continuity of staff almost always means continuity of policy‖ (Frum & Perle, 2004: 
188), it is plausible to argue that there has been a basic continuity of national strategy 
since the mid-20
th
 century (Gowan, 2002; Halper & Clarke, 2004; McMurtry, 2007). On 
the basis of this view, it can be argued that most of President George W. Bush‘s foreign 
and security team not only served together for dozens of years, but also shared common 
beliefs and ideologies and possessed extraordinary close relationships. For instance, 
Cheney and Rumsfeld worked together for more than three decades. During the Nixon 
administration, Rumsfeld worked as a Director to the United States Office of Economic 
Opportunity and Cheney was an administrative assistant under his leadership. Powell 
also served for three years as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Defense 
Secretary Cheney during the George H. W. Bush administration. Richard Armitage, 
appointed Deputy Secretary of State in March 2001, worked with Powell in the 
Pentagon during the Reagan administration. In a similar way, Armitage and Paul 
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense 2001-2005, worked together when they were 
responsible for US-Asia relations in the Reagan administration. Wolfowitz also worked 
under the chief of Richard Pipes in the Team B committee, established during the Ford 
administration to reassess the CIA‘s raw data regarding the USSR. Moreover, 
Wolfowtiz had worked as a top aide to Cheney in the Pentagon during the 1990s. Lewis 
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Scooter Libby, who worked as Chief of Staff to Vice-President Cheney, was an 
undergraduate of Wolfowtiz at Yale University and then worked as his assistant during 
the Reagan and first Bush administrations (Moens, 2004; Mann, 2004). Owing to their 
closer relationship, some called Libby 'Wolfowitz‘s Wolfowitz‖ (Moens, 2004: 31). The 
roots of the Bush-Rice relationship can be traced back to before the Bush I presidency 
(Moens, 2004; Mann, 2004). Cliffe and Ramsay point out that ―the group around Vice-
President Cheney, Defence Secretary Rumsfeld and his Deputy, Paul Wolfowtiz, plus 
Richard Perle have been involved in articulating quite explicitly a coherent, aggressive 
strategy for the USA for many years‖ (2003: 353).  
In order to pursue American hegemony, it would be argued that both Wolfowitz and 
Libby, the main authors of the Pentagon‘s offensive strategy in the early 1990s and 
promoters of the invasion of Iraq, returned to office following the 2000 election 
(Gowan, 2002; Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003). On the other hand, Cheney ―offered something 
Bush lacked: an intimate knowledge of how the executive and legislative branches in 
Washington work‖ (Moens, 2004: 31). 
Overall, Lindsay argues that the ―main beneficiary of the change in politics of US 
foreign policy [after 9/11] was the White House, not Congress‖ (2005d: 53). As he 
suggests, the reason for this was two-fold: the US public was not ―split on what the 
government should do in response to the terrorist attacks … and congressional 
Democrats, who would normally have the greatest political incentive to criticize a 
Republican president, lacked the ability to do so‖ (Lindsay, 2005d: 53). Therefore, a 
very unusual political landscape was established. On the one hand, as well as 
congressional criticism of the president‘s FP became muted after 9/11, public 
enthusiasm for his FP initiatives became blossomed (Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008). 
On the other hand, with the US public ―firmly behind the president, members of 
congress who might have preferred to be elsewhere on policy grounds, quickly decided 
they had to be there as well‖ (Lindsay, 2005d: 53). Moreover, the influence of several 
interest groups over AFP, which had strengthened in the 1990s, was sharply eroded 
post-9/11 (Lindsay, 2005d; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2008).
1
 Therefore, 9/11, the WoT 
                                                          
1
 However, some interest groups maintained their political influence after 9/11. According to Mearshiemer & Waltz 
(2006), one of these groups was AIPAC and its influence over the Bush administration‘s decision to go to Iraq was 
observable. Similarly, the Project for the New American Century‘s (PNAC) proposal of ―Rebuilding America‘s 
Defence‖ in 2000 called for increasing the Pentagon budget to equal 3.8% of GNP. When Bush took office, the 
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and the nation‘s rally around his leadership gave President Bush a unique opportunity to 
pass any political agenda he or his FP team preferred without fear of being resisted.  
Accordingly, in contrast to the 1990s, in which a US hegemonic agenda was pursued 
under very difficult political circumstances, 9/11 provided an opportunity to promote 
America‘s post-CW hegemonic agenda, owing to a combination of political 
circumstances, both inside and outside American government. First, there was a team of 
Republicans who believed in remaking world order occupying key positions in the 
executive branch. These can be identified as American nationalists or traditional 
conservatives (Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and Powell) or neo-conservatives and 
democrat imperialists (Wolfowitz, Libby, Perle and Abrams). Second, 9/11 itself 
offered a political environment that allowed any agenda to be put into practice (Singh, 
2006). 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter‘s aim is to bridge the gap between the 1990s and the post-9/11 period. In 
contrast to those who argue that AFP suffered from a strategic blindness and confusion 
during the 1990s, this chapter shows that AFP represented continuity rather than 
change, in order to consolidate its global leadership and hegemony. However, it was 
influenced by the EoCW. By closely assessing AFP during the 1990s, the chapter 
reveals the causes that hindered the state from implementing its agenda. This chapter 
argues that the EoCW affected AFP performance, but the problem was not a lack of 
strategic plans or strategic short-sightedness. It was an unprecedented interplay between 
domestic and foreign policy, in which Congress no longer blindly followed the 
presidential leadership in the FP and security domain. Congress started challenging the 
president and blocking his initiatives during the decade. Congress also showed 
inconsistent behaviour and was open to the influence of different interest groups. The 
conflict between the president and Congress was also seen within the AFP institutions. 
The AFP machinery was not reformed to deal with the new international environment, 
but still operated as it did during the CW. The rivalry between bureaucrats and policy-
makers also intensified and the competition within and between institutions over FP 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Defence budget was increased to US$379 billion (3.8% of American GNP). PNAC also demanded permanent 
American military bases in Iraq. Rice told congress that US intervention in the region is a matter of ―generational 
commitment‖ (George, 2007). 
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authority increased. The external enemy that had united such huge organisations 
dissipated with the EoCW, and the Congress‘s failure to reform those institutions 
clearly confused the direction of AFP.      
The EoCW and the collapse of the external enemy also fragmented AFP‘s domestic 
context, as several societal sources of AFP changed. For instance, the US public 
automatically followed the US presidential leadership in the pre-Vietnam era and, even 
with the emerging influence of the Vietnam debacle in the 1970s and 1980s, AFP had 
stayed controlled by US presidents and the public showed reasonable support for their 
initiatives. However, since the EoCW US public opinion was no longer virtually 
monolithic towards AFP. While it supported an activist role abroad, and a contribution 
to the UN‘s humanitarian missions, it simultaneously showed great sensitivity to the 
price that America paid. In this way, the public encouraged the intervention in Somalia 
but then pressurized policy-makers to withdraw after the deaths of some US soldiers. In 
addition, it accepted the US intervention in Bosnia, but rejected the deployment of US 
ground troops there. Such conflicting attitudes tied Clinton‘s hand when dealing with 
issues such as the Bosnia crisis and the Kosovo crisis. 
There was also the issue of the growing influence of interest groups (business and 
ethnic). While the unanimity of the CW limited the influence of such groups, the EoCW 
changed the status quo and gave an extra influence to these groups. Because of this, the 
1990s showed unprecedented domesticization of AFP. For the first time, AFP was 
influenced by the agenda of these groups. Such intervention, coupled with other societal 
and governmental divisions, confused the AFP strategy, because it limited the ability of 
policy-makers to formulate a fully-fledged strategy.  
The same was not true after 9/11, with the re-appearance of an external enemy. The 
attacks on the Twin Towers brought an end to the domestic divisions and reasserted the 
presidential leadership in foreign and security policy, allowing President George W. 
Bush to drive AFP strategy without opposition. After more than a decade of presidential 
effort to put the US hegemonic agenda into practice, the terrorist attacks allowed Bush 
to succeed in doing so without facing resistance. The congress, US public, AFP 
institutions, and the media followed his agenda and showed unprecedented support. 
9/11, therefore, overcame AFP‘s domestic fragmentation that had previously 
undermined American performance in international affairs. 
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It would be fair to remember here what was argued in the first chapter. George W. Bush 
was not a strategy designer, and his political skills were no better than those of his 
father, (George H. W. Bush), or his predecessor, President Clinton. Therefore, why did 
he succeed in leading the state towards a hegemony format at a time of several other 
difficulties? The reason was 9/11, or, more accurately, because 9/11 united the domestic 
context of AFP around a new mission, the WoT. In this context, President Bush‘s 
strategy was not unprecedented, as many have argued, and its steps were available since 
the foundations were laid in the early 1990s. 9/11 and US domestic bipartisanship 
allowed him to implement them, whereas the collapse of the USSR and the US domestic 
fragmentation undermined his predecessors‘ attempts. In the next chapter, the objective 
is to show that 9/11 and WoT did not initiate a new course in AFP conduct, but were a 
continuity of the old agenda.       
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It is the US government that is manipulating the September 11 events to enforce its own political agenda. 
What has changed in the past months is not the world but the political tenor of the US itself. Just think, 
for example, where Bush would have been without September 11?. 
(Zizek, 2002) 
 
[A new phase of American aggressive hegemony] merely made acceptable by 9/11, not made by 9/11 
itself. 
(Parmar, 2005: 1) 
 
Just as the struggle against communism led … to an expansion of American influence after 1947, the war 
against the new global enemy known as terrorism helped extend American power after 11 September. 
(Cox, 2002a: 272) 
 
Chapter Five 
9/11, The War On Terror And The Continuation Of US Global 
Hegemony Strategy 
5.1. Introduction 
As Layne argues, ―US hegemony is the bridge connecting the pre-September 11 world 
to the post-September 11 world‖ (2002: 233). As explained in the last chapter, 
America‘s attempts to establish hegemony and supremacy did not stop in the 1990s, but 
the efforts of the US administrations to establish a new hegemonic world order were 
constrained by domestic political divisions. However, since 9/11 this impediment was 
removed and terrorism remedied the long-standing threat deficit that AFP suffered from 
the end of the Cold War (EoCW) to 9/11. The attacks of 9/11 gave the pretext to US 
policy-makers to legitimate and realise their hegemonic agenda. Thus, 9/11 was the 
bridge linking pre-and post-9/11 America. In contrast to the environment of the 1990s, 
America was now able to carry out its hegemonic agenda without fear of domestic or 
international opposition. The nature of the terrorist attack was deliberately changed to a 
‗war on America‘, and was also massively exaggerated to serve the US hegemonic 
strategy in the post-Cold War (CW) era.  
Based on this epistemological foundation, this chapter contradicts three sets of 
American foreign policy (AFP) literature. The first set argues that 9/11 changed 
everything including AFP strategy. The second set describes the Bush doctrine as a 
revolutionary change in AFP conduct, and the third set understands the US response to 
9/11 merely as a global war on terror (WoT). However, this chapter argues that 9/11 
changed nothing and its aftermath demonstrates continuity rather discontinuity in 
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America‘s post-CW hegemonic strategy. Post 9/11 policy is seen as a new phase in a 
long chain of struggle to expand American hegemony worldwide. To evaluate this 
argument, this chapter, following the same technique used in the third chapter, aims to 
put the terrorist attacks and the US response, the WoT, in its fullest theoretical and geo-
strategic context. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first highlights the continuity 
of AFP strategy in pre-and post-9/11; and the second puts the WoT in a wider geo-
political context to establish its hidden agenda. 
5.2. 9/11: The Day That Changed America? 
As previously stated, a large body of AFP literature deals with 9/11 and its aftermath as 
a turning point in AFP‘s post-WWII strategic trajectory. This contradicts with the 
current study‘s main argument that America has not experienced a break in its FP 
strategy of hegemony from the mid-1940s until the fall of Baghdad in early April 2003. 
Therefore, it is important that 9/11 and the US reaction to it is not be seen as a separate 
AFP historical geo-political struggle. The subsequent sections will cast more light on 
these issues.  
5.2.1. The Exaggeration: 9/11 As An Existential Threat And The WoT As The 
Only Possible Response 
Since terrorism is not an unprecedented political tool (Nye, 2003), the attacks of 9/11 
have been seen as ―the worst not the first‖ (May, 2003b: 38). Accordingly, it is 
unsurprising that the terrorist attacks have been classified as criminal acts ―under the 
ordinary criminal law of the United States‖ (Greenwood, 2002: 302) as well as under 
international law. However, the Bush administration and its supporters tended to portray 
the attacks as unparalleled in world history; this was reflected and made fashionable in 
the immediate post-9/11 discourse which posits that 9/11 changed everything (Layne, 
2002; Brunn, 2004). Condoleezza Rice (2002), for instance, describes 9/11 as an 
existential threat greater than any challenge the state had faced during the CW or before, 
and Secretary of State Colin Powell argues that after 9/11 ―not only is the Cold War 
over, the post-Cold War period is also over‖ (cited in Litwak, 2002: 76).  
In a speech to Congress on 20 September 2001 that has been seen by some as the ―most 
important statement of American grand strategy since President Harry Truman‘s Greece 
and Turkey speech of 12 March 1947‖ (Ikenberry, 2001b: 19), President Bush II framed 
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9/11 as an ―act of war against‖ the US committed by ―enemies of freedom‖ (Bush, 
2001a emphasis added). The US response to these acts was also framed as a ―war on 
global terror‖ not only for self defence, but also to protect and sustain global liberty and 
freedom (Hume, 2001; May, 2003b; Ryan, 2004; Covington, 2005; McKeever & Davis, 
2006; Owens & Dumbrell, 2006; Simpson, 2006; Maggio, 2007; Boyle, 2008). Since 
then, the ‗war on terror‘ has become ―the most often used term‖ (Record, 2003: 1). 
According to Alejandro Colás & Richard Saull, ―the naturalisation of the war on terror 
as the only possible response to 9/11 was an initial achievement of the Bush 
administration and its allies in congress, the mainstream media and civil society‖ (2006: 
5). The description of the terrorists as evil and the strike against America as an attack on 
freedom justified the US response as a ‗good war‘ or a ‗just war‘; such terminology is 
comparable to that used in the struggle against Nazism during WWII (Kellner, 2003; 
Watson, 2003; McCartney, 2004; Boggs, 2006; McKeever & Davis, 2006; Jackson, 
2007). Therefore, the WoT as a ‗good war‘ was not for revenge or punishment but to 
defend freedom and democracy that were under attack and to create a new world 
without evil (Watson, 2003; McKeever & Davis, 2006). President Bush II in his speech 
to Congress said: ―Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend 
freedom‖ (2001a).  
The Bush administration intentionally drew upon the experience of Pearl Harbour, the 
CW, and the War of Independence to help create the ―frame of acceptance‖ (Kern et al, 
2003:) that was needed to persuade Americans and prepare them to accept and support 
the military reaction to 9/11. Amongst these events, Pearl Harbour was the most used 
reference point to contextualise 9/11 (for example, see McCartney, 2004; Jackson, 
2005; Simpson, 2006; Ryan, 2007). However, according to some scholars, such as 
Gaddis (2004) these attacks cannot be easily compared because ―the cases are [not] 
similar enough across variables‖ (Schaefer, 2003: 94).1 Nevertheless, what is important 
                                                          
1
 It is true that both attacks were sudden and achieved total surprise because of the failure of US agencies 
in predicting such aggressive plans. Moreover, both attacks employed ―familiar technologies in 
unfamiliar ways: the Japanese by launching fighter-bombers from aircraft carriers; the terrorists by 
turning civilian airlines into cruise missiles‖ (Gaddis, 2004: 35). The attackers also targeted American 
soil and produced multiple causalities, which led to an immediate declaration of war. However, there are 
crucial differences between the two attacks. 9/11 was an attack carried out by a terrorist group whereas 
the attack on Pearl Harbour was conducted by a sovereign state that was a great power at the time. Also, 
while 9/11 attacks targeted innocent civilians and cities, the Pearl Harbour‘s target was a military and 
naval base (May, 2003b; Gaddis, 2004; Owens & Dumbrell, 2006). 
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is that the Bush administration had selectively derived its stance from history. These 
moves were merely intended to prepare the US public for the next step: the long war 
against terror.
1
 In sum, the US exaggerated the nature of the terrorist attacks and the 
media immediately picked up the ‗war metaphor‘ and sold 9/11 as a war on America 
(Kellner, 2003). Such an adaptation of the reality could lead one to reasonably ask: were 
the attacks of 9/11 really a devastating war on America that changed everything? 
5.2.2. The Reality: Nothing Changed 
In contrast to the above discussion, scholars such as Goh (2002), Saravanamuttu (2006), 
Chollet (2007, 2008) and Goldgeier and Chollet (2008) argue that nothing profound 
changed in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. In sharp contrast to the EoCW, the 
terrorist attacks did not ―produce structural change, which is to say a fundamental 
change in the relationship between the units of the international system‖ (Crockatt, 
2007: 129). The US, according to Mick Hume, was not under attack from an adversarial 
power ―seeking to defeat it on the global stage‖. The strikes of 9/11 ―did not move the 
centre of world power one inch away from Washington‖ (2001). However, according to 
David Skidmore (2005), the change in the US‘s unilateral and hegemonic FP post-9/11 
was not only due to the neo-conservatives‘ (neo-cons) influence over President George 
W. Bush, but also due to the structural effects of the EoCW at home and abroad. In fact, 
in addition to the demise of the USSR that left America as the unipolar power, the 
institutional bargaining that once steered the relations between America and its closest 
allies was also undermined by the disappearance of the Soviet challenge. As a result, the 
US disengaged itself from the CW‘s multi-lateral constraints (Skidmore, 2005). In 
reality, the EoCW freed the US from such restrictions as discussed in the first chapter, 
and gave it room to manoeuvre and impose its will (Waltz, 1999; Ikenberry, 2001c; 
McCarthy, 2007; Brzezinski, 2008). Ikenberry explains this advantage when he argues 
―for the first time in the modern era, the world‘s most powerful state can operate on the 
global stage without the counterbalancing constraints of other great powers‖ (2004b: 
609). This transformation, as stated in the second chapter, gave the US an overdose of 
                                                          
1
 According to David Simpson (2006), no one used the Hiroshima or Nagasaki destruction, for example, 
as a reference point to describe the destruction in Lower Manhattan. And, in terms of mass death, no one 
compared the 3,000 innocent civilian victims who were killed in a few hours with a quarter million 
innocent people also killed in minutes when the US dropped two atomic bombs on Japan and targeted 
civilian cities (Pauly & Landsfor, 2005). These examples show that the US intended to politically utilise 
9/11 to frame public knowledge and advance another set of objectives. 
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confidence and energized its hegemonic ambition at the turn of the new millennium 
(Crawford, 2005; Chollet, 2007).   
However, it is not entirely true that the post-9/11 world affairs have witnessed deep 
changes that ―no one could have foreseen‖ (Rockmore & Margolis, 2005: 3). As 
Cakmak argues, post-9/11 US policy ―is only a slightly new version of the former 
American foreign policy‖ (2003: 5). This is because ―whatever the new shape of 
American foreign policy, the basic characteristics of American politics will 
continuously affect the whole output. Political decisions are set so as to obtain the 
maximum benefit and satisfaction‖ to the US (Cakmak, 2003: 5). On the basis of such 
analysis, 9/11 only focused public and world attention on the traditional concerns that 
have guided AFP throughout its history (Bose, 2002; Wittkopf & McCormick, 2004). 
The attack did not initiate a new course of militarism or imperialism within AFP, but 
those characteristics have been present since the nation‘s inception; the only thing that 
changed after 9/11 was the nakedness of those features (Foster, 2005). In this context, 
Robert Kagan in Of Paradise and Power put it succinctly: ―America did not change on 
September 11, it only became more itself‖ (cited in Harries, 2005: 229).  
In this context, critics, such as Allen (2003), Cox (2002a), Daalder and Lindsay 
(2005a), and Wedeman and McMahon (2006), argue that America‘s post-9/11 reaction 
is no more than a re-ranking of the priorities of its FP strategy in which the WoT 
doctrine was given priority instead of the 1990s rhetoric of new world order (NWO) and 
globalisation. However, this discussion does not mean that 9/11 did not affect the geo-
political status quo. Rather, it ―had a profound impact for the geo-political restructuring 
of the world. The United States asserted its hegemony, declared the existence of an ‗axis 
of evil‘ and set out to combat terror throughout the world‖ (Brunn, 2004: 307). It was 
for this reason that the US claimed that 9/11 changed everything and exaggerated its 
nature to that of an existential threat. This phenomenon was similar to that adopted 
during the CW period when the US deliberately magnified the danger of the USSR in 
order to increase its military spending, rally domestic public opinion and preserve its 
hegemony over its allies and elsewhere (Vasquez, 1985; Larison, 1998; Farrell, 2000; 
Borosage, 2000). In brief, if it is true that nothing changed in the morning of 9/11, why, 
and for what reasons, did the US policymakers intentionally exaggerate the nature of 
these terrorist attacks?  
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5.2.3. The Exploitation: 9/11 As A Pretext To Legitimate US Hegemony 
It is important to study the PNAC‘s document which admitted that without a 
―catastrophic and catalyzing event-like a new Pearl Harbour‖ (2000: 51), a clear 
hegemonic change in American foreign and defence policy might not be possible. 
Accordingly, 9/11 was the catalytic event, missing since the EoCW, needed to push 
America towards a unilateral phase of hegemony. Thus, President Bush II used a 
metaphor of war and located 9/11 within well known historical events ―for practical 
political reasons: to rally the public; to gain support for appropriations without regard 
for the reality the word is supposed to reflect‖ (Bobbitt, 2008: 174). For these reasons, 
the fear of terrorism, as it had appeared after 9/11 was ―powerfully fuelled by creative 
alarmists and the terrorism industry‖ (Benn, 2007: 971). Since then, and along the 
following years, fears shaped policy (Leffler, 2003). 
In turn, if 9/11 changed the world because it was an unparalleled attack, the US 
response was an unprecedented global war. In this context, the WoT is considered to be 
a global war against an unspecified enemy extended ―over an indefinite time frame‖ 
(Parenti, 2002: 2). Such a description has been drawn by the President himself. Bush II 
declared that ―our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated‖ (2001a). The National Security Strategy (NNS) of 2002 also asserted that ―the 
war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration‖ (White 
House, 2002: 4). The WoT, as Bush II reaffirmed ―is not over, yet it is not endless. We 
do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide‖ (2003b).1 
This type of war was needed to expand Pax-Americana to every corner of the world, 
which is why critics, such as George Soros, were surprised: ―how could a single event 
… have such a far-reaching effects?‖ (2004: 2).  
                                                          
1
 It is important to stress that President Bush‘s term the ‗good war‘ did not emerge as a response to 9/11 
but during his election campaign in 1999 when he ―consistently referenced World War II not simply to 
justify his own policy aims, but more importantly as a cultural project as well as an ongoing gesture of 
self-making‖ (Noon, 2004: 340). As a consequence, 9/11 consolidated and backed his already formed 
agenda and, by framing 9/11 in this way, he pushed the nation towards the New American Century. In 
coincidence, with such conviction, George W. Bush‘s ―language and metaphors conjured up those of his 
Cold War predecessors as he sought to prepare the nation for another long, twilight struggle‖ (Melanson, 
2005: 42). 
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However, Cox offers a reasonable approach to this matter when he said that ―every 
crisis represents an opportunity as well as a challenge, and how the United States 
responded to this particular challenge was going to be crucial‖ (2002a: 271). In this 
way, Halper & Clark are not convinced that the 9/11 attacks required a ―decisive and 
sustained response‖ (2004: 4). They argue that the US response was in fact ―grounded 
in an ideology that existed well before the terror attacks and that in a stroke of 
opportunistic daring by its progenitor, [it] has emerged as the new orthodoxy‖ (2004: 4). 
This analysis can be linked to the previous chapters‘ discussion that the American 
unilateralist and hegemonic tendency was consistent from the CW period (Pfaff, 2001; 
Bose, 2002; Bremmer, 2002; Ali, 2003; Brunn, 2004; Parmar, 2005; Western, 2006; 
Griffin, 2007). In this context, after the ―US intervention in Kosovo that crystallized 
fears of US hegemony … if any doubt remained that US hegemony would trigger a 
nasty geopolitical ‗blowback‘, it surely was erased on September 11‖ (Layne, 2002: 
240).  
Equally, if not more important, Gowan argues that 9/11 was evidently ―just the kind of 
shock needed to pull the American people around to a new dose of militarism‖ (2007: 
8). In this context, the attack ―reinforced US credibility, power projection, and military 
involvement abroad‖ (Goh, 2002: 1). As a result, according to Chalmers A. Johnson, 
political leaders ―began to see our Republic as a genuine empire, a new Rome, the 
greatest colossus in history, no longer bound by international law, the concerns of allies, 
or any constraints on its use of military force‖ (2004: 3). In this way, the NSS of 2002, 
for instance clearly states that 11 September 2001 ―opened vast, new opportunities‖ 
(cited in Griffin, 2007: 13). President Bush II declared that ―we‘ve been offered a 
unique opportunity, and we must not let this moment pass‖ (2002). Therefore, as 
Gowan argues, ―9/11 gave the US an opportunity in the field of grand strategy‖ (2006: 
132). It was an opportunity to reorganise American priorities and remedy the domestic 
divisions that affected FP-making process prior to 9/11 (Wittkopf et al, 2003).  
Therefore, building on the discussion in previous chapters, the already present 
hegemonic and unilateralist foreign agendas gained both moral justification and 
political encouragement from the events of 9/11 (Kellner, 2003; Cakmak, 2003). In this 
context, Carl Boggs argues that 9/11 ―has given new impetus, and to some degree new 
legitimacy, to the US long-standing pursuit of global dominance‖ (2005). Thus, the 
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terrorist event was exploited ―to provide the justification, the fear, and the funding for 
the so-called war on terror, which would be used as a pretext for enlarging the US 
hegemony in the post Soviet era‖ (Griffin, 2007: 15). US policymakers saw 9/11 ―not 
merely as a disaster to be avenged, but an opportunity to reawaken America and redirect 
it to its historical mission‖ (Harries, 2005: 229). On the basis of such analysis, 9/11 
triggered, accelerated and legitimated, but did not originate, assertive foreign policy 
(Parmar, 2005).
1
 Accordingly, Neack argues ―just as the terrorists seem to have 
rewritten global politics, the lone superpower is also rewriting its interests and 
behaviour in this new world order‖ (2003: 153). America would not let such an 
opportunity go. The US response to 9/11 was massive, dramatic and unpredictable. Not 
only militarily in which two countries were invaded, but also politically when a 
hegemonic language and unilateral set of thinking and tactics were also applied (Colás 
& Saull, 2006; Fukuyama, 2006a; Kennedy-Pipe & Rengger, 2006). Therefore, it can be 
argued that the missing element in the 1990s to justify the US‘ post-CW agenda was 
found on the morning of 11 September 2001 and just as Pearl Harbour offered the US 
an opportunity to move into an internationalist FP phase, 9/11 provided policy-makers 
with the pretext to put the unilateralist and hegemonic FP agenda into practice (Parmar, 
2005; Gordon, 2007; Griffin, 2007).  
In summary, it is true that the unipolar moment was initiated in the early 1990s when 
the USSR collapsed, but ―the materialisation of US hegemony was only partial until 
9/11‖ (Miller, 2007: 248). After 9/11, US hegemony ―reached its zenith‖ (Cox, 2007: 
648), and served US unilateralist and hegemonic agenda that was formulated long 
before the terrorist attacks. 
                                                          
1
 In this regard, it is of crucial importance to go back to the early hours after 9/11 when the President and 
his closest assistants expressed their intention to take this opportunity to remake the world in line with 
American interests and values (Soros, 2004; Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; De Zoysa, 2005; Ondaatje, 
2006). Bob Woodward, among others, argues that the first 36 hours after 9/11 demonstrated that the US 
administration intended to use the attacks to advance American global agenda of the post-CW world. In a 
cabinet meeting held on 14 September 2001, Bush and Powell argued that the attacks were an opportunity 
to restructure world affairs. Bush also believed that strikes will ―strengthen America‖. Condoleezza Rice, 
the National Security Advisor (NSA) at the time, said, just few days after the attacks, that 9/11 was an 
opportunity for creating opportunities for the US to change world politics. Donald Rumsfeld shared the 
same idea that 9/11 offered the US a chance to restructure the world just as WWII done. Dick Cheney, on 
12 September 2001wnated to targeting the terrorists as well as any states sponsoring them (Gowan, 2002; 
Lechelt, 2003; Lemann, 2002; Parenti, 2002; Malik, 2003; Dumbrell, 2005; Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; 
Melanson, 2005; Gowan, 2006; Griffin, 2007). For this reason, President George W. Bush, just nine days 
after the attacks declared that America‘s war on terror would not be stopped until every terrorist and state-
sponsored terrorism was defeated (Lynch & Singh, 2008). 
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5.2.4. The Bush II Strategy: Continuity Or Change? 
If 9/11 changed nothing and AFP represented the same agenda, is it possible to divorce 
Bush II‘s policy from his predecessor‘s? According to Desmond King, the Bush 
Doctrine ―is not inconsistent with an increased emphasis, since 1989, on the pursuit of 
self-interest (both security and economic) presented concurrently with a defence of 
human rights and promotion of democracy‖ (2006: 166-67). Similarly, Walden Bello 
argues that scholars and politicians who ―exaggerate the break between Bush and his 
predecessors‖ have failed to ―acknowledge that many of Bush‘s initiatives found 
precedents in the actions of earlier presidents including Clinton‖ (2005: 15). In fact, 
Clinton‘s enlargement and engagement (En-En) strategy and Bush II‘s strategy are 
similar in that: (Posen, 2007: 563): 
The United States faces no peer competitor and that it is difficult, for many 
reasons, for the other consequential powers to coordinate a coalition to truly 
‗balance‘ American power—especially American military power. Both 
strategies are committed to maintaining this preeminent power position for as 
long as possible.  
Therefore, as David N. Gibbs (2006: 28) states, 
While there is little doubt that the Bush administration was deeply shocked by 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there can be equally little doubt that 
the attacks were manipulatively used to justify a massive expansion of US 
power in the Middle East/Central Asia region, combined with an augmentation 
in the military budget. And in addition, there have been numerous sub-pretexts, 
which have followed the attacks, and have further served to justify policy.  
On the basis of such analysis, Daalder and Lindsay argue that the US response to 9/11 
―did more to reaffirm Bush‘s view of the world than to transform it‖ (2005a: 78). 
Likewise, May contends that 9/11 did not bring about crucial change but ―enabled the 
Bush administration to pursue, with less opposition and greater violence, policies that 
might otherwise have appeared too aggressive‖ (2003a: 18). The diplomatic historian 
Marilyn Young, in the same vein, says that 9/11 became ―a site for reinforcing a 
preexisting US unilateralism‖ (cited in Dudziak, 2003: 3). Accordingly, Bush‘s famous 
reference to the axis of evil in early 2002 ―rhetorically lumped together the separate 
challenges posed by North Korea to the stability of Northeast Asia, by Iran‘s longer-
range ambitions in the Persian Gulf region, and by the unfinished legacy of the 1991 
campaign against Iraq‘s Saddam Hussein‖ (Tomiak, 2006). These issues were not 
related to 9/11.  
Chapter Five: 9/11, The War On Terror And The Continuation Of Us Global Hegemony Strategy 
202 
 
5.2.5. The Bush Doctrine: The Institutionalisation Of US Hegemony 
If it is true that US hegemony became institutionalised, were there new characteristics 
of the Bush doctrine? In contrast to those who saw the Bush FP as a revolutionary 
change in the AFP strategic trajectory, it can be argued that the Bush policy was not 
new. 9/11 was merely used as a pretext to expand US hegemony and to institutionalise 
the US hegemonic policy.  
Those who argue for the newness of the Bush Doctrine define a number of pillars and 
principles as unprecedented characteristics of AFP. These include the sustaining and 
maintenance of American military superiority; the use of pre-emptive or preventive war 
instead of the traditional containment or deterrence policy; the spread of democracy 
including regime change even if by force; and the dependence on unilateralism and 
acting globally without approval of the UN or its NATO partners (Marqusee, 2007).
1
 
Even with these divergent elements, as Leffler (2004: 23) argues, ―the differences 
between Bush and his predecessors have more to do with style than substance, more to 
do with the balance between competing strategies than with goals, with the exercise of 
good judgment than with the definition of a worldview‖. This view confirms that 
nothing had changed and AFP has represented continuity rather than discontinuity after 
9/11. In the following sections, light will be cast on various aspects of the Bush doctrine 
and its historical pedigree. 
                                                          
1
 In fact, Bello argues that America‘s ―unilateralism has always been a central, if not the central feature of 
US policy‖ (2005: 15). While in the 1990s, as discussed previously, the distinction between multi-
lateralism and unilateralism was blurred, the post-9/11 policy demonstrated that the US turned 
deliberately to implement unilateralist agenda. In actuality, unilateralism offered several advantages to 
US policy-makers at the time. By acting unilaterally, the US not only kept its allies from involvement in 
crisis management decision-making, but also offered itself a large margin of manoeuvre for formulating 
its own agenda to reconstruct global system. To guarantee its supremacy in the unilateralist moment, 
America not only needed to defeat its enemies, but also to contain its allies, or potential rivals. Indeed, 
arguably allies/likely rivals such as China, Russia, and France need to be militarily under control rather 
than enemies. By restricting control, no one will be able to be a real competitor (Cox, 2002a; Leffler, 
2004; Anderson, 2003). It is true that unilateralism is not unprecedented in AFP legacy: the EoCW 
revived this tendency when harsh rivalry became an ‗ash heap of history‘ and reappeared clearly in the 
1992 defence document. Unilateralism was also stated in the 1997 project for the New American Century. 
Such agendas constituted a guideline to the US foreign policy-makers post-9/11 and the political 
environment allowed them to pursue such policies under the claim of fighting against global terrorism 
(Soros, 2004; Lind, 2007). 
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5.2.5.1. The NSS Of 2002 
The NSS of 2002 is the main official document that informs the Bush Doctrine. It has 
been described as the most important document since NSC-68 of the late 1940s (Gleek, 
2003). This conviction was built on the assumption that the document introduced an 
unprecedented set of thinking and implementation and marked a discontinuity in 
mainstream thinking (Bose, 2002). However, in contrast to such a viewpoint, the NSS 
of 2002 was no more than a repetition of AFP‘s official literature from earlier periods, 
and its main objective was to maximize the US interests in the post-CW world. 
President Bush, in his West Point address on 1 June 2002, said: ―different circumstances 
require different methods, but not different moralities‖ (White House, 2002: 3). 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the strategy was based on American internationalism 
that combined both American morals and national interests and this marriage, as 
mentioned in previous chapters, has driven AFP at least since WWII, if not earlier 
(White House, 2002; Leffler, 2003). Since WWII, liberalism and idealism have guided 
AFP in a unique combination with power politics (Coll, 1995; Wittkopf et al., 2003; 
Ikenberry, 2004b).  
NSS‘s (2002) main objective is to ―help make the world not just safer but better. Our 
goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful 
relations with other states, and respect for human dignity‖ (White House, 2002: 1). Such 
justifications have also been repeatedly stated in AFP literature since its very 
foundation. The US has, in fact, fought all its wars to preserve and sustain its power and 
interests worldwide but, as mentioned previously, its geo-strategic policies have always 
been galvanized by moral justifications (Coll, 1995).
1
  
According to Leffler, the importance of this NSS resided on such a combination of 
idealism and pragmatism; however, its most striking idea is in its ―marriage of 
democratic idealism with the exercise of pre-emptive power‖ (2003: 1047). However 
                                                          
1
 As mentioned in previous chapters, lessons drawn from several historical events have led scholars and 
policymakers alike to suggest that on the practical level, America‘s performance in international affairs 
could be faced by numerous obstacles unless those two trends (idealism and realism) work hand in hand 
in the right combination (Rice, 2002; Leffler, 2003; Isaacson, 2006b; Stengel, 2006). In this spirit, 
Condoleezza Rice saw that the academic debate that separates the two perspectives could no longer stand, 
and told her audience: ―as a professor, I recognize that this debate has won tenure for and sustained the 
careers of many generations of scholars. As a policymaker, I can tell you that these categories obscure 
reality‖ (2002). 
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this mixture is not surprising because such a tendency in AFP thinking was clear from 
the collapse of the USSR. The NSS of 2002 did not show any shift in policy, but just 
several components of both the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 and the PANC‘s 
2000 document/strategy were integrated into formal AFP. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the Bush doctrine ―does follow a pattern in American foreign policy, one that 
brings together American exceptionalism and American unilateralism‖ (Bose, 2002: 
620). The strategy demonstrated that the US policy-makers believed that America ―has 
the natural right to be above the law‖ (McCarthy, 2007: 129). This might be the most 
important view as the document clearly announced the US unilateral hegemonic project 
ignoring America‘s closest allies. This shift started during the 1990s, but it became very 
clear after 9/11. 
5.2.5.2. The Pre-Emptive Doctrine: The US Iron-Fist Hegemonic Strategy 
The other element that has aroused controversy in the Bush Doctrine was and still 
remains the pre-emptive war strategy; however, this was not entirely new in American 
military strategy. Unsurprisingly, the use of military power ―has been a staple in US 
national security policy and a card played by presidents since Thomas Jefferson sent 
marines to liberate the crew of the ship Philadelphia and deal with pirates off Tripoli in 
1806‖ (Watson, 2003: 9).1 What changed at the turn of the new millennium was that 
―the military dimension has taken on new significance‖ (Boggs, 2006: 4). As discussed 
previously, the unipolar hegemonic movement that started at the EoCW gave the US an 
unchallengeable and unrivalled position and the capability to do whatever it wanted. 
Peter Anderson argues that due to this advantage and more obviously since 9/11, the US 
                                                          
1
 In this context, it would be plausible to say that since the Monroe Doctrine formulated in 1823 by 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the use of force has systematically been used as a tool to achieve 
US political interests. The US had frequently intervened in Latin America to preserve its interest, promote 
trade, and prevent Europeans from involvement in the continent. The Roosevelt Doctrine (1904) not only 
developed the main idea of the Monroe Doctrine of limiting European presence in Latin America, but also 
clearly stated that the US would reserve the right to use force, if needed, to defend its interest in the 
Western Hemisphere. This doctrine stayed in operation throughout the first half of the 20
th
 century. In 
addition to the US engagement in two world wars, the use of force was still a dominant choice in AFP 
strategy during the second half of the 20
th
 century. Even with the containment strategy, the US fought two 
major wars during the CW. In the post-CW era, the US fought in four wars and in the post-9/11 era the 
US has engaged in two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq under the title of WoT in addition to several 
other small-scale-wars (Watson, 2003; Watson et al, 2003; Gaddis, 2004).   
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―has increasingly opted for the threat and use of military power to enforce its will, rather 
than the force of economics, diplomacy, ideology and law‖ (2003: 38).1 
When President George W. Bush proclaimed that the US would strike first against its 
enemies in his speech to West Point cadets on 1 June 2002, it was quickly regarded as 
signifying a profound shift in the US military policy and that a new doctrine had 
replaced the CW‘s long-standing ―doctrine of containment and deterrence with a new 
policy of pre-emptive strikes‖ (Kellner, 2006: 149). According to Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, this changed the long-standing ―self-defence doctrine‖ of AFP to adopt a 
new policy of ―anticipatory self-defence‖ (2003). In this regard, the US presented its 
Nuclear Posture Review in December 2001 which ―expressly considered the 
deployment of nuclear weapons‖ not only against nuclear powers such as Russia and 
China but also against non-nuclear powers such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and 
Syria (Tokatlian, 2006: 240). Officials close to Secretary of Defense (SOD) Rumsfeld 
argued that the US ―should not be very sensitive about the political feelings of others 
when it decides it has to use its power‖ (cited in Cox, 2002a: 276).  
However, these changes did not alter the US doctrine of using military power to achieve 
political ends; it was merely a shift in tactics rather than strategy. According to one 
observer, ―after 9/11, Bush and his team had stumbled across—possibly even 
discovered—a new doctrine for the projection of American power into the indefinite 
future‖ (Cox, 2007: 648). In this context, US Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith 
said in an interview with the Los Angeles Times on 29 May 2003: ―everything is going 
to move everywhere … there is no place in the world where [US military presence] is 
                                                          
1
 In addition to what has been said previously, it may be added that the US defence spending increased 
dramatically since 9/11 to unparalleled levels. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the US was 
―representing half of the world military expenditures, no countervailing coalition can create a traditional 
military balance of power‖ (Nye, 2003: 60). For example, the increase in the defence budget in 2002 
alone was ―more than the entire annual defence budget of Great Britain‖ (Hall, 2002: 2). Since then, 
American power and influence have been unexpectedly intensified (Wittkopf et al., 2003; McMurtry, 
2007), and the world has dealt with ―a superpower that has been willing to flex its military muscle 
without diplomatic consensus or the backing of key allies‖ (McCarthy, 2006). According to the pre-2004 
figures, the US military budget was ―more than that of the next 14 countries put together‖ (Held & 
Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). The US military budget of 2004-2005 ―amounts to $536 billion, including 
Homeland security … this amounts to higher military expenditure than the next sixteen countries 
combined‖ (Smith, 2005b: 198). Gibbs argues that the US now ―spent as much on military power as the 
next 27 largest military powers combined‖ (2006: 28). However, according to Ruggie (2006), the US 
military budget equalled the total defence spending of the rest of the world, and that huge number only 
consumed about 5% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is not surprising that ―the US military 
budget exceeds the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of India or Brazil, the Netherlands or Russia ... 
[and] the US military is the world‘s eleventh largest economy‖ (Smith, 2005b: 199).  
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going to be the same as it was‖ (cited in Cornell, 2004: 241). Of relevance here is that 
the shift was not exactly because of 9/11 but, as has been argued previously, Bush II 
revealed his desire to change military affairs in his presidential campaign in 2000 
(Hartung, 2003; Melanson, 2005). SOD Rumsfeld argued that prior to 9/11, the US had 
started to revise its post-CW defence strategies and tended to move away from the ―two 
major-threat wars‖ of the early post-CW (2002). Rumsfeld‘s revolution in military 
affairs, according to Kurth (2007), aimed to terminate the Weinberger-Powell doctrine 
that had coupled the US traditional way of war, particularly in WWII, and the 
significant usable lessons of the Vietnam and Korean wars.
1
 However, Rumsfeld‘s 
manoeuvre to change the old military doctrine cannot be seen as a shift from previous 
military doctrines because the Weinberger-Powell doctrine did not deny the use of 
power; it only conditioned it.  
Even during the CW the US used the pre-emptive war doctrine and its wars in Vietnam 
and Korea—among others—were in this category. However, this shift was a response to 
the unipolar moment that did not exist previously. The Bush administration moved from 
the previous military tactical strategies when it rejected the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, and opened the way for modernizing new generations of long-range nuclear 
missiles in addition to the militarization of space. These efforts to guarantee US 
supremacy, however, had started prior to the EoCW when the Reagan administration 
started the largest military build-up ever. In this context, 9/11 and its aftermath were 
regarded as an opportunity to the military-industrial complex to reassert its supreme role 
in AFP-making process after the CW (Hartung, 2003).   
                                                          
1
 This doctrine includes the ideas of Caspar Weinberger (Secretary of Defence during the Reagan 
administration) and Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State in George H. W. Bush‘s 
administration). The central idea in this doctrine emphasizes that the US should use its military power as 
a last resort and with a commitment to preserve its national vital interests when they are at risk. 
Weinberger‘s viewpoint denied the coupling between threats of force and diplomacy, but the use of force 
must occur only after US diplomacy failed to achieve its objectives. Under all circumstances, military 
force should not be used unless Congress and the US public show great support. Drawing upon lessons 
learnt from Vietnam, Powell also warned against engagement in long and undefined wars but contended 
that the US military should be applied against a military power of another hostile nation to achieve US 
objectives within a very limited timeframe and with great concern to minimize the risk to US soldiers 
(Blechman & Wittes, 1999; Watson, 2003; Kurth, 2007). This perspective of using US military force was 
also repeated by President George H. W. Bush at the close of his presidency. At West Point Military 
Academy in January 1993, he argued that the use of force must be constrained: ―Where its application can 
be limited in space and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential coasts and sacrifices‖ 
(cited in Dumbrell, 2008: 93). 
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Several critics such as Gaddis (2004) and Layne (2006) argue that the pre-emptive 
doctrine and the preventive war are also found in other periods throughout US history. 
Since the early 1800s, when the US alliance with France ended, meaning that the 
younger nation had to be self-dependent to preserve its independence and defend its 
territory, the debate over pre-emptive war started (Chace, 2004; Gaddis, 2004). In this 
context, according to Gaddis, ―Adams, Jackson, Polk, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and 
Wilson would all have understood ... [the pre-emptive strategy] perfectly‖ (2004: 22).   
Such a tendency is clear when the NSS of 2002 states the US ―has long maintained the 
option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security‖, but 
at this time, the need to apply such a strategy was greater: ―The greater the threat the 
greater is the risk of inaction‖ (White House, 2002: 15).    
Although Ronald Schaffer states ―the ideas of preventive and pre-emptive war had long 
been a part of strategic thought‖ (1985: 200), its modern roots lie in the post-WWII era. 
During the CW, even with the official strategy of deterrence and containment in Europe, 
the US ―took anticipatory action to deal with real and imagined threats from Central 
America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East‖ (Leffler, 2004: 23). After 
the USSR‘s atomic test in 1949, some US officials used the term ‗pre-emptive‘ 
interchangeably with ‗preventive‘ and ‗preventative‘ war in their proposals to head off 
the Soviet threat (Schaffer, 1985; Pauly & Lansford, 2005). The term meant ―initiating 
an attack when an enemy seemed about to strike‖ (Schaffer, 1985, 200)1 and this is 
repeated exactly in the NSS of 2002. Terrorism‘s threat is unpredictable, and ―if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy‘s attack. To forestall or 
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-
emptively‖ (White House, 2002: 15).  
In the absence of any real competitor to its power in the post-9/11 era, this military 
doctrine was chosen not only to defeat enemies but also to serve America‘s hegemonic 
agenda. The NSS of 2002 made a commitment that the US would neither use military 
                                                          
1
 For example, less than two months after the Hiroshima bomb dropped, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared 
that ―when it became evident that the force of aggression was being arrayed against the United States, 
America could not afford, through any misguided and perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive attitude, to 
permit the first blow to be struck against us‖ (Schaffer, 1985: 200). In a similar way, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff also recommended President Eisenhower to ―conduct a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet 
Unions‖. At the time, they suggested that ―the Strategic Air Command could have delivered a devastating 
blow against Soviet bomber bases and largely prevented the Soviets from launching a major retaliatory 
strike in their infancy as a nuclear power‖ (Martzel, 1998: 224).   
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force pre-emptively against all threatening cases that faced it nor would it use pre-
emption ―as a pretext for aggression‖ (White House, 2002: 15). However, America 
failed to meet this commitment when it invaded Iraq on the basis of a pre-emptive war. 
William D. Hartung concludes that ―while the United States has engaged in military 
first strikes in the past, from the 1989 invasion of Panama to the invasion of Iraq, the 
Bush doctrine seeks to elevate this approach from an occasional tactic to a guiding 
principle of American foreign policy‖ (2003: 66). In sum, as has been argued here, the 
Bush doctrine that materialized in the NSS of 2002 was not in fact a new turn in AFP 
strategy; instead, its main ideas were borrowed from the Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG) document of the early 1990s and the neo-cons‘ proposal of 2000.  
In brief, in contrast to those who argue that 9/11 changed everything, this discussion 
shows nothing profound changed. 9/11 was a terrorist attack on America, and the US 
response to it was designed to be a global war. If the US was really concerned with the 
defeat of global terrorism, it would have been able to do that in several other ways. As it 
will be shown in the next section, the WoT was not really about terror but about geo-
political calculations in the post-CW era.   
5.3. America‟s Response To 9/11: The WoT And The Continuity Between The Pre- 
And Post-9/11 Hegemony 
On the ground of what has been said above, it can be argued that the US response to 
9/11 was not the only possible alternative, but was also a continuation of the pre-9/11 
policy to create a NWO suitable to the US unipolar moment. Consequently, this section 
aims to examine the US response to 9/11 (the WoT) within its geo-political context to 
discover the characteristics of the US hegemonic project that was accelerated and 
legitimated by response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In other words, contrary to US 
officials‘ claim that the WoT was a struggle against global terrorism, this section argues 
that the overall objective was and still remains in harmony with the objectives of all of 
America‘s previous wars. Therefore, as stated previously, the US‘ WoT has a two-fold 
structure and its explicit objective (or surface structure) conceals a hidden agenda (or 
deep structure). While the explicit objective of the WoT was to defeat al-Qaeda and 
global terrorism, the trajectory of this war has shown its hidden agenda that used 9/11 
and global terrorism as a pretext to advance America‘s hegemonic project from the CW 
era.  
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5.3.1. Afghanistan And AFP Strategy Prior To 9/11: An Historical Overview 
The US concern about Afghanistan started several decades prior to 9/11. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was seen by President Carter and his administration as 
an attempt to build a geo-strategic bridge towards the Gulf region, to fulfil the USSR‘s 
long-term objective of a warm water port. In reaction, Carter released his doctrine on 23 
January 1981 which emphasized America‘s intention to defend its interests in the region 
by force if necessary (Sanders, 1983; Dixon, 2001; Parenti, 2002; Gibbs, 2006; Fraser, 
2009). However, as Norm Dixon confirms, ―the opening of the archives of the former 
Soviet Union and the published reminiscences of former US power brokers have proven 
these US claims to be outright lies‖ (2001: 14).  
In fact, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan gave US policy-makers the excuse to 
become involved in the region. One Carter advisor whose ―hardline viewpoint had been 
on the ascendance well in advance of the Russian invasion is quoted as saying: 
‗Afghanistan is finally shaking people into shape ... I think the Soviets have done us a 
big favour‘‖. This mirrors the delight of the Truman administration officials who 
exclaimed in a similar fashion at the breakout of the Korean War, ―we were sweating 
over it (NSC-68), and then thank God Korea came along‖ (Sanders, 1983: 240). On the 
basis of such views, it could be argued that as well as the Korean War which legitimated 
military spending at the time, the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan also energized 
President Reagan‘s assertive FP and military build-up (Sanders, 1983). Carter began 
aiding the mujahedeen against the USSR and Reagan continued this effort to defeat the 
enemy (Hoff, 2008).   
Yet, the US economic, political and military interests in the Central Asia have gradually 
increased since the early 1990s (Blank, 2001). Cakmak argues that ―the starting point of 
the American military response to Afghanistan is rooted in the changed international 
environment created by the end of the Cold War‖ (2003: 11). The Middle East and 
Central Asia took a backseat in the US strategy after the 1991 Gulf War because of the 
US engagement in central Europe. However, after managing European affairs in the late 
1990s and whilst seeking the best way to move effectively towards the Middle East and 
Central Asia, the terrorist attacks offered the US the pretext it needed to put these areas 
under its direct military control (Kuniholm, 2002). In this way, the US followed in the 
steps of its imperial predecessors, Britain and France, and ―consistently manoeuvred to 
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control the Middle-East and Central Asia‖ as an integral part to its post-CW hegemonic 
strategy (Ralph, 2006: 263). 
5.3.2. The Rush To The Afghanistan War: Do Not Miss The Opportunity 
In order to highlight the importance of the US‘ occupation of Afghanistan, it is 
necessary to assess the Bush administration‘s rapid response and its attempts to legalise 
the WoT as the only possible response to 9/11. From a retrospective view, it is clear that 
the US needed to invade Afghanistan as quickly as it could; in doing so, America used a 
number of justifications to legitimate its response to 9/11. However, such a legal 
framework casts suspicions over the US‘ real agenda that lay behind its reaction. 
America was in fact trying not to legalise a global WoT; rather it was manoeuvring to 
enlarge its hegemonic position using an unexpected moral excuse. 
As stated previously, the attacks of 9/11 were classified as criminal acts because they 
were conducted by a terrorist organisation (Greenwood, 2002). Due to this, the US 
faced a legal problem in responding militarily to the terrorist attacks: how could it 
justify its military response? By using several possible legal justifications for the 
employment of military force against Afghanistan, the US relied merely on the right of 
self defence (Byers, 2002). According to the UN Charter, ―without Security Council 
authorisation ... force is restricted only to self defence against armed attack‖ (cited in 
Chomsky, 2007: 113). However, to be valid for the justification of war, self defence 
requires that the US should ―be able to point to the existence of an armed attack‖ on its 
own territory (Greenwood, 2002: 307). In this case, there was no armed attack or a 
declaration of war against the US by any sovereign state. Instead, the attack came from 
a terrorist network. Therefore, when the US military took action, it ―violate[d] the 
territorial integrity of a state that is not itself directly responsible‖ (Byers, 2002: 406).  
To overcome these legal problems and to regulate its action within the framework of 
international law, the US utilised two complementary strategies. First, it enlarged the 
war‘s stated objectives and instead of targeting Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, it included the 
Taleban, ―the then de facto government of Afghanistan‖ because it was ―giving refuge 
to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and refusing to hand them over‖ (Byers, 2002: 408). 
According to this argument, Al-Qaeda organised the attacks and the Taleban regime 
facilitated them (Mingst, 2006). If, as Michael Byers argues, the US ―singled out Bin 
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Laden and Al-Qaeda as its targets, it would have run up against the widely held view 
that terrorist attacks, in and of themselves, do not constitute armed attacks justifying 
military responses against sovereign states‖ (2002: 408).  
Second, the US intended to secure political support for its military response to 9/11. 
These efforts were clear when the members of NATO regarded the attacks of 9/11 as an 
armed attack on all 19 countries as did the members of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance. The UNSC resolutions adopted on 12 and 28 September 2001 
also affirmed the right of self defence in their deliberate wording (Byers, 2002; 
Greenwood, 2002; Mann, 2003; Byers, 2005). While such a framework of legalisation 
was controversial, for many observers, these actions were sufficient to legalise the US 
response to 9/11 attacks. For example, according to scholars such as Byers (2002; 
2005), the US had merely employed the principle of ‗necessity and proportionality‘ to 
carry on its agenda.  
It is true that the US demanded the Taleban regime hand Bin Laden over and the de 
facto government in Kabul requested the US show evidence that demonstrated his 
involvement in the attacks. However, shortly prior to the beginning of the war, the 
Taleban ―offered to turn Bin Laden over to a neutral third country, even without hearing 
the evidence—even to allow him to be tried under Islamic law in the United States‖. A 
few days after the beginning of the war, the offers were repeated but ―Bush‘s response 
was: there‘s no need to negotiate. There‘s no discussion. I told them exactly what they 
need to do. And there is no need to discuss innocence or guilt‖ (Mahajan, 2003: 34).         
However, such the dispute over the legality of the war was constrained to academia 
because the US reaction was acceptable to the rest of the world. The US rush to war was 
not viewed as suspicious because American citizens had been killed and injured and all 
the world, including Arabs and Muslims, showed sympathy to the innocent victims and 
to Americans (Schuller & Grant, 2003; Thurber, 2006). In this context, in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11, Europeans forgot the 1990s tensions with the US over issues such as 
the Kyoto Protocol, the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, and the role 
of the (ICC). Romani Prodi, the then President of the European Commission, pledged to 
support the US in its war. He said: ―[I]n the darkest hours of European history, the 
Americans stood with us. We stand by them now‖ (cited in May, 2003a: 10). This 
sympathetic attitude was echoed in Le Monde: ―[W]e are all Americans now‖ (cited in 
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May, 2003a: 10). The Bush administration accordingly secured ―a blank cheque from 
the UN, support from Russia and China, and extended its influence in West and Central 
Asia‖ (Ali, 2003: 316). As a result of this, Carl Boggs argues that ―the horrific events of 
9/11 brought unprecedented levels of worldwide sympathy for what was already a 
global hegemon‖ (2005: 35).  
In the light of such global support, the US hegemonic project appeared to be in line with 
the US consensual hegemonic model that was discussed in the first chapter. However, 
the US, practically, went on to invade Afghanistan alone. About 98% of the military 
operations were carried out by its own troops, while the UK‘s contribution was around 
2%. Americans did not even allow NATO allies to join the effort until early 2003 when 
President Bush II made some policy concessions to engage other countries (NATO and 
non-NATO). NATO‘s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) took over in 
August 2003 only because of the US‘ new battle in Iraq (Cox, 2002a; Judt, 2002; 
Mingst, 2006).  
The feverish efforts to legalise the war against Afghanistan raises the question: was it 
true that America‘s rush to war was solely motivated by its announced objectives? This 
will be discussed later. The next section‘s concern is to show how the US hegemonic 
project developed in the post-9/11 era. 
5.3.3. The Easy Victory In Afghanistan Motivates The Rush To Baghdad  
The war in Afghanistan was the first step towards hegemony. The rapid collapse of the 
Taleban regime and the easy victory in the first frontline of the WoT motivated US 
policy-makers to expand the goals and targets to Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Scholars 
such as Cox (2002a), Pauly and Lansford (2005), Gardner (2005), Apodaca (2006) and 
Goldstein (2006) argue that this shift was primarily because of the US‘ failure in finding 
key terrorist leaders such as Bin Laden. The administration was in danger of losing 
public support for the war since it listed bringing the terrorists to justice as a prime 
objective. However, this analysis does not convey the full story. The WoT is described 
as unlimited war, and President Bush, in his State of the Union address on 29 January 
2002, made it clear that the second step in the WoT would focus on rogue states that 
sponsored terrorism and proliferated weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Apodaca, 
2006; Goldstein, 2006).  
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The Afghan War also sent a clear message to its allies as well as potential enemies. If 
the Gulf War of 1991, and the air campaign on Kosovo in 1999 showed the remaining 
powers that the US, in terms of military capabilities could not be challenged, the war in 
Afghanistan showed them that balancing against the US was impossible. In this context, 
one leading scholar says that (Cox, 2002a: 272): 
[The successful US air power campaign in Afghanistan] had uncomfortable and 
important consequences for its allies as well as its enemies. US predominance 
was not just quantitative either; it was qualitative too. To take one example, 
whereas only 6 per cent of the bombs dropped during the Gulf War were 
precision weapons, some 95 per cent of those dropped by the United States in 
Afghanistan were in that category—a huge step forward in a relatively short 
space of time. 
In this context, once the victory in the Afghanistan war had been accomplished, 
Kenneth Pollack who served as a staff member of NSC under the Clinton 
administration, wrote (Pollack, 2002): 
Today the shock of the September 11 attacks is still fresh and the US 
government and public are ready to make sacrifices—while the rest of the world 
recognizes American anger and may be leery of getting on the wrong side of it. 
The longer the wait before an invasion [of Iraq], the harder it will be to muster 
domestic and international support for it, even though the reason for invading 
would have little or nothing to do with Iraq's connection to terrorism.  
Accordingly, ―Bush‘s policy choices in regard to Iraq all bore the imprint of both the 
administration‘s recent experience in Afghanistan and the broader trends toward 
unilateral (or perhaps selectively multilateral) actions that were manifested during the 
Clinton years‖ (Pauly & Lansford, 2005: 6).  
5.3.4. The Unilateral Turn To Iraq: The Mission Determines The Allies Instead Of 
The Allies Determine The Mission 
As discussed in the second chapter, the US depended on its partners to secure its 
hegemony during the CW. However, since the EoCW the US began to separate itself 
from the old constraints of multi-lateralism. This approach became clearer during the 
1990s; however, from 9/11 onwards, it became the dominant approach in AFP strategy. 
As highlighted in the third chapter, the US saw the UN as an AFP tool during the 1990s 
(Bennis, 2000: Falk, 2007). However, this approach faced a crucial challenge in the run-
up to the war on Iraq. The US attempted, as it had usually done, to get UNSC approval 
for legitimating its decision to use military force against Iraq. This attempt unexpectedly 
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failed, and the US, for the first time since the EoCW, was unable to secure its allies‘ 
support for an international resolution to carry out its own agenda. The UNSC‘s 
disapproval was not only because of the opposition of three permanent members 
(France, China, and Russia), but also due to its failure to enforce any of the middle 
six—Angola, Cameroon, Guinea, Chile, Mexico, Pakistan—to vote in its favour, 
despite enormous diplomatic pressure and outright bribery (Du Boff, 2003; Gardner, 
2005; Mingst, 2006; Western, 2006). In line with the UNSC‘s attitude, Kofi Annan, the 
UN Secretary-General at the time, said that the Iraq war ―was not in conformity with the 
UN Charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal‖ (cited 
in Reynolds, 2004). This caused liberal commentators such as Ikenberry and Nye to 
remark that the ―potential cost of the US pursuit of unilateralism is in undermining the 
consensual order between great powers which provided legitimacy to the exercise of US 
leadership and hegemony during the Cold War‖ (Dannreuther, 2007: 30). 
The lack of support also affected the long-standing trans-Atlantic partnership. In this 
context, Nye (2000) was correct when he predicted that the US‘s post-CW unilateral 
actions would inevitably affect the strong historical relationship with Europe. It is true 
that several disputes between the US and its European partners were lurking beneath the 
surface in the 1990s. However, post-9/11 these disagreements reached a level not 
previously seen.  
In contrast to its position in the UNSC in 2001, France, with Russia and Germany, 
refused to pass an international resolution from the Council to legalise the US military 
operation against Iraq. In this context, the EU High Representative of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana argued that ―the Iraq crisis produced 
a sense of real crisis in transatlantic relations. It divided the EU, NATO and the UN‖ 
(2003: 2). Within Europe, in contrast to Germany, France and Belgium, the UK, Italy, 
Spain, and the eastern Europeans countries supported the US position (Gardner, 2005; 
Tokatlian, 2006). These divisions led Javier Solana to argue that: ―the Alliance should 
determine the mission and not vice versa. The alternative is to pick partners, like tools 
from a box. Most of us would prefer to be considered an ‗ally‘ or a ‗partner‘ rather than 
a tool in a box‖ (2003: 3). German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer agreed with Solana 
that ―allies are not satellites‖ (cited in Rhodes, 2004: 426). However, Solana‘s approach 
did not fit with the US unipolar moment. Thus in sharp contrast, Donald Rumsfeld 
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emphasized that the mission should determine the allies, not the other way around 
(Litwak, 2002; Ayoob, 2003).  
The American unilateral approach cannot be separated from the domestic political 
environment that was dominant at the time when the neo-cons occupied many high 
ranking positions in the US political system and AFP bureaucracy. In this vein, the 
former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt argues that ―this nationalist-egocentric 
influence of imperialistic-minded intellectuals on US strategy is greater than at any time 
since the Second World War‖ (cited in Szabo, 2004: 60). Therefore, as it did in 
Afghanistan, the US intended to wage the war in Iraq alone or with a few selected allies. 
Drawing lessons from the debate in the run up to the Kosovo war, Bush‘s key advisers 
convinced him that little multi-lateral constraints will not challenge American global 
leadership, and discussion in the lead up to the Iraq war was worthless. The UN, from 
their viewpoint, ―is nothing more than a debating society while NATO still suffers from 
the fact that postmodern French and German elites want to slow or keep American 
power in check‖ (Western, 2006: 113). After the military victory in Afghanistan, US 
strategic planners were convinced that Europeans would add nothing to the US military 
capabilities. The war ―illustrated the extent to which the United States no longer seemed 
to require the active military support of its allies, except as bases or cheerleaders‖ (Cox, 
2002a: 272). Just four months after the US sought to build a coalition and work with 
allies, European-American tensions over a number of issues started to come to light. 
Therefore Krauthammer angrily argued that the WoT was not a war for America alone, 
but it ―is also a war for Western civilization. If the Europeans refuse to see themselves 
as part of this struggle, fine. If they wish to abdicate, fine. We will let them hold our 
coats, but not tie our hands‖ (Judt, 2002). As a further indicator of the US unilateralist 
perspective and its tensions with the EU over Iraq, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
travelled to Europe only twice, and he did not go to the Middle East at all during the six 
months run up to the Iraq war. In contrast, James Baker, the Secretary of State during 
the Gulf War in 1991 ―made six trips to Europe and four to the Middle East and also 
travelled to Russia before the beginning of the military actions‖ (Western, 2006: 118).  
Finally, if the UNSC refused to legitimate the war, and the US‘ closest allies were 
against this step in the WoT, what were the justifications that led the US to go it alone? 
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The Bush administration failed to offer any reasonable answer to this question. The 
following section, deals with American justifications to launch the Iraq War.   
5.3.5. Justifying The Unjustifiable War: US Claims Between Rhetoric And Reality 
Given the premise that the Afghanistan war was a justified response to the attacks of 
9/11 and the world supported the US in its search to bring the terrorists to justice, the 
questions that require to be answered are: what were the justifications for extending the 
WoT to the war on Iraq? and, how did the US administration defend its decision to go it 
alone after its diplomatic failure in the UNSC? In fact, the post-9/11 honeymoon 
between the US and the world—including the UN and a number of its closest allies—
was short-lived due to its decision to invade Iraq without UNSC approval. This 
unilateral action led to a reduction in international support and raised several crucial 
questions regarding its post-CW hidden agenda (Judt, 2002; Schuller & Grant, 2003; 
Thurber, 2006; Carter, 2008).  
In this context, and in line with what has said in the last chapter, terrorism and 9/11 
were used by the US government as the justification for this unjustified war and ―fear 
has become … [the Bush administration‘s] favourite weapon of choice‖ (Füredi, 2005: 
124), while Iraqi‘s alleged WMD programme was exaggerated (Malik, 2003; Mian, 
2007). UK officials, for instance, claimed that Iraq posed an imminent threat to the 
West as its WMD could reach Europe within 45 minutes (Malik, 2003; Katzman, 2003; 
Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Leaman, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005). In his State of the Union 
address on 28 January 2003, Bush also claimed that Saddam‘s regime could ―produce as 
much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent‖ , and quoted a US intelligence 
reports that said Iraq ―had upwards of 30.000 munitions capable of delivering chemical 
and biological materials‖ (cited in Malik, 2003: xxxiv). Similarly, Rumsfeld assured 
that a new 9/11 using WMD to kill countless thousands of Americans was possible 
(Malik, 2003; Paterson et al., 2010). Another US official warned that ―we don‘t want 
the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud‖ (cited in Paterson et al., 2010: 490). On the 
basis of such logic, Paul Wolfowitz put it clearly that ―we cannot afford to wait until we 
have a visceral understanding of what terrorists can do with weapons of mass 
destruction‖ (cited in Leffler, 2003: 1049). 
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The justification of the threat from Iraq‘s WMD was an important influence on the US 
public. However, the divisions over support for the war in the UNSC, along with the 
resistance of the US‘ closest allies to the invasion of Iraq under the claim of WMD, left 
the US public unsure about the administration‘s policy. Therefore, a second step was 
taken to make the war more acceptable to US citizens; Iraq was linked to al-Qaeda and 
9/11. The existence of this link was mentioned in the immediate 9/11 attacks when 
President Bush was asked about the attacks on September 17, 2001, and replied, ―I 
believe Iraq was involved‖ (cited in Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005: 526). Furthermore, as 
mentioned previously, from the first hours of the attack the Bush administration strove 
to find any links to Iraq in the events of 9/11 (Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Leaman, 2005; 
Dumbrell, 2005). However, on 6 March 2003, Washington claimed it possessed 
bulletproof evidence which not only demonstrated links between Iraq and al-Qaeda, but 
also an undeniable connection between 9/11 and the Iraqi regime (Dumbrell, 2005; 
Gershkoff & Kushner, 2005; Paterson et al, 2006; Simpson, 2006; Daniel & Alexander, 
2007). 
However, according to Jay Bookman, these justifications seemed to be ―contrived and 
artificial‖ (2002). Thus, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Executive 
Director Mohammed El-Baradei declared that his agency had examined several claims 
about Iraqi nuclear programmes, such as Iraq‘s attempts to purchase uranium from 
Niger and the aluminium tubes which could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear 
weapons but did not find any evidence proving these claims. Similarly, the former Chief 
UN Weapons Inspectors Scott Ritter (1991-1998) and Hans Blix, UNMOVIC chief, did 
not accept the US allegation that Iraq still possessed any WMD programmes (Bidwai, 
2003; Malik, 2003). Blix‘s report to the UNSC certified that ―Iraq has undertaken a 
substantial measure of disarmament and that Baghdad‘s recent cooperation can be seen 
as active or even proactive‖ (cited in Bidwai, 2003). According to Praful Bidwai (2003), 
this report removed America‘s key moral justification for the war on Iraq. Nonetheless, 
despite the lack of evidence and opposition from the international community, the US 
continued with its project to invade Iraq using the claim of destroying of its WMD 
before the UN inspection team had finished its job. This led Aftab A. Malik to suggest 
that by depriving the UN team at the time, one could suggest that ―perhaps the hawks 
[in the US administration] feared that the inspectors were doing their work too well. 
Perhaps with even a little more time, they would have robbed them of their excuse for 
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going to war‖ (2003: xxxv). Because of this, Pollack (2002) argues that it would be 
mistaken to understand the Iraq invasion as a component of the WoT because it would 
jeopardize that war. What was striking was that the Reagan administration  supplied 
Iraq with chemical materials when it was sure that the Iraqi regime would employ these 
weapons in its war against Iran, as well as against its own citizens. ―Now, however, 
Iraq‘s use of gas in that conflict is repeatedly cited by President George W. Bush as 
justification for ‗regime change‘ in Iraq‖ (Zizek, 2002). 
After the administration‘s failure to find any WMD or to discover any evidence linking 
al-Qaeda and Saddam (Daalder & Lindsay, 2005b; Putzel, 2006; Fukuyama, 2006b; 
Mueller, 2008), the justifications for the war turned to democracy, liberation of Iraq, 
and a war to reform the Middle East (Rice, 2002; Katzman, 2003; Apodaca, 2006; Nye, 
2006). However, ―this excuse led Fukuyama to say: a request to spend several hundred 
billion dollars and several thousand American lives in order to bring democracy to … 
Iraq would have been laughed out of court‖ (Mueller, 2008: 115). In fact, this plan to 
use military force to establish democracy, or democratic imperialism was designed and 
supported by hardliner neo-cons as a central element of their strategy of regime change 
(Clark, 2005). 
Thus, international liberalists, nationalists and neo-cons who were in the office after 
2001 depending on US exceptionalism ―believe[d] that legitimacy matters less than 
material power … legitimacy is nice to have, but not necessary‖ (Posen, 2007: 564). 
Iraq was seen as a rogue state and the US intended to use power to remove its 
undemocratic regime. The proponents of US primacy strategy found this excuse 
sufficient to carry out their hegemonic agenda (Posen, 2007). 
5.3.6. The War On Iraq In The Context Of US Hegemonic Strategy 
5.3.6.1. The War: Necessity Or Choice? 
Thus, the US offered several different justifications for its plan to invade Iraq; however, 
none of these justifications was proven to be true. Therefore, the war cannot be seen as a 
war of necessity, but as a war for geo-strategic ends. The invasion was conduct outside 
of the international community‘s legal framework, and soon after the invasion started, 
political developments showed that the US allegations about Iraq were a ‗―noble lie in 
neoconservative circles‖ (Gardner, 2005: 12). Iraq was neither connected to the attacks 
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of 9/11 nor did it have any WMD (Bremmer, 2002; Bookman, 2002; Roy, 2004; 
Rockmore & Margolis, 2005; Mingst, 2006; Vanaik, 2007). This led Malik (2003) to 
reconceptualise the meaning of WMD to ―words of mass deception‖. The deception was 
an instrument to persuade the US public that the pre-emptive war on Iraq was a 
necessity not only to protect America, but also to maintain world peace and security 
(Cliffe & Ramsay, 2003; Leaman, 2005; Dumbrell, 2005).  
Accordingly, in contrast to those, such as, who denied the Bush administration‘s 
deception, scholars such as Chomsky and Herman emphasize that ―deception and 
propaganda play even in formally democratic countries‖ (Gibbs, 2006: 26). The use of 
deception for political ends is not unlikable in mainstream realist theory. It is sometimes 
needed ―for elite manipulation of public opinion‖ because a wide spectrum of realists 
believe that ―the government must realize that it is not the slave of public opinion‖ 
(Gibbs, 2006: 26). In this way, one can understand President Bush‘s Executive Order 
13.233 that gave ―indefinite authority to hold up release of White House records‖ 
(Gendzier, 2006: 181). So the failure to release the records heightens the suspicion that 
the real agenda behind the Iraq war is hidden and that the war was consistent with 
American grand strategy since the CW.  
Iraq was portrayed as a challenger to US interests from the early 1990s, and this 
perception was exaggerated after 9/11. However, Iraq did not pose any real challenge 
and there was no urgency to act pre-emptively against the regime. If Iraq was posing a 
real challenge to the US, then ―containment and deterrence remain to manage this 
threat‖. Therefore, ―dealing with Iraq should be a lower priority than dealing with North 
Korea‖ (Dunn, 2003: 297). Kim Jong II was known to be processing uranium to 
produce WMD in 2003, as was Iran. However, the Bush administration was unable to 
provide a ―rational answer as to why Saddam‘s seemingly dormant WMD program 
possesses a more imminent threat than Korea‘s active program‖ (Clark, 2003). If it is 
true, Iraq was one of the ―evil powers at par with North Korea, what prevented ... [the 
US] to pass legislation for regime change in North Korea‖ (Dhar, 2010) or Iran. What 
―separates America‘s approach to Iraq from its approach to North Korea‖ Dunn (2003: 
286) asks. Leffler answers, saying that the US ―has hesitated to act preventively in Iran 
and North Korea, calculating that the risks are too great‖ (2003: 23).  
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However, this is not the entire story, Iraq was chosen for a number of reasons. First, its 
lack of military capabilities. Second, Iraq was portrayed as a pariah state in the region 
because of Saddam‘s aggression towards his neighbouring countries. This portrayal 
served the agenda of US officials towards Iraq particularly inside the US. Third, 
Washington was also sure that no Arab government had the ability or inclination to say 
no, to the invasion. Fourth, Iraq‘s location was geo-strategically important to the 
projection of US power worldwide. Fifth, Iraq, and the wider region, was an important 
source of hydrocarbon reserves. These advantages were not present in North Korea. The 
US had already maintained significant military presence in the southern part of the 
Korean peninsula. Equally if not more important, China, North Korea‘s closest ally, 
would not allow the US to operate in its backyard. In the Middle East, there was no 
other important regional power such as China to make the US rethink its agenda 
(Everest, 2004). Iran, a possible candidate as a regional power, facilitated the removal 
of the Saddam regime in 2003, for its own national interest.  
Therefore, the US, after its military successes of the 1990s, was optimistic that it could 
―invade a country halfway round the world and bring about a reasonable settlement‖ 
(Dunn, 2003: 286). Thus, Arthur Schlesinger argues that ―we are at war again—not 
because of enemy attack, as in World War II, nor because of incremental drift, as in the 
Vietnam War—but because of the deliberate and premeditated choice of our own 
government‖ (2003). Similarly, Leffler argues that the US administration acted 
―selectively, much as its predecessors did. Vietnam, like Iraq, was a war of choice‖ 
(2004: 123). 
5.3.6.2. The Occupation Of Iraq: Unfinished Business From 1990/1991 
If the war was a matter of choice, it should therefore be understood in the context of 
AFP strategy after the CW. As said in the third chapter, the US sought to control the 
Middle East from the mid-20th century, but this objective was not easily achieved in the 
bipolar political system of the CW. However, with the EoCW, Iraq offered the pretext 
to do so following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990; however, although the US eventually 
engaged in that war, the geo-political map of the post-CW era was not yet entirely clear. 
As a result, the Bush I administration opted to defeat Saddam Hussein, but not to invade 
Iraq. However, this decision was criticized by several neo-cons. Robert Pauly argues 
that Bush‘s decision to keep Saddam Hussein in power in 1991 ―proved short-sighted as 
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the opening decade of the post-Cold War era unfolded‖ (2005: 30). Thus, the neo-con 
Krauthammer argues that Bush I could have avoided the deployment of troops in Saudi 
Arabia and economic sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s, if Hussein had been 
overthrown in 1991. Krauthammer concludes that these problems were the main reasons 
that led Bin Laden to ignite his war against America on 9/11 (Pauly, 2005). Through 
this understanding, it was possible to indirectly link the Hussein regime to the attacks of 
9/11. 
However, what was risky in the early 1990s became easier in the early 2000s. The US 
was able to act independently. Its economic difficulties had been overcome by the end 
of the decade, and the US was becoming more confident that it could bear the burdens 
of its global unilateral leadership. Furthermore, the geo-political map of the early 2000s 
was clearer than that of the early 1990s. On the one hand, America had built its power 
during the 1990s to unprecedented levels, while on the other hand, no remaining power 
was able to challenge the US strength and influence. More importantly, the key neo-
cons officials who proposed the idea of regime change in Iraq were now in key 
positions within the Bush II administration. In addition to these reasons, the easy and 
rapid victory in Afghanistan encouraged US policy-makers to institute their plans to 
occupy Iraq and topple its regime: the proposals to overthrow Saddam Hussein were 
ready from the early 1990s and re-emerged after 9/11. However, Bush‘s decision to 
occupy Iraq was carried out between summer 2002 and February 2003 (Ullman, 2006; 
Bolton, 2008).   
In line with this discussion, Iraq was part of the US strategy in the region from the early 
1950s. During the 1990s, it was kept under harsh economic sanctions and subject to 
repeated air strikes (Davis, 2003; Roy, 2004; Putzel, 2006). As a result of these actions, 
when the WoT started, US policy-makers were sure that Iraq ―was brought to its knees, 
its people starved, half a million of its children killed, its infrastructure severely 
damaged, after making sure that most of its weapons have been destroyed‖ (Roy, 2004: 
25). The moment was ideal for completing the unfinished business from the 1990-91 
Gulf War (Hoff, 1994; Pollack, 2002; Davis, 2003; Roy, 2004; Bolton, 2005; Putzel, 
2006; Buchanan, 2007; Fraser, 2009).  
The debate in the US cabinet immediately following the terrorist attacks in 9/11 showed 
that Iraq was the preferred target of a number of key officials. According to David Benn 
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since the proposal to remove Saddam Hussein was clearly stated prior to 9/11, the 
―invasion of Iraq to do so in 2003 is not more than a conscious decision to carry out a 
policy desired for other reasons‖ (2007: 972). Thus, Vice-President Cheney and 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld advocated war against Iraq rather than Afghanistan at a 
cabinet meeting held on 12 September 2001 (Gowan, 2002; Lechelt, 2003; Melanson, 
2005; Dumbrell, 2005; Mian, 2007). Three days later, Wolfowitz supported the plan 
without any clear evidence against Iraq (Guyatt, 2003; Buchanan, 2003; Melanson, 
2005). Bush did not show any disagreement with his key officials‘ attitude, but he 
suggested that the US need not target Iraq with cruise missiles, rather the aim must be 
regime change in Baghdad (Mian, 2007). As a result, the president‘s ―speechwriters 
were asked at the end of 2001, to make a case for war against Iraq to be included in the 
forthcoming State of the Union Address‖ (Mian, 2007: 149). There were also neo-cons 
officials located in and around the Pentagon, which enabled Cheney to play a significant 
role in widening the scope of the WoT to include Iraq as a pre-emptive strategy to 
secure the American people (Lechelt, 2003; Soros, 2004; Tunander, 2007). The British 
allies were told by U.S. officials in July 2002 that a military operation against Iraq was 
unavoidable and that policy was now designed around this aim (Danner. 2005).  
Bremmer (2002) argues that the 9/11 attack actually delayed the plan to invade Iraq 
because the US was forced to start with Afghanistan. Hoff recognises that most of the 
political goals of the 1991 war against Iraq were not achieved at the time. ―Saddam 
remained in power, the free Kuwait remained undemocratic … and the Middle East was 
left no more stable than before the war‖ (1994: 211). What is unsurprising that these 
issues were taken as justifications to invade Iraq. However, alongside these issues, Bush 
II also had a personal motivation. Scholars such as Wormer (2002) and Dunn (2003) 
argue that Bush sought to invade Iraq as revenge against Saddam Hussein who was 
accused of being involved in a plot to kill his father during his visit to Kuwait .  
In summary, would it be possible to see the US post-9/11 policy and particularly the 
war on Iraq merely as a part of the WoT or as a response to 9/11? In the next section, 
some potential aspects of the WoT will be discussed.  
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5.3.7. Beneath The Surface: The Real Agenda Behind The WoT 
This section returns to question posited earlier: was the US‘ rush to the war on 
Afghanistan really to defeat terrorism? And, if the war on Iraq was not related to the 
WoT, but was a matter of choice, why Iraq? And why now? (Clark, 2003; Singh, 2004). 
However, if the Iraq invasion was actually about furthering American hegemony, what 
would the occupation of Iraq add to the US hegemonic strategy? The next sub-sections 
will discuss two intertwined perspectives to deal with these questions. 
5.3.7.1. A Geo-Economic Approach 
―It is the oil, stupid‖ Joseph Clifford (2002) asserted. Relevant to this question‘s 
answer, history tells us that oil has been a central element in the US strategy to the 
Middle East since the mid-1950s, with its attempts to gain control over the region‘s raw 
material (Watkins, 1997; Cameron, 2002; Bromley, 2005). As explained previously, the 
control of oil was also amongst the main objectives that led the US to fight in the Gulf 
in 1990-91. In the draft DPG of 1992, the authors explain that the Persian Gulf is very 
important to US interests because of its huge oil reserves and the US should take control 
over it to block other states from becoming competitors to the US in the region 
(Bromley, 2005; Tunander, 2007; George, 2007). Similarly, since the 1970s, the pursuit 
of oil has resulted in the US coexisting with both al-Qaeda during the mujahidin war 
1979-1989 against USSR troops and ―the world-dominating Afghan heroin trade‖ 
(Scott, 2007: 74). It has also been one of the driving forces behind US involvement in 
Central Asia. Four years before 9/11, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security 
Advisor (NSA) during the Carter administration, argued that the US needed to gain 
unrestricted access to Central Asia‘s huge oil resources. The vital importance of this 
region to US interests led Brzezinski to contend that a military operation, or at least 
locating military bases in the region, would be unavoidable to control Caspian oil. 
However, he acknowledged that such a policy necessitated a strong domestic consensus 
that was impossible ―except in the circumstances of a truly massive and widely 
perceived direct external threat‖ (cited in McMurtry, 2007: 136; Griffin, 2007: 16). 
However, 9/11 provided the environment for Bush II to put the plan into practice. 
In line with its strategy, the US‘s desire to take control over world oil reserves and its 
transportation routes from the Gulf and Central Asia became more important in its 
unipolar moment . On the one hand, without an abundant supply of oil, America would 
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not be able to project its military power globally (Lobe, 2003). History tells us that ―one 
of the main reasons for Germany‘s defeat in WWI was due to its lack of crude oil‖ 
(Clark, 2005: 69). On the other hand, the geo-politics of oil changed considerably after 
the 1990-91 Gulf war: not only did the world consumption of oil increase but (Morse & 
Richard, 2002: 22): 
the increase in the US share of oil market, in terms of trade, was higher than the 
total oil consumption in any other country, save China and Japan. The US 
increase in imports accounts for more than a third of the total increase in oil 
trade and more than half of the total increase in OPEC‘s production.  
In this light, Pepe Escobar argues: ―[a] war against terrorism? Not really. Reminder: it‘s 
all about oil‖ (2002), while T. V. Paul (2005) suggests that besides terrorism, the US 
hegemonic strategy in Iraq was pushed by the state‘s increasing demand for oil. Neil 
Smith argues that ―the oil is clearly a central calculation in the decision to invade Iraq 
and toppling Saddam Hussein‖ (2005b: 24). Once the administration turned to invade 
Iraq, Dreyfus contended that Bush was continuing the geo-strategy of 1975 that 
advocated the invasion of the Persian Gulf to control its oil resources (Clark, 2005).  
In this milieu, while it might be true that 9/11 legitimated and facilitated the US strategy 
to go to war in order to control world oil, this strategy was also energized by the 
inclination of the Bush II administration. There was a close link between the Bush 
administration‘s key officials and the US oil industry sector, including the president 
himself and Vice President Cheney. For instance, Enron was the largest contributor to 
the Bush‘s presidential campaign of 2000. Furthermore, the oil lobby was, and still is, a 
very influential actor in AFP-making process and has a large impact on both Congress 
and the executive. However, as Bromley (2005) argues, the US economic hegemony 
and the control over oil may also be seen as a counterpart of the project of America‘s 
post-CW military predominance.  
Certainly, as shown in the report of the National Energy Policy Development Group 
(NEPDG) released on 17 May 2001, the Bush administration strategy to secure an oil 
supply from foreign sources appeared prior to 9/11 (Klare, 2003; Moens, 2004).
1
 The 
                                                          
1
 ―One of the first officials to meet with Vice President Cheney‘s energy task force (the National Energy Policy 
Development Group ... [was] James Rouse, the vice president of ExxonMobil and a large financial donor to the Bush-
Cheney presidential campaign. Several days later, Kenneth Lay, the CEO of Enron, meets with the group‖ (History 
commons, 2001). 
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main objective of the report, also known as the Cheney report, was to put forward a 
clear strategy to meet the increasing US demand on petroleum over the next 25 years. 
The report states that the US demand for oil imports would rapidly increase from 52% 
of its total energy consumption in 2001 to nearly 66% in 2020. Furthermore, the US‘ 
2001 consumption of 10.4 million barrels per day (b/d) would expand to 16.7 million 
b/d by 2020 (Callinicos, 2002; Klare, 2003). For this reason, the report ―calls on the 
White House to make the pursuit of increased oil imports a priority of ... [America‘s] 
trade and foreign policy‖ (cited in Klare, 2003: 54). The Pentagon‘s Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) Report of September 2001 stated that the US and its ―allies and 
friends will continue to depend on the energy resources of the Middle East‖ (cited in 
Klare, 2003: 54). However, as discussed in chapter three, the US, as the unipolar power 
and the global hegemon, needed to secure its oil supply and also to ensure that other 
powers were kept out of the area. This was an essential strategy to sustain its hegemony 
(Volkov, 2003).  
As it turned out, the US‘ need for oil was greater than that predicted in the Cheney 
report. Contrary to the report‘s expectation, the US‘ consumption rose to 20 million b/d 
in 2004 or around one quarter of the world‘s total consumption of approximately 82 
million b/d (Clark, 2005). Consequently, its dependence on imported oil was set to 
increase ―from about half to two-thirds of its consumption by 2020‖ (Billon & Khatib, 
2004: 115). According to Morse and Richard (2002) and Clark (2005), by 2020 the 
world‘s oil consumption would increase by 50% to reach about 120 million b/d. The oil 
consumption of the Asian economies, including China, was forecast to equal that of the 
US: 25% of the world‘s energy. Western Europe will follow with 18%; Eastern 
Europe‘s and the former Soviet Union‘s consumption will remain slightly lower at 13%; 
and Latin America will consume just 5%. However, Europe‘s dependence on imported 
oil will probably increase from 70% to 90% of its consumption by 2030 whereas India, 
China, Japan and other Asian countries‘ dependence on Gulf oil ―will also rise 
significantly and the Asian demand in oil is to overtake the European and North 
American respective demands by 2010‖ (Billon & Khatib, 2004: 114- 115). That is to 
say, sooner rather than later the world will not only witness a scarcity in oil supply, but 
also the demand for oil of potential rivals such as China and the EU will increase to 
unprecedented levels.  
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Therefore, if one asks why were Afghanistan and Iraq targeted and at that particular 
time, the answer does not only lie in defeating terrorism but also in securing oil and 
deterring potential rivals. The run-up to the WoT ―most probably stimulated a jump in 
precautionary stock-building‖ (Williams, 2006: 1080). If China‘s apparent oil demand 
rose to an unprecedented monthly average high of 5.52 million daily barrels in January 
2003‖ (Williams, 2006: 1080) the US will not be able to wait. It is another preemptive 
strike.  
Central Asia‘s oil and gas were also seen as an additional source of supply for America 
after the CW. Since 1998, a vice president of Unocal with close ties to the Bush family, 
was enthusiastic about establishing a 1,040 mile pipeline between Turkmenistan and 
Pakistan and called on Congress to support regional and world attempts to achieve this 
proposal. If such a dream was seen impossible in the late 1990s due to geo-political 
obstacles, the invasion of Afghanistan ―has made all Unocal‘s wishes accessible‖ 
(Young, 2003: 24). Escobar rejoices that ―pipelineistan is the golden future: a paradise 
of opportunity in the form of US$5 trillion of oil and gas in the Caspian basin and the 
former Soviet republics of Central Asia‖ (2002). As Escobar (2002) explains: 
In Washington‘s global petrostrategy, this is supposed to be the end of 
America‘s oil dependence on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) ... The Caspian states hold at least 200 billion barrels of oil, 
and Central Asia has 6.6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas just begging to be 
exploited. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are two major producers: 
Turkmenistan is nothing less than a ‗gas republic‘.  
Certainly, if the US succeeded in this task, Central Asia would guarantee an additional 
source to its oil supply, and increased its importance in oil politics. In line with 
Escobar‘s view, the NEPDG‘s report released on 17 May 2001 asserted that the access 
to Central Asia‘s reserves would actually reduce America‘s dependence on Middle 
Eastern oil (Klare, 2003). At the time, one quarter of the US‘s imported oil came from 
the Middle East (Morse & Richard, 2002). Saudi Arabia alone supplied ―around 1.7 
mb/d of the roughly 10m b/d imported into the United States‖ immediately after 9/11 
(Morse & Richard, 2002: 21). For this reason, Central Asian oil was very important to 
the US in order diversify its energy supply and to marginalise the Middle East 
producers. This is why Simon Tisdall was confident that the US would not leave 
Afghanistan soon because its ―potential benefits … are enormous: growing military 
hegemony in one of the few parts of the world not already under Washington‘s sway … 
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and grail of holy grails—access to the fabulous non-OPEC oil and gas wealth of central 
Asia‖ (cited in Young, 2003: 24).  
However, those like Escobar (2002) who suggested that the US would depend on 
Central Asia‘s oil as an alternative to the Middle East‘s were mistaken. The US invasion 
of Iraq and its intention to control the region‘s natural resources demonstrated that the 
US did not really intend the pipeline from Afghanistan to be an alternative to its supply 
from the Gulf, but rather it was seen as a complementary effort to control the whole 
world oil reserves (Volkov, 2003). The US will not exclude the Middle East from its 
petroleum strategy, at least, in the near future. Put simply, the Persian Gulf remains the 
pivotal centre of the world‘s petroleum industry as it contains about 65% of the world‘s 
known oil reserves, up to 34% of the world‘s natural gas reserves and accounts for 
nearly 30% of the world‘s output of each (Morse & Richard, 2002; Everest, 2004; 
Billon & Khatib, 2004).  
Accordingly, the following provides part of the answer to the question, why Iraq? 
(Dunn, 2003: 280): 
Iraq‘s oil reserves are the second largest in the world, with a value of $3,400 
billion (at $25 per barrel), its actual output is relatively small. Iraq has the 
lowest yield of any major producer, amounting to 0.8 per cent of its potential 
output, or 3 per cent of global output, due to the geology of the oil fields and the 
technology available to exploit the resource.  
Accordingly, the US invaded Iraq not only to secure the flow of oil from the region 
(about 24% of its consumption), but also to gain control of over 65% of the world‘s oil 
reserves (Morse & Richard, 2002). This region with its huge reserves cannot be opened 
to the US‘s rivals. If the oil is regarded to be a geo-strategic commodity to the US, the 
Middle East is therefore a vital region to its core interests (Clark, 2005).  
Oil and gas were not the only potential economic concerns in the WoT; Central Asia‘s 
huge supply of other raw materials was another important aspect. These raw materials 
include iron, copper, coal, phosphor, tungsten, zinc, uranium, silver and gold (Escobar, 
2002; Stahel, 2010). Americans knew that the USSR discovered and exploited large 
amounts of raw materials in Afghanistan during the occupation of the 1980s. Following 
its military operation, the US conducted several geological surveys. The results were 
significant. Apart from Central Asia‘s oil and gas, in Afghanistan alone there are 
Chapter Five: 9/11, The War On Terror And The Continuation Of Us Global Hegemony Strategy 
228 
 
―deposits of raw materials and minerals ... Afghanistan [also] has deposits of rare metals 
which are vital for electronics and currently only found in China‖ (Stahel, 2010). The 
most important resources in Afghanistan are situated in the east and the south east 
where the US troops are operating and the major military bases are located. The 
American presence in these parts of Afghanistan is commonly justified by the existence 
of the Taleban resistance. However, this has aroused several scholars‘ suspicions. For 
example, Stahel (2010) suggests: 
Could it be that this is not the true reason for these bases to be built? Is it 
possible that the bases have enabled the US to take over the mineral deposits so 
that they can be exploited by American companies later on? If this hypothesis is 
true, then the European states whose troops are not stationed in the mentioned 
regions have been deceived by the war and the nation-building rhetoric in 
Afghanistan. Possibly, some states are confidants of the US and will have their 
share in the future exploitation! In this case, NATO‘s Afghanistan war would 
mean nothing else than theft on a geo-political scale! 
Furthermore, the war was also related to competition between the US dollar and the 
EU‘s euro. According to Clark (2005), when the euro emerged in 1999, numerous EU 
key policy-makers and bankers tried to convince major US dollar holders such as 
Russia, China and the OPEC members to change a portion of their reserves to the euro. 
When the US dollar dropped prior to the war, Iraq and other countries such as Russia 
and China unloaded dollars and bought euros, resulting in a devaluation of the US 
dollar. The war on Iraq therefore ―was not about Saddam Hussein‘s old WMD program 
or the war on terrorism, it was the threat that other members of OPEC would follow Iraq 
and shift to a petroeuro system, thereby eroding the dollars‘ dominant role in global 
economy‖ (Clark, 2005: 38). If this had occurred, it would have affected not only US 
currency but also its predominant position in the world (economically and politically). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the war on Iraq ended the feverish efforts of several 
OPEC members to turn to the euro instead of the US dollar (Clark, 2005). 
5.3.7.2. A Geo-Political Approach: Killing Two Birds With One Stone 
The Bush government was ―seeking to carry through a political and economic 
reorganization of the world in the interests of American ... [hegemony]‖ (Volkov, 
2003). As stated above, oil and economic interests are vital to the US but this is only 
one aspect of the WoT‘s agenda.  
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It is unnecessary to repeat the discussion that 9/11 offered the US an opportunity it 
could not miss and gave it the pretext to advance its hegemonic project that started 
immediately with the end of the CW. However, without doubt, Afghanistan ―was the 
test bed‖ (Ullman, 2006: 31) in the American strategy of hegemony. As discussed in the 
third chapter, while the US enjoyed a dominant military, economy and political 
presence in Western Europe and Japan after WWII, it lacked such a geo-strategic 
dominion in other vital areas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central and 
Southeast Asia. However, as previously stated, the US gained a geo-strategic position in 
Eastern Europe after the former Yugoslavia crisis. If its presence in Central and Eastern 
Europe was seen as sufficient to keep other powers in the region in check, its presence 
in the Middle East and Asia did not serve its hegemonic agenda. Therefore, the US was 
in an urgent need to directly control the Gulf region and Central Asia for geo-strategic 
reasons. This objective, as referred to previously, was clearly stated in a number of 
governmental and non-governmental documents in the 1990s. Building on such 
analysis, the establishment of the US post-CW hegemonic system at this time required 
new modifications to the US global strategy to fit the new international environment. 
Without the projection of unmatchable American sources of power highlighted in the 
second chapter, this modification would not have been possible (Murden, 2002; 
Callinicos, 2003; Barry, 2003). In this context, if 9/11 was the justification for the US 
hegemonic project, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were and still are just the practical 
steps towards such an objective (Parmar, 2005).  
If the US intervention in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s gave it a geo-strategic 
position between Russia to the north, China to the east, and Europe to the west, 
according to Cakmak, the war on Afghanistan was needed because the region was 
almost the only missing part of the US post-CW predominance (2003: 5): 
Afghanistan occupies a strategic position in the geopolitical landscapes in 
general, [see figure no. 5.1] and the geopolitics of the oil and natural gas 
resources in particular. Afghanistan has been in an extremely significant 
location spanning South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.  
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Figure5.1The Location of Afghanistan in Central Asia 
http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DA25Ag01.html 
Moreover, in contrast to those who argue that regime change in Iraq was due to 9/11, 
the discussion above shows the invasion of Iraq was part of the US bureaucrats‘ agenda 
since the early 1990s. In this vein, the former director for the Persian Gulf Affairs in the 
NSC during the Clinton administration, Kenneth Pollack, argued that the US ―has an 
interest in maintaining military access to the Persian Gulf because of the region‘s 
geostrategically critical location, near the Middle-East, Central Asia, eastern Africa, and 
South Asia‖ (cited in Fraser, 2009: 210). Therefore, regime change in Iraq was ―a top 
priority of the Bush administration from its first day‖ (Peceny, 2006: 230). This was the 
practical dimension to the neo-cons‘ proposal of the Project for the New American 
Century (2000: 14): 
The United States has sought for decades to play a more permanent role in Gulf 
regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the 
immediate justification, the need for a substantial American forces presence in 
the Gulf transcends the issue of regime change of Saddam Hussein.  
Accordingly, the US project in the Middle East ―aimed at dominating and controlling 
this crossroads between Europe, Africa and Asia with 60 percent of the world‘s oil 
reserves [see figure no. 5.2]‖ (Everest, 2004). If this is the case, then Iraq was ―the 
greatest asset‖ (Murden, 2002: 58) for the US hegemonic agenda in the region. 
Likewise, in Central Asia the aim was to use 9/11 as a pretext to extend American 
military presence and direct political influence ―where before it had had hardly any 
influence at all‖ (Cox, 2002a: 271). In consequence, just as the war on Afghanistan was 
the first test case of the US unilateral hegemony strategy, ―the Iraq war came to be the 
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test case of the ‗new‘ Bush strategy of preventative war (Nye, 2003; Clark, 2006). If 
this is true, then both Iraq and Afghanistan were the missing parts that would link US 
presence in Europe to its presence in east and south-east Asia. The invasion of these two 
countries enabled the US to consolidate its ring around the world.   
 
Figure5.2 The Location of Iraq 
Source: http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/iq.htm 
On these grounds, immediately following 9/11, the US acquired new military bases in 
several ex-Soviet countries and quickly signed treaties with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan to ―lease military bases and use … their air space for the military 
campaign in Afghanistan‖ (Rashid, 2003: 119). Accordingly, ―as early as 5 October 
2001, the United States secured permission to establish a military base at Khanabad in 
southern Uzbekistan ... [that] ultimately housed between 2,000 and 5,000 US troops‖. 
As well as ―in December 2001, the United States established the Manas air base outside 
the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek‖ (Cornell, 2004: 240). Geo-strategic experts such as 
Klare (2003) argue that the US would try to make permanent a number of its temporary 
military bases that were established post-9/11 in the Caucasus and central Asia. 
This was a true turning point in the advancement of the US hegemonic strategy because 
it is the first time that the US ―has placed its military forces in such close proximity to 
the borders of Russia and China, both of which consider central Asia as part of their 
sphere of influence‖ (Rashid, 2003: 119). This new position gave the US a unique geo-
strategic advantage to keep regional powers in check. In addition to Russia and China, 
there are also Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia and India and the former Soviet Republics (Cox, 
2002a). China, for instance, is suspicious that the US military existence around its 
borders will affect its security and allow Americans to intervene in its internal affairs 
(Dhar, 2010). Therefore, the war on Afghanistan not only enabled the US to fight 
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against terrorism, but also gave it a ―setting over [a] strategic landscape‖ (Cakmak, 
2003: 5). The Pentagon, in this context, has gained since 9/11, ―military tent cities have 
sprung up at thirteen locations in nine countries neighbouring Afghanistan; more than 
sixty thousand US military personnel now live and work at these forward bases‖ 
(Jackson, 2005: 11).  
Just as the war on Afghanistan was conducted to give the US additional geo-strategic 
presence, the war on Iraq was also conducted to remake the region geo-politically 
(Crocker, 2005). As Paterson et al. argue, ―to build a new pillar of US power in the 
Middle-East ... [by] replacing Saudi Arabia with a democratic Iraq that was friendly to 
Israel, harboured no terrorists, and could pump oil for the world economy at the right 
price‖ (2010: 490).  
In this context, after 1991 ―the Israeli demands for regime change in Baghdad‖ were 
another factor that led to the 2003 war (Falk, 2007: 124). ―The removal of Iraqi support 
for the suicide bombers in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict could also pave the way for a 
settlement there‖ (Dunn, 2003: 290), which is what Kissinger argues: ―the road to 
Jerusalem goes through Baghdad‖ (cited in Dunn, 2003: 290). This approach would also 
support the establishment of Israel as the Jewish home country, which has been part of 
the US‘s long-standing policy in the region (Watkin, 1997; Murdson, 2002). 
Interestingly, in contrast to the conclusion in the previous chapter that the influence of 
interest groups over AFP-making process declined in the post-9/11 era, Mearsheimer 
and Walt (2006) argue that the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) 
played a crucial role in designing and supporting the war on Iraq. Such a view also 
found support amongst a wide spectrum of the Arab street and elite. The 2003 war, as 
they suggested, was a clear message from the neo-cons that whoever attacks Israel, as 
Saddam had done in 1991, will face the same fate.  
Iraq will not be ―the final chapter - it‘s the opening chapter... defence consultant John 
Pike says of Richard Perle and his ilk‖ (Callinicos, 2002). Therefore, preventive war 
was supposed to be extended to the remaining two axis of evil countries, Iran and North 
Korea, plus Syria, among others (Thies, 2006). In this context, on 14 April 2003, the 
then Secretary of State Colin Powell called on Syria to change its behaviour and actions 
or it ―might be subject to measures of a diplomatic, economic, or other nature‖ (cited in 
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Theis, 2006: 204). The US presence in Iraq not only put Syria and Iran in check, but 
also gave the US unprecedented influence in the whole region (Peceny, 2006).  
However, this is not the full picture; the effects of the Iraqi occupation exceeded the 
boundaries of Middle East. It served the US long-term strategic objective of remaking 
the world order, preserving unipolarity and prohibiting the potential rise of any new 
rival. Although key European states, such as Germany, France, and Belgium opposed 
the war, geo-politically, this action served the US strategy. It divided the EU—its most 
likely mid-term rival—into two camps: new and old Europe (Szabo, 2004; Daalder & 
Lindsay, 2005b; Gardner, 2005; Western, 2006). This division weakened European 
efforts to build their own independent political, defence and security body that could 
have undermined the regional and global role of the US (Chace, 2003). It also raised the 
importance of Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland to the US geo-strategy vis-à-vis its CW 
traditional allies, France and Germany. Close military cooperation with these new allies 
gave the US an important presence near Russia (the other mid-term potential rival to the 
US unipolarity), a foothold on the Black Sea, a vital transit point for oil and gas, and 
was operationally significant for the war in Iraq (Rhodes, 2004; Linden, 2007). In this 
context, ―the Graf Ignatievo and Burgas airfields in Bulgaria, together with the 
Constanza base in Romania, served US needs in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars‖ 
(Cornell, 2004: 241) more than its traditional bases in Germany (see figure 5.3). Thus, 
the US geo-strategic presence was boosted in Eastern Europe and the significance of old 
Europe in US grand strategy diminished.
1
  
                                                          
1
 In this context, Josef Joffe, editor of Die Zeit, also understood France and Germany‘s opposition to the 
war in the context of balancing against the US. Their resistance was not actually because of Saddam 
Hussein or Iraq, but they ―feared another swift military victory that would further certify the global 
primacy of the United States‖ (Rhodes, 2004: 425). France and Germany‘s opposition to the war was also 
extended to the transatlantic organisations when they blocked the US request to deploy NATO‘s AWAC 
planes and patriot missiles to defend Turkey during the war (Szabo, 2004; Daalder & Lindsay, 2005b; 
Gardner, 2005; Paul, 2005; Western, 2006). However, Germany did not deny the US ―the air bases and 
other facilities it needs to reinforce and supply American forces in the theatre of operation (Ayoob, 2003: 
31). Similar to the 1990s, there was no single power or coalition of powers that was able to 
counterbalance the US at the time. Seen in this light, France and Germany preferred America to go to war 
alone as this would undermine the US morally, and erode its military power. Thus, the US‘s involvement 
in Iraq could help other powers to balance against it (Ayoob, 2003). 
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Figure 5. 3The Black Sea Region 
Source: http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl 
The Afghanistan war provided an opportunity to limit the influence of Russia and China 
in central Asia and undermined both China and Russia from becoming rivals to the US. 
As discussed in the third chapter, the 1990s showed that China was still a developing 
country and was not ready to become a major pole in the international environment. 
However, US strategists maintained that China was preparing itself to become a 
regional hegemon in the Asian-Pacific region, as well as a potential rival to the US 
(Laliberte, 2006; Ullman, 2006). 
The Bush II administration changed the category of China from being a ―strategic 
partner‖ to that of a ―strategic competitor‖ (Nye, 2003: 61). For American officials, 
―long-term hegemony may be challenged not only by military force, but also by its 
changing position in international trade, its growing deficit spending and a challenge to 
the supremacy of the dollar‖ (Putzel, 2006: 77). Between 2000 and 9/11, a number of 
these economic factors began to appear as a consequence of Bush‘s policies. The 
―budget deficit, after having been eliminated in 2000, reached almost $500 billion  with 
the tax and spending decisions of the Bush administration since it took office in January 
2001‖ (Putzel, 2006: 77). Moreover, ―Beijing had a $124 billion trade surplus with the 
US in 2003‖ (Laliberte, 2006: 170). US officials were concerned that rapid economic 
growth in China would sooner rather than later facilitate its ambition to be a military 
competitor to the US (see figure 5.4). In this context, ―with the emphasis on rebuilding 
ground forces that are so actively engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Chinese threat is 
the basis for rationalising air and naval forces‖ (Ullman, 2006: 38). 
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Figure5.4 Official Chinese Military Budget, Selected years (in billions of US dollar) 
Data from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm; 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget-actual.htm 
 
According to Benjian (2001), the US used the cards of Taiwan and Japan to influence 
and contain China. Thus, the protection of Taiwan was amongst Washington‘s top 
priorities in the region. The figures show that between 2002 and 2003, the US 
―delivered $4.5billion in arms‖ to Taiwan (Gurtov, 2006: 293). However, more 
importantly, after 9/11 the US found an opportunity to put China under more direct 
pressure: first, when US troops gained bases in Central Asia; and second when the US 
gained control of the Middle East. Central Asia and the Middle East were and remain of 
great significance to Chinese interests as sources for oil, gas and other raw materials 
required to fuel its rapid economic growth. The presence of the US in the Gulf means 
that, for the foreseeable future, China will be reliant on American military forces to 
protect its oil supply. According to Yiwei Wang, this ―will limit China‘s geo-strategic 
freedom of choice, especially over the Taiwan issue‖ (2004: 147). Thus, Chinese access 
to both regions and its influence especially in the Middle East have been limited. 
Furthermore, China did not show itself to be a responsible power in the UNSC‘s vote 
over the Iraq war. These issues all would not only affect its interests, but will also 
eclipse its soft power (Wang, 2004). For this reason, Irene L Gendzier argues that the 
―expanded American presence in Iraq and the eastern Arab world assured Washington 
of the means to prepare for greater challenges from an eastward direction which explain 
the reallocation of US forces from Europe to points of the Middle East‖ (2006: 182). 
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The war on Iraq also targeted Russia. Although, Russia as a big oil producer (unlike 
China) was not reliant on the supply oil from the region, its oil companies discussed and 
signed contracts with Iraq to expand their share in the region‘s hydrocarbon sector. One 
such agreement was signed in 1997 by Lukoil to develop the West Qurana field which 
contained reserves of roughly 15 billion barrels. Furthermore, Russia was a key trade 
partner with Iraq under the UN Oil for Food plan. Russian companies made huge profits 
from exporting goods prior to 2003—about $7.7 billion according to some estimates. 
Russia also owed Iraq US$8 billion from the Soviet era (Katz, 2003; Golan, 2004). 
These factors were undermined by the invasion of Iraq, but this is not the whole story. 
The Russian economy, as said in the second chapter depends on a single commodity, oil 
(Nye, 2007), and according to Dumbrell (2005) among the US objectives of its war in 
Iraq was to offer oil in reasonable prices to the Western consumers, which if 
implemented would negatively affect the Russian economy. As Katz points out ―a $1 
rise or fall in the price of a barrel of oil leads to a corresponding rise or fall of 0.35 
percent in the Russian GDP‖ (2003: 49). Equally if not more important, other Russian 
interests in the region were at stake. Iraq was one of the largest Arab buyers of Russian 
military equipment prior to UN sanctions in the early 1990s. The war would change the 
region‘s direction to the US and other major weapons producers. Russia not only lost its 
foothold in the region, but also lost its soft power in the Middle East. America‘s war on 
Iraq put Syria to the east and Iran to the west in check, in addition to other historical 
partners of Russia in the region such as Libya and Sudan.  
On a macro-level analysis, while the WoT helped to secure the US oil supply, the most 
important objective was to weaken potential competitors of the US in Europe and Asia. 
In the US unipolar moment, these potential competitors should be ―subjected to the will 
of the American corporate and political elite‖ (Volkov, 2003). In this context, the WoT 
was about control. If the US controlled the supply of oil that was of major importance to 
its potential rivals such as China, Japan, and the EU, Washington would be able to 
undermine the wishes of these potential competitors to be free from its influence. Thus, 
the war in Iraq was on the surface merely a war on Iraq, but its hidden agenda was a 
pre-emptive war to maintain America‘s unipolar moment. ―The Iraq war itself, meant as 
it was to ‗shock and awe‘ the world and particularly US adversaries‖ (Danner, 2003). In 
this context, it can be understood why powers, such as France and Germany, resisted 
US plans to invade Iraq (Clark, 2003; Volkov, 2003). 
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After all, prior to 9/11, ―nearly 80% of US forces in Europe remain in Germany, while 
three-quarters of US troops in Asia are deployed at bases in Japan and South Korea‖ 
(Cornell, 2004: 241). 9/11 and the WoT allowed the redeployment of these troops to 
Central Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, in 2005, about 386,000 troops were 
stationed and operated in foreign lands (Kane, 2006). This huge number gave the US a 
unique opportunity to intervene in every corner around the world. The WoT served the 
US strategy of hegemony in several ways. First, by establishing control in the Middle 
Easr, about 60% of the whole world‘s certain oil reserves have come under its unilateral 
control, in addition to central Asia‘s huge reserves, while simultaneously depriving 
other powers, particularly, Russia and China of a similar advantage (Fraser, 2009). The 
US also bridged the gap between its geo-strategic presence in Europe and in Southeast 
Asia, which means that no point in today‘s world is untouched by the US geo-strategic 
presence (see figure no. 5.5). 
 
Figure 5. 5 US Military Presence Worldwide (2001-2003) 
Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5564 
Therefore, it has ―become clear the War against Terror is not really about terror, and the 
war on Iraq not only about oil. It is about superpower‘s self-destructive impulse toward 
supremacy, stranglehold, [and] global hegemony‖ (Roy, 2004: 34). It ―aimed at 
redrawing the world‘s geopolitical map in order to extend, strengthen and solidify US 
imperial dominance‖ (Everest, 2004). In other words, it was ―the official emergence of 
the United States as a full-fledged global empire‖ (Bookman, 2002). It is true that the 
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US government discourse has entirely avoided using terms such as hegemon, empire, 
imperialism or even global dominance; however, this does not change the reality of the 
situation.
1
  
If it was not a war for hegemony and predominance, Bookman questions, why did the 
administration rush into war and ―dismissed the option of containing and deterring Iraq‖ 
(2002). If the US war was not a hegemonic war, why it was not designed to be a limited 
war? And ―why does the administration seem unconcerned about an exit strategy from 
Iraq once Saddam is toppled? Equally, if not more important, why is that the US ―will 
create permanent military bases in that country‖. The former Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, in an interview on 27 September 2002, ―brushed aside that suggestion, noting 
that the United States does not covet other nations‘ territory‖. However, Bookman 
remarks: ―that may be true, but 57 years after World War II ended, we still have major 
bases in Germany and Japan. We will do the same in Iraq‖. The US turned from 
containment to pre-emption, ―because even if it worked, containment and deterrence 
would not allow the expansion of American power. Besides, they are beneath us as an 
empire. Rome did not stoop to containment; it conquered‖ (Bookman, 2002). In this 
way, it is needless to recall the Project for the New American Century‘s 2000 called for 
a constant military presence in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq (Griffin, 2007; 
Tunander, 2007). 
5.4. Conclusion 
The previous chapter showed that 9/11 enabled AFP‘s to overcome the domestic 
divisons that had undermined it since the EoCW by rallying the nation round the flag. 
This chapter shows that 9/11 did not change the fundamental direction of AFP strategy 
and the post-9/11 policy cannot be separated from the context of AFP since WWII.   
9/11 united America allowing AFP bureaucrats to regain their supremacy in policy- 
making. Some of those who were in the US cabinet in September 2001 had laid out a 
clear strategy for the post-CW world from the early 1990s, but prior to this date they 
                                                          
1
 On 28 April 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, reacted angrily when Aljazeera 
asked him, whether the Iraq invasion was part of an American imperialist project. He answered that 
America was not imperialistic. This answer was a ―fine answer for public consumption. The problem is 
that it isn‘t true‖ (Boot, 2003:). 
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lacked the pretext for its full implementation. Therefore, 9/11 was the kind of event they 
required not only to legitimate their proposals to deal with international affairs, but also 
to unite America, mobilise the public, increase military spending, and deploy US troops 
in every single corner of the world. For this reason, 9/11 was portrayed as an 
unprecedented threat that enabled a change in AFP and international relations.  
However, in contrast to this approach, this chapter shows that what happened in 9/11 
was a terrorist attack carried out by a terrorist organisation. Yes, it was the worst, but 
not the first. Furthermore, this terrorist attack was deliberately exaggerated to be a 
declaration of war. The description was used in order to serve a hidden agenda. This is 
not a conspiratorial perspective, but it has been said by the US policy-makers 
themselves during the first 36 hours after the attack as journalist Bob Woodward 
asserts. This also reveals that America was in urgent need to such action, and such an 
inspiration was clearly stated in the PNAC‘s 2000 document. In order to influence 
public opinion, the attack was framed as a new Pearl Harbour, and the US response to it 
portrayed as a just war. The objective of remaking the world order that appeared at the 
EoCW was presented with a unique opportunity to be implemented. Furthermore, 
America, in contrast to the early 1990s, was now in a position to take advantage of the 
opportunity. Therefore, the attacks of 9/11 were portrayed as a war on America, creating 
the conditions for the US response to be designed as a global war against all terrorists. 
Therefore, the US moved rapidly to war without considering other options, without 
identifying clear objectives, without determining a suitable time-frame to end the war, 
and without charting any exit strategy. The open-ended nature of the war suited the 
establishment of US hegemony. Therefore, 9/11 served US policy-makers because it 
created a climate of fear that allowed the Bush administration to mobilise American 
citizens to support the US military operation abroad in order to fulfil the hidden agenda 
of expanding America‘s geo-strategic presence.  
However, 9/11 changed nothing in international politics and AFP. The American 
response to 9/11 was unsurprising given the imbalance in international power at the 
time. A hegemonic power usually works to aggrandize its comprehensive predominance 
at the expense of other potential challengers when the political conditions allow it to do 
so. In this context, it would be so difficult to accept the argument that 9/11 changed 
everything and the post-9/11 hegemonic policy was only a response to the events 
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themselves. The comparison between 9/11 and 11/9 in terms of facilitating the 
establishment of the US hegemony is not entirely accurate. This thesis argues that 
without the EoCW, the US would be unable to respond to 9/11 as it did. From a geo-
political viewpoint, the EoCW removed the main challenger to the US. The world 
political system became unipolar rather than bipolar, enabling the US to enjoy an 
unchallengeable position. Thus in this context, 9/11 changed nothing: the US‘ global 
position was not affected, while the international structure remained the same as during 
the 1990s.  
However, domestically, 9/11 offered America the necessary shock to overcome the 
political divisions of the 1990s. Internationally, it gave the US the necessary pretext to 
pursue its unilateralist and hegemonic agenda without considering its allies or 
international institutions. Therefore, the post-CW strategy that was initially pursued 
under difficult domestic political circumstances acquired moral legitimacy and political 
support after 9/11. Thus, 9/11 was a pretext to initiate the WoT that served the US grand 
strategy of the post-CW era. However, the real opportunity that allowed the US to do 
this was the EoCW and the demise of the USSR. 
By stating that 9/11 was an unprecedented threat to America, the government 
legitimated the global war which achieved America‘s geo-strategic agenda and 
institutionalised the US hegemony strategy. In this context, the Bush Doctrine that was 
implemented in post-9/11 policy was no more than a tool for expanding American 
hegemony. A large number of critics argue that this political perspective was 
unparalleled and it constituted a revolutionary change in AFP. However, the Bush 
Doctrine was built on the traditional principles of AFP. The notion that Bush‘s doctrine 
was unparalleled is no more than an exaggeration to serve US hegemonic strategy. Such 
exaggerations were needed to domestically and internationally legitimise the WoT. The 
Bush Doctrine can be distinguished form previous AFP in its style but not components. 
For example, the US unilateralism has always been a central, if not the central, element 
to AFP, while regime change has been an integral ingredient from its earliest days, as 
has the militarisation of AFP. The only thing that changed was the absence of any real 
rival or competitor to the US hegemony. This advantage offered the US an 
unprecedented opportunity to advance its unilateral and militant agenda using 9/11 as a 
licence.   
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The US response to 9/11, the WoT, targeted the terrorists and their havens, but did not 
stop there. If America‘s objectives were the destruction of al-Qaeda and the Taleban 
regime, what were the justifications for the invasion of Iraq? Putting aside the US‘ 
rhetoric in the lead up to the war, this chapter argues that the hidden agenda behind the 
WoT was US hegemony, not the struggle against global terrorism. In this context, 
regime change and the occupation of Iraq in 2003 was the end result of US policy in the 
region since the early 1990s. In this way, it is clear that all of America‘s justifications to 
go to war were founded on false allegations. Moreover, the occupation was conducted 
without a clear mandate from the UN. This illegal action produced a deep cleavage in 
the transatlantic partnership because a number of the US‘ allies understood that war on 
Iraq was a war of choice based on geo-political interests. The sole aim was to impose its 
absolute hegemony. 
Thus, this chapter argues that the US turned from its alleged WoT to a deliberately 
designed plan to establish US hegemony and global predominance. This raises the 
important question: why did the US start this project from the Middle East and Central 
Asia? First, the US, at least since the 1950s, saw the Middle East as an important area 
for its vital interests: The Middle East was a key battleground in the CW. Furthermore, 
the region from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf is also very important geo-strategically 
to the US not only because of its huge energy reserves, but also because of its location 
between the East and the West. In the third chapter this thesis showed how the US 
extended its geo-strategic presence in the post-CW era into new areas in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the post-9/11 era, the US‘s aim was to 
expand its presence in the Middle East and Central Asia. This geo-strategic expansion 
launched American geo-political influence to every corner around the globe. Because of 
this, 9/11 served the US strategy to an unimaginable extent, and that is why 9/11 was 
portrayed as war on America, and the US response was designed to be unlimited war. 
Building on such a discussion, the WoT was not only to defeat enemies, but to prevent 
other powers from controlling the Middle East and Central Asia, in order to secure the 
flow of oil and gas, and, to position itself within such a vital geo-strategic location. This 
policy was clearly adopted during US administrations from Roosevelt to Clinton, but it 
was legitimated by the attacks of 9/11.  
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The WoT not only expanded US influence in the Middle East and Asia, but also it 
divided Europe, weakened its internal unity, and raised the importance of Poland, 
Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic at the expense of traditional allies such as Germany 
and France. China also was circumvented. Its access to Central Asia restricted, and its 
interests in the Middle East were also at stake. The US now controlled most of the 
world‘s production and reserves of the strategically vital resource, oil. The WoT, in this 
context, can be seen as a pre-emptive war on the rest of the world, because oil 
consumption was increasing globally to unprecedented levels. The Cheney report of 
2001 recommended that the Bush administration secure America‘s oil supply. If the US 
controlled the supply of oil, it automatically undermined the ability of others (foes and 
allies) to become competitors to its unipolar moment. This was also true for oil-rich 
Russia, because the politics of oil is very important to the Russian economy. If the US 
tried to reduce the price of oil, the Russian economy would be deeply affected. Russia 
also lost its foothold in the region.  
Did the attack of 9/11 really change AFP? And was the WoT actually a WoT? In both 
cases the thesis has shown that the answer to both questions is an unequivocal no. AFP 
did not any show strategic shift, maintaining its traditional agenda of supremacy and 
hegemony, including the need to ensure a secure supply of natural resources, including 
oil. The WoT was not about fighting terrorism but was used as pretext to expand 
American political and military influence over the world.  
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Great grand strategies are bounded by time and space, but they also transcend time and space. They all 
arise … within particular periods, places, and sets of circumstances. 
(Gaddis, 2005: 380) 
 
Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
6.1. After The End of The Cold War (CW): America Alone 
First and foremost, the US hegemonic propensity is not new or just related to the end of 
the CW (EoCW), but it has been a preponderant characteristic in the AFP conduct, at 
least, since the end of WWII. Throughout the CW‘s harsh struggle against the 
communist geopolitical challenger, the US expanded not only its political influence 
over the rest, but also its geostrategic presence around the globe. Due to this, the US 
was seen as a hegemon not only within its sphere of influence, but eventually over wide 
parts of the world. On the grounds of such understanding, the USSR was no longer a 
military competitor unable to challenge America‘s comprehensive hegemony. In turn, 
the EoCW did not bring the American hegemonic ambition to an end because, if the 
CW ended in 1991, the US hegemonic project has continued as was during the CW. 
On the other extreme, another spectrum of some critics argue that although America 
was the strongest during the CW compared to its allies and foes alike, the existence of a 
military competitor, whatsoever its size, was in itself a realistic barrier facing the US 
absolute hegemonism over the system. This might be true, but this sort of controversy 
came to a close in the very early 1990s when the EoCW removed the hardest 
impediment which had hindered America from being a comprehensive global hegemon 
for decades. This means that the collapse of the Soviet empire has bequeathed the US an 
unprecedented opportunity to reconstruct the world‘s new order in its image, not only to 
preserve, but also to sustain its unipolar moment as much as possible ahead. Since then, 
America‘s longstanding ambition to be the world‘s sole hegemon has become true, and 
the 21
st
 century has inevitably been labelled as a new American century.  
On the grounds of such analysis, one could reasonably ask: if America was merely a 
hegemon within its sphere of influence, what would be the world‘s political landscape 
after the collapse of the USSR, its major CW competitor? Simply put: the CW‘s 
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hegemon over the West turned out to be an absolute hegemon over the rest in the post-
CW world. Arguably, when the USSR – the American CW counter-balancer - 
collapsed, the gap in the relative material power (military, political, and economic) 
between America as the only remaining superpower and the lasting big powers in the 
system increased to an incredible level as was illustrated in the second chapter. Owing 
to this, the CW‘s semi-balance of power came to an end, and the US‘ materialistic 
capabilities overweighed that possessed by the industrialised nations combined. 
Additionally, the EoCW itself revitalised the US hegemonic project since it gained 
America a strong dose of self-confidence that it had nearly lacked, particularly after 
several outer failures during the 1970s and 1980s. That is why the collapse of the 
communist global regime was portrayed as an American triumph not only over a 
geopolitical rival, but also over its aggressive ideology, economic regime, and life style. 
This victory, therefore, had to be used as an incentive for several intellectual and 
ideological elites – within and outside the government - such as conservatives, 
neoconservatives, and American nationalists to push America towards a new phase of 
preponderance and hegemony. Without any serious ―other‖ looming on the horizon, and 
with no any real challenger at the US‘ gates, its hegemonic project flourished and 
expanded, motivating by a unique collection of both hard and soft power. The US, then, 
presented itself as an indispensible nation not only to regulate the system, but also to 
enlarge democracy, liberty and prosperity.  
6.2. Obstacles Along The Road 
However, one could easily challenge the above viewpoint by arguing that if the AFP 
conduct had deeply witnessed a long decade of inconsistency and dysfunction, as 
discussed in the 1990s literature, how we would possibly be speaking about an 
emerging strategy of hegemony at the eve of the EoCW? In approaching such a 
question‘s answer, it is of crucial importance to mention that this study does not claim 
that the US American strategy of hegemony represented an explicit fully-fledged form 
or was implemented directly without difficulties prior to 9/11. The reality is that 
America was operating in a very difficult transitional era in which the old system had 
become ―an ash heap of history‖ and the new one was emerging. Under such 
circumstances, not only the world had entirely changed, but also America changed from 
within as a response to the external transformations. The EoCW, as said once and again, 
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did not only offer the US an opportunity to lead, but also produced several 
disadvantages. A crucial difference between them was its influence over the AFP‘s 
domestic political consistency. The USSR, as is well-known, had functionally worked 
as an organising principle for the AFP making process for more than four decades, and 
when such a North Star dimmed, AFP lacked its long-standing reference point.  
Owing to this, the intra-relationships between the AFP‘s decision-making actors which 
were consolidated by the long struggle against the USSR entered a new phase of change 
and transformation. Accordingly, the president was no longer capable to lead the state‘s 
FP strategy as he had during the CW, and most of his foreign policy initiatives stayed in 
the White House. In a similar way, the Congress, in contrast to its CW behaviour, 
appeared as a challenger to the presidential supreme role in the AFP making process. 
Besides, several societal actors such as ideological and ethnic groups, business lobbies, 
epistemic communities, and NGOs, among others, turned from being just peripheral 
actors during the CW to be significant agenda-setters in the post-CW era. Such a 
transition blurred the traditional distinction between what is foreign and what is 
domestic. In other words, the AFP making process became subjugated to the political 
bargaining that determined the formulation of American domestic politics. Or as some 
critics put it: the US politics did not end at the water‘s edge.  
The cleavage occurred also within the AFP institutions and bureaucratic body in which 
the Pentagon, the intelligence community, and the State and the Defense Departments 
did not witness any crucial reform process that qualified them to meet the reality of the 
post-CW world. Moreover, the majority of the AFP bureaucrats were still loyal to the 
only political thinking and heritage they knew, superpower struggle. On the other hand, 
some other agencies and departments intervened in the AFP making process as 
discussed in the fourth chapter.  
Most of these barriers appeared in the leading up to the Gulf War in 1990/91, but they 
peaked during the Clinton presidency. Therefore, the formulation of the state‘s foreign 
strategy became a matter of disagreement.   
6.3. The 1990s: The US Hegemony In Progress 
Undoubtedly, the domestic fragmentation impeded the ideal implementation of the 
strategy of hegemony, but, even with the existence of such barriers, the US did not lose 
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its bearings, or suffer from a strategic confusion between the EoCW and 9/11 as 
discussed in the third chapter. This does not mean that the US hegemony emerged as a 
fully-fledged strategy at the eve of the EoCW, but its characteristics were apparent in 
the governments‘ agenda throughout the 1990s. Consequently, it does seem sensible to 
argue that behind the 1990s‘ day-to-day fragmented policy, America was operating 
within the same strategic direction of hegemony and predominance, but with different 
techniques.  
It is no necessary to repeat what has been said about the difficulties that faced the Bush 
I administration in pursuing the strategy of American hegemony. But it would be of 
great significance to mention that, in addition to the political uncertainty that the EoCW 
produced, the early 1990s financial problems and the psychological barriers of the 
defeatist Vietnam Syndrome, the administration‘s strategic plans, also, and more 
importantly, faced the domestic partisanship and fragmentation that had distinguished 
the political landscape at the time. This is why President Bush I faced many legislative 
problems during the last two years in office and then lost the presidential elections of 
1992. 
With all of these problems, the opportunity to serve the US grand strategy of hegemony 
came with the invasion of Kuwait in 1990/91. Iraq‘s invasion was taken as a pretext to 
the establishment of the new world order (NWO) which was needed to replace the CW 
order. Putting aside the Bush administration‘s rhetoric of multilateralism and Wilsonian 
that galvanized its explicit discourse, the implicit objective was to construct a new 
world system that is suitable to the US‘ new status as the sole world hegemon in the 
post-Soviet era. On the basis of such analysis, the 1990-91 war on Iraq enhanced the US 
strategy of hegemony in several ways: Firstly, it showed the remaining big powers how 
far ahead America was in terms of military power and how difficult the 
counterbalancing against it was. As a result of the US military parade in the Gulf, the 
lasting powers in the system preferred to accommodate not to compete with the new 
reality, at least for some time ahead. Such a retreat from the competition with the US 
over the global leadership guaranteed it a semi-consensual hegemonic status over the 
system and blurred the distinction between its own interests and the interests of 
international community. That is why this war was the cheapest American war in terms 
of blood and treasury, but the greatest in terms of advancing its advantages. In this way, 
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while the war was essentially to serve the American agenda, the big share of its bill had 
been paid by its allies: Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. 
Secondly, America skilfully grouped more than thirty nations – including the big 
remaining powers - to fight under its command not only to liberate Kuwait or defeat 
Iraq, but also to expand its geostrategic presence and consolidate its global leadership 
by containing other big powers and limiting their abilities to challenge its interests in 
the unipolar moment. At the end, the US kicked off the defeatist effects of the Vietnam 
Syndrome, and enjoyed the taste of victory. This was a very important psychological 
factor allowing the only hegemon to engage militarily outside without fear of domestic 
dissatisfaction.  
Thirdly, the US found the pretext to put its foot in the Middle-East, the region vital to its 
interests in the post-CW era to secure the flow of oil to its machinery, and to limit the 
other big powers‘ involvement in the region‘s matters. After the war, armies of the other 
nations came back, while America‘s geostrategic presence regionally and globally 
increased.  
True, the Bush I administration stayed a very short period in power but even with such 
time pressure and the changing features of the moment, the administration established 
the foundations for the continuity of the US strategy of hegemony that the following 
administration had built on. This should not suggest that the administration succeeded in 
replacing the CW strategy by a fully-fledged new one. What is important for this 
research is the conviction that the hegemonic strategy did not disappear at the CW‘s 
end, or just start with the attacks of 9/11. Accordingly, the Bush I administration was 
able to overcome many obstacles which were seen as barriers facing the US hegemony 
strategy. The management of the status quo and the facilitation of the world‘s transition 
from a bipolar system to the new unipolarity was a crucial element in its achievements. 
The administration‘s capability to achieve America‘s objectives was not limited by the 
state‘s temporary weaknesses such as the early 1990s‘ financial problems and economic 
recession, the remaining psychological effects of the Vietnam Syndrome, and the 
transformative characteristics of the moment. They were real problems, but they did not 
bind the US policymakers‘ search for enhancing the US geostrategic presence. But even 
with such significant achievements, the whole characteristics of the new US grand 
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strategy of hegemony were not yet finally formed and the new American world order 
was waiting for other steps to be workable.     
Just as with the Bush I administration, the Clinton administration had also suffered from 
more difficult constraints. The threat- free environment after the EoCW and the victory 
of the Gulf war expanded cleavages over AFP agenda-setting. Therefore, it was the first 
time ever that the US president faced such barriers in terminating his foreign initiatives. 
The Congress showed a new assertive conduct in the AFP making process challenging 
the presidential supreme authority over it such as the case in the former Yugoslavian 
war or over economic issues such as the ratification of the NAFTA and the GATT 
treaties. The president had been challenged not only by a Congress that was dominated 
by the opposition party, but also by a Congress which was controlled by his own party. 
This phenomenon is unprecedented in US history. The Clinton administration faced 
both budgetary and legislative barriers. The societal actors that were interested in the 
AFP process were also more interventionist throughout the policymaking process. 
Groups such as ethnic minorities and economic lobbies were able to influence the 
administration‘s foreign agenda to serve their own agenda. The US public mood over 
foreign and security issues was also fluctuating. Due to these impediments, the Clinton 
administration‘s FP was accused of being directionless and disoriented.  
But even with such difficulties, the saying that the Clinton administration lacked any 
clear perspective to deal with the world for enhancing American position in the post-
CW era is paradoxical. The real problem was the domestic fragmentation that limited 
the administration‘s ability to work as it had planned. In a retrospective assessment, it 
does seem sensible to argue that the Clinton administration did not only follow the same 
strategy of hegemony, but also was able to prepare America for the 21
st
 century.  
First of all, the Clinton administration was able to turn course from the geopolitical 
competition with other remaining big powers to geo-economic approach. As said above, 
the Gulf War presented America as a hyper-power that no one could compete with or 
counterbalance against. On the other hand, the Clinton administration was also aware of 
the weakness that hindered its predecessor from acting freely during the Gulf War. The 
conviction was that America could not be operating as the world‘s sole hegemon 
without a strong and a vital economy which was capable of bearing this. For doing so, 
the Clinton administration intended to revitalise the US economy by the opening of the 
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whole world‘s markets to its goods and removing any remaining barriers to its foreign 
trade. The Clinton administration pursued this agenda through its influence in the UN as 
the Bush I administration did, but also through its leading role within other international 
organisations such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, among others. The turn 
to the geo-economic approach therefore was not really a sort of confusion as has been 
repeatedly portrayed, but it was a complementary technique to strengthen American 
hegemony in the post-CW era.       
As shown in chapter three, the Clinton strategy of enlargement and engagement served 
American hegemony in several ways. First of all, since the mid-1990s the US economy 
gradually returned to healthiness, and by the late 1990s, the chronic budgetary deficit, 
the foreign trade deficit with its main partners, and the unemployment rate were all 
down. And everything that should be up was also up. Due to this, the Clinton 
administration played a significant role in preparing America to be the real world 
hegemon. Secondly, in addition to its economic achievements, the administration also 
continued the same agenda of enlarging the US geopolitical presence throughout the 
world. If Bush I used the Kuwaiti invasion to enlarge American presence in the Middle-
East, the Clinton administration also expanded US influence in central and Eastern 
Europe with its humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia, and the 
democratization process in the former communist countries, and the expansion of 
NATO toward the east. Thirdly, although the administration turned to an economic 
perspective as a guide to its foreign agenda, it did not discount the politics of power in 
international affairs. In this context, the administration maintained the military 
expenditure levels of the early 1990s, and it increased it after 1994. Furthermore, the 
administration vowed to kept the US army as the best trained, the best equipped, and the 
most prepared in the world. In practice, the Clinton administration used military power 
abroad greater than any other administration after Vietnam.  On the basis of this 
understanding, it would be plausible to say that the Clinton era was not absent in AFP 
history and the whole 1990s was not a confusing decade in the AFP trajectory. 
Likewise, Bush II‘s WoT was used not only to defeat terrorism as has been repeatedly 
claimed, but it also to  maximize hegemonic and geostrategic ends.  
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6.4. 9/11 And The Continuity Of The US Hegemonic Strategy 
If the US hegemonic strategy has been in continuity since the EoCW, how can 9/11 be 
located in the context of this strategy? In approaching this question‘s answer, it would 
be argued that 9/11 served the US grand strategy of hegemony in very distinctive ways: 
First of all, if the EoCW deprived the AFP making process from its ―magnetic north 
pole‖, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 reproduced the environment of uncertainty and 
returned such a missing pole, but instead of the CW communism, Islamic terrorism 
became the new enemy 
Secondly, if the US administrations of the 1990s lacked the pretext needed for rallying 
the US public and the international community alike behind their agenda of hegemony, 
the terrorist attacks offered the US policymakers an unimaginable pretext to pursue any 
agenda they liked without fear of being criticised or resisted domestically or abroad. 
Therefore, if America was being forced to use several indirect strategies for expanding 
its influence over the rest in its unipolar moment and to engage in multilateral actions to 
accomplish that throughout the 1990s, the terrorist attacks gave it the moral justification 
to expand its dominion everywhere under the motto of fighting against the global 
terrorism. It also provided the pretext needed to escape from any multilateral constraints 
on its power.  
Thirdly and more importantly, the attacks rallied once again the nation around a grand 
objective and ended the domestic cleavage of the 1990s that hindered the 
administrations of Bush I and Clinton from terminating their complete hegemonic 
agenda. Therefore, in contrast to troubled relationships between the main participants in 
the AFP making process (the president, the congress and FP bureaucracy), 9/11 returned 
the AFP initiatives to the president hands and Congress, once again, took a backseat in 
the FP making preferring to facilitate with money and legislations, not to challenge the 
presidential supreme role as a leader of the nation. Due to this, the President was able to 
carry on the US strategy of hegemony abroad while the nation supported his leadership. 
The security concern came back as a FP priority whereas issues such as economic 
globalisation and environment politics receded in importance. In consequence, the 
domestic fragmentation which had stretched since the early 1990s and deeply affected 
the efforts to formulate a new grand strategy came to a close after the attack on the twin 
towers.  
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 On the basis of such understanding, and in contrast to those critics who have regarded 
9/11 as a radical shift in the AFP strategy, it could be argued that 9/11 served only as a 
justifier to the transition from the US‘ unwilling cooperative hegemonic model to an 
explicit unilateral hegemonic one - the approach that was promoted by a radical team of 
the US policy makers in the very early 1990s. On the other hand, the US response to 
9/11 attacks was not formulated at that time to merely defeat terrorism as has repeatedly 
been said. The general idea, in reality, was ready since the early 1990s. 9/11 attack 
offered only the pretext to start such a plan. The occupation of Iraq was proposed in the 
very early 1990s and has been repeated throughout the 1990s, and the US‘ search to put 
a foot in Central Asia and the Middle East was also scheduled since the later 1970s and 
consolidated after the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, the strategy behind the WoT 
pursued by the Bush II administration was not simply a response to 9/11, but was a 
delayed response to the EoCW that enabled America to gain its unipolar position. To 
serve this end, 9/11‘s nature was exaggerated and it was portrayed as an existential 
threat to the US. This exaggeration legitimated the response that was designed as an 
unlimited global war. Although America tried several times to establish unilateralism 
during the 1990s in support of its hegemonic agendas, the US unilateralist and militant 
age dawned after 9/11 when the US agenda was supported by unconstrained force.  
6.5. Conclusion 
During the CW the US was not a fully-fledged hegemon, but was a superpower in a 
bipolar world system. The EoCW, however, saw America adopt the status of a 
hyperpower. This new status has been reflected in AFP hegemonic strategy since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. The ability of Bush I to pursue an explicit hegemonic agenda 
was actually constrained by the psychological problem of the defeat in Vietnam, the 
weak economy and the lack of a domestic political consensus. Bush II responded 
unilaterally and militarily to the terrorist attack of 9/11because these problems had been 
overcome in the intervening years. Bush I remedied the psychological effect of the 
Vietnam Syndrome and oversaw a peaceful transition from the EoCW to the post-CW 
world. Clinton overcame the economic weaknesses that limited his predecessor‘s ability 
to act globally and set the economic foundations for its hegemonic position. This 
enabled Bush II to initiate the WoT unilaterally. While Bush I and Clinton were 
constrained by the domestic divisions over AFP strategy in attempting to pursue the 
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strategy of hegemony, 9/11 resolved the issue of domestic political fragmentation and 
legitimated the US hegemonic agenda domestically and abroad.  
Accordingly, if the war on Afghanistan was really a war of necessity, the Iraq war was 
absolutely a war of choice. 9/11 was a terrorist attack which served US hegemony, 
through a deliberate policy of exaggeration. This gave the US the moral legitimacy to 
launch the global WoT as the only possible response to 9/11 without discussing other 
alternatives.  
Therefore, AFP strategy did not experience any critical shift in the post-CW era, but 
was in line with American tradition. In this context, the war in Iraq in 1991 and the 
DPG of 1992 were clear messages to other powers that American hegemony had 
dawned; the NSS of 2002 institutionalised this hegemonic status. Just as the Iraq war of 
1991 was a test case for the American NWO, the war in Afghanistan was the test case 
for the US strategy of unilateralism in the post-CW era. Finally, in line with this 
strategy, the war in Iraq in 2003 was the test case for the pre-emptive war doctrine of 
Bush II. 
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